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PRE F ACE
When, nearly half a century ago, the Croall Trustees
invited W.L.Davidson to deliver the twentieth series of
Croall Lectures, they invited him to sum up, as far as
this was possible ,the contribution made by Gifford
Lecturers to the study of Theism. Davidson's book,
Recent Theistic Discussion, was pUblished in 1921. Since
then no further attempt has been made to assess the total
Gifford contribution to Natural Theology.
of the renewed interest in the subject
appropriate to attempt such a survey.
There did not appear to be a complete list 0 f
published works in any form. The annotated bibliography
In the light
it seemed
in Appendix 3 fills this gap and the thesis itself is an
attempt to assess the contribution of Gifford lecturers
to our understanding of Natural Theology and its present
function. Since the work W3.S begun John }1acQ.uarrie's
Twentieth-Century Religious Thought has appeared (1963 )
and although its scope and intention are different th e
fact that Gifford lecturers and their lectures find Euch
frequent mention is further evidence, if it were neeae~
of our indebtedness to Lord Gifford and his lecturers.
B.E.J.
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21. The Sick Man of Europe
In one of the many recent books dealing with the philosophical
approach to theology Natural Theology ie described as the Sick Man
of Europe1• It has been further suggested that i~ might be the
2kindest thing to let him die quietly. The patient however i& an
unconscionable long time a-dying and indeed shows remarkable powers
of resistance and recovery. Some think he will never be fit enough
for his previous employment but may recover sufficiently to take on
a less onerous task. Others seem to think he will have a better
chance of employment if he changes his name or at least the
description of his trade. Owing to the generosity of Lord Gifford
well oyer a hundred specialists have been called in during the past
seventy seven years with the express purpose of giving their attention
to natural theology in the widest sense of they-term. Only one of
these specialists, namely Karl Barth, has been prepared unreservedly
to sign a death certificate. Some of the specialists, it must be
admitted, have walked round the ward and scarcely noticed the
patient. Most however have given the careful consideration that
the case merits. It is our purpose to examine the reports given in
the published Gifford lectures, to assess the present state of
natural theology and, if possible, to offer a prognosis. Since the
time of the Reformation itching fingers have been stretching for the
bell-rope to toll the death knell of natural theology. It was then
that the disease became apparent and it may be useful initially
to glance briefly at the case history so that we can understand
what led Lord Gifford to seek further opinions and call in the
specialists.
32. Two Ways to God
Any enquiry into natural theology must begin on the Areopagus
for here we have the first confrontation, of which we have a clear
account, of that philosophy which claims that the knowledge of
God is within the purview of human reason and that religion which
claims that God can only be known fully by divine revelation.
When St. Faul addressed the Council of the Areopagus3 he appears
to have thought that his .essage was complementary to the knowledge
of religious truth enjoyed by the Athenians rather than diametrically
opposed to it. 4Similarly in his letter to the Roman church he
recognised that there was a knowledge of God available to the
gentiles even though they might not avail themselves of it. St.
Paul tells us that their reasoning led them astray. "They did not
see fit to acknowledge God,,5and so God allowed them to go their
own way. Thus the opportunity of knowing God had been given to
Jews and gentiles and they would be judged according to their
response. Not all the gentiles had failed to know God, limited
though their knowledge might be, and as the early Christian fathers
turned to the Greek writer. they found that some of their
philosophers had discovered truths about God which could not be
dismissed a. idle pagan speculation. It is quite understandable
that there should grow up the idea that just as Christianity wae
the fulfilment of the Jewish faith so also it was the completion
of Greek philosophy. There were others, like Tertullian, who
could not accept that there was any connecting link between Athens
and Jerusalem, but on the whole the view that there are two ways
of knowing God prevailed. Finally St. Thomas provided a philosophy
and a theology which embraced these two approaches to God and
established a principle which is still maintained by Roman Catholic
theologians.
The first kind of knowledge of God is either self-evident or
demonstrable from self-evident facts. Such knowledge gives
certainty of the existence of God. The second kind of knowledge
ie not demonstrable. For Aquinas it depended upon faith informed
by revelation, yet what we thus hold to be divinely revealed is
6n,ver contrary to our natural knowledge. These truths are not
accessible to unaided human reason, but nevertheless
" it i. useful for the human reason to exercise itself in
such arguments, however weak they may be, provided only that
they present no presumption to comprehend or to demonstrate.
For to be able to se, something of the loftiest realities,
however thin and weak the sight may be, is, as our previous
remarks indicate, a cause of greatest JOY."?
It appears then that this second kind of knowledge is an extension
of the first. In other words, some truths about God can be
reached by natural reason while other truths, for instance, the
doctrine of the Trinity, can only be known as proposed by God for
man'a accep4ance. There is, tor Aquinas, no unnatural break
between the two kinds of knowledge. Indeed the man of less
intellectual ability may have to travel the whole way by faith,
accepting the truths of reason and revelation alike by faith,
5because he is incapable of reasoning his way through the first
stages. On the other hand the intellectual may enter the realm
of revealed truth and revel in it providing there is no presumption
to comprehend or demonstrate.
St. Thomas recognised that through the poverty of man's
intellect "the truth about God such as reason could discover,
would only be known by a few and that after a long time, and with
8the admixture of many error.," but he did not regard the
achievement of this knowledge as an utter impossibility. He
believed that man'. knowledge of God had been impaired by the
Fall but not rendered void. God's Essence can only be known in
heaven, according to Aquinas, and man's knowledge of God before
the Fall was something between his present knowledge and the
perfect knowledge in heaven.9 It should be added that Aquinas
described a third kind of knowledge of God, "by which the human
10mind will be elevated to gaze perfectly on the things revealed" ,
but this direct vision of God is vouchsafed to the rare soul in
this life and to the redeemed in heaven.
Both Luther and Calvin agreed with St.Thomas in declaring
that there are two kinds of knowledge of God. For the reformers,
however, there is a clear break between the two kinds of knowledge.
Indeed the second kind of knowledge might be better described as
"eaving knowledge" for any intellectual truth about God it conveys
is incidental to the knowledge of salvation. This second kind
of knowledge comes through faith and efforts to reach God any
6other way are attempts to find salvation through works. Luther
writes :
" There is a double knowledge of God : general and
particular. All men have the general knowledge, namely
that there is a God, that he created heaven and earth,
that he is just, that he punisheth the wicked. But what
God thinketh of us, what his will is towards us, what he
will give or what he will do, to the end that we may be
delivered from sin and death, and be saved, (which is true
knowledge of God indeed,) this they know not."11
Luther draws the parallel between knowing about a man and having
direct knowledge of the man himself. It is possible to know a
lot about God without knowing God himself. This knowledge of
God himself can only come through Christ.
" Without Christ there is nothing else but mere idolatry,
an idle and falee imagination of God, whether it be called
Moees' law, or the Pope's ordinances, or the Turk's
Aleoran."12
The general knowledge, available to all men, is the source of
idolatry, for the knowledge that God!! led to vain imaginings
concerning his nature13•
emerging as idolatry.
For Aquinas no such risk is involved. Intellect is a gift
Any natural theology runs the risk of
of God and provides a reliable way to at least partial knowledge
of God. Fartial it may be but as far as it goes it is genuine
knowledge of God. It is perhaps because Luther's second kind of
?
knowledge give •• u8h immediacy of experience that the general
knowledge seems vain and empt1 b1 contrast. This immediac1 is
lacking iD the second kind of knowledge of St. Thomas. Indeed
in some wa1. Luther's second kind of knowledge is akin to Aqiinas's
third kind, the direct vision. Faith, ~r Luther, is far more
than the acceptance of truth about God on the authority of
revelation; it is the direct acceptance of grace. Thus natural
theologJ has little place in Luther's thought. When a man stands
in need of salvation
there is nothing more dangerous than to wander with
curioqs .peculations in heaven, and there to search out
God in hi. incomprehensible power, wisdom and majesty,
how he createth the world, and how he governeth it.
If thou seek thus to comprehend God, and wouldest pacify
him without Chri.t the Mediator, making thy works a means
b.tween him and thyself, it cannot be but thou must fall
as Lucifer did, and in horrible despair lose God and all
together. For aa God is in his own nature unmeasurable,
incomprehensible, and infinite, so he is to man's nature
14intolerabl ••"
It is interesting to note that thesenegative attributes of God
belong to the thought of Athens rather than Jerusalem. Luther
did not recognise the debt but saw natural theology as a snare
and delusion, utterly incapable of leading a man to true knowledge
of God. In spite of the lip-service paid to the general knowledge
of God, reason is described elsewhere as a harlot, or, as a variant,
8Luther tells us that "Philosophy is an old woman that stinks of
Greece" 1.5. For the reformers the Fall rendered man's general
knowledge of God almost worthless.
We find a similar ambivalent attitude towards natural
theology in Calvin's thought. On the one hand there is a knowledge
of God available to natural reason, but on the other hand such
knowledge i8 virtually useless to mau as a result of the Fall.
Because of his palsied limbs man is unable to reach beyond the
first rung of the ladder, yet because the ladder is there he is
under judgment for not climbing itl
" That there exists in the human mind, and indeed by
natural instinct, Bome sense ot Deity, we hold to be
beyond dispute, since God himself, to prevent any man
from pretending ignorance, has endued all men with some
idea of his Godhead, the memory of which he constantly
renew. and occasionally enlarges, that all to a man
being aware that there is a God, and that he is their
Maker, may be condemned by their own conscience when they
neither worship him nor consecrate their lives to his
aeryice.,,16
Even if a man is fortunate enough to reach the first rung he has
no hope of reaching the top. So Calvin continues :
" Though experience testifies that a seed of religion is
divinely sown in all, scarcely one in a hundred is found
who cherishes it in his heart, and not one in whom it
grows to maturity." 11
9The worship such men offer is unacceptable to God for they are
not worshipping the true God but "the dream and figment of their
own heart" 18. True knowledge of God can only come through the
Word of God himself and not through man's striving, however
well intentioned.
Richard Kroner in his Gifford lectures contrasted the
solutions proposed by Catholics and Protestants to the problem
posed by the dual knowledge of God in this way :
" While mediaeval catholicism had brought about a system
in which nature and grace, world and God, reason and
revelation, were integral parts, supplementing each other.
so that the whole was in perfect equilibrium in spite of the
gap between the parts, Protestantism stressed the fact of
the gap. While the catholic system reconciled the
oppositions by means of a hierarchy which mediated between
the lowest and the highest spheres in accordance with the
neoplatonic type of philosophy, Protestantism emphasized
the mission of God's word and of Christ as the only mediator
b.tween God and man, and thus generated the Kantian type
of Philosophy.,,19
Natural theology was to be aasailed later by Hume and Kant on
the grounds of the sheer inability of reason to deal with the
question of Divine Being, but thia earlier attack is directed
against reason as corrupt because of its contamination by pride.
For the reformers natural theology can neither help in leading
10
man towards a knowledge of God nor is it possible to look to
natural theology to support a theological position already
established by faith. It remained for Barth to give this view
its extreme expression. In his view the Fall rendered man utterly
incapable of doing anything for himself; the impotence of reason
even to consider the question of God is complete.
Eventually the Reformation reached Scotland and the Confessio
Scotica was proclaimed by John Knox, affirming faith in the
" ane onelie God, to whom only we must cleave, whom onelie
we must serve, whom onelie we must worship, and in whom
20onelie we must put our trust,"
and asserting that the word of God needs no external support from
reason or any other authority.
" As we beleeve and confesse the Scriptures of God sufficient
to instruct and make the man of God perfite, so do we affirme
and avow the authoritie of the same to be of God, and nether
21to depend on men nor angelis."
Religion thus depends entirely upon faith. The truths of religion
are embedded in holy scripture which needs no confirmation from
natural theology. There were still two kinds of knowledge of
God, that which could be obtained from scripture and that other
knowledge of God which came through the experience of salvation.
There was no place for any knowledge of God which was the product
of human reasoning. In support of this position there arose from
the country of John Knox the strangest of allies, who would
demonstrate on other grounds the ineffectuality of natural theology.
11
,. The Philosophical Challenge to Natural Theology
In the Dialogues concerning Natu.ral Religion, David Hums,
through the person of Philo, pOints out the weaknesses of the
traditional theistic arguments and concludes that if a man is to
have a firm foundation for his religion it must be grounded in
faith supported by divine revelation. In the absence of any
convincing proof of the existence or non-existence of uod this is
the only possible source of enlightenment. ~he Deists had been
mistaken in thinking that they could arrive at a religious faith
through philosophy. Scepticism is a prerequisite of faith. In
the well known passage Philo says :
" A person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections
of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the
greatest avidity: while the haughty Dogmatist, persuaded
that he can erect a complete system of Theology, by the mere
help of philosophy, disdains any further aid, and rejects
this adventitious instructor. To be a philosophical Sceptic
is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step,
22towards being a sound, belieYing Christian."
Neither John Knox nor Karl Jarth could desire more definite support
than this. Hume declares that neither belief in God nor the idea
of immortality can be supported on rational grounds, but only by
appeal to the revelatory truth afforded by Christianity. Otto
Pfleiderer, an early Gifford lecturer, wrote of Hume :
" By his logical criticism he has destroyed the
12
self-sufficient dogmatism of the period of rationalistic
enlightenment, whose half-criticism was neither just to
faith nor to knowledge, because it imagined it had
exhausted all reason in its narrow intellectual conceptions,
and had no sense or comprehension for the unconscious reason
of the religious feelings and symbols, or for the
development of reason in the history of religion.,,23
Pfleidererremarks that after Hume it was impossible any longer to
speak of "natural religion" in quite the same way. He had
destroyed for ever the illusion that there had been a religion,
common to all men, based on a few simple truths of reason.
Similarly natural theology would never regain its earlier authority.
Kant tells us he was awakened out of his dogmatic slumbers
by Hume. Like Hume, he claimed that, in abolishing knowledge
in religious matters, he was making room for faith.24 He claimed
to be doing real service to morality and religion in silencing
objectors by the Socratic method of proving their ignorance.25
It is impossible to reach knowledge of things beyond this world
on the basis of data presented by our empirical world, and so no
rational knowledge of God is possible. Like Hume, Kant left the
way open for faith, but where Hume lett his puzzled reader to
find his own way to revealed truth, Kant offered the alternative
of a rational "faith", described as "the moral faith of reason".
In matters of religion the practical reason is superior to the
intellect and God is the postulate of pure practical reason.
13
Ethico-theology thus replaces natural theology. It is doubtful,
however, whether the religion proposed by Kant is any more
satisfying than that of the Deists.
Eighteenth century rationalism produced an attenuated
religion. Philosophers were so concerned that they should be
reasonable that they could not recognise that the data of religious
experience was relevant to their quest.
" Thus it could come about," wrote William Temple,
"that David Hume should compose his Dialogues £!!. Natural
Religion so cogent in argumentation, so urbane, sO
devastatingly polite, at a moment when John Wesley was
altering the characters of thousands and the course of
English History by preaching salvation through the precious
Blood - a theme which one suspects that Hume and his friends
26would have thought ill-suited for refined conversation."
One might add that while Kant was developing his moral argument
for the existence of God the followers of Wesley were singing of
Christian holiness and finfing an exuberant joy in religion
somewhat different from the intellectual calm enjoyed by those who
found their religion within the limits of mere reason.
4. Natural Theology Persistent
Natural theology withstood the attacks of the Reformers and,
as we shall see, survived the onslaught of Hume and Kant. The
conviction that natural theology could support the findings of
faith was not to be lightly set aside. Descartes, a Roman
Catholic, Leibniz, a Lutheran and Locke a nominal Anglican all
believed that it was possible to support religious beliefs by
means of philosophical argument. The traditional arguments of
the school men took new shape under their hands. As far as the
faithful were concerned Descartes recognised that they would
accept the truth of Christianity because it was taught in sacred
scripture. He also recognised that the argument from scripture
for the existence of God was circular, so that if any apologetic
was to be addressed to the infidel it must be based on reason.'?
If the unbeliever can be taken so far by natural reason he may
well finally accept the authority of scripture for those truths
not accessible to reason. Here we see the shadow of Aquinas.
In England Francis Bacon had described natural theology as
"that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God, which
may be obtained by the contemplation of His creaturesl~8 There
was further knowledge, of course, to be accepted through
revelation. Similarly Hobbes recognised that man had indeed
reached religious truths through reason but that God had planted
further truths by divine reve1ation.29 Locke made the extremely
tidy analysis of propositions, distinguishing those according to
30reason, those above reason and those contrary to reason. No
religion, one would think, would ask a believer to accept a
proposition completely disproved by reason.
a proposition clearly demonstrated by reason does not need the
On the other hand
15
authority of faith. The category of the suprarational is the
most pertinent. Truths in this category we accept by faith,
which is, according to Locke,
the assent to any proposition, not. • made out by
the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the
"
proposer, as coming from God in some extraordinary way of
communication. This way of discovering truths to men we
call'revelation.",1
There must, however, be "good reasont' for anything we accept by
faith,2 and we must be able to distinguish between the delusions
of Satan and the inspirations of the Holy Ghost. The reasonable-
ness of propositions thus accepted by faith turns on the credit
of the proposer. In the gospel accounts the proposer is Jesus
of Nazareth and his credit appears to depend on the fulfilment
ot prophecies and the performance of miracles. Locke does not
pursue the question of the credit of those who wrote the accounts
of the prophecy fulfilments and the miracles. This way of thinking
proved unsatisfactory to Locke's successors who preferred to
dispense entirely with the concept of revelation and who believed
that the dogmas of universal religion could be reached by man's
unaided reason.
Spinoza had specified the details of such an universal faith,
whose principles were also the fundamental dogmas of scripture :
" There is a Supreme Being, who delights in Justice and
Mercy, whom all who would be saved are bound to obey, and
whose worship consists in the practice of justice and
16
and charity towards our neighbour.,,33
Spinoza believed that scripture should be examined in the light
of reason and any alleged revelation must be judged by reason.
The lack of reason is no recommendation for scriptural or a~
other kind of truth. He exclaims :
" Men who contemn reason and reject understanding are
strangely believed to be possessed of heavenly light!" 34-
He criticises Christian thinkers for their attitude to holy
scripture on two counts_ In the first place, he eays,
" I have found them giving utterance to nothing but
Aristotelian and Platonic speculations, artfully dressed
up and cunningly accommodated to HolY'Writ.,,35
And further,
" A conclusion that further appears _ •• that they moetly
assume as the basis of all inquiry into the true meaning of
the ~ible, that it is everywhere inspired and literally
true_,,36
The one obstacle which will preTent the Christian thinker from
grasping the truth is, quite simply,
" the idea that Reason should be subordinate to TheOlogye,,3?
The prophets were only different from other folk in that through
vivid imagination they were able to grasp truths beyond the reach
of lesser men,38 and the certainty that came to them was moral
rather than mathematical.39
Lord Gifford was a great admirer of Spinoza and one can
readily understand his desire to follow the clues given by Spinoza
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and to discover how much we can really know about God without
resort to special revelation. The answer provided by the Deists
was barren and cold. Theirs was a purely intellectual knowledge
of God. From the knowledge of God described by Spinoza as
intuition40 there arises, so he tells us, the highest possible
41peace ot mind and joy • This is the intellectual love which
gives a "felt" knowledge ot God, on which Lord Gitford was to lay
eo much stress. If Hum. and Kant were right there was little or
no proepect for a religion based on demonstrative proof. An
authoritarian religion had no appeal for Lord Gifford. Undoubtedly
he hoped that there would emerge from the studies he proposed a
religion, based, like Spinoza's, on intuitive knowledge of God,
or, as Lord Gifford preferred to put it, on a true and fel~
knowledge of God.
5. The Nineteenth Century
Lord Gifford was born in 1820, at the end of a half century
that had eeen the deaths of Hume, Wesley and Kant, and if we
follow the fortunes ot natural theology in the nineteenth century,
we shall discover eome of the influencee that led to his desire to
establish the Gifford lectureships.
Continental philosophy was dominated by Hegel, whose
influence extended to Britain in the latter part ot the century.
Hegel had produced a new solution to the problem raised by Kant.
Where Kant had declared that thought was incapable of grasping
reality, Hegel saw thought as the only reality known to us.
For Hegel subject and object are not separate entities but
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integral parts of one whole. Hegel re-established the possibility
of metaphysical speculation. In reTiving the ontological argument
h. demonstrated the possibility of reaching knowledge of reality
through thought. His philosophy provided a neat scheme within
which he could set Christianity as the absolute religion.
According to Hegel Jewish religion stressed the transcendence of
God; Greek philosophy emphasised immanence; Christianity,through
the doctrine of the Trinity, recognises that God is neither beyond
the world nor simply all-pervading within the world. Again there
is a threefold development of the spirit. First, there was
simple faith; this was followe. by the destructive criticism of the
Enl~ghtenment; finally there is the constructive attitude of
speculative philosophy. In some respects Hegel's thought
represents a flight from faith to reason. Others might describe
it as an advance from theology to philosophy. "It is a titanic
undertaking to conquer the heavenly sphere by human thought,"
42wrote Richard Kroner • In this lay the appeal of Hegelianism
to the nineteenth century, a century which saw so many triumphs
of the human intellect. The attempt to find a speculative
philosoph~which would do justice to the findings of science yet
within which the Christian faith might find expression, continued
into the twentieth century. John Watson wrote in 1912 :
" Nothing but a philosophical reconstruction of belief,
which shall reconcile reason and religion, can lift us, in
these days of unrest and unbelief, above the fatal division
of the heart and the head." 43
19
Metaphysical speculation was later to fall into disrepute, but
while there is religious faith it will be necessary to find some
way of thinking about religion in the context of contemporary
scientific knowledge. This has been essayed by a number of
Gifford lecturers and in our own day the wide interest shown in
the work of a thinker like Teilhard de Chardin is evidence of
man's constant desire to set his faith in the context of a total
system.
If negel's philosophy stands as symbol of the emphasis on
the head in nineteenth century religious thought, then
Schleiermacher's thought is symbolic of the emphasis on the heart.
For Locke and the Deists as for Kant and Hegel religion was a
matter of intellectual belief and moral conviction. One can
discern little of the living faith of Luther or the mystics in
this type of natural theology. Even within protestantism the
dogmatic authority of scripture was substituted for the authority
of the church, leading to another kind of formalism. Schleiermacher,
who has been described as the founder of modern theology,
reasserted the importance of the affective element in religion.
Although he disclaims Spinozism as such he is in the line of
44succession to Spinoza. In his Speeches ~ Religion he offers a
tribute of almost unqualified admiration, a tribute that Lord
Gifford would have endorsed without reservation. Where other
apologists for religion had been content to show the plausibility
of religious propositions Schleiermacher sought to show to its
cultured despisers the real nature of religion. He writes
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The usual conception of God as one single being outside
the world and behind the world is not the beginning and end
"
of religion. It is only one manner of expressing God,
seldom entirely always pure and always inadequate. • • The
true nature of religion is ••• immediate consciousness of
the ~ity a. He i. tound in ourselves and in the world •.,lt-5
In this description of religion we can eee the toreshadowings
of later religious existentialism, and in his Christian Faith4~
Schleiermacher anticipates more recent writers in his treatment
ot the historical element in Christianity. He helps his readers
to distinguish between factual historical statements and religious
truth. and shows that among all the arguments for the existence
ot God the argument trom religious experience is not the weakest.
Schleiermacher and hi. successors thus provide yet another
.trand ot nineteenth century religious thought. But in England
ot the nineteenth century the name ot Paley was much more
tamiliar than that of Schleiermacher or ,.,enHegel.
6. Natural Science and God
At the opening of the century the assiduous Archdeacon
Pal.y, undaunted by Hume and Kant, was busily engaged in drawing
implication. from the hypothetical discovery of the proverbial
watchl Hi. Natural Theologz, or, Evidences of the Existence
~ Attributes ~ ~ Deity collected !!2! ~ appearances of
Nature, published in 1802, became a popular textbook of
apologetic. Its message was reinforced by the Bridgewater
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Treatise. which were published. between 1833 and 1836. The
Rever.nd Francis H.nr,r Egerton, who became the eighth Earl of
Bridgewater, bequeathed LB,oOO for the publishing of a work or
4 .work. ot theistic apologetic. The Tery title a 7 of the works
publish.d give som. indication of the variet7 ot evidence adduced
to prove th. .xistenc. ot a benevolent and wise deaigner of the
univers •• Tb.a. volumes did not grip the popular mind as did the
monum.ntal work ot Paley. Nevertheless two of the works went into
nine edition •• Adam Gifford as a young man would b. familiar
with at l.aat som. ot the treatiaes and it may be that the Earl
of Bridgewater's example l.d him to make his own bequest half a
century lat.r.
We a.y dismi.a Paley and hi. naiv. argument., but we shall
not und.r.tand th. nin.t ••nth century unl.sa we see the problem
with which h. wa. grappling. The general knowledge of God and
th. rev.al.d knowl.dg. of God of the .arlier c.nturiea had become
identifi.d with aci.ntitic knowl.dge of the world of nature and
tb. word of scriptur. re.pectively. Natural theology came to mean
tbe sy.t.mati.ing of that knowl.dge of God which can be gained from
tbe scientific study ot natur •• The Bibl., however, offer.
knowl.dg. ot th. natural world aa well as knowledge of God, or so
it a••med to tb. prosaic clerical minda of the early nineteenth
century. Tb. inerrancy of ~cripture waa generally accepted and
no distinction b.tw.en myth and tactual account was recognised.
Tbe qu.ation whether the new scientitic knowledge ot the world
22
could confirm the .upposedly historical accounts given in scripture
had to b. faced.
In geology A.a.Werner, Professor of Mineralogy at Freiberg,
h.ld the field for som. time with theories that in most respects
confirmed the biblical accounts of the creation and the flood.
J•••• Button, the Scottish geologist, published his Theory ~
!h! FArth in 1795 and was subsequently accused of atheism because
his interpretation of natural science did not confirm the biblical
account.. Scienti.ts like Deluc and Kirwan opposed Hutton's
theories and for a time Wernerian theories held their ground in
Scotland largely through Robert Jam.80n. Hutton's theories were
followed up by John Pl.yfa1r, Professor of Mathematics and later
of Natural Fbilosopby at Edinburgh. This was a period when the
Scotti.h uni••r.itie. w.r. dominat.d by the church. It was not
infr.qu.nt for an academic po.t to b. held bl a minister who also
had pastoral charge of a congregation. Where so manl academic
poets wert held by ••n committ.d by their calling to the acceptance
of • dogmatic faith it i. und.r.tandable that .cience should be
.een .s just anotber wal of int.rpreting the goodness and wisdom
of th. Almighty. I n tb. cours, of one of the manl disputes
witbin the Scotti.h churcb Profe.sor Playfair wrote an open letter
in whicb h. complained that few Scottish clergymen were eminent in
.atb ••aties and that in any cas. it was impossible for a man to
do ju.tice to tb. dual responsibility. The charge was answered
anonymouely by Tbomae Chal.ers, subsequently the author of the
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first of the Bridgewater Treatises, then a young man, but later
he h~self opposed the appointment of uni.ersity professors to
pastoral charges. Ne.ertheless the link between science and
religion in the universities was still strong. Of the authors
of the ~ridgewater Treatises, C.G.Gillispie writes :
" All the authore chosen knew something of science at
first hand. Four were clergymen, four were physicians,
and three of the eight had lectured on theology at one of
the univ.rsitie ••n48
In contra.t, two only of more than on~undred and ten Gifford
lecturer., namely Bishop Barnee and Canon Raven, were clergymen
and scientiets. Such harmony as there was in the early nineteenth
century wa. to be disrupted by later developments.
The publication in 18S9 of Darwin's Origin ~ Species ~
means ~ Natural Sel@ction marked the beginning of the end of the
more popular type of natural theology. It was not that the new
theories mad. it more difficult to believe in design but it was
easier to believe in chance • The evolutionary approach weakened
•criptural authority, for if the Genesie accounts were incorrect,
might not the whole fabric pro.e unreliable? J.B.Stirling, the
first Edinburgh Gifford lecturer, dates the decline in interest
in natural theology from 186049• He records the bewildered defeat
of hi. landlady under the crowing triumph of her son, a lad of
.eventeen or eo, who had asked her to explain to him where Cain
got hi. wife ISO It is strange that difficulties which had been
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dismissed in a paragraph by Origen should loom so large in the
nineteenth century. It became clear as the century drew to its
close that it religion was not to be completely undermined by the
adyances ot science there must be some rapprochement between
science and religion, which might be furnished by a natural theology
that was not tied to popular apologetic. Church leaders wielded
the hammer ot scriptural inerrancy to crack the nut ot new
scientitic theory, but the nut cracked the hammer. Lord Gifford
sought a new enquiry which would make no appeal to supposed
miraculous reyelation.
7. Other Factors
The nineteenth century apologetic was somewhat different from
the natural theology ot the Deists for it went alongside the proclam-
ation ot an eyang_lical gospel. It was an aid to faith rather than
a substitute. It was an attempt to appeal to the head as well as
the heart. Francis Bacon had remarked three centuries earlier
that natural theology sutfices to confute atheism but not to inform
religion and this well expresses the conviction of the nineteenth
century eyangelicals, on whose bookshelYes Paley rubbed shoulders
with holy writ. Wesley bad recognised the part to be played by
reason in apologetic and the interpretation of scripture but he
was quite clear about reason's limitations. In his sermon on
~ f!!! £! Reason Impartially Considered, he declared:
" Reason cannot produce faith. Although it is always
consistent with reason, yet reason cannot produce faith
•
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in the scriptural sense of the word.,,51
Thu8 a typical British compromise permitted natural theology to
flourish alongside a sturdy evangelicalism in England and an
austere Calvinism in Scotland. Lord Gifford desired to appeal
to mind and heart and he expected natural theology to lead to
a ~ ~ !!l! knowledge of God.
A further factor in the nineteenth century situation was the
neWintereat in non-Christian religions, which had arisen partly a8
a result of missionary enterprise and partly by reason of the
impetu8 given to their study by the scientific spirit of the age.
David Livingstone. the great nineteenth century missionary hero,
was explorer as well as evangelist and much of the early anthropo-
logical data was provided by missionaries. It seemed that some
truth was to be found in other religions and if the Bible were
shown to be little more than a human record then the study of
religion in general might show the way to a universal religion.
baaed on rea80n rather than revelation. It was Lord Gifford's
hope that through the impartial study of religion and religious
ideas true knowledge of God might be reached. . If the sword of
the spirit had been blunted by new scientific discoveries then
natural theology might be the bow of burnished gold to save
Scotland if not England from the dark satanic Mills and Huxleys
of the nineteenth century.
In the Roman Catholic Church natural theology had retained
its well established position. The Papal Encyclical of Leo XIII.
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issued in 1879, restated the function of philosophy in relation
to faith and gaye a new impetus to Thomist studies.
" If philosophy be rightly and wisely used, it is able in
a certain measure to paYe and to guard the road to the true
,
Faith; and is able, also, to prepare the minds of its
follower. id a'fitting way for the receiving of revelation.
Hence it has not untruly been called by the ancients "an
education leading to the Christian Faith", "a prelude and
help of Christianity", "a schoolmaster for the Gospel".,,52
The Encyclical recognised St. Thomas as the philosopher R!!
excellence :
" Moreoyer, carefully distinguishing reason from Faith,
&s is right, and yet joining them together in a harmony of
friendship, he so guarded the rights of each; and so
watched over the dignity of each,' that,as far as man is
concerned, reason can now hardly rise higher than she rose,
borne up in the flight of Thomas; and Faith can hardly gain
more helps and greater helps from reason than those which
Thomas gaye her." 5'
We cannot pretend that the publication of a Fapal Encyclical would
be likely to influence the declining years of a dour liberal
protestant like Adam Gifford, but neo-Thomism was to influence the
deyelopment of natural theology in subsequent decades. Lord
Gifford did not envisage natural theology as an aid to faith,
but rather as a means to whathe called, in language reminiscent
I -
of Spinoza, "the true and felt knowledge of God".
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8. Drawing the Threads Together
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century it was clear
that a new appraisal of the two kinds of knowledge of God was
needed. The authority of the church had been weakened from the
time of the Reformation and now the authority of the Bible was
shaken by the new critical approach and by new scientific
discoveries. As we have seen, the attempt had been made to use
natural theology as a support for revealed truth, but the rising
tide of scientific discovery had swept away many of the more naive
arguments of natural theology along with ingenuous appeals to the
letter of scripture. Yet because man's reason had triumphed in
sO many other fields it seemed to many. including Lord Gifford,
that reason applied to religion might meet with similar triumphs.
In all rac.s and in all generations men had believed in God and if
the rigorous methods of chemistry or astronomy could be applied
to religion clear conclusions concerning the existence and nature
of God might emerge. Lord Gifford was himself a deeply religious
man and r.alised that religion must be felt as well as known. yet.
because he was a man of his own century, he put his trust in
reason and scientific method to discover the truths of religion.
H. was too deeply committed to the philoBophy of Spinoza and the
scientific spirit of his century to conceive that truth might come
througb special or miraculous revelation. Natural theology. the
sick man ot Europe, was to stand on his own two feet. Only the
nineteenth century could have produced such a last will and
testament as that ot Adam Gifford. It is little wonder that men of
the twentieth century have at times found difficulty in fulfilling
its conditione.
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1. Lord Gifford
Adam Gifford, we are told by one of the early Gifford
lecturers,was " a Scotch lawyer, who by ability, hard work and
self-denial had amassed a large fortune, and attained the
dignified position of a seat on the Bench".1 He was born in
Edinburgh on February 29th, 1820, and was appointed to a judgeship
at the comparatively early age of forty-nine. In his youth he was
a bright boy who mastered his lessons easily and because of his
persistent curiosity and acute intelligence he was nick-named
"The Philosopher". Nevertheless when some of his equally
precocious friends established a society for asking and answering
questions he declined to join. However he more than atoned for
this youthful omission; by his bequest he set generations of
philosophers, scientists and theologians answering the profound
questions that he himself had posed.
A deeply religious man, Lord Gifford brought to his thinking
about religion the same keen mind that he exercised in the law
court. In establishing the Gifford lectures he desired that the
evidence for religion should be presented by the keenest minds of
the day. The evidence was not to be one-sided, for he allowed
that even sceptics might be appointed provided that "they be able
reverent men, true thinkers, sincere lovers of and earnest
inquirers after truth". The evidence was to be subjected to
all the careful examination and cross-examination it would meet
if presented in a court of law.
One small volume of Lord Gifford's work, Lectures delivered
on various occasions, was published posthumously by his niece,
Alice Raleigh, and his son, H.J.Gifford, in June 1889. The subjects
2of the lectures are interesting as revealing the breadth of Lord
Gifford's interests, for only two of them lie within his own
discipline. J.H.Stirling used the introductory lecture of his
second series to give a lengthy review of this little bOOk.'
It is plain that in his philosophical and literary ventures Lord
Gifford was an amateur, yet the little book of lectures reveals
that he had read widely and thought deeply. His brother records
in a memoir4 that Adam Gifford would retire to his room at the
week-ends after a busy week in his chambers and would enjoy the
company of the philosophers. We only need to read his will and
his lecture on Substance to recognise that his week-end companion
was often Spinoza.
Adam Gifford believed in God, as he testified in his will:
" I give my body to the earth as it was before, in order
that the enduring blocks and materials thereof may be
employed in new combinations; and I give my soul to God,
in Whom and with Whom it always was, to be in Him and with
Him for ever in closer and more conscious union."
Be judged that if only the evidence could be adequately presented
unbelievers would share the true and felt knowledge of God, in
which man's highest well-being rests. In his lecture on Substance
be said :
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Only go deep enough and prese analysis far enough, and
the most obstinate materialist may be made to see that
"
matter is not!!! the universe, and that there is something
below and above and around and within it.".5
tt The sUbstance and essence of a man is his reasonable
6and intelligent ~."
Do you not feel with me that it is almost profane to
apply the word Substance to anything short of God? All
"
lesser meanings are inadequate,' all lower meanings are
base. The universe and all its phenomena, suns and
galaxies - with their inconceivable dependences, other
universee, countless1y unthought, because unthinkable by
finite minds, all, - all, - are but forms of the Infinite,
the shadow of the Substance that is One for ever."?
These three brief quotations suffice to indicate the philosophical
background against which the will is to be understood. When Lord
Gifford described God in his deposition as "the Infinite,the All,
the First and Only Cause, the One and Sole Substance, the Sole
Being, the Sole Reality, and the Sole Existence," he was in
effect anticipating that those who lectured would share his
conception of God. It almost seems as if he had arrived at certain
conclusions himself but that he desired to make provision for
others to argue the case for him. The fact that the existence of
God is already assumed and a definition given constitutes just one
of the many difficulties facing the Gifford lecturer.
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For the last eight years of his life Lord Gifford suffered
from a protracted paralysis of the lower limbs and the right arm.
Characteristically he learned to write with his left hand and
continued to carry out as much work as he could. Some of his
thoughts during this period are crystallised for us in the memoir
written by his brother. We quote three of these obiter dicta.
" I think I have seen more clearly many things about
God since I have been laid aside; in the night I often
can't sleep, and I follow out new trains of thought
about .Him. ,,8
" To be happier or wiser, that just means to have
more of God.,,9
" He is infinite, how can our finite minds grasp His
Being ? But it is not wrong to go on in our thinking
10as far as we can."
It was during this period that he drew up his will, embodying
the conditions under which the lectureships were to be established.
The document is dated 21st August, 1885, and was witnessed by
a medical doctor and a cab-driver. Lord Gifford died on 20th
January, 1887.
2. The Gifford Bequest
Lord Gifford bequeathed £25,000 to the University of
Edinburgh; £20,000 each to the universities of Glasgow and
Aberdeen, and £15,000 to the University of St. Andrews for the
establishment of
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" A Lectureship or Regular Chair for "Promoting, Advancing,
Teaching, and Diffusing the Study of Natural Theology," in
the widest sense of that term, in other words, "Th.
Knowledge of God, the Infinite, the All, the First and
Only Cause, the One and Sole Substance, the Sole Being,
the Sole Reality, and the Sole Existence, the Knowledge
of His Nature and Attributes, the Knowledge of the
Relations which men and the whole universe bear to Him,
the Knowledge of the Nature and Foundation of Ethics or
Morals, and of all Obligations and Duties thence arising."
This is the crucial sectiQn of the will, but Lord Gifford
elaborated in legal form nine general principles for the guidance
of the "patrons".
The first is concerned simply with the wise investment of
funds. The second allows for intermissions in the lectureship
for the accumulation of funds. The third limits the lectureship
to two years but permits the reappointment of a lecturer for one
11further period of two years • The fourth and fifth principles
are by far the most important and are discussed more fully later.
The eixth principle insists that the lectures shall be "public and
popular". Any admission fee charged should be as small as
possible. One Gifford lecturer ventured to define "popular" as
12meaning "within the compass of the plain man's understanding" •
If thie indeed was the intention then this principle has not
always been observed. The seventh principle suggests that there
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should be a course of twenty lectures, though this should finally
be left to the discretion of the lecturer. The eighth principle
allows the patrons to make grants towards the publication of the
lectures "in cheap form". The ninth principle regulates the
auditing of accounts.
To return to the fourth principle: this established that
no religious test should be applied in the appointment of lecturers.
.. The lecturers appointed shall be subjected to no test of
any kind, and shall not be required to take an oath, or to
emit or subscribe any declaration of belief, or to make any
promise of any kind; they may be of any denomination
whatever, or of no denomination at all (and many earnest
and high-minded men prefer to belong to no ecclesiastical
denomination); they may.be of any religion or way of
thinking, or they may be so-called sceptics or agnostics
or freethinkers, provided only that the "patrons" will use
diligence to secure that they be able reverent men, true
thinkers, since~e lovers of and earnest inquirers after
truth."
The accusation is sometimes brought against Gifford lecturers that
they set out to find rational arguments for what they accept by
Jaith, or that they assume the truth of their conclusions before
the argument opens. If there is truth in the accusation, and there
may be some, we must not blame the founder, who thought that
neither belief nor unbelief would sway a scholar who was a
sincere inquirer after truth. This principle allows for the
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appointment of a scholar like Karl Barth who does not consider
that such a study as natural theology is possible; it permits
the appointment of others whose arguments do not necessarily
culminate in theistic conclusions. A philosopher must guard
against wishful thinking but he cannot be blamed if he sincerely
comes to the conclusion that reason confirms or supports his
faith. So long as he is a sincere lover of and earnest inquirer
after truth he may be appointed to a Gifford Chair.
3. Lord Gifford's Conception of Natural Theology
To'understand the fifth principle we must recall the
intellectual climate of the late nineteenth century and appreciate
Lord Gifford's personal convictions. He believed in a general
revelation, and this is sUbstantiated by three brief quotations
from his lecture on the Ten Avatars ~ Vishnu :
" Ever and again man's spirit tells him - 'The gods are
come down to us in the likeness of men', in the crowd or
the solitude, by night or by day, even still the heavens
are opened, the dazzling smites us to the ground, and
deep calleth unto deep.,,13
II God's revelations are not over, are not completed.
We have not yet heard His last word, we shall never do so.
14We look for his coming still."
He pictures the educated Hindu, who, without abandoning his own
faith, can say :
" I find the great central doctrine of Christianity,
that on which all its other doctrines turn and revolve
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as on a pivot, to be an impressive, most mighty, and most
magnificent Avatar - God manifest in the fleshJ,,15
What he viewed with suspicion, as is clear from his lecture on
St. Bernard and the Middle Ages, are the extravagant claims that
can be made in the name of so called miraculous revelation. This
view is confirmed by Max Muller, who, in a brief tribute to Lord
Gifford at the opening of his Gifford lectures, said :
" There can be no doubt that he deliberately rejected all
miracles, whether as judge, on account of want of evidence,
or as a Christian, because they seemed to him to be in open
conflict with the exalted spirit of Christ's own teaching.
Yet he remained always a truly devout Christian, trusting
more in the great miracle of Christ's life and teaching on
earth than in the small miracles ascribed to him by many of
his followers.,,16
It seems then that Lord Gifford accepted revelation in a general
sense but was chary of recognising what he described as supposed
exceptional or so called miraculous revelation.
Much of the discussion concerning the correct interpretation
of the will has ranged round this fifth principle, in which Lord
Gifford declares :
" I wieh the lecturers to treat their subject as a etrictly
natural ecience, the greatest of all possible sciences,
indeed, in one senee, the only science, that of Infinite
Being, without reference to or reliance upon any supposed
41
special exceptional or so-called miraculous revelation.
I wish it considered just as astronomy or chemistry is.
I have intentionally indicated, in describing the subject
of the lectures, the general aspect which personally I
would expect the lectures to bear, but the lecturers shall
be under no restraint whatever in their treatment of their
theme; for example, they may freely discuss (and it may
be well to do so) all questions about man's conception of
God or the Infinite, their origin, nature, and truth,
whether God is under any or what limitations, and so on,
as I am persuaded that nothing but good can result from
such discussion."
The use of the analogy of chemistry and astronomy and the
insistence that natural theology is a science have led to much
confusion and the paragraph lays itself open to at least three
different interpretations :
(1) It seems at first sight as if Lord Gifford believed that
beginning from empirical data it is possible by careful reasoning
to arrive at certain conclusions about God, just as in astronomy
ve reaeheconclusions concerning the movement of heavenly bodies.
But in astronomy or chemistry we begin by accepting the existence
of the phenomena we are investigating. In what Lord Gifford
calls the greatest of all possible sciences we cannot begin with
the assumption of God's existence or else we are not engaged in
what has traditionally been understood to betnatural(t&eology.
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Here again we detect the influence of Spinoza, whocpened his
Ethics with a definition of God, not dissimilar to that offered
by Lord Gifford, and then proceeded by the method of mathematical
reasoning.
(2) The second possible interpretation,and one adopted by some
of the lecturers, is that we should use scientific methods to
investigate the truths propounded by various religions. This is
what Max Muller and others wanted to call "the science of
religion". When we have finished such an investigation we have
no more than an account of religious beliefs that actually have
been or are held. Comparative religion may be a preparatory
study and it is undoubtedly allowed under the wide Gifford terms
but it must not be confused with natural theology. What Lord
Gifford wanted was a "Science of Infinite Being" rather than a
science of religion, but he did not see the contradiction
involved in a science of infinite being.
(3) A third possibility is that Lord Gifford believed that the
natural theologian could take the findings of the sciences, and,
using similar scientific reasoning, draw conclusions concerning
the Ultimate nature of the universe. This interpretation led to
the appointment of a number of scientists to the various chairs,
but, as we shall see, again and again theY,declined the temptation
to become natural theologians or openly admitted that there was
a point where they were leaving the realm of science for that of
metaphysics.
If we examine all the provisos made by Lord Gifford we find
many varied interpretations are allowable. The lectures delivered
in the past three-quarters of a century tell their own story of
the many attempts made to untangle the threads, to understand
the intention of Lord Gifford, to comply with his conditions and
to answer some of the questions set by him.
4. The Gifford Lecturers
Between 1888 and 1965 some one hundred and thirteen names
appear in the lists of Gifford lecturers in the four universities.
Four names appear in two lists Pringle-Pattison lectured at
Aberdeen and Edinburgh, Edward Caird at st. Andrews and Glasgow,
James Ward at St. Andrews and Aberdeen, and James Frazer at
St. Andrews and Edinburgh. On two occasions at Edinburgh the
lectures were not delivered although the names remain in the
official lists. In 1907 Robert Flint's lectures were not given
owing to his illness and more recently John Baillie's lectures
were published posthumously and accorded the status of Gifford
lectures. Baron von Hugel was appointed to the Gifford Chair
at Edinburgh for the sessions 1924-26 but was compelled to
withdraw because of ill-health. At Glasgow in 1935-37 Professor
W.McNeile Dixon took the place of Emile Meyerson who had died.
Jacques Maritain was appointed at Aberdeen but owing to war
conditions he was unable to lecture and other commitments prevented
his acceptance of a further invitation. There have been
occasional gaps between two series of lectures by the same scholar
due to sickness or other circumstances18• Among the Gifford
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lecturers there have been two pairs of brothers, the Cairds and
the Haldanes, two archbishops, three bishops, politicians like
the Lords Balfour and Haldane as well as the scientists,
philosophers and theologians one would expect in such a list.
No woman has yet been appointed to a Gifford Chair.
It is understandable that there should be delays in the
publication of lectures and at the time of writing over twenty
series of lectures have not yet reached publication. Over ten
of these are lectures given since 1948, and no doubt some of these
are being prepared for publication. It is unfortunate that the
list of unpublished lectures from the earlier period includes
those of Bergson, Hocking and Schweitzer. This means that
ninety two sets of lectures have been published, the work of
eighty eight scholars19•
5. ·An Earlier Classification
The only previous attempt at a survey of Gifford literature
was made by W.L.Davidson in the Croall Lectures in 1921 and
published under the title, Recent Theistic Discussion. He wrote :
" They (the Croall Trustees) wished me to state what I
conceive to be the lines of recent theistic reasoning that
are specially important, and to express my opinion of their
value, taken directly in connexion with the diverse series
of Gifford Lectures delivered before the four Scottish
20Universities within the last quarter of a century."·
The lists of Gifford lecturers then contained only forty three
names. In his closing lecture Davidson offered the following
classification~O which serves to illustrate the great variety of
approaches made by an equally great variety of scholars. Where
a name appears twice the series of lectures on which the
classification is made is indicated in the reference notes.
A. ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF GOD, AND THE GROWTH OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
(Anthropology, MYthology, etc)
E.B.Tylor, Andrew Lang, Max Muller, James G. Frazer,
C.P.Tiel., William James, William Ridgeway, Rudolfo
Lanciani, W.M.Ramsay.
B. PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION
I. ~ationality of Religion
Edward Caird21, John Caird, H.M.Gwatkin, Otto Pfleiderer,
William Wallace, A.M.Fairbairn.
II. Religious Philosophy among Ancient Peoples
22A.H.Sayce, James Adam, Edward Caird , Lewis Campbell,
W.R.lnge, W.W.Fowler.
C. PHILOSOPHY AND ULTIMATE REALITY
James Ward23, Josiah Royce, Emil Boutroux, R.B.Haldane,
A.C.Bradley, B.Bosanquet, John Watson, Samuel Alexander,
G.F.Stout.
D. PHILOSOPHY AND THEISM
I. With Theism as General Theme
J.B.Stirling, G.G.Stokes, A.C.Campbell, A.J.Balfour,
24A.S.Pringle-Fattison t S.S.Laurie.
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II. Special Aspects of Theism
James ward25• W.R.Sorley, A.B.Bruce, Henri Bergson,
C.C.J.Webb.
III. Theism and Science
Hans Driesch, Arthur Thomson.
Davidson's survey, made in 1921, provides a convenient
dividing line. . From this point there is a declining interest
in the anthropological approach and an increasing interest in
scientific thought. Idealism is losing its spell and metapbys-
icians are thinner on the ground. More attention has been given
to moral philosophy and further eth~studies have been added to
that of Sorley. There has been a growing interest in what we
may call "the personal", following up the studies of Bosanquet,
Bergson and Clement Webb. The status of religious knowledge
has been challenged by modern positivism and a number of works
have been concerned directly or indirectly with the nature of
faith. Another feature of the later period has been the
appointment of a number of scholars who are theologians rather
than philosophers of religion. Th. Gifford programme of recent
years gives the appearance of a continuing dialogue between
scientists, theologians and philosophers. Such a dialogue is
in the true spirit of the Gifford bequest.
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6. The Present Classification
A further seventy series of lectures have been given since
Davidson's volume was published,
before 1921 have since appeared.
is considerably more difficult.
and some of the lectures given
The task of classification
In our attempt to investigate
the various interpretations of natural theology and to elucidate
its legitimate function, we shall review the lectures under
the following headings :
I. The Scientific Study of Religion
In view of the veto on any supposed special revelation it
is understandable that a number of lecturers should concern
themselves with the study of those religions generally regarded
as outside the realm of special revelation. In this section the
work of scholars in the fields of anthropology and comparative
religion is reviewed. William James's Varieties is included as
a psychological study of religion, and Faterson's The Nature
2! Religion finds a place here as drawing conclusions from the
data furnished by the scientific study of religion.
II. Metaphysical Ventures
Since the time of Aristotle, if not before, it has been
assumed that metaphysical speculation can provide some knowledge
of the being and nature of God. This exercise has frequently
been described as natural theology. In this section are
included those lectures which set out to give a total world-view
within which it is possible to conceive of deity. Many of the
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lectures discussed in other sections can be described as
metaphysical, but the reason for their inclusion in other
sections will become apparent.
III. Natural Theology in its narrower sense - Cosmology and Theism
One of the traditional tasks of natural theology has been
the proYision of rational arguments for the existence of God
where a direct appeal to revelation is undesirable or unacceptable.
This section includes those lectures mainly concerned with the
traditional theistic arguments. Since the cosmological and
teleological arguments involve law, order and design within the
uniYerse, the contributions of the scientists are included here.
This section then is concerned with the attempts of the philo-
sopher. to examine the validity of the theistic arguments and the
philosophisings of the scientists as they try to answer the
question, "From a scientific study of nature can we draw any
conclusions about God ? "
IV. The Wider Scope ot N3tural Theology
Some lecturer. haye dealt with one particular aspect of
natural theology, while others haye ranged widely over the whole
field, producing in some cases what might well be regarded as
an outline of Philosophy ot Religion. These studies may impinge
on subjects dealt with in other sections, but because they serve
to illustrate the expansion ot natural theology into what might
be more fittingly called Philosophy of Religion they are accorded
a section to themselves.
V. From Goodness to God - Arguments from Morality to Religion
Lord Gifford specifically included the study of the
foundation of Ethics as possible subject matter and the lectures
given by a number of moral philosophers are discussed in this
section. The moral argument for the existence of God has been
discussed frequently in Gifford lectures but not all the ethical
studies reach theistic conclusions.
VI. Defenders of Faith - Reason's Vindication of Faith
One of the primary services rendered by natural theology
in the Christian era has been the provision of apologetic. Many
of the lecturers have been committed Christian theologians who
have looked to natural theology to provide rational justification
for what is accepted by faith. The use of the lectureship for
this purpose, it is argued, is justifiable so long as the appeal
is made to reason and not to special revelation. Such expositions
of faith will be discussed in this section including Karl Barth's
denial of the possibility of any such rational support.
VII. The Historical Approach
There remain a number of lecture courses, which, while"they
may be described as essays in natural theology, are more readily
classified as historical accounts of its development. Some of
the earlier lecturers made special studies of the Greek thinkers,
the precursors of natural theology. Others have dealt with later
periods of its development. This section provides a brief survey
of the sources from which material is drawn for the account of
natural theology given in Fart Two.
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Part I, Chapter 1 Reference Notes
1 G.69. p.1
2 This volume was published privately at Frankfort-on-the-Main
and contains lectures on: Ralph Waldo Emerson; Attention as
an Instrument of Self-Culture; Saint Bernard of Clairvaux;
Substance: a Metaphysical Thought; Law, a Schoolmaster, or the
Educational Function of Jurisprudence; The Ten Avatars of Vishnu;
and, The Two Fountains of Jurisprudence.
3 G.90. pp 197-216
5
H.J.Gifford, Recollections ~~ Brother, 1899, printed for the
family.Lectures delivered ~ various occasions,Frankfort, 1889, p.130.
6 Ibid. p. 152.
7 Ibid. pp. 154-5.
8 Recollections ~ ! Brother, p.25.
9 Ibid. pp. 25-6.
10 Ibid. p.26.
11 It appears that only in the case of Max Muller has the period
been extended to four years.
12 G.29, p. 11.
13 Lectures delivered on various occasions, p.217.
14~. p. 237.
15~. pp. 239-40.
16 G.69. p.3.
17 !h! Reality ~ ~,1931, includes some of the material Baron
von Hugel had prepared.
18 Balfour's second series at Glasgow was delayed by the first
war; John Ca1rd's by sickness; Farnell's second series was also
delayed.
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19 This includes Eoutroux's Science ~ Religion ~ Contemporary
Philosophy and Fairbairn's Philosophy ~ ~ Christian
Religion, which are not acknowledged as Gifford lectures but
are thought to contain much of the material used.
20 Recent Theistic Discussion, Edinburgh, 1921, pp. 1-2
21 Caird's St.Andrews lectures on The Evolution ~ Religion.
22 Caird's Glasgow lectures on The Evolution £1 Theology ~
~ Greek Philosophers
23 Ward's St. Andrews lectures on The Realm of Ends.
24 P.ringle-Pattison's earlier lectures at Aberdeen on !!!~
of God.--
25 Ward's Aberdeen lectures on Naturalism and Agnosticism.
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1. Natural Religion and Natural Theologz
Hume recognised that there are two permissible and
fruitful lines of enquiry in the study of man's ideas about God.
The first approach is seen in his Natural History ~ Religion,
and the second in his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion.
The former is a study of natural religion while the latter is
concerned with the problems of natural theology. Confusion has
often arisen because the distinction between the two has not been
made clear. Hume himself introduces "Natural Religion" into
the tille of the Dialogues to describe what turns out to be
natural theology. We find the same kind of confusion among
Gifford lecturers. Lord Balfour, for instance, assumes in
the opening paragraph of his first lecture that the general
subject of the Gifford lectures i8 " Natural Religion It.
H.H.Farmer points out the same misunderstanding of the term on
1the part of Archbishop Soderblom and indeed Soderblom's lectures
were concerned with religion rather than theology, The term
"Natural Religion" never appears in Lord Gifford's will.
Indeed he appears to avoid the word "religion", which he uses
only once and then to explain that the lecturers may be "of
no religion".
Theology is the conceptual element in religion and
therefore we must not expect to find a theology apart from a
religion of some kind. That we should look for natural
theology in natural religion and revealed theology in revealed
religion is a tempting generalisation but one that has created
misunderstanding. The distinction between natural and revealed
religion was quite clear to western scholars in the late
nineteenth century. Revealed religion~s were those that have
shared in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Other religions,
even if they claim revelation as Hinduism does, were to be
regarded as natural religions. So much is clear. This led some
of the early lecturers to conclude that the conditions of Lord
Gifford's will demanded the consideration of natural religion
to the exclusion of any reference to revealed religion. Now
Christian thinkers, beginning with st. Paul, have recognised
that there are truths embedded in Christianity which are also
available to those outside the circle of revelation. The
existence of God is such a truth. If this is so then there
cannot be a clear cut distinction between natural and revealed
theology corresponding to the distinction between natural and
revealed religion. If natural theology is that knowledge of
God which can be reached by human reason, then it will be
found in those religions described as revealed as well as those
called natural. Any assertions about God, which can be reached
by reasoned argument, are still natural theology even when
included within the bounds of revealed religion. Thus while
we may not derive revealed theology from natural religion, we
may well discover natural theology within revealed religion.
H.H.Farmer went a stage further :
" So far from natural theology being equated with
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natural religion, its significance is found in the fact
that its appeal, resting on reason, is potentially
universal and independent of what religion a man professes
or whether he professes any at all." 2
Lord uifford did not specifically distinguish natural
theology from natural religion, though his whole emphasis is
on the conceptual aspect of religion. Because of this
misunderstanding it is not surprising that three of the first
four Gifford lecturers were anthropologists, - students of
natural religion rather than natural theology.
2. Early Anthropological Studies
At Aberdeen the first lecturer was E.B.Tylor, Professor of
Anthropology at Oxford. His lectures were not published but
we learn that
" They dealt with savage peoples and their beliefs, ways
and customs; and wearing apparel, implements (stone,
flint and other), and objects of religious interest among
the lower races were exhibited in illustration of the
lecturer's discourses.,,3
It is not often that Gifford lecturers avail themselves of visual
aids in the presentation of their lectures 1
The first occupant of the Gifford Chair at St. Andrews
was a scholar who is perhaps better known in the realm of
folk-lore and fairy tale. Andrew Lang's ~ Making ~ Religion
is a sustained argument for primitive monotheism, posing the
conundrum, ''Whichcame first, the ghost or the ~od 1"
It reads in parts very much like the proceedings of the Society
for Psychical Research even to the appendix containing the
evidence of Police Constable Higgs concerning poltergeist
phenomena at Joe White's house!
In contrast Max Muller's four volumes are marked by careful
scholarship, the result of a lifetime's study of eastern
religions. In earlier years he had iectured at Oxford on Modern
Literature and Language and had written fhe Science ~ Language.
In view of more recent developments in linguistic analysis his
comments in the introductory Gifford lecture in 1888 are not
without interest
" Whatever further research may teach us about the true
nature of language, it is clear, from a purely practical
point of view, that language supplies at least the tools
of thought, and that a knowledge of these tools is as
essential to a philosopher, as a knowledge of his ship
and oars is to the sailor. t,4
He continues
" The Science of Language • • • is pre-eminently an
analytical science. We take languages as we find them
• • • and then analyse every word till we arrive at
elements which resist further analysis.,,5
Muller's description of mythology as one of the earliest
ramifications of language is also illuminating
" These mythological expressions are by no means ~~~l~~ed
to religious ideas, but ••• there is a period in the
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growth of language in which everything mayor must assume
6mythological expression."
Mythology, for Muller, is not the expression of thought but the
very vehicle of thought. Language and thought are inseparable.
He declares that thought is language minus sound rather than ae
is commonly supposed that language is thought plus sound. Thus
language and thought are not only inseparable but identical.
In early Hebrew thought, for instance, to know the name of a
man or a god is to know something of his nature.
Max Muller proceeds to a careful definition of terms.
Religion is the subject itself; Theology is the study or science
of the subject.? Religion gives what he calles the sensus
numinis8 as opposed to the kind of knowledge that the ordinary
senses give. "A known God," he tells us, "would ipso facto
cease to be God.,,9 It is interesting to note that twenty years
later Rudolf Otto coined the word "numinous". Religion, for
Muller, is a mystical insight into the nature of reality -
what Fichte meant when he called religion the highest knowledge.
" All religions may be called endeavours to give
expression to that sense of the real presence of the
10Divine in nature and in man."
In Muller's view the commonly accepted distinction between
natural and revealed religion is untenable, for people of all
religions claim to have had insight into the nature of reality
and this could only come through a revelation of some kind.
For instance, it is normally asumed in the Judaeo-Christian
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tradition tha~when Moses was told that the name of God is
"I am that I am", this was revelation. Max Muller claims that
among the twenty sacred names of God given in the Avesta there
appears the name "Ahmi yet ahmi", "I am that I am". He asserts
that the relevant verse in the book of Exodus is a later addition
and that the idea of God as "I am that I am" comes from a
Zoroastrian source.11
In his first course of lectures Muller set out to define
natural religion. In his second serie~ published as Physical
Religion, he surveyed the field of Indian religion and concluded
that,
II The human mind, such as it is, and unassisted by any
miracles except the eternal miracles of nature, did arrive
12at some of the fundamental doctrines of our own religion."
This is not to say that the human mind reached these concepts
by a process of pure thought, but rather that these ideas of God
were reached without recourse to the revelation given to Jews
and Christians. Muller's arguments offer support for a natural
insight which can perceive a general revelation open to all
rather than a natural reason which unaided can conclude its
argument with God.
The third course, Anthropological Religion, treated of
man's belief in a soul; the fourth course was entitled Theosophy
or Psychological Religion. Thus Muller traced the course of
man's development from primitive natural religion to a
sophisticated mysticism, in which man ultimately loses his
being in God.
If we can say that there is something of revelation in all
religions, may we also trace something of "nature" in all
religions including those generally regarded as revealed. At
the turn of the century A.H.Sayce addressed himself to a study
of Egyptian and Babylonian religions. While he is far from
asserting that Judaism and Christianity grew '!naturally" out
of these ancient religions, he traces back many of the fundamental
ideas of Judaism and Christianity to their source in earlier
religions, thus arriving at a similar conclusion to that of Max
Muller. Sayee concludes :
" The doctrine of emanation, of a trinity, wherein one
god manifests himself in three persons, of absolute thought
as underlying the permanent substance of all things, all
go back to the priestly philosophers of Egypt. Gnosticism
and Alexandrianism, the speculations of Christian
metaphysic and the philosophy of Hegel, have their roots
in the valley of the ~ile.,,13
In the second series of lectures he arrives at a similar
conclusion concerning the origins of Hebrew religion.
" The same relation as that borne by the religion of
ancient Egypt to Christianity, is borne by the religion
of Babylon to Judaism. The Babylonian conception of
the divine, imperfect though it was, underlay the faith
14of the Hebrews, and tinctured it to the very end."
Nevertheless Sayce recognises "a gulf, wide and impassable"
between Judaism and Babylonian religion, but the question
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remains whether the difference is one of degree or kind.
Theologians speak of the gradual revelation of God in the
scriptUres. Are we to think of a gradual revelation of God
through SO called natural religions culminating in Judaism and
Christianity? Or are we to look for a clear distinction
between "general" and "special" revelation ? Or are we, with
Barth, to see everything outside the circle of Christian
revelation as idolatry ? From the beginning the Gifford
lecturers found Lord Gifford's exclusionn of miraculous
revelation difficult to interpret.
3. A Science of Religion?
As early as 1873 Max Muller had described his studies as
the Science of Religion. C.P.Tiele, Professor of the History
and Philosophy of Religion in the University of Leyden, called
his Edinburgh lectures Elements ~ ~ Science £! Religion.
The term "Natural Theology" , he tells us, is outdated, and no
doubt Lord'Gifford's demand for "a science of Infinite Being"
encouraged him to use the term Science' of Religion. Yet this
new science of religion should not be confused with either
natural theology or philosophy of religion. Tiele's description
of it makes the difference clear.
II All she (Science of Religion) desires, and all she is
entitled to do, is to subject religion, as a human and
therefore historical and psychological phenomenon, to
unprejudiced investigation, in order to ascertain how it
arises and grows and what are its essentials, and in order
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thoroughly to understand it. • • He (the Scientist of
Religion) knows nothing of heretics, schismatics, or
heathens; to him, as a man of sCience, all religious
forms are simply objects of investigation.,,15
In this description we recognise what we have come toca11
Comparative Religion or Psychology £! Religion; it is not
natural theology.
It is clear that Lord Gifford's conditions permit such
scientific investigation of religion; it is equally clear that
he wanted the lecturers to discuss the truth of religion. It is
not uQfair to say that Lord Gifford expected from his Science
of Infinite Being much that some Spiritualists expect from the
Society for Psychical Research, namely a dismissal of any false
or fraudulent element and the establishment of essential truth.
Such research may well expose fraud, yet it is questionable
whether such research can adequately demonstrate the validity
of religiouB truth. ~evertheless Tiele expressed the pious
victorian hope that
"without preaching, or special pleading, or apologetic
argument, but solely by means of the actual i'actsit
reveals, our beloved science will help to bring home to
the restless spirits of out time the truth that there is
no rest for them unless 'they arise and go to their
16Father'. "
It is as well that the term Science 2! Religion has fallen into
disuse since it is ambiguous and confusing. The study of
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of comparative religion provides valuable data for the natural
theologian, but it is not itself natural theology.
4. Comparative Religion
The Universities of St. Andrews and Edinburgh in turn
invited Sir James Frazer to give their Gifford lectures, in
1911 and 1924 respectively. The published works are both
straightforward anthropological studies of religious
practices and beliefs. They are set in the context of the
Gifford formula, but atter defining natural theology Frazer
excuses himself from any dogmatic or philosophical approach.
The definition within which he works is given thuB
" By natural theology I understand that reasoned
knowledge of a God or gods which man may be supposed,
whether rightly or wrongly, capable of attaining to by
the exercise of his natural faculties alone.,,17
The phrase "reasoned knowledge" suggests that man's religious
beliefs are the product of reason rather than insight and it
is significant that his second definition, given some
thirteen years later, makes no reference to 'Teasoned
knowledge". In the Edinburgh lectures Frazer writes :
" By natural theology I understand the conception which
man, without the aid of revelation, has formed to himself
18of the existence and nature of a God or gods."
Theology, Frazer tells UB, is the conceptual aspect of man's
religion, at first undifferentiated from religion itself.
Only at a later stage does man separate religion and theology.
Frazer draws attention to the analogous development that has
taken place in man's scientific thought. As the scientist has
gradually reduced the many forms of matter to one substance,
hydrogen, so the primitive theologians reduced the multitude of
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spirits to one God. Theology is the application of reason to
religion. It is clear from Frazer's work that he too finds the
distinction between natural and revealed religion unsatisfactory.
Since Frazer's Edinburgh lectures in 1924-25 there have
only been two series of lectures ~ can be called anthropo-
logical and both appointments were made at St. Andr~s.
In 1931-32 R.R.Marett lectured on Faith, Hope ~ Charity in
Primitive Religion. He is concerned more particularly with the
pre-theological stages of religion, where the emotional element
is dominant and the rational element scarcely evident. Rhythm
20serves primitive man in lieu of reasoning • Reasoning may
produce theology later but it has little or no part to play in
the beginnings of religion.
" It was the savage who first made fire; and doubtless
he burnt his fingers badly in so doing. Religion is
likewise playing with fire. The religious man is trying
out the properties of an element which warms but also
burns and sears. Thanks to the predominance of emotion
over reason in it, religious experience is always hot.
Gone cold it has gone out. Rationalism can at most serve
to temper a flame which it does not light and may easily
extinguish.,,21
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In this pre-scientific stage of culture religion has a survival
value for it is through primitive religion that moral ideals
grow. In his second series of lectures, Sacraments ~ Simple
~, Marett investigates elementary symbolic forms of thought
and action concerned with everyday happenings, matters of life
such as eating, fighting and mating, and matters of death.
The most recent series of lectures based on anthropological
study is Experiments ~ Living by Professor Alexander MacBeath,
who lectured at St. Andrews in 1948~9. The work is solely
concerned with the foundations of ethics and he deals with the
moral and social life of the Trobriand Islanders, Crow Indians,
Australian aborigines and a Bantu tribe.
5. Further Studies in Primitive Religion
A number of lecturers have turned to early European
culture to find the roots of later religions. The pre-philo-
sophical stages of Greek religion were discussed by L.R.Farnell
at St.St. Andrews in 1920. His Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of
Immortality is concerned with religious origins and the
relationship between hero worship and divine worship with little
reference to the philosophical thought of the early Greeks.
His second series of lectures in 1924-25 deals with !£!
Attributes of Go'. This is an historical and factual account
of the concepts of God held in various primitive religions, and
only in the closing chapter does the lecturer touch on
metaphysical problems and then only to indicate them.
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Similarly in Asianic Elements ~ Greek Civilisation W.M.Ramsay
examined textual and archaeological evidence in an attempt to
find the antecedents of Hellenism, tracing social and religious
customs to their early beginnings in Crete and Asia Minor.
William Ridgeway made a similar ethnological study of the
evolution of Greek and Roman religion, when he lectured at
Aberdeen in 1909-11, but these lectures were never Published.22
Primitive Roman religion was one of the themes of Rodo1fo
Lanciani's strange miscellany, published as New Tales £!~
Rome in 1901. Mention should be made in this connection of
Edwyn Bevan's Holy Images, which contains the first four of his
Gifford lectures. The later lectures, published in Symbolism
and Belief, are much better known. The earlier lectures take
the form of an enquiry into idolatry and the use of images in
paganism and Christianity.
6. The Living God of Revelation
Again and again lecturers have returned to the problem
involved in the distinction between natural and revealed
religion. The problem is not solved by speaking of general
and special revelation as John Baillie pointed out :
" While greatly preferring the distinction between a
general and special revelation to the traditional one
between a natural and revealed knowledge, I cannot find
it wholly satisfactory. Not all the light that God has
imparted to the various pagan peoples in the course of
their historical experience is general to them all;
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there is something that is special to each.,,23
This co~viction that there is something special about all
revelation is the dominant theme of Soderblom's lectures on
rhe Living ~.
Archbishop Soderblom of Upsala lectured at Edinburgh
in 1931 a few months before his death. He was primarily a
theologian and churchman, but he had been interested in the
history of religions and particularly in Iranian religion from
his student days when he had been greatly influenced by C.P.
Tiele, one of his predecessors at Edinburgh. The Archbishop
speaks quite readily of the revelation given to the peoples of
24India and Persia, and of the revelation to the Greeks.
Progress may be explained in part in terms of natural evolution,
but all religion is revealed religion. The very use of the
term revelation implies that initiative lies with God. Soderblom
quotesW.P.P.aterson's Gifford lectures with approval:
" When we trace the course of religious history so far
as it is known, and when we study its golden ages, and
.specially the origins and achievements of Christianity,
there is a very considerable body of evidence to justify
the belief that the living God has had to do with the
historical process.,,25
Soderblom believes that the living God who has revealed himself
to thePersians, Greeks and Indians has revealed himself
supremely in Judaism and Christianity. Real religion wherever
it is experienced is a meeting with God - not psychological
discipline or a rationally created metaphysic. He declares :
" Piety in the Bible is never mere psychology - never
monologue in the proper sense, never philosophical
26discourse - but drama."
Religion is concerned with the right relationship to God and in
this drama man is not a spectator; man and God are both actors.
Religion is meeting with God, not just thinking about him. If
this is true of all religion then we must look again at Lord
Gifford's exclusion of so-called miraculous revelation. To
exclude any possibility of revelation is to treat God as if he
were an object to be discovered rather than a personal being who
can know and be known. If Soderblom i~ right then our only hope
of knowing God is through religion, and natural theology is
an attempt to think a8 clearly as we can about God. Soderblom
does not specifically draw this conclusion concerning the function
ot natural theology, but if true knowledge of God depends on
the I-Thou relationship he describes then natural theology may
elucidate the idea ot God but it cannot present the living God.
Z. The Essence of Religion
In A Pluralistic Universi? William James analysed the
process whereby an individual comes to accept a faith for himself.
Xe recognises that rational argument may playa part at the
beginning, but faith i8 more than thinking that something is
likely or that it ought to be true. There is something more in
religion which meets a deep need of human nature. In his
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Varieties ~ Religious Experience James set out to examine this
something more offered by religion, which is not to be found in
reasoned theories about the nature of the universe. He concluded:
" The theories which religion generates ••• are secondary;
and if you wish to grasp her essence, you must look to the
feelings and the conduct as being the more constant
elements. It is between these two elements that the
short circuit exists on which she carries on her principal
business, while the ideas and symbols and other
institutions form loop-lines which may be perfections and
improvements, and may even some day be united into one
harmonious system, but which are not to be regarded as
organs with an indispensable function, necessary at all
28times for religious life to go on."
There is truth in this, but the "faith-state" will not long
continue if the rational theory to which it is linked is
undermined. Once Dorothy discovered that the Wizard of Oz was
only a little man with a microphone and a box of tricks all
fear was gone. A man will not truly worship or direct his
conduct towards certain ideals unless he believes that his God
is real. Here natural theology may help in the provision of
rational support for a position held by faith. We cannot describe
the Varieties as natural theology but William James helps to
elucidate the part to be played by natural theology. Once again
we are reminded that theology grows out of religion rather than
religion out of theology.
W.P.Paterson's Nature £! Religion provides a threefold
argument for the truths of religion. First, he argues that
religion would not have evolved unless it had some useful
function to serve. When one form of religion has decayed another
has taken its place and higher forms have replaced lower
manifestations. This, he argues, provides a strong prima facie
case for the truth of Christianity as the highest form of
religion. Unfortunately the same kind of argument can b. used
to show that man will ultimately grow out ot a theistic type
of religion. Secondly, religion has expanded man's thought
•concerning himselt and the universe; it has opened the way to
philosophy and has given .an a purpose without which lite would
be meaningless; it has given man an optimistic world view.
Neither ot these arguments, however, meet the objection that
religion may be just a usetul development in man's early
evolution to be replaced later by a more mature philosophy.
Paters'on's third argument is more fundamental but it is a
declaration ot the self-evidence of religious truth rather than
an argument :
" The most obvious reason whJlreligion has been believed
by man is, as Coleridge put it, that it found him, or in
Bosanquet's phrase, that he felt this was the real thing~~
The ultimate ground of assurance for Paterson is a faith
supported by but not established by reason. He concludes :
" I am disposed to think that the best reason which the
Christian Church or the Christian man has for believing
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his religion to be true i8 that, made as he is and seeing in
it what he sees, he is constrained to believe it to b.
true.~ 30
The Buddhist, Mohammedan and the Jew might make similar
assertions. Yet when a man asserts faith h. is usually also
asserting that the religion of his choice provides him with
the most reasonable account of the nature of things and if he
finds unreasonable elements he devises a philosophy of religion
to demonstrate that they are only apparently unreasonable.
It is with this latter rational approach to religion that
natural theology is concerned.
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1. Th. Shadow of Hegel
"Speculative philosophy," says Whitehead, "is the endeavour
to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of geDera1 ideas
in terms of which every element in our experience can be
interpreted.,,1 The task of the metaphysician is to build up
a picture of the universe from the thousand and one oddly shaped
jig-saw pieces of empirical experience. Unfortunately he has
no guarantee that all the pieces are there or even that the
pieces he has belong to the same puzzle. From his narrower
experience of the separate sciences he concludes that some of
the pieces fit together and he follows a metaphysical hunch
which suggests that there is indeed one gigantic picture into
which all the parts fit. The sky is always the most difficult
part ot a jig-saw puzzle and metaphysicians have their own
problems with the "sky". Indeed they are otten accused of
introducing extra pieces - intuitions or revelations - in order
to complete the picture. Th. Hege1iane assumed that there i8
a complete picture, that all the bite do indeed tit together,
and that every tiny piece ot experience i8 necessary to make
eenee of the universe. To follow our jig-saw analogy, Hegel
believed that religion gives you the picture on the box!
Less prosaically Hegel says :
" As on the summit of a mountain, removed from all hard
distinctness of detail, we calmly overlook the limitations
ot the landscape and the world, so by religion we are
75
lifted above all the obstruction of finitude. In
religion, therefore, man beholds his own existence in a
transfigured reflexion, in which all the divisions,
all the crude lights and shadows of the world, are
softened into eternal peace under the beams of a
spiritual sun.w2
Through religion man sees himself as part of the Absolute, or
to use Hegel's terminology, "religion is the Divine Spirit's
knowledge of itself through the mediation of finite spirit.'~
Sixty years after the death of Hegel British philosophers
were still under his spell and traces of Hegelian thought are
to be found in almost all the early Gifford lecturers who can
fairly be described as philosophers.
2. Neo-Hegelianism
" God is the beginning of all things, and the end of all
4things," wrote Hegel. "All our life," wrote Edward Caird,
"is a journey from God to God.,,5 God is the beginning and
the end of knowledge. Caird gives unqualified approval to
Hegel's description of religion. For Caird God is transcendent
and external as well as immanent, but it is the immanence that
he stresses. Caird claims that Christianity, with certain
qualifications, i8 the true type of religion but he also
recognises that some non-Christian religions manifest the true
religious spirit. In his lectures at St. Andrews Caird traced
in Hegelian fashion the evolution of religion. Greek religious
thought is the type of objective religion; God is immanent in
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the world of nature. Jewish religion ie subjective; God ie
revealed in the moral consciousness of man. Christianity ie the
type of universal religion, embracing the subjective and the
objective element •• This, in brief, is the thesis of Caird's
Evolution ~ Religion.
R.B.Haldane, in hie Fathway 12 Reality, describes Hegel
as "the greatest master of abstract thought that the world has
seen since the day when Aristotle died".6 An admirer of Hegel,
he defends him against many critics, and, although he admits
difficulties in Hegelian interpretation, he confesses at the
end of the first series of lectures :
" All that is in these lectures I have either taken or
adapted from Hegel, and that in Hegel there is twice as
much again of equal importance which these lectures cannot
e'Yentouch.,,7
God, for Haldane, is the Ultimate Reality, into which all else
, 8
can be resolved. God is not Substance but Subject.9 God is
10defined as "mind that comprehends itself completely".
Finally Haldane expresses his own conclusions in one of his many
Hegelian quotations.
" God is God only in so far as He knows Himself; Ris
self-knowledge is, further, His self-consciousness in
man, and man's knowledge of God, which proceeds to man's
self-knowledge in God.,,11
In the Hegelian sense, then, man can find God through reason;
indeed, reason is the only satisfactory pathway to Reality_
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A year after Haldane had lectured at st. Andrews, S.S.
Laurie occupied the Gifford Chair at Edinburgh. His published
lectures take the form of meditations under the Hegelian sounding
12title, Synthetica. Here again we have almost pure Hegelianism
though it is variously described as Natural Realism or Absolute
Idealism.13 Logical demonstrative proof of theism is an
impossible task in Laurie's view. He does not propose to
demonstrate the existence of God so much as to "point Him out"
or "show Bim to be there". Be says :
" Ultimate philosophy as a synthetic presentation does
not take the form of a demonstration, but is rather as
"14lucid a statement as possible of what we see.
The world is a unity and God is the Object as revealed to the
finite mind but is finally the AbsoluteSynthesis.15
" The Absolute Synthesis is God; and there can be no
other God." What men have often called God has not bee~
false, but only one aspect of the total content of the
Notion." 16
" God is All; All in All; One; One in Many;
Identity in Difference.,,17
The problem of evil in the world is resolved by declaring evil
to be ~egation necessary for the fulfilment of the creative
purpose. Discord, pain and death are conditions of the
possibility of finite life. Man struggles on, seeing himself
as part of the externalisation of God and his own struggles as
part of the creative activity. He is made for more than this
78
world and he carries into a further life all that has been
valuable in his ethical experience.
Henry Jones, a disciple of Edward Caird, was one of the
last of the Hegelian lecturers. He lectured at Glasgow in the
years 1920-21. With Caird he believed that the Absolute must
18be personal. The indwelling of God constitutes the
personality of the individual and empowers him with freedom.
In this way Henry Jones safeguards the necessities of both
morality and religion. The faith that Henry Jones expounded
was not classical Christianity but his own form of Hegelian
Christianity. "It was, he believed, 'a faith that enquires and
invites enquiry', 'without one strand of superstition',
capable of meeting the most rigorous demands of scientific
method and yet of satisfying man's profound religious
aspiratione.n19 So Henry Jones's biographer described this
heroic statement at taith, prepared and delivered under the
shadow of an illness that was to prove fatal. The title of the
lectures, ! Faith ~ Enquires, may give us a clue to the
function of natural theology in relation to faith. Henry Jones
did not reason his way to his .aith but nevertheless brought
his reasoning to bear on his faith.
,. Absolute Idealism
Josiah Royce,· the first American scholar to occupy a
Gifford chair, propounded his own particular brand of Idealism
at Aberdeen at the turn of the century. All individual
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experience is shown to be partial and fragmentary. Meaning can
only be found in the "Individual of Individuals, namely the
Absolute or God himself".20 In the first volume of The World
~ !h! Individual four possible interpretations of being are
discussed. Realism is written off as unsatisfactory; Mysticism
as defining I1RealBeing as WhollY' within Immediate Feeling"
has severe limitations; what Royce describes as Critical
Rationalism faces the same problems as realism in that we have
no means of getting at the supposed "real" world apart from
ideas. After critical appraisal of these conceptions or
misconceptions C?fBeing ROY'ce expounds a fourth way, "the
Synthetic or the constructive Idealistic conception of what it
is to be".21 This means that :
" Being is
(1) a complete expression of the internal meaning of the
finite idea with which, in anY' case, we start our quest~
(2) a complete fulfilment of the will or purpose partially
embodied in this idea;
(3) an individual life for which no other can be
substituted.,,22
Royce's specific contribution lies in his definition of internal
mean~g in terms of will or purpose. The external meaning is
dependent upon the internal meaning and, since purpose is
essentially mental, the Absolute or the ultimately Real is
the ideal communitY' of all purposes. In the Absolute the
finite and the infinite, the one and the many, the world and
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the individual, God and man find their unity.23 God, for Royce,
is personal. Eternally viewed, God's life is the infinite
whole that includes the endless temporal processes and consciously
surveys it as one life. Temporally viewed his life is the
entire realm of moment to moment consciousness.24 His final
conclusion concerning the relationship of the individual to
the Absolute is expressed in his closing paragraph.
" Despite God's absolute unity, we, as individuals,
preserve and attain our unique lives and meanings, and
are not lost in the very life that sustains us, and that
needs us as its own expression. This life is real through
us all; and we are real through union with that life.
Close is our touch with the eternal.
meaning of our nature.,,25
Boundless is the
~ll this, of course, does not constitute a proof of the
existence of God, but then, if realism - in the sense that
objects exist "outside" which correspond to our ideas - is
dismissed, it is difficult to see what proof is possible.
What Royce provides is a metaphysical system within which it is
possible to account for religious experience without
contradiction. Perhaps this is all that Idealism can do.
This was the conclusion arrived at by Professor A.C.Bradley
in his Glasgow lectures, delivered in 1907 but not published
until 1940. He wrote :
" The truth, the secret of things, God, is not
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something far off and clouded in impenetrable mystery;
it is within us, and the very centre of our being, and
we have only to look there to find it. To prove God is
not only impossible, it is a senseless endeavour, because
God is already implied in the very centre of the thought
which sets out to prove him.
26the implication clear."
All you can do is to make
Andrew C.Bradley, Professor of Poetry at Oxford, was the
younger brother of the distinguished author of Appearance ~
Reality. While reflecting his brother's thought, he brings
the insights of poetry to his metaphysical interpretation of
the universe. The scientific picture, he reminds us, is
fragmentary and analytic whereas poetry sees reality as a whole
and unifies experience. Poetry is not true in the scientific
sense, yet the poet sees truth that the scientist may miss.27
Similarly religious language does not yield literal truth but
nevertheless expresses religious truth. The problem of the
figurative use of height, for instance, which seems to have
28unduly disturbed present day thought ,was discussed and
dismissed by Bradley in 1907.29 Whether we can ever really know
God is problematic for the Absolute Idealist and the identification
of God and the Absolute has its own difficulty succinctly
expressed,' by F.R.Bradley.
" If you identify the Absolute with God, that is not the
God of religion. If again you separate them, God becomes
a finite factor in the Whole.,,30
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A.C.Bradley avoids the use of the term "Absolute" and does not
seem to be worried about the distinction. At times he uses the
term "Kingdom of God" to suggest the unity within which God and
finite individuals are brought together; at other times he writes
as if God himself were that unity. Ultimately there can be no
discord and through the struggle against evil and through
suffering man seeks his supreme good in the infinite.
Bernard Bosanquet, who lectured at Edinburgh in 1911-12,
adhered much more closely to the teaching of F.H.Bradley.
Logically the principle of non-contradiction involves a world
which is a "whole" and so truth can be defined as the whole.31
The individual only finds his fulfilment as he discovers himself
as part of the whole. The universe is, in the well known phrase
of Keats, a vale of soul-making. Like F.H.Bradley, Bosanquet
distinguishes between the God of religious experience and the
Absolute. The God of religion is ultimately only an appearance
of Reality. In the language of Christian theology God is
described as Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Creator and
Providence, but none of these terms can be applied to the
Absolute which has nothing outside itself. Religion pre-
supposes a personal God with whom personal relations are
possible as with other selves. Yet once again we are reminded
that religion is unable to prove the existence of such a God.
Religion "is an experience of God, not a proof of him".32
Through religion the individual gains assurance of the stability
of life; he is no longer hemmed in by the hazards and bardships
of finite life; he is saved from isolation. He wins his place
in the Absolute, or rather, he wins knowledge of his place in
the Absolute.
C.A.Campbell, lecturing at St. Andrews in 1953-55,
offered a revised idealism, combining moral and metaphysical
arguments to support what he describes as supra-rational theism.
He himself declares that his answers differ from F.H.Bradley's
and Bosanquet's only in their mode of presentation and not in
their substance33 and in his concluding chapters he follows
Bradley's arguments closely. On the basis of non-contradiction
he argues to the unity, infinitude and eternity of ultimate
reality. In face of the difficulty, inherent in idealism,
of saying anything positive about the Absolute he is driven to
assert that the propositions ascribing these qualities to
reality are literally true in what they deny but only
symbolically true in what they affirm. For instance,
H When we say that reality is a unity, we deny that
there is a plurality of reals; and there is nothing
merely symbolic about this negation. But in so far as
we are also, in saying that reality is a unity, assigning
to it a positive character, this positive character can
only have symbolic significance. For no thinkable
unity can be appropriate to the kind of unity that reality
possesses.H34
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In the same way ,
It Mind or spirit • • • cannot be more than a symbol of
the perfect unity in difference that characterises the
non-contradictory ultimate reality which we may for
convenience designate 'the supreme being of metaphysics,.~5
Campbell finally draws together the three strands of his argument.
The ultimate reality of metaphysics, the mysterium tremendum et
fascinans of religious experience and the ~ God, the Moral
Governor of the World are one. He believes that if theism be
interpreted in supra-rational terms there is good corroboration
for all the major articles of the theistic creed save one.36
Constructive philosophy, in his v~ew, can neither sustain nor
refute specific divine manifestations in human experiene ••
Critics may interpret Campbell's supra-rational symbolic theism
as 'agnosticism in disguise' but he believes he is saying
something meaningful about God for on his terms we cannot reach
the supra-rational any other way than through the rational.·37
4. Personal Idealism
Immediately after the publication of Bosanquet's two
volumes Pringle-Pattison lectured at Aberdeen on ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ Light ~ Recent Philosophy. In the first course he
discussed the thought of Hume and Kant and subsequent nineteenth
century developments, reserving the second course for the
criticism of the Absolute Idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet
and the exposition of his own metaphysical system. Bosanquet's
description of the individual as merely adjectival and hie view
of God as a manifestation of the Absolute are not adequate, in
Pringle-Pattison's judgment, to account for actual personal
and religious experience. God and man are bound together not as
aspects of the Absolute but as personalities in relationship.
Man needs God as "Creator" but creation is not to be understood
in any crude sense of the term; the world of nature is an
eternal manifestation of God rather than his "creation". To
speak of "the eternal purpose of God" is the most fitting
description of the relation of the time-world to the divine
totality.
" !!~ finite world means anything 12~, the ideas
of activity and purpose are indispensable. If he is not
himself active in the process, he is no more than the
Eternal Dreamer, and the whole time-world becomes the
illusion which many absolutist systems pronounce it to b'?"
So in a sense God needs man for the fulfilment of his eternal
purpose. He is
" no God, or Absolute, existing in solitary bliss and
perfection, but a God who lives in the perpetual giving
of himself, who shares the life of his finite creatures,
bearing in and with them the whole burden of their
finitude, their sinful wanderings and sorrows, and the
40suffering without which they cannot be made perfect."
The Christian concept of God is the highest and truest but
Pringle-Pattison considers that the doctrine of the Trinity
86
would be better understood as the profoundeat and most
intelligible attempt to express the indwelling of God in man
rather than as a supra-rational mystery concerning the inner
constitution of a transcendent Godhead.41 As we have seen this
approach was developed later by C.A.Campbell.
On hia second appointment at Edinburgh in 1922-23,
Pringle-Pattison chose as his theme ~ ~ ~ Immort&lity.
He is with Bosanquet and Keats in seeing the world as a vale
42of soul-making. Eternal life is the goal which may be
experienced here and now or beyond what is called death. He
differs from the Absolute Idealists who hold that the richness
of the Absolute consists in .the 106S of identity of the
individuals. For Pringle-fattison and the Personal Idealists
the value of the Absolute is enhanced by the interplay of
individuals.
Clement Webb traversed similar ground at Aberdeen just
after the first World War. The fundamental problem for
Idealists is the relationship of God and the Absolute. Wi reach
the Absolute by metaphysical speculation; we reach God through
religious experience. Webb recognises that if our theism is
to be satisfying the supreme God must also be the supreme
Reality.43 Making this identification involves the use of
religious language within the sphere of metaphysics. Since
religious language is frequently symbolic from time to time
there may be need for a new symbolism or at least a
reinterpretation ot the 01d.44 Here we have once again a
foreshadowing of C.A.Campbellts solution of the dilemma. Webb
claims that to speak ot a "personal" God is not another torm ot
anthropomorphic theology.45 Personality is seen in God not as
something that depends on his relationship with man but as
"a relation within the lite ot God himselt".46 A "personal"
God is one with whom personal relationship is possible tor his
worshippers.47 In Christianity we eee most clearly what is
meant by a personal God largely because ot the doctrine of
divine incarnation. Thus a satistactory detence ot a personal
God can only be based on religious experien... It is ditficult
to see how we can reconcile the Supreme Reality of metaphysics
and the God of religious experience except ~y an act of faith
or a supra-rational theology, which is perhaps the same thing
in the end.
5 Body, Mind and God
The body-mind relationship has been one of the tormenting
problems of philosophy, and in a century in which so much had
ween discovered about the physical world a naturalistic solution
of the problem was almost inevitable. At the beginning of the
nineteenth century La Place had boasted to Napoleon that in his
account ot the universe any theistic hypothesis was superfluous.
In spite of Paley and the Bridgewater treatises this view gained
ground. Science would eventually be able to solve all mysteries
that were worth solving and the rest could be safely left. So
88
in the closing years of the century James Ward could write of
the theistic problem,
" Naturalism speaking in the name ot science, declares
the problem superfluous, and agnosticism, professing to
represent reason, declares it to be insoluble.,,48
In the true spirit of Lord Gifford James Ward set out to answer
the arguments of naturalism and agnosticism. In 1896 when Ward
opened his lectures at Aberdeen, psychology was still regarded
as a branch of philosophy and not as a svience. Ward was
psychologist and philosopher. Although he is perhaps best known
as the author of Psychological Principles, his Gifford lectures
are metaphysical. He attempts to show that there is "more in
heaven and in earth than is dreamt ot by the naturalistic
PhilosoPh;rtt.49 A mechanical or purely evolutionary explanation
of the universe is merely an abstraction and therefore inadequat~.
As a psychologist Ward was particularly interested in the
body-mind relationship. Mind, he declares, is not amenable
to mechanistic explanation. Man is rational and asks questions
nature, which shows itself to be rational in the answers given.
Thus finall;r, "the realm of Nature turns out to be a realm ot
, 51Ends" •
The Realm of Ends was to be the title of Ward's lectures
at St. Andrews some nine years later. In these lectures he
developed his philosophical position which may be described as
Spiritualistic Monism, which, he claims, is compatible with
an empirical pluralism. Rudolf Metz sums up Ward's achievement
in this way :
" Pluralism finds its completion in theism. This
crowning position of his system Ward reaches with a bold
speculative leap from the finite and relative plurality
of monads to an infinite and absolute unity. The
existence of the many is grounded in and aims at the
divine; God is both their source and their end. Theism
is thus the base and crown of pluralism.,,52
So once again but this time from a somewhat different approach
we reach yet another variety of idealism. In common with other
Wardthinkers of his day/ found~a place for evolutionary development
but God is at the beginning and not merely at the end. The
world is not created just for the glory of God but is an
expression of love.
" The world is God's self-limitation. self-renunciation
might we venture to say? And God is love. And what must
the world be that is worthy of such love? The only
worthy object of love is just love. But love is free:
in a ready made'world then it could have no place. Only
as we learn to know God do we learn to love him : hence
the long and painful discipline of evolution, with !!!
dying to live - the converse process of incarnation -
the putting off ot the earthly for the likeness of God.,,53
This is the highest possible concept of the end for which the
world came into being, and, Ward claims, it is no more than
rational to believe the best.
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G.F.Stout, like Ward, whose pupil he was, is better known
for his studies in psychology. The Gifford lectureship afforded
him the opportunity of systematising the findings of his earlier
studies, which were mainly psychological, and to express his
philosophical conclusions in a comprehensive work. Although the
lectures were given in 1919-21, Mind and Natter was not--;._...;...;.~
published until 1931 and the second volume, ~ ~ Nature,
appeared posthumously in 1952. In the first volume materialism
is dismissed as an unsatisfactory explanation of the body-mind
relationship. Mind is fundamantal and, Stout holds,
t1 It is wrong to hold that matter can have a separate
being and nature of its own which is in any manner or
degree independent of the mind which creates it.n54
His final conclusions are in line with traditional idealism.
t1 Mind, as I maintain, must be fundamental in the
Universe of Being and not derivative from anything that
is not mind. If we discard mind-stuff theories as
.
failing to account for individual selves, and monad ism
as failing to account for anything else, we are bound to
posit one universal and eternal Mind developing and
expressing itself in the world of finite and changeable
beings which we call Jlature.,,55
The further problem of the relationship between God and Nature
is reserved for the second volume. It could be that Nature
itself is the Absolute Mind, but for Stout God is not to b.
identified with Nature; rather God is embodied in Nature.
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Stout argues from tbe Unity of Knowledge and the Unity of the
Universe to the existence ot a Universal Mind. Not until the
closing pages does he identify the Universal ~dnd and the God
of theism.56 No proof is claimed but Stout declares that the
position is indeed "logically detensible".
The first world war generated a new interest in psychology
not merely because of its therapeutic value but because of the
strange mixture of motives that had proved to have power to
move millions of people to act in a common cause. Because of
57this new interest Sir William Mitchell chose as his subject
at Aberdeen in 1924-26 the place and power of minds. The first
course, published as ~ Place of Minds ~ !h! World, does not
reach a point where any relevance to natural theology is
apparent, though a purely materialistic concept of mind is
dismissed. The second course dealt with the power of minds in
the world, but the lectures have not been published.
6. Realist Metaphysics
While it is true that most of the earlier Gifford
lecturers subscribed to an idealism of one form or another,
other schools of thought were not unrepresented. Bergson,
Alexander and Lloyd Morgan within a decade lectured at Edinburgh,
Glasgow and st. Andrews respectively. They were moving away
on the one hand from nineteenth century idealism and on the
other from a purely mechanistic naturalism. Lloyd Morgan was
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primari17 a scientist, who saw metaph7sicS as something
superimposed on science. He quotes Bergson with approval,
" Philosophy ought to follow science in order to
superimpose on scientific truth a knowledge of another
kind which may be called metaPh7sical.,,58
Bergson's Gifford lectures were not completed owing to the
outbreak of war, nor were such lictures as were given
subsequently published. Undoubtedly Bergson's Creative
Evolution influenced Alexander and Ll07d Morgan, widely different
though their conclusions were.
Alexander saw metaphysics as an attempt "to describe the
ultimate nature of existence if it has any." 59 Space ~ ~
Deity is his attempt to build a framework within which the
findings of science and the data of ordinary ezperience make
sense. Space-Time is the foundation of this framework, and
his own cOffimentarybrings out the distinction between space-time
as a mathematical concept and space-time as a metaphyisical idea.
He tells us in the prelace to a new impression of Space ~
and Deity
" The hypothesis of the book is that Space-Time is
the stuff of which matter and all things are specifications.
That the world does not exist in Space and Time, bit in
Space-Time, that is a world ot events, has and had, even
when I wrote, become common property through ~e
mathematicians, with whom, as I suppose, the conception
was a.pd.ec e of scientific intuition. The method which
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brought me to the same result was purely metaphysical,
a piece ot plodding analysis." 60
There can be nothing beyond Space and Time. It is the
61primordial stutt out ot which all existents are made. Not even
God is exempt from this condition. "Call it what you will,
universe or God or the One, 62it is not above Space and Time."
Under Alexander's guidance we arrive at the concept ot God
trom two directions. On the one hand God is the object ot the
religious emotion just as food is the object ot the appetite.63
Now we know independently that there is such a thing as food,
but we cannot have the same satistaction concerning the existence
ot God; it could be that the idea ot God is a man-made
satistaction. Thus we need such contirmation ot God's existence
as metaphysics can aftord. In this way it comes about that
religion leans on metaphysics tor the justitication ot the
reality of its object, while philoaphy leans on religion to
justify calling what Alexander describes as "the possessor of
64deity" by the religious name ot God. Thus,
" God is the whole world as possessing the quality of
deity. ot such a being the whole world is the 'body' and
deity is the 'mind'. Eut this possessor of deity is not
actual but ideal. As an actual existent, God is the
infinite world with its nisus towards deity, or, to
adapt a phrase of Leibniz, as big in travail with deity.,,65
God is thus immanent in that he includes all finite existence
but transcendent by nature of his deity. While religion will
conceive of God as existing here and now and everywhere,
metaphysically God is emergent. God is Omega rather than Alpha,
the terminus ~ quem rather than the terminus! quo. This
concept of God can never satisfy the religious .onsciousness,
66which as Clement Webb remarks , demands not merely a prospective
but an actual God, who already possesses the nature we worship.
Alexander's philosophy illustrates the difficulty that metaphysics
always encounters. Unless the philosopher begins with a concept
of God arising from faith and worship he is not likely to end
with a m.taphysical God who commands worship. The metaphysician
must always be able to say at the end of his argument, as Aquinas
did, "and this we call God".
Lloyd Morgan's metaphysical approach is similar to
Alexander's in many respects. " Neither of them," wrote Rudolf
Metz, "is pupil ot the other, but both are masters, who in their
works supplement, help and urge forward each other.,,67 We need
only concentrate here on their divergences. Where Alexander
follows the way of "plodding analysis" to reach his ultimate
conclusions, Lloyd Morgan acknowledges his personal religious
conviction at the outset.
" For bett.r or worse, while I hold that the proper
attitude of naturalism is strictly agnostic, therewith It
for one, cannot rest content. For better or worse, I
acknowledge God as the Nisus through whose ActiYity
emergents emerge, and the whole course of emergent
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evolution is directed. Such is my philosophic creed,
68supplementary to my scientific policy of interpretation."
Lloyd Morgan tells us that in the presence of a mystery a
mystical approach is inevitable. The Divine Purpose is revealed
in the passing life of man.69 It is not enough to acknowledge
God as part of emergent evolution, as above and beyond; we
must also intuitively enjoy His activity within us.70 Lloyd
Morgat7l1t~i~gmore than Alexander, who wrote,
" Were the passion towards God not already lit, no
speculative contemplation or proof of the existence or
attributes of a metaphysical God would make him
-71worshipful.h
Yet it is quite clear that for Alexander the God of religion
does not yet "exist" while for Lloyd Morgan the God of emergent
evolution is also the God of religious experience. We should
note that while Alexander claims that his conclusions are purely
metaphysical Lloyd Morgan acknowledges the religious nature of
his assertions. This supports the Kantian view of the function
of natural theology in respect to faith. It may support a
faith derived from another source but it is impotent to create
one.
When Whitehead speaks of the creativity of the world as
the throbbing emotion of the past hurling itself into new
transcendent fact,72 we recognise immediately that we are still
in the world of Alexander and Lloyd Morgan. Whitehead's universe
is an organism within which all the parts are mutually
dependent, and in Process ~ Reality, the Gifford lectures of
1927-28, this metaphysic of organism is worked out in great
detail. Speculative philosophy must interpret every element
in our experience and therefore religious experience must find
a place. "Philosophy may not neglect the multifariousness of
the world - the fairies dance, and Christ is nailed to the
Cross."??; So if people do worship or claim what they call
religious experience then any metaphysical scheme must
recognise these facts, even if ultimately they are dismissed
as illusions.
The three images of God, familiar to western thought, -
the imperial ruler, the personification of moral energy, the
ultimate philosophical principle - are dismissed. Whitehead
continues
" There is however, in the Galilean origin of
Christianity yet another suggestion which doesnot tit very
well with any of the three main strands of thought.
It does not emphasise the ruling Caesar, or the ruthless
moralist, or the unmoved mover. It dwells upon the
tender elements in the world, which slowly and in
quietness operate by love; and it finds purpose in the
present immediacy of a kingdom not of this world. Love
neither rules, nor is it unmoved; also it is a little
oblivious as to morale.,,?4
Whitehead offers no proof of the being and nature of God, but
otfers his speculations, adding, as it were, "another speaker to
that masterpiece, Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion,,?5
There are two phases ot the being and nature of God described
as primordial and consequent. As primordial God is described
as "the unlimited conceptual realisation of the absolute wealth
of potentiality". He is not before all creation but ~ all
creation, and here we are reminded of Alexander's God particular~
when God is described by Whitehead as "defivient1y actual".
The primordial nature is constituted by his "conceptual
experience" and in that sense is deficiently actual. His
consequent nature originates with physical experience within the
temporal world.
" It is determined, incomplete, consequent, 'ever-
lasting', fully actual and conscious. His necessary
goodness expresses the determination of his consequent
nature."?6
God is described as saving the world as it passes into the
immediacy of his own life; there is a tender care that nothing
be lost. God is the poet of the world, with tender patience
leading it by his vision ot truth, beauty and goodness.??
In the concluding paragraphs of Process ~ Reality Whitehead
describes the four creative phases in which the universe
accomplishes actuality. The first is conceptual origination;
the second a temporal phase of physical origination; in the
third phase of perfected actuality the multiplicity of phase
two gives way to unity - the many become one. The final phase
can best be described in Whitehead's own words:
" The action of the fourth phase is the love of God for
the world. It is the particular providence for particular
occasions. What is done in the world is transformed into
a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes
back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal
relation, the love in the world passes into the love in
heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this
sense, God is the great companion - the fellow-sufferer
who understands." 78
Because the love of the world passes back into the love of
heaven the craving for immortality is satisfied. Our immediate
actions take on importance because in some sense they pass into
the Being of God. Whitehead often uses the language of
orthodoxy and has sometimes been hailed as a Christian philo-
sopher, but as soon as he declares that "it is as true to say
that God creates the World, as that the World creates God" he
parts company with Christian orthodoxy. E.L.Yascall, who
recognises the valuable insights of Whitehead's work suggests
that if he had taken Christian scholasticism as seriously as
he takes the ancient Greeks, Whitehead might well have gone far
towards providing the modern philosophical world with an
urgently needed synthesis.79 The speculative philosophy of
Alexander, Lloyd Morgan and Whitehead underlines the
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problem involved in substituting a metaphysically produced God
for the God of religion.
? Pragma tiem
William James popularised Pragmatism and in his Gifford
lectures set out to demonstrate the psychological value of
religious experience. For the pragmatist the proof of the
pudding is in the eating and if it is good for a man to be
religious then for that man religion is true. James is prepared
80to say that God is real since he produces real effects, and in
the closing chapter of Varieties he declares that while he has
no philosophical justification for what he calls his over-belief
it is in living by this ove~elief that he finds satisfaction,
But the God he believes in is not necessarily the sole ruler of
the universe. He writes,
" I believe the pragmatic way of taking religion to be
the deeper way. It gives it body as well as soul, it
makes its claim, as everything real must claim, some
characteristic realm of fact as its very own. What the
more characteristically divine facts are, apart from the
actual inflow of energy in the faith-state and the
prayer-state, I know not. But the over-belief on which
I am prepared to make my personal venture is that they
81exist."
This may indeed be a satisfying religious faith, but it does
not offer any metaphysical justification for asserting the
existence of God.
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While William James's pragmatism led him to a religious
faith the pragmatism of John Dewey, who lectured at Edinburgh
in 1929, led to something more like positivism. The aim of life
is purely practical. When man is questing for certainty it is
not because he wants to solve speculative problems but because
practical issues are involved. Dewey sees the pragmatic approach
to reality as a Copernican revolution, "which looks to security
82amid change instead of to certainty in attachment to the fixed".
The old centre was mind seeking certainty in the unchangeable,
whereas,
" The new centre is indefinite interactions taking place
within a course of nature which is not fixed and complete,
but which i. capable of direction to new and different
results through the mediation of intentional operations.fl83
When Dewey describes the revolution as being "from knowing as
an outsider to kgowing as an active partiCipant in the drama
84of an"on-moving world" we are very near to the language of
existentialism. Traditionally religion with its belief in an
unchanging God and a fixed creed had provided one way to
certainty in a transitory world. Science gives us instrumental
knowledge but it is a mistake to expect scientific knowledge to
substantiate moral and religious beliefs. In any case, Dewey
claims, knowledge is not the be-all and end-all of life, the
only means of access to the real. We meet the real in all the
activities of life, in thought and feeling and supremely in
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action. The religion we reach under Dewey's guidance is much
attenuated. It is "devoted to inspiration and cultivation of
the sense of ideal possibilities in the actua1".85 It thus
provides no certain knowledge of God or of the universe but
offers a challenge to action. In his concluding paragraph
Dewey defines the task of philosophy as he sees it:
" It has to search out and disclose the obstructions;
to criticize the habits of mind that stand in the way;
to focus reflection upon needs congruous to present life;
to interpret the conclusions of science with respect to
their consequences for our beliefs about purposes and
values in all phases of life.1t86
Dewey's philosophy has much in common with the moral theory
expounded some years later by his fellow countryman, R.B.Perry.
8. Tentative Conclusion
The question, It Canst thou by metaphysics find out God?"
seems destined to receive a negative answer. The idealist
philosophers come nearest to showing us God, but on closer
with the assumptionexamination we find that they begi~that there is one
comprehensive purpose embodied in the Absolute, so that they
either show us a God who is less than the Absolute or simply
add to the Absolute the Thomist formula "and this we call God".
On their own metaphysical theory it i8 impossible to prove'the
I
existence of a !!!! God who corresponds to any appearance we
may have discovered. The most they claim to do is to demonstrate
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the existence ot God in Laurie's sense of "pointing him out"
or "Showing him to be there". Or, they can shoW'that there is
nothing selt-contradictory about the idea of God.
The realist metaphysicians fail for a different reason.
It W'ould be easier to worship the Absolute than the emerging
developing God of Alexander or ~fuitehead. Lloyd Morgan's concept
of God is more acceptable to the traditional theist, but on
his own admission Lloyd Morgan's God is the object of faith
rather than the product of metaphysical thinking. In the same
way William James acknowledges that personal conclusions about
the being of God rest upon "over-belief". If Dewey's
conclusions are disappointing to the theist he at least has the
merit of not producing the God of religious faith in any
metaphysical disguise. William James was clearly aware of
the limitations of metaphysical argument. Religion cannot be
based on reason alone; the religious man goes the extra mile.
In James's view it is important that we should recognise our
"over-belief.:...~".Most ot us pretend," he says, "in some way
to prop it upon our philosophy, but the philosophy itself is
really propped upon the faith."B7 If this is true then we
must question any metaphysical conclusions whether they lead
to theism or atheism.
The straightforward answer to our question is that if we
could find out God through metaphysics more philosophers W'ould
be theists. Metaphysical thought may be likened to a
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computer. If we feed in faith then faith will be expressed in
some way in the answer we get. If we feed in scept~m, unbelief
will appear in the conclusion. If we feed in "nonsense" then
presumably the modern computer has some way of throwing it back
at usl Metaphysics is capable of building an edifice on the
basis of faith; metaphysics may also construct a system into
which we can build our faith; metaphysical thought may throw
back theological propositions as nonsense. Whether we can
identify any of these functions as natural theology must await
further discussion.
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1. Theo1ogia Natura1is
Raymond de SabQnde, an early exponent of Natural Theology,
published his Theo1ogia Natura1is in 1438. It is an infallible
science, he tells us, and one that "anyone can acquire in a
month and without labour".1 Its main concern is to take the
findings of science and, by a process of of induction, to show
that there is design and therefore, by a process of deduction.
a designer. Francis Bacon gave a similar interpretation of
natural theology
" Natural Theology is rightly called also Divine
Philosophy. It is defined as that spark of knowledge of
God which may be had in the light of nature and the
consideration of created things; and thus can fairly be
held to be divine in respect to its object, and natural
in respect of its source of information.,,2
William Derham's Boyle Lectures for 1713 were entitled,
Physico-Theology: ~ Demonstration 2! the Being ~ Attributes
of God from His Works of Creation. Inihis period high-sounding----.;.;.;..;..;;;;;~
names like Astrotheo1ogy. Hydrotheo1ogy, Ornithotheology, and
Pyrotheo1ogy3 were coined to describe the evidences of God to be
found in the various spheres of natural science. Pa1eY;,in the
same tradition, eoncluded:
" The marks of Design are too strong to be goClten over.
Design must have a designer. That designer must be a
10'7
person. That person is God. It is an immense
conclusion, there is a GOd.,,4
By the will of the Earl of Bridgewater the President of the
Royal Society was under obligation to appoint a pereon or
persons to produce a work
" On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, as
manifested in the Creation; illustrating such work by
all reasonable arguments, as for instance the variety and
formation of God's creatures in the animal, vegetable and
mineral kingdoms; the effect of digestion, and thereby
of conversion; the construction of the hand of man, and
an infinite variety of other arguments; as also by
discoveries ancient and mode~ in arts, sciences, and the
whole extent of literature.,,5
Adam Gifford was a child of his century in the implicit faith
he placed in science and scientific method in his attempt to
provide reasoned support for theism. The very first lecturer
at Edinburgh dismisse. any naive dependence on science, when
he declared that "the very tallest American, with the very
tallest7{elescopes will never be able to say that he spied out
GOdll•6 It was inevitable however that the appeal to science
should be made again and again and that the traditional arguments
tor the existence of God should be discussed by Gifford lecturers.
2. Theistic Arguments
Hutcheson Stirling, the first Edinburgh lecturer, discussed
108
the traditional arguments in his first series. In the second
course he dealt with criticisms of the arguments with particular
reference to Hume, Kant and Darwin. In spite of the critic~sms
Stirling still found the proofs satisfying. He declares
" The three proofs are but the single wave in the rise
of the soul, through the Trinity of the Universe, up to
the unity of GOd."?
And again
" The very thought £!~ is of that which ~, and
8cannot not-be."
Stirling still lived in the world of Hegel.
A few years later at Glasgow A.B.Bruce approached the same
subject from a slightly different angle. He recognised that
evol*tionary theories had weakened the teleological argument
in its earlier for~. Withdrawing from the field of natural
science he considered the possibility of confining the argument
from design to man's moral and spiritual development. Evolution
might apply there also, but he saw evolution as part of the
design, not degrading man in the least.
" Man, considered as in his whole being the child of
evolution, instead of being a stumbling-block to faith,
is rather the key to all mysteries, revealing at once the
meaning of the universe, the nature of God, and his own
"
destin~.,,9
In the broad sweep of history, in man's place in the universe,
in providence revealed in individual life, in the solidarity of
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the race, in election and in suffering Bruce finds the
evidence to support the theistic position. In his second series
he dealt with the idea of providence in Buddhism and Zoroastrian-
ism, in Greek, Hebrew and Christian thought and in certain more
recent thinkers, notably Robert Browning. Bruce's arguments are
not theistic proofs. Rather he provides a well-ordered
demonstration that the idea of Providence is not incompatible
with evolution and that the Christian doctrine of Providence is
the moet acceptable, satisfying alike the demands of heart,
10conscience and reason. Bruce was a biblical scholar rather
than a philosopher. His views on biblical criticism met with
disapproval in the General Assembly of the Free Church of
Scotland and his ready acceptance of evolutionary theories can
scarcely have passed without criticism in the last decade of
the nineteenth century.
In 1914 A.J.Balfour, a self-confessed amateur philosopher
but nevertheless a profound thinker, turned his attention to
the problems of design and purpose in the universe. The theory
of natural selection had not made it harder to believe in
11design but had made it easier to believe in chance. Balfour
thought that he had found a pattern within the design that
could not b. expldned by chance or by mechanical laws.
" In a strictly determined physical system, depending on
the laws of matter and energy alone, no room ~ been
found, and no room can be found, for psychical states
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at all. They are n.ovelties, whose intrusion into the
material world cannot be denied, but whose presence and
behaviour cannot be explained by the laws which the world
12obeys."
The argument finally rests on the values that emerge from man's
reactions to the natural world. The design is far deeper and
richer than any of the adjustments due to natural selection.13
The theistic arguments have been discussed many times in
passing but half a century was to elapse after Stirlings
inaugural lectures before John Laird undertook what might be
termed a full-scale examination of the proofs in 1939-40. His
lectures were subsequently published under the titles Theism
~ Cosmology and ~ ~ Deity. After discussing various
descriptions of natural theology Laird chose the term
"philosophical theiem" to describe the exercise. This, he claims,
is just another name for natural theology~4suCh a theism has the
liberty of all philoeDphy of "following the argument whithersoever
it may lead". In the former volume Laird discusses the
cosmological and teleological arguments and concludes that
neither is adequate to establish theism, even though it may
still be reasonable to believe what is not demonstravle. In
Mind ~ Deity Laird takes the Ontological argument as his
starting point. Contrasting the attitudes of Kant and Hegel,
Laird concludes that the argument is a sham but that nevertheless
what he calls the Grand Ontological Assertion may be the last
word in metaphysical insight. Finally Laird examines the moral
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proofs of theism and pOints out that such arguments and Kant's
in particular are speculative constructions rather than proofs.
ttisfinal judgment however is not unfavourable to theism. He
concludes
" While i do not think that any theistic argument is
conclusive, and am of opinion that very few theistic proofs
establish a high degree of probability, I also incline to
the belie! that theistic metaphysics is stronger than most,
and that metaphysics is not at all weak in principle despite
the strain that it puts on the human intellect. It is
quite impossible, I believe, to refute theism. A verdict
of "not proven" is easier to obtain, largely because proof
is so difficult and its standards so exacting. If
plausibility were enough, theism is much more plausible
than most other metaphysical conclusions.,,15
The half century had been more than sufficient to undermine the
optimism expressed by Lord Gifford and the confidence of the
first Edinburgh lecturer in the valility of theistic arguments.
,. Science and Natural Theology
It is quite understandable that the trustees at the several
universities should turn to the scientists to help to solve the
problems raised by Lord Gifford. It had become increasingly
clear that the natural theologian, concerned with the "why" of
the universe, must turn to the scientist for knowledge of the
"how". Both questions must be asked if design and purpose are
to be established. Etienne Gilson wrote
" Knowledge of the why, even if it were possible, could in
no sense dispense us from seeking the how - and that is all
that concerns science ••• but, if anyone looks only for
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the how, can he be surprised if he fails to find the why?~6
Thus a number ot scientists have been invited from time to time
to discuss the how and the why of the universe.
The immediate successor of Stirling at Edinburgh was Sir
George G.Stokes,.an Irishman, physicist and mathematician.
one time Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge. In the spirit
of the Gifford terms he claimed the right to apply the scientific
method of "hypothesis" to natural theology.
" by assuming .!.2!:. trial the truth of a statement made on
whatever authority it may be, and then examining whether
the supposition of its truth so falls in with such
knowledge as we possess. or such phenomena as we observe,
as to lead us to a conviction that the statement does
indeed express the truth. It may be that the statement
comes trom a source which professes to be a revelation made
from God to man.,,17
Stokes is confessedly a Christian so that forrlhim natural
theology is the examination of his faith in the light of reason.
This gives a clue as to the possible function of natural theology
it it is once accepted that theistic proof is unattainable. It
should be added that faith is more than the acceptance of a
possible hypothesis. and Henry Jones says this clearly,
" For the scientific man to convert his hypothesis into a
taith were to betray the very spirit of science. A
hypothesis must not turn into a dogma. and the scientific
man is the servitor of no creed. Hypotheses,consequently,
can not transform character • • • The sciences may
conjecture, religion must "know" : that is to say it must
be a matter experienced. tl 19
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Nevertheless a man may treat his faith as a hypothesis for the
purpose of testing its vali~ity. Thus the "design" that Stokes
found in the solar system and the human eye might confirm a faith
already established but could not produce proof. At the end of
his second series of lectures G.G.Stokes expressed his profound
dissatisfaction with Lord Gifford's exclusion of reference to
revealed religion. He could not approve the divorce of natural
theology and revealed religion. What if the answers to the
questions set by Lord Gifford should actually be found in
revealed religion? At least we should examine the evidence in
the light of reason. So Stokes concluded
" In the study of natural theology we are not to shut our
eyes to such light as may be thrown upon the subject by
revealed religion, or to refuse to entertain for trial
some solution of a difficulty felt by natural theology on
the ground that the solution in question involves the
supernatural. ,On the other hand, in the study of revealed
religion we are not to reject the exercise of the moral
faculties in forming our judgment as to whether what is
asserted to be revealed is really so, and is rightly
20interpreted."
This view is echoed by later Gifford lecturers and is one to
which we shall need to return later.
Emile Boutroux, Professor Philosophy in the University of
Paris, lectured at Glasgow in 1903 on ~ Nature !i L'Esprit.
The original lectures have not been published but it is thought
that much of the material is embodied in Boutroux's Science !!
Religion ~ ~ philoBophie contemporaine, published in 1908
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and in its English translation in 1909.21 In an introductory
chapter Boutroux surveys the conflicts between religion and
science from early times to the present day and then devotes the
remainder of the volume to a careful analysis of "The Naturalistic
Tendency" and "The Spiritualistic Tendency". Boutroux draws a
clear line of demarcation between the truths of rel~gion and the
truths of science and concludes that while strife may temper both
there can be no final reconciliation between the two approaches,
which is another way of saying that we cannot draw religious
conclusions from scientific premisses, nor can we draw scientific
conclusions from religious premisses. This still needs saying.
4. Evidence from Biology
Hans Driesch of Heidelberg recognised the demarcation
between natural science and natural theology but concluded that
it was permissible to cross from the realm of science to that
of metaphysics so long as clear acknowledgement of the fact is
made. He describes the transition in this way
" We shall study the phenomena of living organisms
analytically, by the aid of experiment; ourprincipal
object will be to find out laws in these phenomena; such
laws will then be further analysed, and precisely at that
22point we shall leave the realm of natural science proper."
The first volume of Drie~h'6 work is a biological treatise on
morphogenesis, adaptation and in~~nce, concluding with a survey
of some nineteenth· century evolutionary theories. The biological
study is concluded in the second volume, the main part of which
is an exposition of Driesch's philosophy of organism, which he
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terms "Vitalism". This is an exercise in metaphysical
speculation rather than a religious faith, but one which is
compatible with a religious faith.
J. Arthur Thomson, Professor of Natural History at Aberdeen,
lectured at st. Andrews in 1915-16 on The System £! Animate Nature.
This was a similar teleological study and the general conclusion
much the same as Driesch's. Thomson claims that purpose is
revealed in nature and in spite of the problem of evil man is
the crown of creation. He does not claim to have proved the
existence of God, but the purpose discerned in nature may help
to confirm a faith already held.
J.S.Haldane, another biologist, dismissed the vitalistic
theories of his predecessor, Hans Driesch, and pointed out the
problems involved in basing any philosophy purely on scientific
data. He writes :
" The only world which the Sciences appear to be capable
of representing to us is not consistent with itself. Not
merely mathematical, physical and biological Science, but
Science of any kind, fails to furnish us with what we can
describe as objective truth. When ve examine the body of
knowledge presented to us by each science, we find that
though it is logically consistent it only corresponds
partially or imperfectly with our actual experience. In
other words it does not represent actual reality, but only
a subjective picture of reality. If we take it to
represent actual reality, and suppose that the represent-
ation constitutes realism, we are only mistaking a form
of subjective idealism for realism. Thus Science brings us
to a point at which we require more than sCience.,,23
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In the second part of his book he deals with this "more than
science" and attempts to reconcile science, religion and
philosophy. The philosopher is seen as the critic alike of the
scientist and the theologian. Haldane claims that his own
naturalistic religion is quite compatible with the findings of
science. Lord Gifford's conditions provided no difficulty for
Haldane, who had hard things to say about those, who,in his
opinion bolster up bad theology with bad science. He declared:
" I am not here' to support what seems to me an unsatis-
;:,;"7af~~!,~~~~eology,but to carry out to the best of my
ability the intention of the founder of the Gifford
lectureships. I can put my heart into this attempt because
no-one can feel more strongly than I do that religion is
the greatest thing in life, and that behind the recognized
~hurche6 there is an unrecognized ~hurch to which all may
belong, though supernatural events play no part in its
24CI'eed."
Here of course we have a clear statement of faith rather than
a conclusion from science. Haldane is really declaring that
life is more than biology and the body more than chemistry, but
we learn this from what biology and chemistry don't tell us
rather than from what they do.
Man ~ li!! Nature is a philosophical and scientific study
of the human organism, written by Sir Charles Sherrington who
lectured at Edinburgh in 1937-38. Illustrations showing the fine
mechanism of the cat's ear, the design of the human egg, the egg
of the sea-urchin and the development of the malarial parasite
add to the vividness of the argument. Sherrington stressed the
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the evidence of design and harmony which he believed supported
his view of the spiritual nature of reality but he did not
pretend to have arrived at any prDof of God's existence. Thus
" One thing we can discern about Nature as a factor in
this question, an element in this situation; at least it
is a harmony ••• That we should have attained that
knowledge, that it should be given us to apprehend that,
that we can follow its being that, can hear it, trace it,
retrace it in part and even forecast it as such, is an
inexpressibly estimable gOOd.,,25 ,
" Even should mind in the cataclysm of Nature be doomed to
disappear and man's mind with it, man will have had his
compensation: to have glimpsed a coherent world and himself
an item in it. To have heard for a moment a harmony
wherein he is a note. And to listen to the harmony is to
26commune with its composer?"
Sherrington is not far from the Hegelian kingdom of God. The
question mark at the end of the passage is significant. In the
second edition (1951) the sentence is omitted. Sherrington only
reaches what he calls Natural Religion. Man is the product of
nature, the only reasoning being in nature, and therefore the
only mad one. He has discovered for himself love and hate,
reason and madness, the moral and the immoral. He has eaten of
the tree of knowledge of good and evil and the true expression
ot this natural religion will be in loving where love can be
felt - in loving one another. The quest for meaning in the
universe is, in a measure, its own satisfaction. In all these
conclusions Sherrington has crossed the Driesch frontier from
scientitic tact to metaphysical speculation.
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5. The Neutrality ot Science
E.W.Hobson, a pure mathematician, lectured at Aberdeen in
1921-22 on ~ Domain ~ Natural Science. His survey is wider
than the mainly biological studies of Driescha, Thomson and
Sherrington; he discusses scientific law as manifested in
mathematics, dynamics, thermodynamics as well as biology, turning
finally to.the relevance of scientific findings to the traditional
·theistic arguments. He is less confident than some of his
predecessors in the help to be derived from science.
" It may be held that Natural Science provides a most
important part of the justification for the ascription of
complete rationality to the real. ground of the phenomenal
world. But the limitation must be fully recognized, and
this postulation of complete rationality of the real goes
far beyond anything that has been, or can be, unimpeachably
established by Natural Scienceo,,27
Natural science cannot provide more than indicative evidence and
never demonstrative proof of a theory concerning the whole of
nature simply because scientific investigation is always
incomplete. The same stricture must apply to any attempt at
establishing a teleological argument on the basis of natural
science. Such argument may provide us with a tentative hypotbee1s,
but it cannot provide us with a living faith or open to us the
secret of the universe. "The man of science, as such," declares
. 28h'ofessor Hobson, " is not even concerned with that secret.1I
A similar warning was to be given by Eddington. It had
been widely thought from earliest times that the stars could
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throw light on theology, and it was inevitable that the
astronomers should be called to give evidence in the Gifford
court. Eddington was their first representative in 1927 at
Edinburgh. In his lecture on "Pointer Readings" he made it clear
that his science has little to say about what happened when the
morning stars sang together and all the sone of God shouted for
joy. Science conducts only a partial investigation of the meaning
of the universe; it transforms human experience into pointer
readings, and if only pointer readings are fed into the
scientific machine .then we cannot grind out anything more than
pointer readings.29 Eddington likens the task of the scientist
to the working out of a huge jig-saw puzzle. The scientist knows
that some pieces fit together, but he is not always sure which
way up the picture is. Even when he has finished his picture is
only a two-dimensional representation of a world of three or
more dimensions.
" The scientist has his guesses as to how the finished
picture will work out; he depends largely on these in his
search for other pieces to fit; but his guesses are
modified from time to time by unexpected developments as
the fitting proceeds. These revolutions of thought as
to the final picture do not cause the scientist to lose
faith in his handiwork, for he is aware that the complete
portion is growing steadily. Those who look over his
shoulder and use the present partially developed picture
for purposes outside science, do so at their own risk.,,30
Even if the scientist's picture could be completed it would
remain nothing more than a scientific picture, significant for
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for religion, but demonstrative of nothing more than design.
As Eddington points out, it is as well that a man's faith in God
should not be based on something like the Quantum Theory which
might be swept away in the next scientific revolution. Science
is neutral.
6. Science and the Christian Faith
Among the lecturers who approach natural theology from the
viewpabt of science are two churchmen, Bishop Barnes and Canon
Raven. Barnes's Scientific Theory ~ Religion is an abstruse
discussion of space-time, relativity, theories of matter and the
origin of life, the evolution of plant and animal life and the
place of our world within the universe. Science is public
knowledge of the world as opposed to private and subjective
impressions. It cannot take into account intuitions unless these
are subject to confirmation in the form of hypotheses. Nor can
theology be based simply on spiritual insights.
" Man is the outcome ot Nature's processes. He is a product
of the general scheme of the Universe. No one of his
faculties is entirely independent of his ancestry and
environment. Without exaggeration we can assert that man's
spiritual experience is as unreal as a dream unless the God
to Whom it leads him is also the God whose nature is shewn
in the Universe as a whole.,,31
As the argument proceeds it appears that the Bishop is not
denying the authority of spiritual insight but only the authority
of alleged insight which proves to be at cross purposes with
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scientific truth. The Bishop believes that the study of theology
begins with a study of science. He examines the scientific
world picture, finds it impossible to draw religious conclusions,
and falls back on religious experience.· If we ask why we cannot
go directly to religious experience in the first instance, Bishop
Barnes replies that it i~ a dangerous procedure.
" Spiritual exaltation which is built on falsehood is an
evil thing. The great religious teacher is one in whom
religious emotion is not only strong but also pure; and
who, to preserve its purity, is quick to test by the dry
light of reason the knowledge which such emotion seems
to give him. ,,32
It might not be an unfair use of Eddington's analogy to
suggest that spiritual insight may complete the scientis~
picture by putting in the straight-edged pieces - providing the
framework. What has happened in the past is that the theologian
has claimed to have all the straight-edged pieces and then the
scientist has found so many more pieces that the neat framework
provided by the dogmatic theologian broke up. Straight-edged
pieces may be a useful guide but the theologian must not assume
that he has found all his pieces! As the scientist's picture
broadens so the theologian may have to look for more pieces
to create a framework big enough for the picture. This is the
moral of Bishop Barnes's Gifford lectures.
Any jig-saw puzzle addict knows what difficulties arise
when two people join in solving the one puzzle. The occasional
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advantages of the situation must be weighed against the
controversies that arise over the placing of some particular
piece or section. Canon Raven's first volume, ~cience and
Religion, deals with the efforts of the scientist and the
theologian to build a world-picture from the earliest creation
myths to the time of Darwin. Canon Raven mourns the fact that
religion as represented by the church has so often cut itself
off from the findings of science particularly when they
disturbed an accepted position of theology. Therehave been,
of course, exceptional individuals like St. Albert, who
recognised that science and theology ~re dealing with the same
world. In the closing lecture of the first series, Canon
Raven surveyed, what he called in 1951, the new situation.
The scientist, he claims, is much less confident and he quotes
Heisenberg who had recently declared that
" at present the four hypotheses associated with the
names of Newton,Riemann, Einstein and Planck must all b.
accepted as appropriate to different groups of phenomena.,)3
The rigid mechanical view of science had disappeared. The
Gifford lectures of Alexander, Lloyd Morgan and Whitehead had
underlined the process. Temple's Nature ~ ~ ~ had seemed
to mark the beginning of a new reconciliation between science
and religion. Barthian reaction, however, had stayed progress.
" Just when a synthesis was becoming possible, Christians
who were surely committed to the integration of experience
and of life seemed to be retiring into their own ivory
towers, cells and catacombs.,,34
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In his second volume, Experience ~ Interpretation, Canon
Raven calls for a new reformation. This New Reformation would
gather up all the thinking of science and theology but in the
end we are left to walk by faith.
7. Towards a newapproach
Heisenberg has since made his own contribution to the
Gifford discussion in his lectures at St. Andrews in 1955-56,
which have been published as Physics ~ Philosophy. He does
not reach even the beginning of a theistic argument. He
recognises that there are some forms of thought that do not fit
into the close frame of scientific thought. In other words, it
looks as if there might be something in religion, but the
scientist as scientist will still be sceptical.
" Modern Physics," he declares, " has in many ways
increased this scepticism; but it has at the same time
turned it against the overestimation of precise scientific
concepts, against scepticism itself.,,35
The concepts of mind, the human soul, life or God belong to what
Heisenberg calls natural language, having immediate connection
with reality, and therefore not amenable to scientific analysis.
The best that science can do is to save us from gross errors in
our religious assertions, and finally make its contribution to
a general "unification and widening of our present world".
Modern scientific thought, according to Heisenberg, at least leads
to humility and tolerance of other men's ideas.
Bishop Barnes had emphasised that science is public
knowledge, but Michael Polanyi's thesis challenged this generally
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accepted assumption in Personal Knowledge : Towards ~ Post-Critical
Philosophy, based on the Aberdeen lectures of 1951-52. He writes
in his preface :
" I start by rejecting the ideal of scientific detachment.
In the exact sciences, this false ideal is perhaps
harmless, for it is in fact disregarded there by scientist~
But we shall see that it exercises a destructive influence
in biology, psychology and sociology, and falsifies the
whole outlook far beyond the domain of science.,,36
He proceeds to demonstrate that the scientist's personal part-
icipation is inextricably involved in science itself. His
knowledge is not and never can be impersonal. Polanyi contrasts
the "impersonal" knowledge of the scientist and the kind of
knowledge claimed by the religious man and comments
" The book of Genesis and its great pictorial illustrations,
like the frescoes of Michaelangelo, remain a far more
intelligent account of tbenatare and origin of the universe,
than the representation of the waid as a chance collocation
of atoms_,,3!
Polanyi finally reaches a form of teleology. Man, he finds, is
the only centre of thought and responsibility in the universe.
So far the human mind has been the ultimate stage in the
awakening of the universe, but there is, he believes, some
further far-off divine event.
" All that has gone before, the strivings of a myriad
centres that have taken the risks of living and believing,
seem to have all been pursuing, along rival lines, the aim
now achieved by us up to this point. • • We may envisage
then a cosmic field which called forth all th... centres
12.5
by offering them a short-lived, limited, hazardous
opportunity for making some progress of their own towards
an unthinkable consummation. And that is also, I believe,
how a Christian is placed when worshipping Gof." }8
For Po1anyi, as for Sherrington, man is the centre ot his own
universe. Scientifically he can investigate and analyse and
sketch a two-dimensional picture of what he finds. But when he
has sketched his picture or fitted together his jig-saw puzzle
he may find that he is not in it himself.
" Then law is no more than what the courts decide, art
but an emollient for nerves, morality but a convention,
tradition but an inertia, God but a psychological
necessity. Then'man dominates a world in which h. himself
does not exist.,,39
The picture that science haa traditionally drawn is partial and
incomplete. Man himself ia part of the picture - a living piece
of the jig-saw puzzle.
In his recently published book, The Relevance of SCience,
the Glasgow lectures for 1959-60, c.r. von Weizsacker, made
an historical survey of scientific thought and in a final chapter
attempted a diagnosis for the present times. }'aith in science,..
he finds, is the dominant religion of our time, yet there are
more open questions in science than ever before. Christianity
must come to terms with science. He concludes,
tt Science has come into being and will, to judge by human
standards, endure; in face of it there remains only the
task of interpreting Christianity in a way credible to a
40thought schooled in it."
Science provides the tools of modern rationality.
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8. Tentative Conclusions
We have travelled a long way from the natural theology of
Raymond de Sabunde, whose science could be acquired in a month
and without labour. We have surveyed the work of seventeen
Gifford lecturers who have struggled with the problem of
wresting from the physical world evidence for the existence of
God. To this n~er more could be added who faced the problem
in the course of a larger project or whose approach was more
strictly metaphysical.
During the period covered by the lectures there has been
less and less confidence shown in the ability of science to
provide evidence for theistic belief. What conlidenee there
was in the teleological argument at the beginning ~f the period
has steadily diminished. Any hopes Lord Gifford had of
establishing a science of Infinite Being were to be disappointed.
On the question of the existence of God Science, as science, must
be neutral.
Similarly confidence in science as the gateway to all
knowledge has diminished. There has been an increasing
recognition that science deals with only one aspect of reality.
It can only produce, as it were, a two-dimensional Mercator's
projection of a world of many dimensions. The sCientist may
be sceptical of the other dimensions he is unable to understand,
but if Heisenberg. is right, he is also sceptical of scepticism.
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The religious man must accept the scientist's account of
the universe for what it is. At certain points scientific facts
may make it easier to believe in God; at others they make it
easier to believe in chance. The religious man cannot unload
his burden of decision upon the infallible scientist, who, in
any case, can only give a partial picture and cannot produce a
living faith out of test-tubes. The scientist indeed may produce
evidence for design but there will be more than one hypothesis
to explain the design.
What the Gifford lecturers have shown is that the scient-
ific evidence is not incompatible with belief in God and in a
limited way may support this belief. If we are to separate the
functions of science and religion Gilson's demarcation is as
useful as any; science deals with ~ and religion deals with
Why? We have to remember that the two questions are asked about
the same world and therefore it will be well for the dialogue
between the scientist and the theologian to continue.
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1. Philosophy of Religion
The term "Philosophy of Religion" may be used to describe
a philosophical approach to the problems of theology. It ie an
encyclopedic term and would include many of the studies we have
already discussed. It could be used to embrace all that Lord
Gifford meant by "Natural Theology in the widest sense of the
term". There are a number of Gifford studies that range over
a wide field of philosophical problems involved in religion.
They are not easily classifiable in any of our other sections,
but may be broadly described as Philosophy of Religion.
Campbell Fraser made a comprehensive survey of problems
involved in theistic belief when he lectured at Edinburgh in the
early years of the Giffords. The lectures were subsequently
published as ~ Philosophy ~ Theism. Beginning with the
general problem of the ultimate meaning and purpose of human
life, he reviewed materialistic and pantheistic answers and
what he calls panegoism. He is a theist finally not because ot
the cosmological or moral arguments but because he finds goodness
at the very heart of things. Yet for a satisfactory theistic
faith this must be an omnipotent goodness and he spent some
five lectures on the problem of evil, divine intervention and
human progress. Fraser considers the alternative to an optimistic
theistic view and finds it unbearable. He concludes:
" It is the inevitable sceptical and pessimist alternative
in this dilemma that makes theistic optimism, with its
rational consequences, the highest human philosophy; 80
1.31
that we are obliged in reason to rest in final faith and
hope, unless its incoherence can be demonstrated,
dissolving experience and its divine postulate, along with
science and goodness in common ruin. The extinction of
1theistic faith is the ex,tinction of reason in man."
This is, of course, an expression of faith rather than a
reasoned concludion, but the phrase "unless its incoherence can
be demonstrated" may give us a clue to one of philosophy's tasks
in respect to religion. Though reason may not construct a faith
it may point out inconsistencies.
Much more recently H.J.Faton described this task in the
opening sentence of The Modern Predicament.
" Cne function of philosophy is to think dispassionately
about religion." 2
He recognised that the traditional task of natural theology is
no longer a practical proposition. Yet the fact that the truths
of religion cannot be proved does not mean that we have to make
unconditional surrender in the face of the "artillery of the
Logical Positivists on the Left" and "the big guns of the
Theological Positivists on the Right".' Paton claims for
natural theology the right to reason why in spite of the
volleying and thundering of the cannons to the right and the left.
The ways of religious experience, mysticism or Christian
existentialism offer what may seem at first sight to be
attractive escape routes, but even these must be subject to
the dispassionate examination of reason. So Faton set out to
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examine the problems confronting theistic belief in the mid-
twentieth century, problems posed bl positivist philosophy and
theology, conflicts of science and religion and the perennial
moral problem of the presence of evil in the world. Paton
recognised that in the end it might be necessary to take a leap
of faith or a leap of doubt, but the task of reason is to clear
the ground. tieconcludes :
" For the religious man the decision may come only bl the
grace of God, but even so it should not be taken blindly
in the dark. The leap of faith - or the leap of doubt -
should be made in the light of all that each man can know,
not merell of science, but of action and of art and of
4-religion itself."
Thus natural theology cannot give a man a religion, but it may
prevent him from accepting a foolish one and will help him to
understand the nature of the faith he does accept. As William
Wallace bad said, over half a century earlier, the task of
philosophl is to construe religion rather than construct it.
" To construe a thing," he further explains," is to set it
in its relation to other things, to give it its place in
a system, to deprive it of its mere individualitl, and to
understand its place and value.,,5
2. The Nature of God
Such an exercise in construing religion was carried out
by L.R.Farnell in ~ Attributes 2!~. Here no particular
attempt is made to prove the existence of God. Farnell takes as
bis starting point the pbrase from the will "tbe Knowledge of His
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Nature and Attributes" and discusses the attributes applied to
God in various world religions and the possibility of reconciling
such apparently contradictory attributes as benevolence and
omnipotence. The study is mainly historical but Farnell
recognises that religious faith must be construed and analysed.
.. A religion that makes intellectual assumptions incurs
intellectual obligations; and cannot admit the claim,
occasionally made in our pulpits, that incoherence, and
self-contradiction are proofs of the highest truth.
Intellectual progresss in a religion means progress
6towards harmony and coherence in its assumptions."
The natural theologian thus appears to be the constant critic of
the dotmatic theologian. He construes theological statements; -
in Wallac~s seuse of the word - he tries to discover how they
fit in with the whole body of knowledge available from other
sources. He cannot be satisfied with theological formulary made
once for all, but he must constantly question it in the light
of advances in thought in all the other fields of human
endeavour.
,. Some MiAcellaneous Studies
W. MacNeile Dixon, who held the Chair of English Literature
at Glasgow, wa. invited by that University to take the place of
Emile Meyerson, who had died before he could fulfil the
obligations of the Gifford lectureship. Many different phrases
from Lord Gifford's will have provided jumping off points.
MacNeile Dixon is alone in fixing on the requirement that the
lectures should be "popular", and it must be confessed that his
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lectures are more readable than many. For subject matter he
ranges over the whole field of Philosophy of Religion, illustrating
his points with frequent and apt quotation from the poets, and
all with a humility that forbids any dogmatic conclusion, finding
consolation in poetry rather than metaphysic. He reiterates
Shelley's question
" What were our consolations on this side of the grave,
and what were our aspirations beyond it - if poetry did
not ascend to bring light and fire from those eternal
regions where the owl-winged faculty of calculation dare
not ever soar?"?
The poet sees things in the universe that are missed by the
philosopher and the scientist, and the writer puts his trust in
what he calls "the larger vision of the poets". To MacNeile
Dixon beauty is more satisfying than truth.
" And if I could spend the course ot everlasting time in
a paradise of varied loveliness, I do not fancy my
felicity would be greatly impaired if the last secret of
the universe were withheld from me.,,8
Likewise the problems of morality have little attraction for him,
and he proposed at the outset to review "the human situation" as
clearly as possible, offering sueh light as the poets shed upon
it but bearing in mind that
" our business is not to solve problems beyond our mortal
powers, but to see to it that our thoughts are not unworthy
of the great theme.,,9
MacNeile Dixon thus raises the questions of the ordinary man in
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the ordinary situation. If Paul Tillich is right this is all that
natural theology can do but where Tillich believes there are
revelatory answers to the questions, McNeile Dixon offers the
palliative of poetry.
Pringle-Pattison's book on The Idea £! Immortality has
been mentioned in another section. Pringle-Pattison recognises
that arguments for immortality do not amount to proot, but he
attempts to examine the question with ruthless honesty and avoid-
ing wishful thinking, so that while faith is the final arbiter,
the leap of faith will be made in the light of reasoned argument.
In this spirit Pringle~Pattison examines the problems involved
in the concept of immortality and contrasts impersonal
participation in the Absolute and eternal life in a communion of
saints.
The writers of the, studies included in this chapter are
agreed that final proof ot religious truths are impossible.
They are also agreed that our thoughts on these great subjects
should be as worthy as possible. Perhaps we shall find in the
end that the natural theologian is one who thinks about religion
rather than one who claims to know or to prove.
Part 1. ChaEter 5. Reference Notes
1 G.38. (2nd edn) p.331 6 G.35. p.280
2 Q.:12. p. 19 7 G.29. p.437
3 G.79. p. 47 8 G.29. p. 14
4 388 9 G.29. p. 22~. p.
5 G.100. p. 18
136
Chapter Six
From Goodness to God
1 God and Goodness page 137
2 Self-authenticating Moral
Philosophy 138
3 Comparative and Christian Ethics 140
4 From Morality to Religion 142
5 The Crisis of the Personal 147
6 Tentative Conclusions 150
Reference Notes 151
137
1. God and Goodness
It Is holiness loved by the gods because it is holy, or is
it holy because it is loved by the gods? " was the question posed
by Socrates to Euthyphro. We may rephrase the question : is
goodness a self-authenticating quality loved by God because of
its nature, or is it a quality derivative from ~ nature?
Moral philosophies can be divided into two classes, those seeking
to establish morality on the basis of theism and those who treat
morality as self-authenticating. Thus Kant saw God, freedom and
immortality as postulates which must be accepted if moral
experience is to be understood, while John Stuart Mill offered in
his Utilitarianism a moral philosophy which needs neither deity
nor immortality. Both approaches are open to Gifford lecturers,
who may concern themselves with
It the Knowledge of the Relations which men and the whole
universe bear to Him (God), the Knowledge of the Nature
and Foundation of Ethics or Morals, and of all Obligations
and Duties thence arising."
So among the Gifford lecturers we find those for whom the ideas
of morality and deity are inseparable and those whose exposition
of morality is free from theistic assumptions. It is with the
latter that we concern ourselves first, but it must not be assumed
that all those thinkers who do not introduce God into the argument
have therefore concluded that there is no deity.
138
2. Self-authenticating Moral Philosophy
The Aberdeen lectures of 1935-36 provided Sir David Ross
with the opportunity of restating his intuitionist ethics first
propounded in ~ Right ~ ~ ~ (1930). Rightness and
goodness, according to Ross, are simple, unanalysable properties
to be apprehended by intellectual insight. They cannot be
explained in terms of any other qualities. There is nothing here
inconsistent with theism but Ross keeps the discussion within the
realm of obligation without seeking a divine source. In the
closing paragraphs of his lectures he raises the question of
natural theology but only to indicate that a clear examination of
the whole field of moral judgments is a necessary preliminary to
any natural theology which is to ascribe moral attributes to God.
Foundations of Ethics is such a preliminary examination.
A similar opportunity for the clarification and development
of an earlier work was afforded to Ralph Barton Perry at Glasgow
in 1947-48. Twenty eight years separated the publication of his
General Theory £! Value and the final appearance of his Gifford
lectures, Realms £! Value. According to Perry a thing has value
when it is the object of any interest, and anything that is of
- 1interest is ipso facto valuable. One value is higher than
another because the interest concerned is stronger. There is,
however, no justification for the assertion of the objective
existence of values although they have existence in the logical
sense. Religion is "man's d!pest solicitude, his concern for
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the fate of that which he accounts most valuable".2 God is the
highest value and supreme "object of interest" to the worshipping
man, but this is no guarantee of the existence of God. Perry
briefly reviews the classical proofs and finds them wanting.
Morality does not lead us to religion but religion embraces and
transcends morality.3
" Religion, them, though it be more than morality, cannot
be less. It must contain morality, however much it may
4add thereto."
In other words, unbelief in God does not deny morality, but any
belief in God must include it. Perry puts his faith in
"meliorism" and expounds a religion which has the proud purpose
of "replacing evil with good and good with better, so as to
achieve the best possible".5 This is not what Lord Gifford
understood by religion, admirable though the aims might be for
UNESCO.
Brand Blanshard's Reason ~ Goodness, based on lectures
at St. Andrews in 1952-53, has little bearing on the theistic
discussion. His rationalistic concern for coherence is applied
to the field of ethical study. Feeling and thinking have played
their part in man's moral development, but the final authority
must be reason. It is possible to give a coherent account of
morality without resort to theism. Similarly von Wright's
The Varieties ~ Goodness, based on lectures also at St.Andrews
in 1959-60, enquires into the conceptual foundations of morals
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and legislation but makes no theological reference.
Behind the problem of morality lies the question of freedom,
and, while many lecturers have touched on the problem, only
Austin Farrer has taken it as his main theme. He describes his
Freedom of .!!!.!.~, the Edinburgh lectures of 195? as "a hand
6to hand fight with deterministic misconception". He deals with
the problems of body-mind relationship, thought, speech and
conduct. Only in the last chapter does he touch on theological
issues aud then merely to indicate them. His work is a valuable
prolegomenon to any moral theory and we are led to the conclusion
that any theism demands freedom, but freedom does not necessarily
imply theism. "It we believe our theology," Farrer comments,
"it is probably because we accept a divine voice as having actuall¥
spoken; and that is not a claim which a Gifford Lecturerbis any
business to investigate."? None of these lecturers have claimed
to be doing natural theology, but, of course, their approach
is quite legitimately within the Gifford terms.
3. Comparative and Christian Ethics
Bishop Gore set out to investigate the idea of the good
life "with its postulates" as mankind in general has understood
it. He leaves the psychological problems of freedom and
obligation and simply examines the ideals of the good life as
presented in Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and other eastern religions,
continuing with an examination of Platonism, Judaism and the
teaching of Jesus. He finds in the Christian ethic
tt not only •• the consummation or Israel's religion, but
•• the best and fullest representative of all the
distinctive types of ethical monotheism which have appeared
8in history."
The fact that man has emerged from the animal world and the ideals
of truth, beauty and goodness have been established is taken as
evidence of the ultimate purpose of the universe. The fact that
Christianity is the highest of the religions upholding these
values, Gore argues, conveys a deeper certainty to its postulate
of God as Three in One. In the latter part of the book Bishop
Gore develops his argument for the existence of God. Under Lord
Gifford's terms, he is content "to give • • reasons for holding
that the Christian view of the world is the most rational view
which we men can entertaintl•9 The Bishop's argument is
fundamentally a reshaping of the Kantian thesis, or, as he
cl~ims, it is a summing up of the moral experience of mankind.
" There is something certain - that is, the distinction
of good and evil and the absolute obligation of doing the
right. This.. is something which does not admit of
further analysis. It is an ultimate datum.. It is the
basis of humanism and of the sense of the worth and dignity
of human life all the world over.,,10
Kant thinks that this data demands the "postulate" of God. Gore
prefers to say that it demands a rational faith in Deity.
Bishop Hensley Henson's lectures offer a straightforward
examination of the Christian ethic. The Bishop summons to his
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aid two earlier apologists, Tertullian and Bishmp Butler.
Tertullian had claimed that the human spirit is naturally
Christian and Butler described Christianity as " a republication
of natural religion ft.11 Hensley Henson claims that Christianity
is a natural ~evelopment from earlier, more primitive religions.
Religion is all natural and all revealed.12 This gives the clue
to the understanding of the full title of the lectures,
ChristianiMorality, Natural, Developing, Final. Christian
morality is natural in that it is derivative from "natural"
Christianity. It is developing in that there have been within it
sub-Christian elements which have been outgrown. Yet it is final
in that it is the main stock from which any future morality will
stem. Hensley Henson believes, however, that there is no future
for a Christian humanist morality divorced from religion. Theistic
assumptions are made throughout the book, and no attempt is made
to present a reasoned theistic argument.
4. From Morality to Religion
W.R.Sorley was the first lecturer to present a sustained
exposition of the mora~ argument for the existence of God which
he did in his Aberdeen lectures of 1914-15, subsequently .published
as Moral Values and !h! Idea of God. He argues initially for the
objectivity of values. Thus:
" When we predicate value of anything, we pass from the
mere concept or essence of the thing, with its qualities,
to the bearing which this essence has upon existence; it
is worth existing or it ought to he.,,13
To say that a thing has value assumes its existence; otherwise
we are simply saying that it would be valuable if it did exist.
If we say that value jUdgments are merely subjective we are
striking at the possibility of any kind of primary judgments,
for when we say "A is good" we at least think we are saying more
than "A is pleasing to me,,14, just as when we say something is
yellow we usually mean more than "I think it is yellow". Arguing
from the objectivity of moral values, Sorley goes on to show that
the world process is such that values can be realised in it.
Where Kant and others had argued that another life is necessary
in order that the goods and evils of this life may be fairly
recompensed, Sorley argues that only in such a world as this,
of unequal fortune, can moral values be realised. It is for this
end that the world seems adapted, and for other ends such as the
production of happiness it is peculiarly ill-fitted.
tI The character of the free agent is made by facing and
fighting with obstacles; it is not formed along the line
of easy successful reaction to stimulus. Facile adaptation
to familiar environment is no test of character nor
15training in character."
This is a variant, of course, on Bosanquet's description; borrowed
from Keats, of the universe as a vale of soul-making. Where
Bosanquet's souls are ultimately lost in the Absolute, the selves,
for Sorley, find their destiny in fellowship with a personal
GOd.16 Deism in its various formsj~iscussed and dismissed;
likewise various forms of pluralism. Sorley finally concludes
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" God must therefore be conceived as the final home of
values, the Supreme Worth - as possessing the fulness of
knowledge and beauty and goodness and whatever else is of
value for its own sake.,,17
What is fundamentally the same conclusion was reached by
A.E.Taylor a decade later at St. Andrews. The first volume of
The Faith of a Moralist is concerned with the theological
implications of morality. The relationship between!! and Ought
again provides the starting point for the discussion.
" The possibility of genuine worship and religion is
absolutely bound up with a final coincidence of existence
and value in an object which is at once the most real of
beings and the good "so good that nothing better can be
conceived", at once the Alpha, the primary and absolute
source of being, and the Omega, the ultimate goal of
18desire and endeavour."
Taylor is careful to distinguish between "desires" and
"satisfactions,,19; the pilgrim self moves from one satisfaction
to a higher satisfaction. This moral quest would be self-
defeating unless there were
" an object to sustain it which embodies in itself good
complete and whole, so that in having it we are
possessing that which absolutely satisfies the heart's
desire and can never be taken from us.,,20
Moral experience thus implies both the existence of God and an
eternal destiny for the individual whose aim is the fruition of
the good. He further adduces the experiences of guilt and
loyalty as evidence of the existence of God. The guilt felt by
a man ie something more than the realisation that a social code
has been broken or that institutions have been disrespected.
Similarly the endurances demanded by loyalty are only comprehens-
ible if the loyalty is to an ultimate personal authority.
, " Beliet in the absolute reality of God, and love for
God in whom we believe, are at the heart of living
morality. The good of our fellow-men is unworthily
thought of when we do not conceive that good as a life
of knowledge of God and transtormation by the knowledge
into the likeness of God. And the love which arises
from our belief is the one motive adequate to secure
the full and wholehearted discharge of the duties laid
21upon us by the ideal."
Taylor goes on from this point to demonstrate the necessity ot
"the initiative of the eternal". Man cannot reach the goal set
by morality through his own ettorts. He needs the grace of God
by which alone he can be saved. Taylor concludes that the
Christian revelat~on of God interpreted against the background of
idealist philosophy gives the most ~atisfactory explanation of
our moral experience. Kant's postulates were Gol, freedom and
immortality, but Taylor finds in God, grace and eternal life the
thr~great supernatural implications of the moral life.
Since Taylor's time moral statements have been dismissed by
some thinkers as mere exclamations of like or dislike. Another
decade was to pass, during which the traditional structur~ ot
morality and reason were being threatened by the "enemies of
,,22 b fReason , e ore De Burgh traced the path from morality to
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religion once more. From Morality 1£ Religion is based on the
St. Andrews lectures of 1937-38. Sir David Ross, who had just
completed his Aberdeen lectures, had drawn the distinction
between conduct as motivated by the thought of obligation and
conduct motivated by the desire for a rational good. In
distinguishing between morality and religion De Burgh points out
that morality is based on praxis fDr praxis's sake, that is on
obligation. Religion is also a praxis but based on a theoria
such as belief in the love or goodness of God. Religion differs
from morality in that
(1) religion implies worship,
(2) the essence of religion is theoria while the essence of
morality is praxis.
(3) the activity of religion is motivated by theoria which can
be simply described as knowledge of God.23
Further, and here we have a restatement of Taylor's argument,
man cannot by his own efforts fulfil the demands of the moral
ideal; he needs the grace of God - the virtue infusa of st.
Thomas. All this, the sense of obligation, the lofty ideal set
by the moral consciousness, man's desperate sense of inadequacy,
leads De Burgh to a theistic conclusion.
" The consciousness of obligation is explicable only on
the assumption of a moral order in the universe, and •••
this asumption is most intelligible if we accept the
witness of religion to the being and goodness of God. That
24is the direct form of the moral argument."
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De Burgh recognised'that theism cannot be proved but claimed that
the theistic hypothesis offers a reasonable solution to the
problems involved in ethical theory and, taken with evidence from
other fields of experience, offers a probability that is "almost
irresistible". Commenting on Sorley, Taylor and De Burgh, John
MacQuarrie writes,
" It must be acknowledged that the three philosophers
considered ••• whether taken singly or together, present
an impressive case for completing morality in theistic
religion."25
5. The Crisis of the Personal
The nature and destiny of man have provided subject matter
for numerous lectures, some, like Niebuhr, making a theological
approach and others, like Bosanquet, seeking an answer through
metaphysical enquiry. The opening chapter of John MacMurray's
Glasgow lectures bears the title, The Crisis ~ !h! Personal.
The apotheosis of the state and the decline of religion have led
to an unwillingness on the part of man to assume personal
responsibility and to the dissolution of the older metapbysical
structures. One solution has been offered by existentialism,
which recognises where the weakness lies, but MacMurray judges it
26to be a one-sided solution. He sets out to discover the
intellectual form of the personal. In the first course, ~ Self
!! Agent, he deals with the problem of the self not as a thinker
but as an agent, and in the second couree, Persons ~ Relation,
with the problem of "you and me", for the self c~n only be
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understood in action and reaction with other selves. MacMurray
recognises with De Burgh that practical action demands a theoria,
but declares that action provides the key to meaning. He finally
describes the world as one action, and since the essence of
action lies in its intentional character, the argument leads on
to God. In MacMurray's words:
" The argument which starts from the primacy of the
practical moves steadily in the direction of a belief in·
God. To think of the world in practical terms is u1timate~
to think of the unity of the world as one action, and
therefore as informed by a unifying intention.,,27
The argument is taken further in the second volume with an
analysis of the personal nature of human life. The scientific
picture of the universe must always be incomplete, for the
scientist specifically sets out to be impersonal. There can
never be a proof of God's existence satisfactory to the scientist.
Personal conviction is a different matter. So MacMurray reaches
the concept of a personal God :
" A personal conception alone is fully theistic and fully
religious. For there can be no action without an agent,
and an agent, whether finite or infinite, though he is
immanent in existence, necessarily transcends it •••
God, therefore, as the infinite Agent is immanent in the28world which is his act, but transcendent of it."
In On Selfhood and Godhood C.A.Campbell takes up the problems- -
raised by MacMurray, and asks,
II What kind of a being is man? Is he a "self" in any
sense of that term which implies that he has, or may have,
what is meant in religion by a "soul"? Is he, in fact,
the kind of being he has got to be if religious language
about him is to have any meaning? ,,29
While the argument from moral experience is only part of
Campbell's case, it is a fundamental part. He begins with an
examination of the nature of selfhood. Moral experience is
meaningless unless there is a continuing "self" that acts.
Hume's "bundle of sensations" theory is not sufficient to account
for our awareness of self-consciousness. The self is intrinsic-
ally connected with the mind rather than the body and is
essentially a reasoning being. Reason then must be the arbiter
either in discovering the meaning of life or testing revelations
which purport to give meaning. Psychology can help us in
distinguishing between spurious and "authentic" revelations, but
even the "authentic" must be subject to logical examination.
Revelations, like any other forms of proposition, must at least
be self-consistent. Moral and rational experience only makes
sense if man is free, free to choose good or evil, free to find
truth or error. In the second course Campbell addressed himself
to the question, "Is religion true?" and set out the arguments
for a supra-rational theism, finding support from Otto's ~
Hei1ige. He links the moral argument and the metaphysical to
identify the ultimate reality of philosophy and the God of
religion. He finds irreconcilable inconsistencies in a purely
rational theism and attempts to show that a symbolic supra-
rational theology is at least arguable and self-consistent.
150
On Campbell's neo-idealist view no further proof than this is
possible.
6. Tentative Conclusions
The studies reviewed in this chapter make it abundantly
clear that any account of ultimate reality must include moral
experience in its purview. However we explain it, the moral
sense is a unique product of evolution. Moral experience is as
much part of the data as religious experience. As we have seen,
it is possible to account for moral experience without any
theistic hypothesis; morality is useful for the survival of
mankind. Others, however, represented by Sorley, A.E.Taylor and
De Burgh, find that a theistic faith makes the best sense of
moral experience. Kant's conclusions are confirmed to some
extent in that the moral arguments have seemed more impressive
than the cosmological and teleological arguments discussed in
an earlier chapter. Absolute proof is as impossible here as
elsewhere, but once we have accepted belief on other grounds
moral experience goes a long way to confirming that belief.
While the purely ethical studies cannot be termed natural
theology, it seems justifiable to use the term to describe
the investigation of the implications of moral experience for
theology.
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1. True and Felt Knowledge
It is interesting to note that the word "faith" does not
appear in Lord Gifford's deposition and the word "belief" is
only mentioned once incidentally. He will be satified with
nothing less than "the knowledge of God, the knowledge of His
Nature and Attributes, and the knowledge of the nature and
foundation of Ethics". He does on one occasion qualify the word
adjectively and in parenthesis when he speaks of "the true and
!.!!! knowledge (not merely nominal knowledge)". Evidently for
Lord Gifford faith is knowledge plus feeling as opposed to
nominal knowledge which is accompanied by no emotional
involvement. The man who knows Dr. Smith by sight, where he
lives and what surgery hours he keeps presumably has nominal
knowledge. The man who has "felt knowledge" of Dr. Smith knows
the same facts but in addition trusts him and accepts him as
his physician. He not only knows facts about the doctor but
knows the doctor himself. This would be a helpful analogy if
only there were facts to know about God. While Lord Gifford
saw quite clearly that religion was something "felt" he still
thought that reasoning about God would lead to knowledge and
something imposed upon this knowledge would lead to !!!!
knowledge, much like going to Dr. Smith's surgery and consulting
him would lead to a !!!! knowledge of Dr. Smith.
Tennyson had offered a straightforward distinction ahieh
expresses good Kantian philosophy in the lines,
1.54
" We have but faith, we cannot know;
For knowledge is of things we see.,,1
Many of the Gifford lecturers have recognised this distinction.
Faith, of course, must assume the existence of GOd, but the
assumption of the existence of God is not faith. Even if it were
possible to demonstrate conclusively that God exists, this would
not provide what the religious person understands by faith. At
best such demonstration would put a person in a position where
he could have faith, or if, having arrived at knowledge of God,
he was constrained to worship, he would then have !.!.ll knowledge.
Henry Jones wrote in the introduction to ! Faith ~ Enquires :
" If I read our times aright, there are many thousands
of thoughtful men in this country whose interest in religion
is sincere, but who can neither accept the ordinary
teaching of the Church, nor subject themselves to its
dogma,ic ways. I would fain demonstrate to these men,
both by example and by precept, that the enquiry which
makes fullest use of the severe intellectual methods,
supports those beliefs upon which a religion that is worth
having reats. Let man seek God by way of pure reason,
and he will find him.,,2
In the last sentence Henry Jones suggests that a man may go all the
way by reason, but in the penultimate sentence he takes the view
more widely accepted among Gifford lecturers that reason may give
support to a position already accepted by faith. A number of the
lecturers, as we shall see, have claimed that faith provides a
knowledge of its own which may indeed be tested by reason but
cannot be verified. Reason can thus perform the negative
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function of showing a particular faith to be unfounded, but it
cannot confirm a faith as true except in the sense that it may
demonstrate that it is non-contradictory and therefore possibly
true.
2. Faith and Philosophy
William Temple put his finger on one clear distinc)ion bet~
faith and philosophy when he said,
" The primary assurances of Religion are the ultimate
questions of Philosophy.,,3
The religious man who is sure of his faith needs no support from
theistic arguments. If they are of value to him it is because
they either clarify his own faith or help him to demonstrate to
unbelievers its reasonableness. Religion may come to some few
men at the end of a philosophical pilgrimage but for most men
individually and in the history of the race a living religion
precedes any philosophising or theologising about it. As John
Caird wrote,
If Religion exists and must exist as a life and experience
4before it can be made the object of reflective thought."
William James likewise described theological formulas as
secondary products.5
Life demands action and this is one reason for giving
priority to faith. Decision cannot afford to await the findings
of philosophy; action is of the essence of faith. Some thinkers
may claim that philosophy leads to action, but as soon as it
becomes a way of life we more naturally term it religion.
1.56
A purely theoretical or hypothetical account of the universe
does not compel loyalty or obedience. On the other hand "faith"
unaccompanied by action is nothing more than a theoretical
proposition or series of proposi'tions about God and the universe.
The New Testament says clearly that faith without works is dead
and John Watson expresses it with equal clarity.
" Faith is the expression of,my deepest and truest self;
it is the spirit which determines the whole character of
my self-conscious life. To suppose that genuine faith
should exist without being translated into action is
therefore a contradiction in terms. The faith which has
no influence on the life is not faith."6
The knowledge that Lord Gifford sought was a !!!i knowledge, and
most of the lecturers who have touched on this aspect of his will
have understood it to mean faith.
,. Faith and Credulity
No doubt the individual~who shared in the primitive
religions investigated by Max Muller and others, had religious
experience that was translated into action in daily life. They
had intuitions which might well be described as "felt knowledge".
Such knewle4ge can no longer be so described once it has been
shown to be false. When the searchlight of reason is thrown on
such a faith it is seen to be incredible in its present form and
is either dismi5sed or reinterpreted to give a more rational and
therefore more satisfying world picture. Reason is religion's
safeguard against credulity. If faith is nothing more than a
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capacity for believing the incredible, then ~Duchess in
Alice ~ Wonderland, who believed half a dozen incredible facts
every morning before breakfast, was extremely religious. So
reason serves religion in submitting claimed truths to impartia]
examination. It was this service that Lord Gifford wished to
render religion and he specifically excluded appeals to so-called
miraculous revelation that might by-pass the sentinel of reason.
The lecturers who have expounded the Christian faith (with the
one exception) have attempted to submit their faith to rational
analysis. They themselves may accept "miraculous revelation"
but they have not appealed to this revelation to sustain their
argument. Rather, like Leonard Hodgson, they have tried to show
that the Christian interpretation of the data makes the best
sense. Only Barth, the avowed opponent of all natural theology,
appeals directly to the revealed Word. Even he must believe
that in the matter of knowledge of the eternal Godhead it is
rasonable that our only means of knowledge should be revelation.
Otherwise he has left no satisfactory distinction between faith
and credulity.
Unless we bring faith to the bar of reason there is no
means of knowing if the faith is worth holding. How are we to
'distinguish between the "truths" accepted by the orthodox
Christian and the "truths" accepted by the Jehovah's witness?
How can the validity of faith-knowledge be tested? These are
some of the'problems involved when a man sets out to discover
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"true and felt" knowledge of God. It must be "felt" or it will
not differ from metaphysical speculation. It must be "true" or
it will not differ from illusion.
4. The Necessity of Faith
The revival of positivism in the thirties forced
theologians to look again at the nature of faith. At St.Andrews
in 1939-40 Richard Kroner lectured on ~ Primacy of Faith.
This volume, published in New York in 1943, is not very well
known in Britain. The influence of Barthian theology is marked
but Kroner.has his own contribution to make in his discussion of
the religious imagination. Natural theology had suffered at the
hands of Luther and Kant.
It As Luther stressed the primacy of faith against any
objective guarantee on the part of man, sO Kant defended
the primacy of faith against any objective knowledge of God~
He goes on to point out the contribution made by religious
imagination to faith which solves problems impervious to reason.
" God is a God of faith, not of thought; He appears iu.
the kingdom of the imagination, not in the system of
categories; He appears on Mount Sinai; in the burning
bush, in the still small voice, not in the absolute idea.
The knowledge of God is a knowledge immanent in faith; it
8cannot be isolated and made logical and conceptual."
Kroner does not go all the way with Barth on the subject of
natural theology, but rather echoes Til1ich in declaring that
natural theology can only ask the questions or pose the problems;
it cannot reach the answers. Man cannot understand God because
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God is not an object but rather the all-embracing subject. As
far as man's intellectual approach is concerned God remains a
problematic idea. Kroner continues,
" Natural theology !! lli science .2! ~ problematic
idea. Though the idea is problematic, it is nonetheless
of the greatest importance, since it closes the system of
thought not by giving final answers but by showing the
necessity of revelation. Faith supplements what is lacking
in the field of reason.,,9
We are told finally that faith is an existential assertion.
" Faith is "Existential" as knowledge never can be
without denying its own nature and intention.,,10
There is no hope of verifying religious truth by means of reason.
Although God cannot be an object there can be an apprehension of
God by the self, but only through faith. Faith claims primacy
in the ontological field, and man can only know God, who is
pure being, by faith and not through the understanding or the
will.11 When we ask how a man is to decide which particular
faith he should accept we are told that
" the particular excellence of the Christian religion
derives from the content of its images, or, in other
words, from the truth ot its images.,,12.
Thus faith is selt-authenticating; it is true because it strikes
us as being true. It is not that the Christian taith makes the
best sense; if it does it is quite incidental to its truth.
Although self-authenticating this faith is not self-generating
for its source is God. Kroner's position is not far removed
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from that of Barth as the following passage shows
" Faith is the innermost essence of life, for man is man
because he touches the universal divine mystery. Faith is
devotion to this mystery as conveyed by divine imagination
in accordance with out moral experience and with our
ontological, epistemological, and ethical self-reflection.
But though consistent with it, faith overleaps the
boundary line of philosophic thought; therefore its truth
transcends, and cannot be proved by, any rational means •
• • The majesty of God neither requires nor permits logical
pressure to convince the human heart. God enters the heart
whenever it pleases Him to do so. But, though no human
intellect will ever suffice to prove the existence of God
and to substitute knowledge for faith, so no human mind
will ever avail to refute His existence ot to fabricate a
religion out of the materials of philosophic reflections.
Faith holds final sway in the kingdom of the spirit." 13
Kroner's position has been expounded at some length because in
its main contention - the primacy.of faith - it is the position
accepted by most of the theologians who have held Gifford
appointments in the last decade or more. Where they have differed
has been in the role assigned to reason in respect to faith.
Kroner's stress on what he describes as "divine imagination"
links up with the approach through symbolic thought. In the
earlier part of Symbolism ~ Belief Edwyn Bevan had examined
the relationship of symbolism to the expression of religious
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truth, and in the closing chapter he turned to the question of
what finally justifies the assertion of faith. We are told once
again that a "leap" of some kind is necessary. He concludes
" that neither the hypothesis that the Power behind the
Universe is a spiritual Power which cares for values nor
the hypothesis that the universe is indifferent to values
can be demonstrated, that both the believer and the
atheist or agnostic act upon an unproved hypothesis. make
14a leap beyond experience."
This does not mean that a man has no ground for his choice and
that he is at liberty to accept one hypothesis rather than
another simply because he prefers it. There are other elements
than the purely rational that lead a man to belief but rational
criticism may indeed lead him to disbelief. Thus
" A man believes in God before he can say why he believes
in God, but he will not go on believing in God. if. being
a rational man. he has brought the belief into connexion
with other knowledge about the Universe and convinced
himself that it is incompatible with some bit of Reality of
which he is certain. If, however, after bringing his belief
in God into connexion with other knowledge about the
Universe. he finds the hold of the belief upon him
unrelaxed, he will be able to point to grounds which seem
to justify his belief.' He will be able 'to give reason
for the faith that is in h~m·.,,15
It is clear that Bevan allows reason a rather more important
role than Kroner does. but finally he is one with Kroner in
stressing the primacy of faith, for he concludes that
" what actually causes anyone to believe in God is direct
perception of the divine.,,16
5. The Nature of Faith
We are taken further towards the acceptance of faith as
existential cOffimitmentby Gabriel Marcel, particularly in the
second volume of ~ Mystery ~ Being, sub-titled Faith and
Reality. Faith, for Marcel, is never the culmination of an
argument. The proofs of God are ineffectual when they are most
needed, and when a man already believes they are unnecessary.17
~aith is to be distinguished from opinion and conviction.
Opinion, according to Marcel, expresses nothing.more than "I
18maintain that ••• ". Conviction is nothing more than the
taking up of a definite and unshakeable position.19 Faith,
which comes by conversion rather than argument, is a 'believing
in' rather than a 'believing that'. Marcel uses the analogy of
opening a credit. He writes,
" If I believe in something, it means that I pledge myself
fundamentally, and this pledge affects not only ~ !
have but also ~ !~. In a modern philosophical
vocabulary, this could be expressed by saying that to
belief is attached an existential index, which, in
20principle, is completely lacking to conviction."
21Marcel specifically describes faith as a bet and in the language
of Buber describes the object of faith as a 'toi'. When I believe
I commit myself existentially. Hence the mystery of being is to
be understood through the experience of 'we are' rather than
'I think'. Faith can, of course, fall back to be no more than
a conviction and in gradual deterioration to an opinion. Finally,
Marcel reminds us, the God of faith is the God of Abraham, Isaac
and Jacob and not the God described by Pascal as the God of the
22philosophers.
The question of the relationship of such faith to knowledge
remains. It is sometimes claimed that knowledge of God is an
inference from religious experience, butJohn Baillie strenuously
denies this. Faith itself involves knowledge and is an intrinsic
part of religious experience.
" The reason why we must not say that faith is based on
religious experience is that religious experience, if it
is authentic, already contains faith. Faith is the
cognitive element in it, on which the accompanying
emotional and volitional elements are utterly dependent.,,23
Thus faith yields knowledge not by the process of inference but
as a gift of God. Baillie describes faith as "a mode of primary
24apprehension". Later he writes,
" Faith is apprehension through commitment. This alone
is true faith, fides salvifica as distinguished from mere
intellectual acceptance ••• Faith is thus at"one and the
same time a mode of apprehension and a mode of active
response to that apprehension. This is a region of
experience in which there can be no apprehension without
commitment, but it ie equally true to eay that there can
be no commitment without apprehension ...25
If we ask John Baillie how we can verify the truths thus
apprehended he answers with Kroner, Bevan and Marcel that there
can be no verification, even though a man may be more certain of
God than of the verifiable truths of science.
" It seems impossible to enunciate any theoretical
propositions concerning God and the unseen world about
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which we could be certain that they were true just as we
enunciated them, nevertheless all our experience, in this
realm as in others, 'transfused with certitude' or, in
Ti11ich's phrase, that certitude 'pulsates through all our
thinking'. Our direct knowledge ••• is not knowledge
of truths but knowledge of realities, and it is out of our
immediate contact with these realities that certitude is
26born."
Faith is thus an act of perceiving rather than conceiving.27
There is, however, no reason to suppose that in the
spiritual realm the religious man will be exempt from the
possibility of mistaking illusion for perception. There are those
who are transfused with certitude concerning beliefs that seem
utter nonsense to other people. It is not clear how we are to
distinguish between true faith and illusion if faith is se1f-
authenticating. Leonard Hodgson in ~ Faith and Freedom
stresses the part to be played by reason. He criticises, on the
one hand, the extreme liberal view which deniee that God performs
any particular actions in thie world ef space and time, and,
on the other hand, the Barthian contention that God only speaks
through epecia1 revelation. Nor is he satisfied with the two
source theory which separates truths of knowledge and truths of
revelation. Revelation and reason are complementary.
" It would be no use for God to give revelations to
creatures incapable of receiving them, and the only way
in which truth can be received is by a mind that can
distinguish between truth and falsehood, in other words,
by the exercise of reason. Revelation and reason are not
alternatives appropriate to different fields of inquiry.
They are correlative, the divine and the human sides
involved in all man's growth in know1edge.,,28
Further Eodgson tells us that faith is akin to intuition; it is
.1ikened to a flair for mathematics or diagnosis; it is seeing
things more clearly, but reason is always involved.
" This opening of the eyes of the mind to see with the
eye ot faith is not the substitution of faith for reason,
or the supersession of reason by faith, as though one
organ of apprehension took the place of, or overrode,
another. It is the enlightenment of reason by faith
enabling it to do its own work better. • • The good eye-
sight, the mind that sees straight, is a gift of the
Spirit widely shared in greater or less degree by
unbe1ieyers and believers alike. The one claim which we
Christians cannot help making is that our faith gives us
the right perspective. Conversion is being lifted out of
the side seat in front and put down in the centre further
back.,,29
The only test or verification possible is the persistent
criticism and judgment of reason. In this Leonard Hodgson has
the support of Bishop Butler who declared,
" Reason is indeed the only faculty wherewith to judge
concerning anything, even revelation itse1f.,,30
This reason, says Hodgson, is as much the gift of God as faith.
6. Natural and Revealed Religion
If the distinction between natural and revealed religion
proved unacceptable to the students of comparative religion, it
proved equally difficult for the theologians. On the one hand
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Hensley Henson saw Christianity as the most highly developed of
natural religions31 and John Caird described it as 'natural
religion elevated and transmuted into revealed,.32 On the other
hand William Temple claimed that all existence is in some.sense
revelation, and, as we have seen, Soderblom (the second archbishop
among Gifford lecturers) spoke of revelation known in other
religions than Christianity. Even the further distinction between
general and special revelation was unsatisfactory to John Baillie~3
Over against these variants must be set the uncompromising
position of Barth and Brunner, which asserts "that either
Christianity is not a religion along with others, or if it is
a religion, nothing else is".34
In Revelation ~ Religion H.H.Farmer attempted to give
what he calls in the introduction a "theological interpretation
of religion" from the standpoint of orthodox Christian
affirmations. He asserted that in the Christian revelation the
essence of all living religion is disclosed. Through an analysis
of Christian worship he demonstrated that Christianity is
normative for other religions.
" The living essence of religion is revealed once and for
all, in its sole perfect manifestation, in the Christian
revelation and in the relation with God which that
revelation makes possible for men, and it is exemplified
in other religions in varying degrees of incompleteness,
fragmentariness, distortion and perversion. In other
words, there is given to us through the Christian
revela tion the normative concept of religion. t,35
The various types of religion he submitted to critical examination
he found to be inadequate or incomplete.
Farmer's lectures served only to confirm what had been
apparent from the beginning, namely, that Lord Gifford's attempt
to exclude 'so called miraculous revelation' was vain, largely
because of the difficulty of finding an agreed distinction between
natural and revealed religion. At any rate from early days it
seemed quite proper to those appointed tha~ the Christian
religion should furnish the subject matter of Gifford lectures
sO long as no escape was sought in authoritarian dogma and so
long as rational investigation was applied to Christianity as it
would be to any other religion. We now turn to some of these
earlier studies.
~7. John Caird and A.M.Fairbairn
Caird and Fairbairn were the first to use the lectureship
for the examination of Christian thought in relationship to
natural theology. l'airbairn's lectures appear to have been
used in the preparation of his Philosophy £! !h! Christian
Religion, although ne acknowledgment is made. In this volume he
outlined the philosophical problems involved in a faith which
accepts a personal incarnation of God. Fairbairn's book is a
good example of a work written with the two-fold purpose of
showing the Christian believer that his faith is philosophically
an.dsoun9ldemonstrating to the unbeliever the reasonableness of the
faith.
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~hatJohn Caird, who was still living in/might be termed the
'Science of Religion' decades, resisted the view that philosophy
should confine itself to the study of natural religion, ignoring
the peculiarities of Christianity and taking cognisance of it
only in so far as it agrees with natural religion. He comments,
.. It is just that in which Christianity differs from all
the pre-Christian religions which realises, for the first
time, the true idea of religion. As the absolute and
only perfect form of that idea, Christianity, whilst it
explains the latent significance of all that was true in
the imperfect religions, at the same time transcends,
and in transcending, tansmutes and annuls or supersedes
them ...36
It is in this sense that "Christianity interprets natural religion
From this starting point Caird goes on to
demonstrate that the Christian doctrine of the nature of God
fulfils the demands of reason. He examines at some length
varying theories of incarnation and atonement, rejecting those
which, in his judgment, cannot stand at the bar of reason.
His final conclusion is that the man who has no faith in God
cannot answer the questions posed by the world, but that belief
in God, which is shown by the argument to be not unreasonable,
at least offers tentative and perhaps more than tentative
answers to the questions posed.
8. Otto Pfleiderer and H.M.Gwatkin
Otto Pfleiderer was one of the first theologians to be
appointed to a Gifford Chair. The second volume of his lectures
traces the development of the Christian faith from Judaism
through the theology of the early Church, the Fathers and the
Scholastics to what he regards as the climax in reformation
theology. He proceeds cautiously in the first volume to discuss
philosophical rather than theological problems. Starllng from the
viewpoint of thinkers like Locke, Toland and Tindal, he asks just
how much we can learn of God from morality and science. Both
need religion for their completion. Of science he writes,
" That which is a task for science, an ideal that it has
always to strive after and yet will never completely
attain - namely, the highest Idea of Truth that completes
and concludes all knowledge - is possessed by religion.
Religion, however, does not possess it in the form of
conceptual knowledge that satisfies the scientific thinking,
but in the form corresponding to the presentient soul, of
the symbol or of the Significantsign.,~8
Thus faith answers all the problems raised by science and morality
for theistic philosophy. Personal faith and religious experience
provide practical verification of the religious view of the world.
Pt1eiderer recognises the problems raised for traditional
Christianity bJ the advancement of scientific knowledge, and at
the conclusion of his historical survey anticipates some of the
issues to be taced by Bu1tmann and Tillich.
" History shows by many examples that a traditional faith
which has remained too far behind the advanced knowledge
ot a later time gradually fades away, because it is always
less able to strike its roots in the consciousness of the
generations as they renew their life. Suppose that this
were also to hold good of the inherited faith of the
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Christian Churches, should we then have to expect in an
indefinite future the euthanasia of the Christian religion?
This inference, as it appears to me, would cnly have to
be affirmed, if the position were established that the
ecclesiastical faith were so immutable in its essence that
it could undergo no sort of transformation, no adaptation
to a new consciousness in time, without denying its
principle itself.,,39
Quite understandably he regards the Protestant version of
Christianity as more able to make the necessary adjustments than
the traditional Roman Catholic interpretation, and he looks forwuU
to a new formul~tion of Protestantism ,t as will stand in harmony
with the secular knowledge of the present, and no longer exact
40from us any sacrifice of reason". J.heaims of Bultmann and
Tillich could hardly be better expressed.
Gwatkin, who was writing after a further decade of afford
lectures, did not need to tread so warily in his approach to
revealed religion. He discussed revelation in general and showed
the inadequacy of any non-Christian revelation. The only kind of
revelation that could fully satisfy man's needs would be the kind
of revelation that~s in fact given in the life and death of
Jesus Christ.
" A philosophy might touch reason, a religion feeling,
a law action; but none of them would appeal to human
41nature as a whole."
Only an incarnational revelation can satisfy, which is'another
/
way of saying what Temple was to say later, that natural theology
needs revelation for its completion and in particular the
Christian revelation.
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9. William Temple
Among those who were committed by their calling to the
Christian faith there could be no sturdier champion of natural
theology than William Temple. For him every aspect of religion
is rightly in the purview of natural theology. Revelation is
not to be taken as purely self-authenticating.
" There neither is, nor can be, any element in human
experience which may claim exemption from examination at
the bar of reason.,,42
The apparently arbitrary distinction between truths of reason
and truths of revelation had been, in Temple's judgment, proved
unsatisfactory, especially when understood to imply that the
truths of revelation are like museum pieces to be inspected
reverently but not to be touched. He writes of
" the back-wash from the excessive emphasis put on
authority in an earlier period, and the consequent false
division which allocated some whole departments of belief
to Revelation, leaving others as the proper sphere of
43Natural Theology."
Thus it was illogical that the existence of God should be in the
sphere ot natural theology while the nature of God could only be
known through revelation. If Aquinas had been right this
distinction might have been valid but the two-source theory of
knowledge had proved inadequate. So Temple wanted the Christian
faith in its entirety to be subjected to examination by reason,
but those who examine it must understand what they are examining.
" Criticum must be sympathetic, or it will co'mpletely
miss the mark; but it must also be dispassionate and
relentless.,,44
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If positive proof of theological prOpositions is no longer
possible and the main function of natural theology is the
criticism o! alleged revelation, then the task of the natural
theologian is analogous to that of the customs inspector, whose
tick on the suitcase carries the negative implication that it
contains no dutiable goods yet gives no positive indication of
the contents. Natural theology might declare some religious
beliefs false and they are not allowed past the barrier; other
beliefs are allowed past the barrier on the grounds that there
1s nothing inherently unreasonable or contradictory in them, but
natural theology is not in a position to affirm their truth.
Th. furthest natural theology could go would be in terms of
possibility and maybe probability. This is the way William
Temple takes us, demonstrating the reasonableness of the
Christian interpretation of reality, but concluding that
" Natural Theology ends in a hunger for that Divine
Revelation which it began by excluding from its purview.
Rightly sifting with relentless criticism every argument,
it knows what manner of Voive that must be which shall
promise relief to mankind; but the Voice is not its own,
nor can it judge the message that is spoken. "Come unto
me ••• and I will give you rest"; it is not Philosophy
that can estimate the right of the Speaker to issue that
invitation or to make that promise; that right can be
proved or disproved only by the experiment of life.,,45
Natural theology might thus take a man so far up William James's
'Faith-Ladder' but finally he himself must make the existential
leap or take to the wings of faith according to one's taste in
metaphors.
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10. Karl Barth
If natural theology has no sturdier supporter than Temple
it has no doughtier opponent than Karl Barth. "I am an avowed
opponent of all natural theology," he wrote in reply to the
invitation to become a Gifford lecturer. He would accept Temple's
conclusion that revelation is finally the only means by which a
man can know uod, but natural theology, far from being a road
to God, is a cul-de-sac. Barth's justification of his acceptance
of the invitation after his initial demur was that natural
theology can only exist in antithesis to another totally different
theology. He proposed to serve natural theology by expounding
this other theology, which, in his judgment, affirms what
natural theology denies. He wrote,
" 'Natural Theology' has to make itself known, -demonstrate
itself and maintain itself over against this other theology
by distinguishing itself from it and protesting against it.
How could it do otherwise? It has at any rate never done
otherwise with vigour and success. When 'Natural Theology'
has this opponent no longer in view, it is notorious how
soon it tends to become arid and listless. And when its
conflict with this adversary no longer attracts attention,
it is also notorious that interest too in 'Natural Theology'
soon tends to flag. Why then should the service not be
rendered it of presenting to it once more this its
indispensable opponent, since the requirement is that
46'Natural Theology' shall here be served ? ..
" It can only be to the good of 'Natural Theology' to be
able once again to measure itself as the truth - if it is
the truth! - by that which from its pOint of view is the47greatest of errors."
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Barth then proceeded to expound the Confessio Scotica of 1560.
He regards religion as an essentially divine activity, while
natural theology is a human occupation. Religion, as typified
in the Confessio Scotica, culminates in prayer; natural theology
48has no need of prayer at the beginning or the end.
Because Barth denies the very possibility of natural
theology so firmly we shall need, at a later stage, to look at
the case he establishes more closely. Barth does indeed serve
natural theology by showing what happens when we dispense with
the services of reason and rely on self-authenticated revelation.
11. Niebuhr &nd Brunner
Barth's deep distrust of natural theology is due to his
conviation that man is infected by sin and that his reason is
likewise infected. A similar if not so profound distrust is
found in the thought of Niebuhr and Brunner. Niebuhr gave his
first series of lectures in the spring of 1939 and the second
series in the early weeks of the war - a fitting time to raise
questione concerning the nature and destiny of man. War, for
Niebuhr, ie not the blind result of economic forces but a
symptom of man's disease. Man is a sinner and his whole being,
including his reason, is riddled with the disease.
" Dieease in any part of the organism affects the whole. • •
It is not possible to exempt "reason" or any other human
faculty from the disease of sin.,,49
This implies that nat~ theology can never succeed in its quest,
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for man is blind to his own blindness and is thus completely
misled by reason in matters concerning God.
" Only in a religion of revelation •• can man discover
the root of sin to be within himself. ,,50
This revelation is self-authenticating and man's reason is in no
position to pass judgment on it. The revelation must be accepted
existentially. Niebuhr tells us,
" This person, this other "Thou", cannot be understood
until he speaks to us; until his behaviour is clarified
by the "word" which comes out of the ultimate and
transcendent unity of his spirit.,,51
Niebuhr allows that there is a 'general'revelation which is
available to all men and it shows God as Creator, but there is
something more.
" The assurance ot faith that the nature and character
of God are such that He has resources of love and redemption
transcending His judgments is not something which may be
known in terms of "general" revelation. It is the most
distinctive content of special revelation. It must be
observed that, once this character of God is apprehended in
terms of special revelation, common human experience can
validate it. ,,52
The meaning of the last sentence is not quite clear. It seems to
be saying something about 'validation' but is really only saying
that once a man has accepted the faith, he knows in his inmost
being that he has accepted it. It is not an appeal to reason.
The same pattern of thought is discernible in Brunner's
lectures, Christianity ~ Civilisation, delivered some eight
years later at St. Andrews. Man's sin is seen once more in his
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setting himself in the centre of the picture and thinking that by
the efforts of reason he can master the universe. This is idolatry
" Reverence for the quantum is, so to speak, the new
version of the worship of the golden calf. It is an
inevitable consequence of the objectivist conception of
truth: The object is the truth.,,53
Erunner distinguishes between 'God-truth' and 'world-truths'.
The latter we discover by the exercise of reason; the former
always comes ae a revelation, and even in revealing himself
God does not become an object of my knowledge.54 Man is given
dominion over nature and the power and right to investigate nature
by meane of his own God-given reason.
" Eut the man who knows himself as bound by the word of
the Creator, and responsible to Him, will not misuse his
scientific knowledge of the world by using his reason to
raiee himself up against the Creator and to emancipate
himself from Him by a false pretence of autonomYo,,55
Moreover faith in God is not to be understood as the acceptance
of truths about God; faith consists in meeting God, This is
why natural theology is ineffective; even more it is a kind of
idolatry.56
In attacking the claims of natural theology to establish
a man-made religion Niebuhr and Erunner are striking at a
position no longer defended by natural theologians, and in
attacking this extreme position they ignore the possibility of
humomr services being rendered by natural theology as an
impartial' critic of revelation.
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12. Tillieh and Bultrnann
Brunner touched on a problem to be faced by both Tillich
and Bultmann when he asked concerning 'God-truth',
" Is it then historical truth ? Yes and no. Yes, for
it is in history that this revealed secret encounters me
as truth. No, for it is the eternal God ,who now speaks
to me in this historical revelation. Thereby the
historical event ceases to be historical and becomes
living presence.,,57
For Til11ch man himself is the existential question, but one
cannot derive from the existential question a satisfactory
answer. This is the flaw in natural theology. It appears that
man cannot lift himself up by his own shoestrings. On the other
hand unless he has seen his need, he cannot see the relevance
of revelation. The revelatory answer has no meaning unless the
existential question has been asked. Tillich sees here the
opening for natural theology.
" The truth of naturalism is that it insists on the human
character of the existential question. Man as man knows
the question of God. He is esttahged but not cut off, from
God. This is the foundation for the limited right of
what traditionally was called "natural theology". Natural
theology was meaningful to the extent that it gave an
analysis of the human situation and the question of God
implied in it. One side of the tradtional arguments for
the existence of God usually does this, in so far as they
elucidate the dependent, transitory, and relational
nature of finite human existence. But, in developing the
other side of these arguments, natural theology tried to
derive theological affirmations from the analysis of man's
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finitude. This, however, is an impossible. task.·'
••• For God is manifest only through GOd.,,58
Natural theology is thus allowed the function of asking questions
it cannot answer. This may not be such a mean task as it first
appears. It is said that an experiment is a question put to
nature, and in scientific experiment it is important to know
what questions should be put to nature. The natural theologian
puts his questions to nature in the first instance and in the
absence of an answer may turn to'supernature'. At least the
natural theologian can learn to ask the right questions.
It is important to note that Tillich believes that "man is
estranged but not cut off from God". Barth would not even allow
that man could ask the right questions. Tillich allows that
natural theology can frame the questions but they can only be
answered by revelatory experience, which in turn must be
translated into language which can be understood by the
questioner. So he speaks of "apologetic theo10gy,,59, which is
by no means to be identified with natural ~heology but derives
its form from the kind of question being asked whether it be in
reference to Jewish legalism, ureek scepticism or twentieth
century nihilism. Til1ich's lectures form a part of his larger
Systematic Theology, but nevertheless the volume containing the
Gifford lectures constitutes an attempt to produce "apologetic
theology" revealing the Christ as the answer to man's
existential question.
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Where Tillich goes directly to man as the existential
question, Bultmann asks first what is the meaning of history_
" What is the core of history? What is its real
60subject? The answer is: man."
Just as Tillich's existential question cannot be answered from
the question itself, so Bultmann's question of history cannot
be answered by an examination of history. The answer comes
from an eschatological event outside history, which is another
way of saying that it cannot be reached by natural theology.
Yet the question and answer must be brought together at some
pOint, and this is in fact a point in history, but a recurring
point. "The Christ" is the answer for Eultmann as for Tillich.
" It is the paradox of the Christian message that the
eschatological event, according to Paul and John, is not
to be understood as a dramatic cosmic catastrophe but a
happening within history. beginning with the appearance
or Jesus Christ and in continuity with this occurring again
and again in history. but not as the kind of historical
development which can be confirmed by any historian. It
becomes an event repeatedly in preaching and faith. Jesus
Christ is the eschatological event not as an established
fact of past time but as repeatedly present, as addressing
61you and me here and now in preaching."
The meaning of history, for Bultmann, lies always in the present.
Meaning i8 not to be found at the end of a pilgrimage of thought
but in the eschatological moment. So he concluded his lectures
with these words,
" Always in your present lies the meaning in history.
and you cannot see it as a spectator, but only in your
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responsible decisions.
possibility of being the
62awaken it."
In every moment slumbers the
eschatological moment. You must
Presumably, in Bultmann's view, to be a natural theologian is
to be a spectator - to attempt to find meaning through considered
judgments made trom the touch-line, when real meaning is in the
scruml Yet on the principle that the onlooker sees more of the
game a case may be made out for submitting the discoveries of the
eschatological moment to the impartial examination of the
spectator.
1, Tentative Conclusions
The discussion of the various defenders of faith in this
chapter has brought to light some of the fundamental problems
ot natural theology. Lord Gifford was right in recognising that
religion involves 'true and felt' knowledge. We could hardly
give the name of religion to a formal conclusion reached at the
end of an argument. "It is cold at the summit of Mount Everest,"
might well be the conclusion of such an argument, but it is just
another fact about the universe. Even if I climb Mount Everest
myselt I can only confirm a fact about the universe though I may
teel its truth more intenselyl The natural theologian must
recognise that even if he were able to offer a conclusive proof
of God's existence he would not have produced a religion until
h. had knelt down before the fact. Otherwise even the existence
ot God would just be another fact about the universe. If we
take Barth's advice we shall save ourselves the trouble of a
a fruitless search by kneeling down before the Fact forthwith
and submitting to the Word of God. Yet in spite of Barth there
are questions to be asked., How can one distinguish between two
apparently contradictory "words" of God ? For a number of the
lecturers we have discussed there can be no appeal to reason.
For others reason is the judge at whose bar revelation must be
vindicated.
All the thinkers we have discussed are agreed that faith
is of the essence ot religion. None has claimed that reason
could construct a religion. Indeed it appears at times as it
Barth and his triends are shadow-boxing with an adversary who
does not exist. C.A.Campbell, whose lectures are discussed in
another chapter, helps us when he makes the clear distinction
between (1) reason as an organ for the apprehension of the
Divine, and (2) reason as the ultimate arbiter upon claims to
such apprehension.63 A religion based on the findings of
human reason might well be described as idolatry, but a religion
which disallows the criticism of reason is in danger ot being
confused with credulity. Despair of any hope pf reaching God
through reason might lead to an existentialist 'leap' and this
may indeed produce 'felt' knowledge but if truth is claimed
there is no escape trom the interrogation ot reason.
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1. The Development of Theology
A number of Gifford lecturers, as we have noted,' traced
the development of religion among primitiv.e: peoples. Theology
is the intellectual aspect of religion, the formation of
religious concepts, the application of reason to religion. In
this chapter we turn our attention to those who have traced
the historical development of theology. Where there is religion
there is always theology,however elementary, but primitive man
did not separate the two. Natu~ theology proper begins when
man is self-consciously theological, when he begins to ask how
much he can understand of the nature of deity by the exercise of
his mental faculties. It is man's attempt to become scientific
about his religion. It may sometimes take the form of
criticisms of the grosser anth2opomorphisms of natural religion;
at other times it may be constructive in seeking to establish
the existence of a First Cause or a Prime Mover by the exercise
of reason. Because it is this kind of exercise it found its
birth among the Greeks rather than the Hebrews, and those
lecturers who traced its history turned to Greek thinkers for
the beginning of the story.
2. Pre-Socratic Thinkers
James Adam in ~ Religious Teachers of Greece traced the
development of theology in the thought of the philosophers and
poets of Greece. What he describes as "the action and interaction
1of the two rival principles of orthodoxy and dissent" led to
philosophising against the background of Homeric and Hesiodic
religious ideas. He traced the two main streams of development
on the one hand from Homer and Hesiod through Pindar and
Aeschylus to Sophocles and on the othe hand from Thales through
Xenophanes, Heraclitus and Farmenides to Anaxagoras and the
Sophists. The two streams come together in Euripides, " the
philosopher upon the stage". But on the whole the effect of
Euripides upon traditional beliefs was destructive and it was
left to Socrates, Plato and their successors to build new
foundations.
Some years befor~Lewis Campbell, taking a similar theme
at St. Andrews, had written Religion ~ Greek Literature, in
which he covered much the same ground, but concentrated rather
more on primitive religion in Greece. Both gave some attention
to Socrates and Plato; Lewis Campbell has a final chapter on
Aristotle.
More recently Werner Jaeger lectured on The Theology of the
Early Greek Philosophers. In his preface he suggested the
alternative title, ~ Origin £! Natural TheOlogy ~ ~ Greeks,
and this work is particularly relevant to our quest. He wrote,
" Theology is ••• a specific creation of the Greek
mind. •• Theology is a mental attitude which is
characteristically Greek, and has something to do with the
great importance which the Greek thinkers attribute to the
logos, for the word theologia means the approach to God or
the gods (theoi) by means of the logos. To the Greeks God
2became a problem."
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Jaeger covered much the same ground as his predecessors, but
concentrated on the pre-Socratic thinkers concluding with
Anaxagoras and Diogenes.
3. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle
J.H.Stirling gave pride of place to Anaxagoras in his
discussion of the proofs of the existence of God, but went on
to treat at greater length the three great philosophers and their
quest for deity. Edward Caird in The Evolution £! Theology ~
the Greek Philosophers gave a brief survey of the pre-Socratic
philosophers and then concentrated on the development of theology
in Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle was the first
to use the word 'theology', but Caird describes Plato as the
originator of theology and as the first systematic theologian.
Here is the seeding ground not only of natural theology but of
any kind of theology, for if the substance of Christian theology
was to come from the Biblical revelation its methods and aims
would be drawn from Greece. Edward Caird concluded,
" It was the thought of Greece,which, in this as in
other departments, gave to the philosophical enquiries of
Christendom a definite method and a definite aim. It was
from Greece that the Fathers of the Church borrowed the
forma of thought, the fundamental conceptions of nature
and human life, in short, all the general presuppositions
which they brought to the interpretation of the Christian
faith.,,3
Numerous other lecturers, of course, draw on Platonic and
Aris~otelian thought but only Caird treats it at such length.
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4. Later Development in Greek Thought
In his second volume Edward Caird traced the development of
Greek theology in post-Aristotelian thought, devoting four
lectures to Stoicism and an equal number to Plotinus and
Neo-Platonism, finally summing up in the concluding lecture what
he conceives to be the contribution of Greek philosophy to
Christian thought.
Dean lnge was extremely critical of Caird's treatment of
Plotinus4 and for his own Gifford contribution produced what has
become one ot the standard works on Neo-Platonism, ~ Philosophy
ot Plotinus •-- ~~~~ Dean lnge sees Neo-Platonism as the link between
Greek and Christian thought and complains of the hiatus caused by·
the fact that students of Christian dogma are often ignorant of
Greek philosophy and students of Greek philosophy consider that
their interests end with the Stoics and Epicureans.5 lnge
complains because natural theology is regarded as an intellectual
exercise rather than a spiritual one, and he pleads for a
combination of intellectual search and spiritual insight which
he believs is afforded by mysticism.
" Mysticism is a spiritual philosophy which demands the
concurrent activity of thought, will and feeling. It
assumes from the outset that these three elements of our
personality, which in real life are never sundered from
each other, point towards the same goal, and if rightly
used will conduct us thither. Further it holds that only
by the consecration of these three faculties in the service
of the same quest can a man become effectively what he is
potentially, a partaker of the Divine nature and a
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denizen of the spiritual world.,,6
Dean Inge is in danger of falling into the old confusion between
religion and theology. Mysticism is religion even though it may,
through its insights,furnish a theology. It must not be
identified with natural theology. No doubt such a misunderstanding
has arisen because mystical insight appears to furnish knowledge
of God aeopposed to the knowledge of God embodied in the creeds
of orthodox religions, and indeed at times appears to confirm
otthodox faith. Because ot the spontaneous nature of mystical
insight it appears to be direct knowledge, but fundamentally
it is faith-knowledge and subject to the limitations of faith.
Plotinus belongs to the history of religion and the history of
theology and Dean Inge recognises this when he describes him as
"a spiritual director, a prophet and not only a thinker.,,7
5. The Roman Contribution
Roman thought had comparatively little to contribute to
the development of natural theology except the name, given by
Varro. Consequently little had been written in the Gifford
lectures. Warde Fowler's Religious Experience £!~ Roman
People is an account of religion rather than theology though he
provides a useful account of stoic thought. Lanciani's New
Tales of ~ ~ is little more than a guide book of Roman
antiquities. J.~.Stirling has a lecture in which he traces the
development of Roman thought on religion and deals briefly with
Cicero's contribution.
6. Christian Beginnings
William ..allace, whose untimely death due to a fl~ycle,.ca.-if";
r ~
accident prevented the full preparation of his lectures for
publication, made a histodcal survey in 'his first series.
Unfortunately only three of these lectures are published,
including one with the intriguing title, ~ Natural Theology
of Christ. Edward Caird in his second series on !h!Evolutibn
of Religion gave considerable attention to the beginnings of
Christian theology but with little reference to the concept of
natural theology. Similarly Otto Pfleiderer devoted eight of
the ten lectures in his second series to Christian beginnings
up to the Alexandrian Fathers. The lack of balance of this
survey is sufficiently indicated by the fact that the two
remaining lectures are devoted to AuguB.tine and Roman theology
and Luther and Protestantism respectively.
A better balanced survey was given by Gwatkin in the
sevond volume of ~ Knowledge ~~, though this is a history
of doctrine rather than of natural theology. Perhaps the best
balanced and most comprehensive account of the philosophical
approach to religion is given by John Watson in the first volume
of ~ Interpretation of Religious Experience. He traces the
Hebrew and Greek origins of Christian theology and from the
early conflicts with Jews and pagans traces the development from
Origen to Aquinas, making special mention of Dante, Eckhart
and Descartes and the modern philosophers down to Kant and Hegel.
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7. The Middle Ages
John Watson, as has been indicated, did justice to the
middle ages in his account, but Pfleiderer slips quietly from
Augustine to Luther while Aquinas does not so much as appear in
Gwatkin's index though he is mentioned in a brief catalogue of
great thinkers. J.H.Stirling devoted part of a lecture to
Anselm but scarcely mentioned Aquinas and went on to discuss
Hume and his successors.
This important period has been covered by Etienne Gilson
and less thoroughly by Christopher Dawson. Gilson's work,
published originally as L'esprit ~ ~ philosophie medievale,
discusses the problems involved in combining faith and philosoph~
He raises the question of the possibility of a Christian
Philosophy and challenges the view that nothing happened of any
importance in the realm of religious thought between Plotinus
and Descartes.
" If St.Augustine merely re-edited Plato, if St. Thomas
and Duns Scotus are merely Aristotle misunderstood, it is
quite useless to study them at all • • • and the existence
of a yawning gap between Plot~nus and Descartes will have
to be admitted ••• On the supposition that St. Augustine
added something to Plato, and that St. Thomas Aquinas and
Duns Scotus added something to Aristotle, the history of
mediaeval thought will have a proper object.,,8
Gilson contends that the thinkers of the middle ages did make
such a contribution.
Christopher Dawson, who dealt with the general relationship
between religion and culture in his first volume, entitled
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Religion ~ Culture, focussed attention on European culture
in his Relieion ~ !h! Rise of Wes~ern Culture, which deals
mainly with the mediaeval period.
8. Descartes and After
Arnold Toynbee's An Historian's Approach !£ Religion has
much to say about the earlier developments of religious thought,
but is included here because the second and larger section deals
with religious developments in the west from the seventeenth
century. Toynbee's account is of the interplay of religion
and history and the development of natural theology is purely
an incidental part of the story.
It would be tedious to list all the Gifford lecturers who
have commented on Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Kant and Hegel.
In addition to the lecturers already mentioned who dealt with
the later period, Pringle-Pattison in his ~ of ~ gave
fairly close attention to Hume, Kant and Berkeley, tracing the
later philosophies which arose as a result of or in reaction to
their thought. Campbell Fraser, while not making a strictly
historical approach, discussed at length the attitude of recent
philosophers to theism. Kant's philosophy. of religion is
examined at some length in Kroner's !h! Primacy of Faith, while,
as we have seen, the shadow of Hegel is inevitably cast on the
early lecturers. The more recent developments in philosophy
are, of course, reflected in the lectures given in the last
decade.
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It is thus possible to trace the development of natural
theology through the centuries from the Gifford lectures
and the attempt to do this will be made in the second section
of the thesis. It will be necessary, of course, to turn to
other authorities from time to time and on occasion to let
the thinkers of earlier ages speak for themselves.
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1. Some Negative Conclusions
Gifford lecturers are committed to the discussion of
natural theology "in the widest sense of that term". Lord
Gifford, however, widened the application to such an extent
that some subjects, which can scarcely be termed natural
theology even in its widest sense, have been legitimately
included. Two of the subjects thus permitted but which are
outside the realm of natural theology are Comparative
Religion and non-theistic Ethics, that is, moral philosophy
studied without reference to the existence of God.
Comparative Religion does not set out to judge the truth
of the conceptions of deity formed by various peoples, but
rather, as the name suggests, it compares various religious
ideas. When Sir James Frazer defined natural theology as
"the conception which man, without the aid of revelation, has
formed to himself of the existence and nature of a God or
gOds,,,1 he was in effect equating natural theology and
comparative religion. It could be argued that each of the
religions has its own "natural" theology, but Lord Gifford
recognised that natural theology is concerned with ~
knowledge of God. ' The one thing that emerges from the study
of comparative religion is that the varied "natural"
theologies cannot all be true. There is need, therefore,
for a natural theology which stands over and above the varied
"natural" theologies against which they may be judged. Natural
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theology, in Lord Gifford's sense of the term, does not arise
from natural religion but from man's attempts to reason about
religion. Once this ~ is grasped the fact that the distinct-
ions between natural and revealed religion, and general and
special revelation are uncertain and ambiguous does not matter
so much, for all theologies based on religious insights must
be judged by a theology based on reason.
If Ethics is studied without any reference to deity then
it is clearly not theology of any sort. Thus some of the studies
we discussed in chapter six, while quite admissible under the
Gifford foundation, are not natural theology.
2. The Sickness of Natural Theology
Not one of all the Gifford lecturers in all the seventy
five years has claimed to be able to prove the existence of God.
The confidence of earlier generations ias been profoundly shaken.
Again and again religious truth has been recognised as depending
on faith rather than reason. A few of the lecturers have
declared natural theology to be utterly impotent even to argue
about religion. Earlier lecturers saw the possibility of
natural theology pointing the way even if it could not prove,
and more recently there has been an increasing confidence
expressed by some lecturers in natural theology's ability to
support a theistic view even if it cannot prove the case
completely. Natural theology's malaise does not appear now,
as it did at one time, to be a sickness unto death. Natural
theology can never regain the authority it enjoyed it the
centuries before Hume and Kant. It can never regain the
pre-Darwinian vigour it displayed in the work of Paley and
other nineteenth century apologists, but it can still make out
a case even if it cannot prove it. This seems to be the consensus
of opinion among certain recent lecturers, though others would
still demur.
,. Natural Theology as Impartial Critic
Those who would not go so far as to suggest that natural
theology can make out a positive case might nevertheless agree
that there is a task for natural theology as the impartial critic
of religious concepts. The provision that Gifford levturers may
be of any religion or none providing that they be " able reverent
men, true thinkers, sincere lovers of and earnest inquirers after
truth" is an indication that Lord Gifford saw natural theology
in one of its aspects as an impartial examination and criticism
of religious concepts. Religion, as we have seen, is prior to
theology. The anthropologists have demonstrated this in the
case of primitive religions; the theologians have insisted on
the primacy of faith in the Christian religion. Natural theology
is thus the rational criticism of something that is not
necessarily rational in its origin. The business of natural
theology is, as an early lecturer put it, to construe religion
rather than construct it. Clement Webb regarded natural theology
"as the result of reflection on a religious experience mediated
in every case through a historical religion".2 This process
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of critical reflection had started in the Greek world with men
like Xenophanes. Commenting on the dictum of Hobbes that the
mysteries of religion like pills do more good when swallowed
whole, R.J.Paton says,
" A philosopher has no choice: he cannot always swallow
his religion whole. Whatever may be the clinical results,
there are times when - in spite of Hobbes - he has got to
chew it.'"
Unless religious experience is to be a museum piece, labelled
'Please do not touch', then there must be a place for such
impartial criticism and judgment. Some of the lecturers have
seen this as the chief function of natural theology.
4. Natural Theology as Metaphysical Speculation
It is clear that Lord Gifford believed that it was possible
by metaphysical speculation to construct a system of thought in
which God would be displayed as the supreme, and indeed the only,
reality. We found in out examination of the lectures classified
as metaphysical that frequent resort was made to revelation,
personal faith or a kind of mysticism. Some have arrived at the
end of the argument without any theistic conclusion. We
concluded that metaphysical speculation only ends in faith where
there was faith at the beginning; at best metaphysics can offer
a probability, a possibility or a hope. There are at least four
possible approaches to metaphysics in relation to religious truth.
(1) The philosopher may attempt with utter impartiality to
draw metaphysical conclusions from the data furnished by the
198
natural world. The scientists among the Gitford lecturers hold
out no hope ot a satisfactory theistic conclusion.trom this line
ot enquiry. Recognising the limitations ot such argument a
phil sopher may reach a pOint where he teels justified in making
an existential leap either to faith or metaphysical assertion.
(2) The philosopher may attempt to construct a metaphysical
scheme into which moral and religious experience tits, and which
is therefore consistent with his faith. The early Hegelian
lecturers tit into this category, as do Sorley, Taylor and De
Burgh.
(3) As a variant the philosophical theologian may attempt to
demonstrate the reasonableness of the metaphysic involved in his
belief. H.R.Farmer described natural theology as
" the attempt to present theism as a reasonable and
satisfying (indeed, the most reasonable and satisfying),
4though not logically. demonstrative, world view."
This well expresses William Temple's aim in Nature Man and God.
(4) The philosopher who is a Christian may unashamedly base his
metaphysics on the foundation of his faith and erect what Gilson.
and others have called Christian Philosophy.
Whether any or all of these approaches can be described as
natural theology will be discussed later.
5. Natural Theology and Faith
The theologians have acknowledged faith as the central
tactor in religion and have recognised the impotence of reason
to produce a religion. Most, but not all, have concluded that
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&: religion acceptable to rational man must be subjected to
critical examination at the bar of reason. Faith may go beyond
the conclusions of reason but it must not be contrary to reason.
If we accept religious truth on the grounds of absurdity, the~
as Paton put it5, we are indeed opening the floodgates to folly.
Man's changing and increasing knowledge of the universe
mayor may not shake his faith in God; it will inevitably make
him think about God in different terms. The publication of
John Robinson's Honest ~ ~pDsed the problem to the popular
mind in recent years, but the problem is as old as Xenophanes.
Lord Haldane posed the problem early in this century when he
neatly summed up the task of the Gifford lecturer.
" Two questions must confront a Gifford lecturer who
seeks to try to give effect to Lord Gifford's purpose
in the serious spirit in which it was meant. The first
is: What do we mean by the word "God" ? The second is :
How. in the light that in the twentieth century philosophy
has cast on Reality. must he conceive and speak of Him?,,6
In his own century Xenophanes was asking the same two fundamental
questions. Tillich also asked the questions and saw the need for
an "apologetic theology" which would answer in twentieth century
terms the existential questions posed by twentieth century man.
Natural theology may provide a'critiq_e of faith and may provide
the bridge between modern philosophy and science and religious
faith.
We shall need to examine more closely in their historical
context the two possible relationships between faith and reason
200
suggested by the Credo ut inlelligam of Anselm and the Inte11igo
ut credam sometimes attributed to Abelard. The very existence
of natural theology depends upon man's ability to reason outside
the realm of faith. This problem, as we shall see, has troubled
theologians through the centuries.
6. Natural Theology and Religious Insight
In the course of our survey we have come across two
different interpretations of natural theology, which it would be
as well to clarify before we move on to the historical survey.
(1) Natural theology, on the one hand, is set OTer against
"revealed religion". Scholars have tended to think of any
knowledge of God that does not come from the Biblical traditbn
as natural theology. This kind of natural theology arises from
primitive religion, religious insight or from the experience ot
mystics like Plotinus and his spiritual successors. ~here may
well be a rational element in this "natural theology" as, of
course, there is a rational element in any theology.
(2) Natural theology, on the other hand, is taken by some to
involve only the efforts £! unaided reason to reach religious
truth, and perhaps we ought to add, if any.
There can be no doubt, except in the minds of Barthians,
that natural theology of the first kind does exist and we shall
look at the claims of mystical insight to produce knowledge of
God. If natural theology is to be understood in the second
sense then its scope will be considerably limited. ~atura1
theology in the first sense claims knowledge of God; in the
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second sense it claims the right to think about ~od with the hope
of reaching knowledge.
Recent lectus:erst no doubt influenced by Bubar's thought t
have stressed that knowledge of God only comes by meeting or
confrontation. Religion is concerned with an, I-Thou relationship.
When this relationship is discussed theologically it becomes
an I-It relationship. If this is true then natural.theology can
never lead to a "knowledge" of God in a religious sense. At best
it could lead to knowledge about God and perhaps only thoughts
about God.
In the second part of the thesis we shall trace these
various concepts of God in the history of man's thought. We shall
begin with natural theology as the critic of religion for this
is where the Greeks began •
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1. Reason and Religion
The religious impulse comes from the depths of man's
unconscious and reason can scarcely be said to play any significant
part until man begin. to frame religious concepts_ Hume sought the
origins of religion in fear of the strange and marvellous rather
than in rational consideration of the natural. He did not think
that primitive peoples had been led to a belief in God through any
process of argument "but by a certain train of thinking, more
suitable to their genius and capacity".1 If there is an elementary
train of thought in primitive religion it is overlaid~ as Otto has
suggested, by a strong non-rational element. Reason, as self-
conscious critic, is a comparatively late comer to the religious
field.
When reason does enter the field its task will be both
destructive and constructive_ It must measure the primitive
concepts of religion against the knowledge discovered in other
sphere. and it must seek self-consistency in such elementary
theology as there is. Reason must be the critic of religion.
We may remind ourselves of Clement Webb's description of natural
theology_
" Natural Theology is to be regarded not after the manner
suggested by certain expressions in Lord Gifford's will,
ae a science consisting of truths reached altogether
independently of a historical religion, but rather as the
result of reflection on a religious experience mediated in
2every case through a historical religion."
Such reflection on religious experience may ultimately lead to a
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positive contribution to theology, but initially reason may perform
the negative service of dismissing false belief. We trace now
the course ot natural theology in so far as the term can be used
to describe the dispassionate consideration ot religious truth.
2. Xenophanes, the ReproTer of Homer's Lies
Xenophanes, as Werner Jaeger points out', is the first of
the Greek philosophers whom we can know as a personality. The
picture that emerges trom the scanty data is that of a satirist
rather than a philosopher. We are told that "he also recited his
4own poems like a rhapeode". Jaeger dismisses the picture drawn
by Gomperz and others of one who eith·errecited Homer with the
addition ot his own Terses, or recited Homer during the day for·
a living and gave his own comments at private parties in the
evening. Jaeger sees him as a sincere critic ot anthropomorphic
religion and an intellectual revolutionary. He was a man who
had seen through Homeric religion and therefore, in Jaeger's view,
could not make a living from reciting such tables and retain his
integrity. Ienophanes declared,
" Homer and Hesiod say that the tods
Do all manner of things which men would consider disgraceful:
Adultery, stealing, deceiving each other.n5
It was the satirist, Timon, who described Xenophanes as the
reprover of Homer's lies. God is good and the ancient legends
are fal•• ; moreover there 1s only one god.
" One god is the highest among gods and men; 6
In neither his form nor his thought is he like unto mortals."
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Thus anthropomorphism is dismissed and never so clearly as in the
two well known fragments :
" But if cattle and horses had hands, and were able
To paint with their hands, and to fashion such pictures as
nen do,
Then horses would pattern the forms of the gods after horses,
And cows after cattle, giving them just such a shape
Ae those which they find in themselves."?
fl •• The gods of the Ethiopians are black with snub noses,
While those of the Thracians are blond, with blue eyes and
red hair."B
Xenophanes is the first of a line of critics including Euripides,
Plato, Aristotle and Cicero. There are echoes of Xenophanes in
the early Christian apologists and St. Augustine.
If James Ad...!,interpretation of the fragments is correct
Xenophanes moved on from his negative criticism of the Homeric and
Hesiodic gods to the assertion that there is one god, who is
uncreate, whoee morality is sound, who is eternal and alike in
every direction, finite and spherical and percipient in all his
parts. Thus negative criticism leads to the formulation of a
faith which is consistent with the moral ideals and the scientific
world view held.
,. Other Pre-Socratic Critics ot Religion
Even before the time ot Xenophanes thinkers had been
bringing criticism to bear upon religious concepts. It is in
the sixth century that we can first trace the emergence of the
modern idea of "myth". Originally the word r~'oshad been
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used to describe any speech or story but in the time of the
Milesian naturalists the word was coming to mean fabulous or
unauthenticated as opposed to verifiable truth. Whereas Oceanus
is described in a Homeric passage as the origin of things, Thales
held that water is the origin of everything. So Oceanus is
demythologised as water. If indeed Thales said, "Everything is
full of gods," he may well have meant no more than, "Everything
is full of living forces". It is clear that he was not using the
term 'god' in any crude anthropomorphic sense.
Heraclitus10 was another stern and almost prophetic denouncer
of popular religious concepts, whose most important contribution
to religious philosophy was his teaching concerning the Logos.
Criticisms of anthropomorphism are also implicit in the teaching
of Anaximander and Anaximenes, but as we shall see they were more
concerned to build up a positive account of reality.
Such negative criticism of religion does not necessarily
lead to a reformed theology; it ma~ indeed lead to atheism.
Anaxagoras, a pupil of Anaximenes, undermined generally accepted
religious ideas by hi. scientific speculations. James Adam
commented,
n The ordinary Greek believed the sun and moon to be Gods:
Anaxagoras robbed them of their divinity, and maintained
that the sun was nothing but a red-hot mass of stone; while
the moon, according to him, contained hills and ravines,
and was inhabited like the planet on which we live.,,11
This is one of .the first of many conflicts between science and
religion.
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Criticisms of primitive conceptions of the gods are to
be found in P,ythagoreanism. In a story of a descent into
Hades it is recorded of Pythagoras that
" he saw the soul of Hesiod, bound to a brazen pillar,
and crying out, together with the soul of Homer,
suspended from a tree, and surrounded by snakes, in
return for what they had said about the gOds."12
Hippocrates was not a natural theologian but in one of
his comments we have what is perhaps the first protest against
"the god of the gaps,,13 - the use of theological explanation
to fill the gaps in scientific knowledge. Hippocrates wrote :
" I do not think any disease is more divine or sacred
than others. •• I think that those who first called
this disease (so. epilepsy) sacred were men such as there
are still at the present day, magicians and purifiers
and charlatans and impostors. They make use of the
godhead to cloak and cover their own incapacity.n14
Like Hippocrates, the dramatists were unaware that they were
dealing in natural theology. Thought about the world had not
been categorised and the physician and the poet were merely
commenting on the world in general. Euripides ~corns the
anthropomorphic character of the gods and in one passage comes
down on the side of atheism.15 We find homely phi1osoph-
ising about life and religion in the work of Aeschylus and
Sophocles, but Euripides supremely ls the philosopher-poet
critioising commonly accepted religious concepts. The very
2~
fact that the 'deus ex machina' became an accepted dramatic
device is in itself a comment on the attitude of the dramatists
towards the old-time religion. A god who can be let down in a
crane can hardly be taken seriously.
4. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle as Critics of Religion
Socrates was accused of impiety because he did not accept
current ideas concerning the nature of the gods. He insisted on
asking questions and religious concepts were not immune from his
stringent analysis. Professor H.H.Price's description of
16Socrates as a 'linguistic analyst' is more than justified.
Voices might come to him in moments of insight but,for a man like
Socrates, whether religious ideas come through folk-lore or
revelation they must stand up to the examination of reason.
Socrates would have approved the fragment of Xenophanes :
ttThe gods have not revealed everything to men from the first,
But in time those who seek will find a better way.tt17
The judgments of Socrates are reflected in the work of Plato, who
in the Republic condemns the Homeric conceptions of the gods and
proposes a censorship of literature embodying crude ideas of the
gods. Plato's lasting contribution, however, lies not in his
critical approach but in his theological speculation which was to
influence all future theology.
18Similarly Aristotle criticised popular religion but his
real gift to religious thought is in speculative metaphysics.
In the period immediately following Aristotle the Stoics and
Epicureans did little more than elaborate the religious ideas of
the great era of Greek philosophy.
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5. Varro and Cicero
It is to M. Teretius Varro (116-28 B.C.) that credit must
go for the coinJing of the phrase 'Natural Theology', though his
particular term might be rendered more accurately as 'physical
theology' • The distinction between commonly accepted ideas of
the gods and philosophical concepts of deity has been implicit in
our account of Greek thought, but Varro makes the distinction
explicit. There are, according to Varro, three different kinds
of theology, mythical, physical and civil.19 Varro is
critical of the mythical or 'fabulous' theology which is concerned
with the crude myths related of the gOds. Civil theology 1s
concerned with official state ceremonies and parade services.
Natural theology, for Varro, is speculative philosophy. The
mythical is the sphere of the poet; the civil is the concern of
the common man and natural theology is in the realm of the
philosopher. Only two of Varro's four hundred and ninety books
have survived and it is impossible to say whe'ther or not he would
have counted himself as a natural theologian. According to
Auguetine20 Varro did not fully commit himself concerning the
gods of natural theology though he was prepared to dismiss the
gods of mythology as poetical and the gods of civil ceremonial as
no more than useful institutions.
•
Natural theology, says Varro,
" is that wherewith the philosophers have filled their
volumes: wherein they dispute what, whence and when the
gods were, whether from eternity of fire, as Heraclitus
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held, or of numbers as Pythagoras taught; or of atoms
as Epicurus belie~ed."21
Both Varro and Cicero sought encyclopedic knowledge of the universe
and religion was one subject among many others that they sought to
clarify. For this reason we must not look to Varro for conclusions
concerning the nature of the gods; his work was much more that of ~
analysis. His Christian co~mentators readily pointed out the
inade~uacy of his account of theology. In Ad Nationes Tertullian
criticised all three types of theology as idolatrous. The poets'
contribution is immoral; the civil gods provide only confusion,
while the philosophers have ingeniously composed their 'physical
22theology' out of their own conjectures. Likewise Augustine
criticised Varro for treating the gods as if they were the
inventions ot men.23 It is unfortunate that we have to depend
on his critics for an account ot his work. He seems, however, to
have been more concerned to apply critical analysis to religious
thought and to give an account ot religious customs rather than
to pronounce on the truth or falsehood ot theological assertions.
Montaigne described Varro as a 'notable divine'. Augustine said
ot him:
" Who was ever a more curious in~uisitor of these matters
than Varro, a more learned inventor, a more diligent judge,
24a more elegant divider, or a more exact recorder? "
It natural theology consists in asking pertinent questions about
•
religion and applying standards ot reason to assertions about
divine matters then Varro has the right to be called a natural
theologian.
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Cicero was content to let his De Natura Deorum take the
form of a shop window where alternative views of religion are
displayed and the reader is left to decide which is most
reasonable. Cicero takes it for granted that any religious belief
must be subjected to the careful scrutiny of reason. In his
dedication of the work to Brutus, he says,
" What is so unworthy of the dignity and seriousness proper
to a philosopher as to hold an opinion that is not true, or
to maintain with unhesitating certainty a proposition not
based on adequate examination, comprehension and knowledge.,,25
Herein lies the justification of an impartial examination of
religious tenets. It is not sufficient to accept uncritically
the convictions of Pythagoras or any other philosopher. In any
case diversity of opinions must induce doubt.26 In the course of
the dialogue, which consists of lengthy speeches by Velleius,
the Epicurean, Balbus, the Stoic and Cotta, the Academic, many
of the traditional arguments for the existence of God are produced
and in turn criticised. The Epicurean justification for belief
in God lies in the fact that "it is the constant and universal
opinion of mankind, irrespective of education, custom and law".27
This,of course, was the justification for natural theology at
the beginning of the Christian' era. All men everywhere have a
conception of God. Not all men have received the revelation
through Judaism and Christianity. Therefore there must be a
knowledge of God available quite apart from revelation. Cotta
questions the assumption of the universality of theistic belief.
He points out that it is impossible to know whether the belief is
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universal or not and points to individual philosophers who are at
28least agnostic. In passing Cotta makes a comment that has some
bearing on our con~ideration ot natural theology as critic ot
religion.
tI I always tind it much harder to think ot arguments to
prove a thing true than to prove it talse.,,29
The negative task of natural theology is always much easier than
any constructive function.
In the second book Balbus sets out a number of arguments for
the existence of the gods including a form of the teleological
argument. He also appeals to the consensus gentium as well as
to evidence of divination and records of epiphanies, but his
chief appeal is to the design found in the universe. In his
careful description of the human digestive system30 and accounts
of curiosities of the animal world Balbus anticipates much that
Paley and the authors of the Bridgewater Treatises were to write.
~uch intricate design could only be the work of a divine mind.
Cotta, the uigh Priest, comes back to the attack, pointing out
the moral impe~'fections of the deities of the Roman pantheon,
and the inconsistencies of the various providences and revelations.
Cicero himself seems to have considered that a purified popular
religion would be advantageous to the community though it is by
nO means certain which, if any, of the participants in the
dialogue represents his own views. He is at least urging that
religion, and in particular the popular beliefs of religion,
should be subjected to a rigorous examination by reason. He
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makes Cotta, who has acknowledged earlier that he depends on
religion for a living, conclude with the remark,
" This is the purport of what I had to say concerning the
nature of the gods, not with a design to destroy their
existence, but merely to show what an obscure point it is,
and with what difficulties an explanation of it is attended.',1
The closing sentence of the work suggests that while Cotta, the
critic, had the strongest arguments supporting a critical
scepticism, Cicero himself accepted the arguments of Balbus on
the basis of probability.
Both Varro and Cicero were eclectics rather than original
thinkers. They were critics of religion and theology rather
than theologians or metaphysicians. They were the last great
pre-Christian writers who dealt with religious practices and
beliefs. Not unnaturally they were regarded by the early
Christian thinkers as summing up what the ancient world had been
able to learn of God without the benefit of revelation. Both
were critics of the ancient religions, ready to reject crude
superstition, but prepared to salvage from the welter of early
theologies those concepts which might provide the foundation of
a religion that men of their time might accept with integrity.
They were not engaged in metaphysics; they had no apologetic
brief; they were bringing the light of reason to bear on the
claims of religion.
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6. Towards Christian Self-Criticism
In the early centuries of the Christian era reason became
an instrument in the hands of the apologists. No-one believed
~hat the fullness of the Christian message could be conveyed by
simple reasoning. Nevertheless reason was a useful weapon with
which to attack pagan conceptions of deity. The kind of arguments
used by Xenophanes were used by the Christians against current
pagan anthropomorphism. The theologians would use reason within
the realm of faith to construct formularies, but a considerable
time elapsed before reason is turned on the Christian faith itself
in self-criticism. In an age which tended to exalt the authority
of the Fathers above reason the challenge of Peter Abelard provided
a necessary antidote.
Clement Webb reminds us32 that Varro's use of the word
'theology' had led to its association with heathenism. Abelard
was bold enough to call one of his own works Introductio ad
Theologiam. While we must not dismiss the writings of Abelard
as purely negative, such positive contribution as he makes is
largely the outcome of his critical rational approach to the
teaching of the church. Abelard does not appear to have used
the motto, Intelligo ~ credam, which is sometimes attributed to
him. He does not say that we must understand completely before
we can believe. He is rather protesting against unintelligent
belief and insisting that we cannot be said to believe something
that has no meaning for us. In his ~ !!~ he set conflicting
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passages from the Fathers one against another leaving the reader
to draw the obvious conclusion that two contradictory statements
cannot both be true. This method was to be adopted by later
thinkers and in particular by St. Thomas who was not content to
leave the thesis and the objections side by side but went on to
provide a constructive solution. Abelard saw that Christians
have ~ duty to be "honest to God" but he did not see as clearly
as Aquinas the limitations of human reason. In spite of his
condemnation by the authorities later thinkers followed the lead
given by Abelard. Gilson comments on his momentous influence :
" The end of the twelfth centu~y is indebted to him for
an ideal of technical strictness and exhaustive justific-
ation, even in theology, which was to find its complete
expre~6ion in the doctrinal syntheses of the thirteenth
century. 'Abelard imposed, 60 to speak, an intellectual
standard which no one thenceforth cared to 10wer."33
If Abelard is to be labelled a rationalist it is only in
contrast to those who refused to subject the various authorities
to the examination of reason. In his Introductio ad Theologiam
Abelard declared :
" Now therefore it remains for us, after having laid
down the foundation of authority, to place upon it the
. . 34buttresses of reasoning."
He regarded the truths of the faith as propositions to be
logically and grammatically analysed. Thus:-
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" This is the first key to wisdom, careful and fz:equent
questioning • • • • For by doubting we come to questioning,
and by questioning we perceive the truth.,,35
Theology, for Abelard, who made no distinction between natural
theology and any other, was the examination of religious truths
in the light of reason. In this he was the precursor of later
rationalists who were no longer inhibited by the authority ot
the mediaeval church.
7. Towards Reasonable Religion
Abelard had challenged the authoritarian formulations of
faith from within the church. He did not dispute the necessity
of revelation and faith. Once the external authority of the
historic church was denied not only were the authoritarian
formulations challenged but the status of faith itself was
questioned. Where earlier thinkers had been asking how reason
could confirm the established faith. philosophers now turned
their attention to the reconciling of faith with reason. Indeed
if a reasonable religion could be established there would no
longer be any necessity for faith. Credulity was shown to have
masqueraded as faith SO often that faith itself was in danger
of being discredited completely. It was thought,rather naively.
that just as maps were drawn on the basis of common agreement
among explorers, so it might be possible to review the religious
beliefs of various peoples and to arrive at an agreed theological
"map".
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Lord Herbert, the first English student of comparative
religion, surveyed the various religions in his day in De
Religione Gentilium. In this case the impartial criticism of
religion led to a positive expression of a reasonable "faith".
Herbert began with certain logical assumptions, the chief of
which was that there are certain Common Notions known to all sane
men on the basie of natural instinct. If it can be shown that
the idea of God is such a common notion this will be sufficient
to establish the fact of God's existence. Lord Herbert claimed,
somewhat unhistorically, that the pure rational conception of
God wae primary.and its original purity had been corrupted by
"the covetous and crafty sacerdotal ordertt. This original
catholic faith is embodied in his five assertions
(1) There is a Supreme God.
(2) The Sovereign Deity ought to be worshipped.
(3) The connection of virtue and piety •• is•• the most
important part of religious practice.
(~) The minds of men have always been filled with horror
for their wickedness. Their vices and crimes have been
obvious to them. They must be expiated by repentance.
:36
(5) There is reward and punishment after this life.
Lord Herbert allowed for revelation but the most stringent tests
were to be applied before a 'revelation' could be acknowledged
as genuine. In no case would a revelation contradict the,
common notions and it would be essentially personal. The record
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of revelation is not itself revelation and, owing to the
unreliability of reporters, can never yield more than p~obabi1ity.
Further, Lord Herbert found it difficult to see why God should
entrust to one particular man truths that would be better
imparted to all men by a natural instinct.37 Thus from a critical
approach to actual religions Lord Herbert moved on to constructive
natural theology.
John Locke was as anxious as Lord Herbert to establish a
reasonable religion and, as we have seen38, he was careful to
detine both the limits ot reason and the limits of revelation.
Reason is the final arbiter. Locke declares,
" God, when he maketh the prophet, does not unmake the man.
He leaves all his faculties in the natural state, to enable
him to judge ot his inspirations, whether they be ot divine
origin or no."39
Theology, tor Locke, is a natural science and he does not find it
necessary to use the epithet 'natural'. What is more the study
of this science is laid as a duty upon all men. The one day in
40seven apart from other days ot rest allows time for this study.
Locke does not appeal to the consensus gentium nor does he put any
confidence in the ontological argument. Man knows that he himself
exists, argues Locke, and since a being cannot be produced from
nothing, something eternal exists which is most powerful and most
knowing. This being must be God. This natural theology of Locke's
is the direct outcome of the critical study of religion. Locke,
like Herbert, allows that there may be revelation, but it is
carefully circumscribed.
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The natural theology ot Herbert and Locke prepared the way
for Deism. In 1696 John Toland published his Christianity ~
mysterious, showing ~ there !! nothing !!~ Gospel contrary
to Reason ~ ~ it, ~ ~ ~ Christian Doctrine ~ properly
be called ~ Mystery. Anthony Collins published his Discourse ~
~ Grounds and Reasons ~ Christian Religion in 1724. In this
he challenged the traditional arguments for the truth of
Christianity based on miracle and propheey fulfilment. Six years
later came Matthew Tindal's Christianity!! old !! ~ Creation,
~, ! Republication ~ ~ Religion ot Nature. Reason had
finally triumphed over revelation. From being the critic of
religion reason had become its creator.
8. David Hume Scepticism and Faith
Hume, as we have seen, was careful to distinguish between
any reasonableness that may appertain to religious concepts and
reasonableness as the original ground of their acceptance. Men
are not religious on the grounds of reason. They embrace religion
first and then their religious concepts have to be tested by
reason. Yet because religion's hold upon a man is SO strong
man's reason may be enslaved by the grossest superstitions.
Man's ignorance of scientific explanations may lead him, as
Hippocrates had observed, to ascribe unusual events to the
intervention of the deity. Where the rational man sees such
unusual events as evidence of the lack of a supreme organising
intelligence, the superstitious man sees them as a sign of "the
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41immediate operation of providence". Hume complains that when
a man raises doubts about religion he is immediately condemned as
sinful or presumptuous. This is especially so, he says, where
theism is the fundamental tenet of a popular religion and where
authority is vested in a sacred book like the Alcoran or in a
, 42visible authority like the Roman pontiff. Hume allows that
theologians do not go so far as to say that human reasoning is
totally unreliable and that deity is utterly incomprehensible.
The teaching of the authorities possesses some degree of
consietence and uniformity and so the believers are swept along
to accept the mysteries as well as the reasonable assertions of
faith. What irks Hume most is that such acceptance is regarded
as a virtue and the questioning of such mysteries a deadly sin.
Where Herbert's study of natural religions led him to
discover general unanimi'ty in the common notions, Hume' s study
uncovered all the inconsistencies. He could find no abiding
place for reason in the temples of religion. So at the close of
his NRtural History of Religion he proposed to escape from the fUrY
and contentions of opposing superstitions into the calm, though
obscure, regions of philosophy.
Hume makes a more philosophical approach to the problems
of religion in ~ Dialogues concerning ~atural Religion. The
argument, according to Demea, is not concerned with the being
of God but his nature, yet as the dialogue continues we find
that the discussion of the nature of God inevitably raises the
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question of his existence. At one point Cleanthes and Philo
vie with each other in painting a gloomy picture of the cruel
universe and Philo points out that Epicurus's old questions
concerning God are still unanswered.
" Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able ? then
is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is
he malevolent. Is he both able and willing ? whence, then
is evil 1,,43
It is impossible, Philo urges, for us to infer the goodness
of God from an evil world. Hume developed this thought in the
44Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding.
" It is impossible," Hume claims, " for you to know any
thing of the cause, but what you have antecedently not
inferred, but discovered to the full in the effect.,,4;
If we are arguing from effect to cause,the cause we educe must be
proportioned to the effect. So unless we have a perfect world
we cannot argue to a perfect creator. Philosophers only arrive
at such a Bonclusion because "they have aided the ascent of reason
46by the wings of the imagination". In inferring a perfect
creator, the philosopher is assigning attributes to the cause
beyond what appears in the effect.
In the light of Kant's subsequent conclusions concerning
the limitations of natural theology it should be noted that Bume
had already come to similar conclusions concerning any argument
from design. Hurnehad already abolished knowledge to leave room
for faith.
" There is no view of human life, or of the condition
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of mankind, trom which, without the greatest violence,
we can inter the moral attributes, or learn that infinite
benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and intinite
wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone.,,47
The most we can arrive at by inference is
" That the cause or causes of order in the universe
-- - - -- 48probably ~ ~ remote analogy to human intelligence."
Kant concluded that if a man could have knowledge ot God's
existence from other sources, then the argument from design
might streugthen the belief, but Hume argued, in the person of
Philo, that if a man were assured antecedently that there was a
good God who had created a universe, he would never have inferred
from that assurance that this was the kind ot world he would
create. Philo continues,
" But eupposing, which is the real case with regard to
man, that this creature is not antecedently convinced of
a supreme intelligence, benevolent and powerful, but'is
left to gather such a beliet trom the appearance of things;
thie entirely alters the case, nOr will he ever find
reason for such a conclusion. He may be tully convinced of
the narrow limits of his understanding; but this will not
help him in forming an inference concerning the goodness of
superior powers, since he must torm that inference from
what he knows, not from what he is ignorant of.,,49
So Hume concluded that just as religion was not originally
a product of reason, 80 in a later age reason could not prove
the truths of religion. Equally, reason could not disprove
those truths, and 80 he left the way open for revelation and
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faith. Hume sawall the logical weaknesses of Deism and,
whatever his own convictions were, recognised it as a caricature
of the Christian faith, summing up the position in the celebrated
words of Philo.
" A person, seasoned with a just sense of the
imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed
truth with the greatest avidity: while the haughty
Dogmatist, persuaded that he can erect a complete system
of Theology, by the mere help of philosophy, disdains
any further aid, and rejects this adventitious instructor.
To be a philosophical Sceptic is, in a man of letters, the
first and most essential step towards being a sound,
believing Christian.,,50
This is a very different conclusion from that of Locke and the
deists. In his efforts to be honest to God Hume shook the very
foundations of natural theology. Never again would naive
acceptance of the traditional theistic arguments be possible.
If natural theologians revived the arguments with undiminished
confidence it was because they had either not read or not
understood Hume. In his own century Hume received scant attention
from the theologians. The most important immediate effect was
the awakening of Kant from his dogmatic slumbers. His lessons
have been forcefully repeated by positivist philosophers of our
own day. Hume himself would scareely wish to be called a
natural theologian but he has done much to clarify the possibilities
of natural theology. Indeed, if natural theology is an attempt
to think clearly about God then Hume's work is natural theology.
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One ot his recent editors comments,
" Whether to our salvation or damnation we will have to
go on doing theology. And, ironic as it may seem, Hume
will help us to do it better than we should have done it
without him.,,51
9. Kant: Towards a reasoned taith
Atter the onslaught ot Hume Natural Theology was indeed the
sick man ot Europe, tor it Hume was right there was little or
nothing lett to be done. Kant, awakened by Hume, began again
trom the beginning. He believed that all knowledge and experience
should be subjected to the careful scrutiny ot reason and he did
not exempt theology from this judgment. In the Preface to the
First Edition of the Critique £!~ Reason, he wrote,
tI Ours is an age of criticism, to which· everything must
be subjected. The sacredness of religion and the authority
of legislation. are by many regarded as gr.ounds of
exemption from the examination of this tribunal. But, if
they are exempted, they become the subjects of just
suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which
reason accords only to that which has stood the test of a
free and public examination.,,52
In the chapter of the Critique entitled, "Critique ot all ·Theo1ogy
based upon Speculative Principles of Reasod~3he ana1ys~d the
possible approaches to theb10gy and devised a scheme which is
most clearly dr.preseated diagrammatically:
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THEOLOGY
Theology is ,the cognition of a primal being either on the
grounds of reason (Theologia Rationalis) or revelation (Theologia
Revelationis). Transcendental Theology produces knowledge of God
by means of consideration of pure transcendental conceptions such
as ~ originarium, realissimum or ens entium. If these
conceptions are examined without the aid of experience then the st~
is called Onto-theology. The ontological argument would be an
example of this approach. If reference is made to what Kant calls
"general experience" without any closer reference to the world to
which the experience belongs then we have cosmo-theology. The
cosmological argument, drawing as it does upon the general
experience of cause and effect is thus cosmo-theology. Nothing
more than Deism can be deduced from Transcendental Theology. If,
however, we draw on our experience, intellectual, moral and
physical, then we are in the realm of Natural Theology, through
which we can find our way to Theism. Kant distinguishes Deism
and Theism by saying that the former regards the Supreme Being as
the cause of the world while the latter sees God as the author
of the world. The Deist believes in God; the Theist in a
living God. When we take our experience of the physical world
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into account we may produce an argument from design which Kant
describes as physico-theologieal. weWhen/take our moral experience
into account we have the ethico-theological argument, which, from
Kant's point of view, was the only satisfactory approach.
We are not concerned here with Kant's attempt to build up
a positive argument, but it is important to keep his total scheme
clearly before us, so that we can have full appreciation of the
edifice he is demolishing by his Critique. One by one he
demolished the arguments, leaving the ethico-theological argument
as the one feasible'~roof". It must be made clear, however,
that Kant's dismissal of the rational arguments does not mean that
he has no further use for natural theology. He is prepared to
admit that if we can get knowledge of God from some other source,
and revelation and ethico-theology are possible sources, then
the other arguments add weight. Of the arguments he rejected
the physico-theological seemed to him the strongest and he wrote,
tt The physico-theological proof may add weight to others-
if other proofs there are - by connecting speculation with
experience; but in itself it rather prepares the mind for
theological cognition, and give it a right and natural
direction, than establishes a sure foundation for theology.,,54
From the point of view of our discussion what he goes on to say
is even more relevant. Irrespective of the ability or disability
of reason to establish1theism reason will always have the task of
critic. Thus:-
" Although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient
to demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being, it is of
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the highest utility in correcting our conception of this
being - on the supposition that we can attain to the
cognition of it by some other means - in making it consistent
with itself and with all other conceptions of intelligible
objects, clearing it from all that is incompatible with the
coneeption of an ~ summum, and eliminating from it all
limitations or admixture of empirical elements.,,55
Kant is still prepared to call this exercise Transcendental
Theology. Notwithstanding its objective inadequacy it is
important in this negative application. In particular it will
serve to correct contradictions arising from anthropomorphism in
its many aspects. It may not provide proof but it will serve to
clarify the metaphysical concept of God.
" The attributes of necessity, infinitude, unity,
existence apart from the world (and not as a world-soul),
eternity - free from conditions of time, omnipresence -
free from conditions of space, omnipotence, and others,
are pure transcendental predicates; and thus the accurate
conception of a Supreme Being, which every theology
requires, is furnished by transcendental theology alone. ,,56
This point made by Kant is of no small import even to SO called
Dogmatic or Biblical theology. The very conceptions enumerated
are not to be found in those terms in Biblical literature. They
may be drawn by inference from the scriptures but they remain
metaphysical concepts, the product of pure reasoning rather than
inference from religious experience.
Kant's critique of theology served to show the inadequacy
of transcendental and natural theology in providing serviceable
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proofs. Even the moral argument is not so much a proof as an
expression of faith. Kant's critique opens the way for faith,
which was its expressed intention. It I must, therefore, abolish
knowledge to make room for belief," he wrote in the preface to
the second edition. It also serves to demonstrate that the
findings of faith must be checked and corrected by reason. Kant,
as we have seen, had no hesitation in describing this exercise
as transcendental theology. Since the term natural theology is
used at times by Kant to embrace transcendental theology as well
as what is called natural theology in his analysis, we shall at
least have Kant's authority for claiming that when reason acts
ae critic of religious concepts it is indeed natural theology,
even if it be admitted that reason by itself is unable to produce
anything like a theology. Indeed the possibility must remain
that such critical examination will result in atheism or
agnosticism.
In so far as Kant was successful in abolishing knowledge
to make room for belief, he prepared the way for two further
developments. On the one hand there was a renewed emphasis on
faith and religious experience and on the other the philosophers
turned to Idealism to find a philosophy within which a religious
faith might find expression. These developments are discussed in
later chapters. We need not pursue further the idea of natural
theology as critic of religion. There were later philosophers
who took the same view, but Kant had made the point as clearly
as it could be made.
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10. Gifford Lecturers as Critics of Religion
We now turn to an examination of some definitions or
descriptions of natural theology offered by Gifford lecturers,
wh~ch involve the critical assessment of truth as a part if not
the whole function of natural theology.
We have already noted that H.J.Paton described his task
as a Gifford lecturer as thinking dispassionately about religion.
William Wallace spoke of construing rather than constructing
religion. William Temple stated categorically
It Natural Theology should be the criticism of actual
Religion and of actual religious beliefs, irrespective
of their supposed origin and therefore independently of
any supposed act or word ot Divine Revelation, conducted
with the full understanding of what is criticised, yet
with the complete relentlessness of scientific enQuiry.,,57
Christopher Dawson described natural theology as
" nothing more or less than the philosophic or scientific
study ot religious truth,,,58
while John Laird commented after a careful examination of the
theistic arguments,
" Even it natural theology be insufficient of itself to
prove much', it may appreciably clarify much in theology. ,,59
Sir Henry Jones summed up this approach in the title of his work,
! Faith !h!! Enquires. Natural theology questions faith. Through
the centuries reason has helped to distinguish religion and
superstition, faith and credulity. As Whitehead put it, "Reason
60safeguards the objectivity of religion."
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Even if revelation is accepted as of the essence of
religious faith there is still a place for such .rational enquiry,
or so a number of lecturers have thought. Leonard Hodgson, a
theologian rather than a philosopher maintained that,
" The fullest recognition of the revealed character of the
Christian faith is consistent with the belief that it is God's
61will to submit it to the judgment of human reason."
If the emphasis is put upon religious experience there is the same
necessity for ratiopal criticism. C.A.Campbell believes that
religious experience, interpreted symbolically, provides prima
facie evidence for the truth of religion, but this evidence must
be sifted by reason.
" Natural Theology seeks a rational answer to the question,
'Is religion true Of And if so, in what precise sense ?' ,,62
Some two thousand years earlier Cicero had written,
" In an inquiry as to the nature of the gods, the first
question that we ask is, do the gods exist or not ? ,,63
Natural theology then, and there is considerable support
for this view among Gifford lecturers, checks, criticises and
judges the truth of religious statements by the light of reason.
This is in accord with Lord Gifford's expressed desire that
lecturers should discuss the origin, nature and truth of man's
conceptions o~ God without dependence upon special revelation.
It is one of the functions of a Gifford lecturer to think
dispassionately about religion.
Part 2. Chapter 1. Reference 1'4otes
Natural Histor;r2.! Religion, Ch. 6.
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1. The Need for Apologetic
To the Hebrew mind the 'Thus saith the Lord~, proclaimed
in the deserts or from the hilltops, was sufficient argument
for the existence of God. The Hebrew prophets had a natural
theology but they did not use it to argue the case so much as
to declare the nature of God. Likewise the Christian gospel
is kerlgma - a declaration rather than an argument.
Among the Greeks religious observances might take place
at local shrines but the truths of religion were subjects for
discussion among the cultured classes. While the Christian
message was being proclaimed to Jews the argument of fulfilment
of prophecy might prove effective. They were more accustomed
to the type of argument presented by Elijah - the argument from
God's activity in the world. "The God who answers by fire, he
is God," declared Elijah. st. Paul made an accurate diagnosis
of the situation when he said. " Jews call for miracles, Greeks
look for wisdom".1 If a new gospel was to be presented to the
Greek world, the arguments addressed to the Jews would be
relatively useless; the case must be argued. The problem that
faced the early church was that of preaching a faith to a world
in which the Hebrew scriptures meant nothing. The problem
facing the twentieth century church is that of preaching a faith
to a world which knows little of the scriptures and often
misunderatands th&'; little that is known.
If a case is to be argued there must be some common ground
on which the argument can be founded. Argument with the Jews,
235
as we observed, would begin with the interpretation of the
Hebrew scriptures. Argument with the Greeks would begin on
such common ground as could be found - belief in supernatural
powers or power. Argument with the twentieth century unbeliever
may well begin on the common ground of a search for meaning.
But if conversion is to take place and if it is to be more than
a non-rational acceptance of a dogmatic proposition, then there
must be some kind of reasoned argument. The final step may be
a leap of faith but before a rational man will be prepared to
him
make such a leap it will be necessary to persuade/either that
his present position is untenable or that the new position
commended is as reasonable or more reasonable. So at times
apologetic may be directed against another religion, and at
other times it will involve demonstrating the reasonableness of
the faith commended.
2. St. Paul, Apologist and Natural Theologian
The common ground that St. Paul found in his approach to
the Greeks was belief in God. It is not clear whether this
knowledge of God, which Paul assumes to be available to the
Greeks, is to be understood as an inference from the world of
nature or an intuition arising from man's perception of God's
revelation of himself. The distinction was unimportant in the
first century, but in the light of subsequent theological
discu6sion we shall need to examine more closely the nature of
this knowledge of God recognised by Paul.
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The account of the visit of Paul and Barnabas to Lystra and
the report of Faul's speech before the Court of the Areopagus
provide the earliest documentary evidence of the use of natural
theology for apologetic purposes. When Paul and Barnabas had
been hailed as Hermes and Zeus they declared :
" Men, why are you doing this? We also are men, of like
nature with you, and bring you good news, that you
should turn from these vain things to a living God who made
the heaven and the earth and the sea and all that is in them.
In past generations he allowed all the nations to walk in
their own ways; yet he did not leave himself without witness,
for he did good and gave you from heaven rains and fruitful
seasons, satisfying your hearts with food and gladness.,,2
The emphasis on the living God who did not leave himself without
witness suggests that, in the view of the apostles, God was
actively revealing himself in nature to those who could see, rather
than waiting passivell to be discovered by man's intellectual
ability. This is not to say that there is no intellectual element
in an intuition of God, but that the kind of insight or intuition
involved is more than an intellectual apprehension based on a
teleological or cosmological argument. It is, as we shall see,
more analogous to a person gaining an insight into the character
of another person than to an explorer discovering the source of
a river. This is confirmed by Paul's speech at Athens where he
declared
II He made from one every nation of men to live on all
the face of the earth, having determined allotted periods
and the boundaries of their habitation, that they should
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seek God, in the hope that they might feel after him and
find him. Yet he is not far from each one of us, for
'In him we live and move and are;'
as even some of your poets have said,
'For we are indeed his offspring.'
Being then God's offspring, we ought not to think that the
Deity is like gold, or silver, or stone, a representation by
the art and imagination of man.,,3
The ground on which the Athenians should know that the Deity is
not like gold or silver or stone is that 'we are indeed his
offspring', :;a--',line';from the Greek poet, Aratas, who had
somehow been able to express a thought that tallied with Jewish
teaching. When we come upon the description of man as "seeking
God" or "feeling after him" we are in the realm of insight,
intuition or faith rather than intellectual search.
There is further confirmation in the letter to the Romans
that Paul recognised that the gentiles had a natural theology of
their own upon which the Christian faith could be built. Some
scholars hold the view that,after the relative failure of the
Athens speech, Paul resolved to preach only Christ and him
crucified. Nevertheless some,. including Dionysius and Damaris,
had become believers and in the letter to the Romans Paul
reaffirms his belief that this general knowledge of God is open
And if it exists it could still be the basis ofto all men.
apologetic. Paul wrote,
" For what can be known about God is plain to them,
because God has shown it to them. Ever since the
creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his
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eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in
the things that have been made. So they are without
excuse; for although they knew God they did not honour
him as God or give thanks tdpim but they became futile in
their thinking and their senseless minds were darkened.
claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged
the glory of the immortal god for images resembling
4mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles."
Here it is clear that this knowledge of God depends primarily
on God's revelation of himself in creation. It depends
secondarily upon man's willingness to see what should be plain
to him. Commenting on the passage, Etienne Gilson declares,
" He (Baul) affirms by implication the possibility of a
purely rational knowledge of God in the Greeks, and at
the same time lays the foundation of all the natural
theologies which will later arise in the bosom of
Christianity. No philosopher, from St. Augustine to
" 5Descartes, but will make use of this text.
The question we must raise is whether Baul is in fact talking
about! purely rational knowledge of God in the Greeks. It is
.not purely rational in the sense that the answer to a mathematical
problem is arrived at by a purely rational process. It can be
argued that man could arrive at this knowledge of God by a
purely rational process if he were not a fallen creature, but
since we have no means of knowing how such a creature reasons
it is a purely hypothetical question. ~aul was quite certain
that philosophy is no sUbstitute for faith and that the Christian
gospel is the true wisdom of God. He also believed that there
is a knowledge of God available to any man who looks at the
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natural world in the appropriate way. We must repeat, however,
that this knowledge is not an inference from data which can be
logically verified; it is more appropriately described as insight.
So at the beginning of the Christian era Paul propounded a
two-fold theory of truth. There is a revelation of the existence
of God which can be apprehended by what we have called insight
and there is a revelation in Christ offered by grace and
apprehended by faith. The first kind of knowledge is the basis
of apologetic; the second kind of knowledge is the subject matter
of preaching. So Paul not only laid the foundation of one kind
of natural theology, but, in the words of Pfleiderer,
" This man of .estasies and vision was at the same time
a religious thinker of the first rank. What he felt he
continually made the object of his reflection, in order
to comprehend it in thought and prove it to himself and
others as truth. Thus he became the creator of the
doctrinal form of the Christian;faith, a comprehensive
"6new view of the world, the creator of Christian theology.
So Christian theology was born and natural theology adopted as a
close ally.
3. The Early Apologists
Where Paul appealed to an insight, within which the
teleological argument is a built-in component, later apologists
abstracted the rational element and appealed explicitly to
rational arguments. Paul's natural theology was based on something
God had revealed to the gentiles; later apologists appealed
directly to reason as being the instrument given by God to
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enable man to find things out for himself.
In the second century Aristides, an Athenian philosopher,
wrote an apology dedicated to the Emperor. His starting point,
as Pfleiderer points out7is philosophical rather than religious.
Elementary forms of the teleological and cosmological arguments
are used to demonstrate(~the existence of God, who is described
in philosophical terms as
II unbegotten, uncreated, an eternal nature, without
beginning or end, immortal, perfect and inconceivable;
perfect because being without wants, having need of
nothing, while everything has need of him.tlB
So much is clear to all men, but the pagans have erred in their
expression of religious truth; the Jews have come a little nearer
to the truth, but to the Christians the fulness of the truth has
been revealed. Here we see the beginning of the conflation of
Christian theology and Greek speculative thought about God.
Justin Martyr, another second century apologist, if his
own account of his spiritual quest is true, was actively seeking
God through philosophy. In the Dialogue ~ Trypho, he gives
what might well be a dramatised account of his interviews with a
Stoic, a Peripatetic, a P,ythagorean and a Platonist in the course
of his search for God. The last named gave him the most definite
help but finally Justin met an aged man who told him of God's
revelation of himself to the prophets.
It Their writings are still extant, and he who has read
them is very much helped in his knowledge of the beginning
and the end of things, and of those matters which the
philosopher ought to know, provided he has believed them.
For they did not use demonstration~in their treatises,
seeing they were witnesses to the truth above all
demonstration, and worthy of belief."9
Thus philosophy wa6 successful in leading him part of the way to
God, and in the Christian faith he saw a new kind of philosophy
which would enable him to fulfil his quest. Justin continues,
" I found this philosophy alone to be safe and profitable.
Thus, and for this reasom, I am a philosopher.,,10
Commenting on the manner of Justin's conversion, Gilson writes,
" A man seeks the truth by the unaided effort of reason
and is disappointed; it is offered him by faith and he
accepts; and, having accepted, he finds that it satisfies
his reason. • •• Disordered reason is reduced to order by
revelation; but precisely because they had experimented in
every direction without being afraid of contradictions, the
philosophers had managed to say, along with much that was
11:false, a good deal also that was true."
Christianity was,for Justin, a new philesophy that gave satisfying
answers to which the old philosophies had only been able to give
partial answers. It is interesting to note that after his
acceptance of Christianity he calls himself a philosopher. As a
Christian philosopher he could now expound his Christianity against
the background of the Greek philosophies. One who was conversant
with and indeed owed much to Greek philosophy could commend the
Christian faith to the gentiles more readily. He recognised that
God had spoken in Greek philosophy. John Watson comments,
" Justin is the first writer to maintain that God had not
confined the revelation of himself to the Jewish people, but
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had revealed himself to the heathen world, not only in
the world of creation, but through his Son, who is the
divine reason in every man.,,12
Christianity is thus not the contradiction of pagan philosophy
but the highest expression of divine reason open to all men.
Not all the early apologists shared Justin's liberal view.
According to Tatian (c.160), a pupil of Justin's, who is
described by Gilson as "the arch-enemy of Greek philosophy,,~3
all that was true in Greek thought had been borrowed from Jewish
sources. Athenagoras was prepared to recognise truth in the
Greek philosophers but mainly to demonstrate to the authorities
that the monotheism of the Christians was implicit in Greek
philosophy and did not constitute a threat to the empire. The
chief contribution of Athenagoras to natural theology lies in his
attempt to justify by rational argument the Christian belief in
14the resurrection of the dead. The increasing influence of
Gnosticism led to the production of a numbe.r of works directed
to the heretics rather than the gentiles. Where the Gnostics
based their religion on gnosis available to reason, Irenaeus
(0.130-200) claimed that Christianity was a gnosis attainable
through faith. The true gnosis is the teaching of the twelve
apostles.15 Hippolytus (c.170-236), asserted by one authority
to be a disciple of Irenaeus, seems to have been interested in
Greek philosophy simply to show the superiority of the Christian
'philosophy'.
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A position, similar to that of Justin, was adopted by
Clement of Alexandria (c.150-215). In Clement's view both
Judaism and Hellenism are precursors of Christianity. As in an
earlier century Philo had been able to synthesise Old Testament
revelation and Greek philosophy through the unity provided by
the divine Logos, so for Clement Jewish prophecy and Greek
philosophy find their completion in Christ. Clement writes,
" Before the advent of the Lord, philosophy was
necessary to the Greeks for righteousness. And now it
becomes conducive to piety; being a kind of preparatory
training to those who attain faith through demonstration.
• •• For God is the cause of all good things; but of some
primarily, as of the Old and the New Testament; and of
others by consequence, as philosophy. Perchance, too,
philosophy was given to the Greeks directly and primarily,
till the Lord should call the Greeks. For this was a ,"
schoolmaster to bring the Hellenic mind, as the law, the
Hebrews, to Christ. Philosophy, therefore, was a
preparation, paving the way for him who is perfected in
Christ.1I16
This is the first clear expression of the view that philosophy
is to be the handmaid of theology. Theology, however, is the
undisputed mistress for though much is said in the early fathers
in praise of philosophy the Hebrew revelation is recognised as
infinitely superior and, a6 we have seen, some of the fathers
claimed that Plato was indebted to Moses for his wisdom.
The Greeks had not been able to find the fullness of truth
through philosophy just as the Jews had not been able to reach
the final goal through Judaism. Nevertheless if philosophy was
a preparation for the Greeks then natural theology finds a ready
made place in the pattern of Christian apologetic. At least
philosophy provides the common ground on which the dialogue can
begin. Some think that the object of the apologists was to
strengthen the faith of believers17 but the fact that the works
were frequently dedicated to high Roman officials suggests that
a wider purpose was in view and that the strengthening of the
faith of believers was incidental. Incidental it may have been
but the fact that the Christian was confronting a world of many
philosophies meant that he must devise his own philosophy in
self defence. Philosophical theology came into being.
Origen (c.185-254), a pupil of Clement, has been described
by one Gifford lecturer as "the first philosophical theologian
of the Church".18 Pfleidereris probably right19 in asserting
that Origen only wished to use Greek philosophy for the defence
and establishment of the Christian faith, but inevitably there
came about that fusion of Christian faith and Greek speculation
which marked the development of Christian theology. Taking a
liberal view of the Old Testament, Origen was able to ward off
the attacks of Greeks like Celsus, whose criticisms were
directed against its moral and scientific anomalies. Similarly
he attempted to show that the truths of the Bible are in
accordance with truths which can be reached independently of
20revelation. The impact of Hellenistic ideas forced Origen to
find a way of expressing the gospel in terms comprehensible to
the gentiles and this in turn led to a rethinking of the Christian
faith in Greek terminology. The terms used by Origen to describe
God, "eternal", "immutable", "immaterial" and such like, are
essentially Greek concepts. What began as apologetic became a
philosophical theology.
4. The Western Apologist.
21Tertullian, in common with most of the early apologists ,
held that belief in the existence of God is innate. He believed
that the soul is naturally Christian as testified by his work, £!
Testimonio Animae Naturaliter Christianae. Christianity, indeed ,
is natural religion par excellence. Yet the soul did not learn
Christianity through Greek philosophy; the soul turns to Christ-
ianity because it is created by God. Tertullian has no time for
a "mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic and dialectic
composition". His question, "What has Athens to do with Jerusale~
has echoed down the ages. Far from attempting to show the
reasonableness of Christianity, Tertullian recommends belief that
the Son of God died "because it is absurd" and commends the
resurrection faith "because it is impossible".23 For Tertullian
there is a natural theology which can be grasped by the mind but
the peculiar beliefs of Christianity are beyond reason, and
therefore cannot be commended as reasonable.
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It is uncertain whether Minusius Felix (2nd or 3rd century)
wrote before or after Tertullian. One of his works took the
torm ot a dialogue between a pagan and a Christian after the
pattern of Cicero's De Natura Deorum. The pagans had tried hard
in their own way to discover truths which had been freely revealed
to Christians. Thus it Cicero had discovered some truth about
God and the world it was not unnatural that it should be confirmed
by revelation. So Minueius was willing to use some of the
Ciceronian arguments for the existence of God. However Christianity
is for all and so, while reason may pave the way for the learned,
to the babes the same truth may be revealed and they need not wait
upon the wisdom of the learned. Aquinas was to develop this
approach.
Arbobius (died c.330) set out to counter the attacks of the
pagans who blamed Christianity for be many calamities that had
befallen the world since its rise. An ardent admirer of Varro,
Arnobius used similar methods in his criticism of pagan concepts
of deity. In the main his arguments consist of replies to
specitic accusations and only in the second book of Adversus
Gentes, where he claims that Christianity is confirme~ by the
agreements of pagan philosophy, does he employ something like
natural theology. Jerome criticised Arnobius on the grounds of
the absence of systematic exposition but the time when apologetic
was to consist of a total philosophical exposition of Christian
theology was yet to come with Augustine and supremely with Aquinas.
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In his ~ Opificio ~ Lactantius (c.240-320), a pupil of
Arnobius, developed the argument from design, which had been so
clearly stated by Cicero and was to reach its most detailed
interpretation in the early part of the nineteenth century.
For some reason it would be "horrible and hideous" for the
elephant's mouth to reach the ground. In any case the tusks
prevent it and so the trunk was devised as an extra limb to reach
food. God's masterpiece was man and Lactantius traces the design
from the flat of the foot to the crowning glory of the hair.
Man's perception and reason mark him off from the animals and
in this lies the clear evidence that man is descended from God
)I h o P himself is intelligence, perception and reason.24 Like
Arnobius, Lactantius is at pains to show that the Christian
teaching about God is confirmed by the phi10sophers.25 He was
not immune from error and the "design" he envisaged had no place
for a round earth which would involve rain falling upwards in
26the antipodes! Nevertheless he saw clearly that reason and
religion must go hand in hand and he helped to prepare the way
for the mediaeval pattern of natural theology.
5. From Apologetic to Christian Philosophy
In ~ Confessions Augustine provides us with an autobio-
graphical account which at once reveals the possibilities as well
as the 1im~tions of apologetic. Augustine was not consciously
writing apologetic; he probably thought of his work simply as
a testimony to the grace of God. Yet when a man tells how he
moved from unbelief to belief and rational argument plays some
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part in the process, then the result is attested apologetic,
for in one case at least the argument worked! wben the apologist
is a believer at the outset, whether he be St. Thomas or Arch-
deacon Faley, there is a certain artificiality about the
argument. This was not the train of thought that led the writer
to belief. But when a man like Augustine declares " This and
this led me to belief," then the unbeliever pays more attention.
The first aim of apologetic is to demonstrate that the
faith commended is reasonable; this may be accompanied by an
attempt to show that any alternative position is unreasonable.
The next stage is to show that the view recommended is most
reasonable. If deductive argument cannot lead the unbeliever
all the way he may be invited to take the last step by faith
even when one position has not been clearly shown to be more
reasonable than another. At the end of the fifth book of The
Confessions Augustine describes how, after listening to St.
Ambrose he had reached a point of neutrality. He was convinced
that the Catholic position was defensible and the position of the
Manichees not as sound as he had thought.
" Nor yet conceived I that opinion to be false which
formerly I had professed, because now I thought that
both sides were equal. For although the Catholic cause
seemed not to me to be overcome, as yet withal I took
it not to be victorious.,,27
For a time Auguetine was neither a Manichee nor a Catholic.
Gradually the Hanichean arguments lost their strength and the
Catholic poeition seemed more convincing, but he was still
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looking for mathematical demonstration.
" For I kept my heart free from giving firm assent to
anything. •• For I desired to be assured of that which I
did not see, as fully as I was certain that seven and three
make ten.,,28
Finally he was intellectually convinced of the truth of the
Catholic faith, but there remained the leap of faith which, for
Augustine, meant moral submission.
" By the testimony of all Thy creatures I had found Thee,
our Creator, and Thy Word, God together with Thee, and
with Thee and the Holy Ghost one God, by ~~om Thou diSt
create all things.,,29
Reason was now satisfied but he had still not reached the goal.
The arguments that had satisfied his soul before were now
confuted and destroyed and he tells us that there remained only
a kind of "speechless trembling". Then there followed the
conversion experience, and what he had accepted intellectually
he now accepted with the whole of his being. He was advised
b~ St. Ambrose to read the prophecy of Isaiah and since he would
read the Latin translation of the Septuagint it would not be
long before he came across the text, "Nisi credideritis, non
intelligetis".30 This provided the key to his spiritual
pilgrimage. He had travelled a long way seeking intellectual
satisfaction. He had taken the leap of faith and then it had
all become plain to him. He had been mistakenly looking for
mathematical certainty when what he nee4ed was the assurance
of faith. If this was the way to conversion then it would still
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be necessary to demonstrate the r~asonableness of the faith but
even more was it necessary to declare the grace of God.
apologetic offered by St. Augustine would be a systematic
exposition of the Christian faith, what Gilson deecribes as
So the
"a metaphysic of conversion".
It is a short step from Augustine's experience to Anselm's
fides quaerens intellectum. There is an apologetic element in
Anselm's work, for he tells us that his ontological argument is
"a short way with unbelievers", but he is a theologian rather
than an apologist and we shall examine his "natural theology" at
a later stage. From the time of Augustine apologetic was
merging into Christian philosophy. It remained for St. Thomas
to fulfil the triplerole of philosopher-~apologist and theologian.
6. St. Thomas, Apologist and Christian Philosopher
St. Thomas has been described as the apologist ~ excellence.
He was also the Christian Philosopher ~ excellence. He saw that
the most useful apologetic for his times would be a systematic
exposition of the whole Christian theology. He determined, so he
tells us31, not to adopt the traditional approach of proceeding
against individual errors. The systematic exposition of the
Catholic faith was to be his chief life work. Doctors of the
church, like Augustine, had been able to enter into pagan thought
from inside. While this insight had been denied to Aquinas he
made a sincere effort to stand outside the realm of faith.
Against the Jews he could have used the Old Testament; against
251
heretical Christians he used the New. Faced as he was with
Mohammedans and pagans he could only find common ground in reason
and this was the basis of his apologetic.
As a man of faith, St. Thomas was acutely aware of the
limitations of reason. He respected the integrity of his
opponents and at the outset acknowledged these limitations.32
For Aquinas the truths of reason are accessible through
demonstrative argument; the truths of revelation are proposed
to men for belief. Nevertheless these truths of revelation are
not contrary to reason and they may be investigated by human
reason provieding there is "no presumption to comprehend or
demonstrate".33 It is possible to defend these truths by reason.
Apologetic, for St. Thomas, thus consists in
Ca) demonstrating the truths of religion accessible to reason.
Cb) showing that the truths of revelation are not unreasonable and
therefore they may properly be proposed for acceptance by faith,
thus arguing from probability to faith.34
(c) expounding the Catholic faith in its totality and arguing from
its coherence and self-consistency to its truth.
St. Thomas was prepared to use all the resources of the
rediscovered Aristotelian philosophy for his purposes and much
.
of the argument embodied in the Five v/ays came directly from
It is interesting to note the precise limitationsthat source.
Bet for the exercise of natural reason. Reason can demonstrate
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the existence of God. Further, by what Aquinas calls 'remotion'
we may discover the negative attributes of God. God is eternal
(i.e. not subject to time); there is no passive potency in God;
there is no matter in God; there is no composition in God; there
is nothing violent or unnatural in God; God is not a body.~·
The positive conclusion of this train of argument is that in God
being and essence are the same. But these conclusions will not
furnish a living faith. St. Thomas recognised that the confused
knowledge of God which all men possess does not lead to the
supreme happiness which is the end of man.~ In St. Thomas's
system reason needs faith for its fulfilment and the strength of
his position lies in his careful demarcation of the areas covered
by reason and faith respectively. He did not fall into the
errors of his predecessor Abelard or of the great rational
apologist Raymond de Sebonde. John Watson described Aquinas's
system as a "defence of the Mediaeval conception of life that is
in its own way perfect".35 The pattern of apologetic within the
Catholic church was set by Aquinas for future centuries.
7. Theologia Naturalis sive Liber Creaturarum
As Clement Webb remarks~6 Raymond de Sebonde's claim to a
place in the history ~f natural theology depends on two accidents.
that his work bore the title Theo1ogia Naturalist and that
Montaigne translated the work in response to his father's request
and made the defence of Raymond the subject of one of the most
celebrated of his essays. Montaigne writes of him,
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" His drift is bold, and his scope adventurous; for he
undertaketh by human and natural reasons, to establish and
verify all the articles of Christian religion against
Atheists.,,37
Raymond's own claim is more specific :
" This science is accessible alike to laymen and to clerks
and to every condition of men and can be had in less than
a month and without trouble, nor to possess it need one
have learned anything by heart or keep any written book,
nor can it be forgotten when once 1earned.,,38
The book was first written with a prologue which caused offence
to the Catholic Church and was placed on the Index in 1595.
Some have claimed that the emphasia on the authority of Scripture
as against the authority of the Church was the cause of offence,
but from the quotations cited by Clement Webb it is clear that
Raymond believed not only that his science confirmed scripture
but also that by means of it "the whole Catholic faith is made
known and proved to be true".39 The book of nature, which is
accesaib1e to all men, is clearly put before the book of
scripture which is not universally accessible. Since God is
the common author of both the books, he argues, there can be
no contradiction. The gravamen of the charge against Raymond
is not so much that he puts scripture before tradition as that
he dispenses with the necessity of both scripture and tradition.
If Clement Webb's interpretation of the text is correct then
Raymond claimed that anyone could gain the knowledge necessary
40for salvation by reading the book. According to Montaigne,
Adrianus Turnus, "a man who knew all things", said that
Raymond's work was "some quintessence extracted from out St.
Thomas Aquinas". But in Theologia Naturalis there is nothing
of Thomas's careful demarcation between faith and reason. Further,
while the argument from design has a prominent place, which
might support the statement, the ontological argument, dismissed
so peremptorily by Aquinas, is reproduced and approved by
Raymond. Clement Webb may be right in thinint\at Raymond 1s in
no sense a fore-runner of the Reformation, but nevertheless his
book anticipates future attempts at the creation of an apologet-
ical natural theology, which were to assume that reason can go
much further than ever St. Thomas and the mediaevals allowed.
Francis Bacon was wiser and less ambitious in setting limits
to natural theology, which he fitted into his total scheme of
scientific knowledge outlined in ~ Advancement of Learning.
He wrote,
" And as concerning Divine PhiloJ!>hy or Natural Theology,
it is that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning
God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his
creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed divine in
respect of the object, and natural in respect of the
light. The bounds of this knowledge are, that it
sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion."~
ThuB Bacon seems to allow that natural theology can give a
knowledge of God sufficient to confound the atheist but not
sufficient to give a religious knowledge of God as opposed to
factual knowledge.
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8. Modern Philosophy and Apologetic
Descartes is usually regarded as the first of modern
philosophers, but the Letter of Dedication and the Preface for
the Reader which introduce ~ Meditations put him in the company
of those who regard apologetic as the function of natural
theology. The Letter of Dedication is addressed to the Dean and
the Doctors of the Sacred Faculty of Theology of Faris, and in it
Descartes declares his conviction that the two questions of God
and the soul ought to be determined by the help of philosophy
rather than theology. It had always seemed difficult, he
claimed, if not impossible, to convert infidels unless these
two questions were first settled by recourse to natural reason.
Any argUment from scripture for the existence of God he regarded
as ci~cu1ar. For the benetit of the theological deans and
doctors Descartes sought to justify natural theology from
scripture, quoting the classical passages from the Book of
Wisdom, chapter thirteen and ~he first chapter of the ~pist1e
to the Romans to show that " all that can be known of God may
be manifest by reasons obtained from no other source than the
inspection ot our own minds." Descartes did not expect his
arguments to be understood by the common man any more than he
would expect the geometrical demonstrations of Archimedes to
be universally comprehended. Nevertheless he believed his
philosophy would be a powerful instrument against atheists and
Bought tor it the approval of the Sorbonne. Philosophy for all
its claims to independence was still to be the handmaid to
theology.
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In a sense Locke and the Deists were defending the truths
of religion with reason as the only weapon. Bacon had seen the
weakness of this defence in that reason is sufficient to convince
atheism but not to inform religion. Reason is an insecure
foundation for religion and the step from deism to atheism was
an easy one. The specific intention of Bishop Berkeley's
Treatise Concerning ~ Principles of Human Knowledge was to
examine the grounds of scepticism, atheism and irreligion. From
his own Idealist viewpoint Berkeley argued that God is not only
known with certainty equal to that with which we know the
42existence of other men but his existence is even more evident.
Just as we can only know another man through sensations and the
ideas of our own mind, 60 there c&n be no direct knowledge of
God, but" the effecte of nature are infinitely more numerous
and eonsiderable than those ascribed to human agents.,,43 If we
attentively consider the design and harmony of the universe we
shall conclude that it is the work of the "one t eternal, infini tel¥
44wise, good and perfect Spirit". The dialogues of Hylas and
Philonous begin in a garden at a time of day and in a season of
the year when
" that purple sky', those wild but sweet notes of birds,
the fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers, the gentle
influence of the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless
45beauties of nature inspire the soul with secret transports".
In such words as these Fhilonous passes the time of day and crams
the physico-theologieal argument into his morning greetingl BYlas
ie apparently bothered about the sceptics and atheists and invites
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Philonous to share his concern. Phi1onous then expounds
Berkeley's philosophy, denying the reality of matter, and
asserting that God as eternal Mind must exist to sustain the
universe we experience. Fhi1onous declares,
" Men commonly believe, that all things are known, or
perceived by God, because they believe in the being of a
God; whereas I, on the other side, immediately and
necessarily conclude the being of God, because all
sensible things must be perceived by Him.,,46
Raymond de Sebonde claimed that he could deal adequately with the
atheist in less than a month, but Fhilonous was able to settle
the atheist in two morning walks, and the "wild imaginations" of
Hobbes and Spinoza were overthrown by the single reflection that
nothing exists without a mind. Part way through the second
dialogue PhiloBOus confidently declares,
" Setting aside all help of astronomy and natural
philosophy ••• you may now, without any laborious search
into the sciences, without any subtilty of reason, or
tedious length of discourse, oppose and baffle the most
strenuous advocates of Atheism.,,47
Short ways with atheists are suspect and while one can readily
believe that strenuous advocates of atheism have been baffled by
Berkeley's argumentethe list of atheists convinced by them must
be extremely short.
For Bishop Butler credibility or reasonableness was a prima
facie reason for belief. In his introduction to the Analogy he
expounded the doctrine of Probability. In difficult questions,
Butler claimed, a man is justified in accepting the most
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probable solution and if we can find a number of probable proofs
the case is strengthened. "For probable proofs, by being added,
not only increase the evidence, but multiply it."48 This line
of thought led later thinkers to describe the various theistic
arguments as pointers, strengthening each other and leading to
almost moral certainty. Butler was not initially concerned to
prove the existence of God, but to refute the charge of
irrationality levelled against the Christian faith. The Analogy
is ¥ustained exposition of a text from Origen, so Butler tells us,
" He who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from
Him Who is the Author of Nature, may well expect to find
the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in the
constitution of Nature.,,49
Butler was concerned to fill the gaps left by the Deists and to
give Christian revelation its rightful place. Even so the
morality and the evidence of revelation are to be subject to the
judgement of reason.50 Christianity, Butler believed, was a
republication of natural religion. Another Bishop of Durham,
Hensley Henson, lecturing at St. Andrews just two hundred years
after the first publication of The Analogy, re-affirmed the
view that only in Christianity does natural religion find its
full expression, quoting his distinguished predecessor in the
opening paragraphs of his own lectures.
" Christianity is a republication of natural Religion.
It instructs mankind in the moral system of the world:
that it is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and
under His government; that virtue is His law; and that
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He will finally judge mankind in righteousness, and render
to all according to their works, in a future state. And,
which is very material, it teaches natural Religion in its
genuine simplicity; free from those superstitions with
which it was totally corrupted, and under which it was in
a manner lost.,,51
Here we have an apologetic that is as arid in its own way as that
of Bishop Berkeley, and we have the suspicion that John Wesley,
who firmly believed that reason and religion should be joined,
found a shorter way at any rate with some atheists than either
of the eighteenth century bishops.discovered.
The theistic arguments were to be subjected to searching
criticism by Hume and Kant. Kant left the crumb of comfort
that the physico-theological argument might add weight if there
were other ways to religious truth through moral or religious
experience. Similarly it was still possible to argue on Butler's
principles from prebability. So, as We shall see, physico-
theological arguments, based on an ever increasing scientific
knowledge of the world, survived Hume and Kant to meet the
opposition of Darwin.
9. Science and Apologetic
From earliest times the evidence of design in nature has
been adduced a8 evidence for the existence of God. The argument
from design was used by pre-Christian thinkers. We have seen
how Lactantiu8 saw the providence of God in the design of the
elephant. Even in the eighteenth century Christian Wolff
maintained such a simple faith in the design of the Almighty
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that he could still wonder at the sun, which enables us to put
our clocks right and enables animals to find food by day that they
could not find by night, indeed, "generally speaking, we should
have no sundials if we had no sun.,,52
The story of the changing relations between science and
religion is told in Canon Raven's first series of lectures. While
the authority of the church, and therefore of revelation, was
unchallenged, science was seen as a study of how God's world
works, but since God was also author of the scriptures which had
prior authority, science must not contradict scripture. Francis
Bacon, himself one of the harbingers of modern science, declared
that religion and philosophy must not be "commiBed together".53
It was unsafe, he thought, to draw conclusions concerning faith
trom scientitic data, thus segregating the New Philosophy from
the old religion, as Canon Raven put it. This segregation was
only temporary_ There was to follow what Basil Willey has
described 8S the golden age of natural theology,54 during which
the scientiets joined forces with the theologians in calling
attention to the mighty works of the omnipotent Creator.
Canon Raven points out that in England, in contrast to
the situation on the continent, there was an enthusiastic
welcome tor the New Philosophy. He writes,
" The remarkable group known as the Cambridge Platonists
gave it a secure position in the university; and outside
it churchmen like Jeremy Taylor and John Tillotson and
nonconformists like William Penn and Richard Baxter had in
common a sincere conviction that the works of the Lord
were rightly sought out by his peop1e.,,55
The Cambridge Platonists were concerned to refute the material-
istic philosophy of Hobbes and by their writing and their
preaching influenced not only philosophers such as Locke but
scientists like John Ray. Henry Hore's Antidote Against Atheism
( 1653) and Ralph Cudworth's True Intellectual System £!!£!
Universe (1678) were among the influential works of this group,
while Benjamin ~~ichcote's sermons in Trinity Church influenced
generations of Cambridge men.56
The year following Bacon's death saw the birth of two
apologists for the Christian faith who were firstand foremost
scientists, Robert Boyle, the great Chemist and John Ray, the
botanist. Robert Boyle (1627-1691), one of the founders of the
Royal Society, is remembered not only by the law that bears his
name but as the founder of the Boyle lectureship for the defence
of Christianity. In his work entitled, Seraphick ~; Some
Motives ~ Incentives ~ ~ ~ £!~, Pathetically
Discours'd ~ ~ a Letter to ! Friend (1665), Boyle wrote of his
own faith thus,
" I must needs acknowledge
Telescopes I survey the Old
Planets that adorn the upper
• • that when with bold
and Newly discover'd Stars and
legion of the World; and when
with excellent Microscopes I discern in otherwise Invisible
Objects, the unimitab1e Subtilty of Nature's curious
Workmanship; and when, in a word, by the help of
Anatomical knives, and the light of Chymical Furnaces, I
study the Book of Nature ••• I find my self oftentimes
reduc'd to exclame with the Psalmist, How manifold are
thy works, 0 Lord? in wisdom hast thou made them all."57
This verse from Psalm 104 provided the text for more than one
seventeenth century scientist. John Ray's Wisdom 2! ~
Manifested ~ ~ Creation (1691) was an influential work and
its popularity lasted on into the following century when it was
studied by Wesley and Paley among many others. Thomas Burnet
was at variance with other apologists of his time in that while
be saw evidence of design in the universe it was a marred design.
In his Sacred Theory £! ~ Earth (1684) he described the world
as a mighty ruin, spoiled by the sinfulness of man. One gains
the impression tbat but for the Fall tbe oceans and the mountains
would bave been as symmetrically arranged and formally set out
as the garden of a seventeenth century mansion.58
Like Boyle. Isaac Newton was devoted to science and yet was
sincerely devoted to his religion.59 To Newton as much as
any-one we owe the concept of a mechanical universe, but it was
not automatic, and, in a frequently quoted passage, he traced the
mechanism back to a first cause.
" Whereas the main Business of Natural Phi~osophy is to
argue from Phenomena without feigning Hypotheses, and to
deduce Causes from Effects, till we come to the very first
Cause, whicb certainly is not mechanical ••• Whence is it
that ~ature doth nothing in vain, and whence arises all
that Order and Beauty which we see in the World ? • • •
Does it not appear from Phenomena that there is a Being
incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent, who in
infinite Space, as it were in his Sensory, sees the things
themselves intimately, and throughly perceives them, and
comprehends them wholly by their immediate presence to
himself 1,,60
Newton, however, was remembered more for his mechanistic
interpretation of the universe than for his religious outlook,
and his followers in the scientific field, developed the concept
of the Itechanical universe, until, as Canon Raven remarked, "with
Charles Darwin, man himself was deposed from the position of
controller and graded as part of the machinell•61
The physico-theological argument became firmly established
as part ot Christian apologetic, and, in spite of Hume's
refutation, maintained its popularity in the nineteenth century,
its chief exponent being William Faley. Paley's Natural Theology,
or ~videnc.s ~ ~ Existence ~ Attributes of !h! Deity
collected ~ ~ appearances ~ Nature (1802) was dedicated to
his patron, the Bishop of Durham, to whom he explained how it
came to be written. Like the recent best-seller, Honest 12 ~t
it owes its existence to an indisposition. Faley set out to
repair his deficiency in the public performance of his office by
his work in the study. His enforced leisure was not to be
wasted and he resolved to speak through the press. Within
nineteenth-century limitations the Evidences became a best-seller.
The production of this type of apologetic was stimulated by the
eighth Earl"of Bridgewater who died in 1829 leaving £8,000 to
the President of the Royal Society to be paid to authors selected
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by him who would be commissioned to write on "the power, wisdom
and goodness of God as manifested in the Creation". One of the
best known of thetnatises is that of Thomas Chalmers, The
Adaptation of External Nature !£ ~ Moral and Intellectual
Condition ~ Man. Chalmers discovers design in the moral and
intellectual life of man rather than in the purely physical world.
His argument has some affinity with the moral argument of Kant.
In conscience man has a unique instrument designed to enable him
to live the good life in this world. The world is designed in
general to make a virtuous species happy but there remain
individual injustices which demand redress in another life and
so we are led on to belief in immortality and in God who sustain.
the moral universe. While Chalmers believed that natural~theology
could take man a long way revelation was still necessary. In his
description of the merits and defects of natural theology he
anticipated Tillich. Natural theology can ask the questions
but it cannot give all the answers.
tt All the resources and expedients of natural theology are
incompetent for this solution - it being, in fact, the
great des~ratum which it cannot satisfy. Still it performs
an important part in making us sensible of thed8s(eratum ••
• • Let us not overlook the importance of that which it
does, in its utter helplessness as to that which it does
not. It puts the question, though it cannot answer the
qUestion.,,63
This conclusion was to be echoed by Tillich in his Gifford
lectures over a century later:
It Man as man knows the question of God. He is estranged
but not cut off, from God. This is the foundation tor the
limited right of what traditionally was called "natural
theology". Natural theology was meaningful to the extent
that it gave an analysis of the human situation and the
question of God implied in it ••• None of the conclusions
which argue for the existence of God is valid. Their
validity extends as far as the questioning analysis, not
beyond it.tt64
Just as Tillich speaks of the revelatory answers to existential
questions, so Chalmers tried to show that the Christian religion
answers the questions raised by natural theology. Some of the
other authors of Brifgewater treatises were not so advanced in
their thought as Chalmers and still clung to Paley's type of
natural theology. It is interesting to note the dates of the
last editions of the treatises. These were for the respective
authors: Kirby, 1853; Prout, 1855; Buckland, 1860; Whewell.
1864; Bell, 1865; Roget, 1870; Chalmers, 1884; and Kidd, 1887.
In 1859 the Origin £! Species was published. The flQod-tide of
this particular type of apologetic was receding.
10. Apologetic after Darwin
In his lecture, "Darwin and the Century of Conflict,,65,
Canon Raven points out that while the publicat!o~ ot !h!Origin
£! Species marked the end of an epoch, as did Newton's Principia,
it was a culmination of thought rather than an entirely new
departure. The nineteenth century produced new discoveries in
every realm of science. Already in 1800 Lamarck was proclaiming
. 66the progressive development of liv~ng creatures, and Buckland,
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one of the Bridgewater writers, had dismissed the traditional
dating of Genesis, declaring that the Bible did not contain
historical information concerning the activities of the Creator.67
Kirby, it is true, in his treatise had attacked Lamarck and
reaffirmed the Miltonic picture, but the period of friendly
alliance between science and religion was coming to an end.
Sciemtists like P.R.Gosse made desperate attempts to hold on to
Genesis and geology by the supposition of a 'prochronic' phase
when the earth, fossils and all, existed in the mind of God.
This was followed by the act of creation which resulted in the
68objective existence of the earth, fossils and all. On the other
hand Darwin himself was wistfully religious.69
The post-Darwinian era was dominated by the unseemly
struggle between the representatives of science and religion.
In 1864 the Osford Declaration was issued by Dr. Pusey and Lord
Shaftesbury and supported by eleven thousand clergy, denouncing
those who did not regard the whole Bible as the Word of God.
Gladstone and Huxley kept the conflict alive in the years that
followed. There were, of course, representatives of liberalism
in theological circles, such as F.D.Maurice and Charles Kingsley,
who readily accepted the new truths of science as widening our
knowledge of God's ways. In general, however, natural theology
as apologetic lost its appeal. James Ward, himself an opponent
of agnosticism and naturalism, commenting on the natural theology
of Faley and the Bridgewater treatises, said towards the end of
the century,
" Nobody reads these books now, and nobody writes others
like them. Such arguments have ceased to be edifying,
or even safe, since they cut both ways, as the formidable
array of facts capable of an equally cogent dysteleological
application sufficiently shows."70
J.H.Stirling, writing in 1889, spoke of natural theology as
being out of fashion for twenty years. By natural theology he
meant the Faleyan apologetic. He commented,
" He who should take it up now as Paley took it up, or
as Lord Brougham tookiit up, would simply be regarded as
a fossi1.,,71
Paley had quoted Sturm as holding that an examination of the eye
was a cure for atheism, but Helmholtz in 1893 described the eye
as an instrument that a scientific optician would be ashamed to
make.72
Thus natural theology of the nineteenth century pattern
fell into disfavour with both Science and Religion. The
scientists protested that their premisses did not lead to the
conclusion that an all-wise, all-powerful creator had formed the
world, and religious leaders appealed to scriptural authority
where their predecessors had been happy to set the book of nature
side by side with the Bible. However the Bible itself was not
immune to scientific investigation and textual criticism (~rther
undermined the authority of "Revelation". A new apologetic was
needed which would take into account the vast territories opened
up by science in the nineteenth century. Lord Gifford was
among those who thought that if only the theologians and
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philosophers could draw new maps it might still be possible to
find a way to·God in the strange new world.
11. Gifford Lecturers as Apologists
In the course of one of his lectures Clement Webb remarked
in an aside that "apologetic is not the business of a Gifford
lecturer".73 This would be true if'by "apologetic" he meant the
defence of the Christian faith, but Lord Gifford certainly
expected his lecturers to commend belief in God. He had declared,
" And my desire and hope is that these lectureships and
lectures may promote and advance among all classes of the
community the true knowledge of Him Who is, and there is
none and nothing beside Him, in Whom we live and move and'
have our being."
The lectureships were to be established
" for the teaching and diffusion of sound views regarding
them (sc.true knowledge of'God, &c)among the whole
population of Scotland."
Lord Gifford had added,
" I think that such knowledge, if real, lies at the root
of all well being."
From this addition we may surmise that in Gifford's view it is
part of the function of'natural theology to deal with the
problem of the "if real", that is, to consider the objective
truth of religion, but it is also clearly permissible, if not
desirable that the Giff'ord lecturer should promote and advance
such knowledge of God as he has been able to arrive at by means
of natural theology.
None of the lecturers has claimedthat he has found an
outright proof of the existence of God. Apologetic, however,
does not' requirete proof; it is sufficient if a position can
be defended on rational grounds or ehown,to be worthy of belief.
As we saw, a number of the scientists found evidence of design,
but not such evidence as would enable them to make an unequivocal
assertion of the existence of a ben,f~cent and omnipotent
creator. Tiele trusted that his new science of religion would
"help to bring home to the restless spirits of our times the
truth that there is no rest for them unless 'they arise and go
to their Father,,,.74 The idealists believed that the coherence
of their system was a sufficient recommendation for belief. In
a letter to a friend Sir Henry Jones affirmed his belief in the
apologetic function of natural theology,
" The ultimate meaning of Reality is love. If that is
true, there must be a soul, a personal God, to do the
loving. The task of philosophy is to justify that view.,,75
At the end of his own series of lectures he claimed that by using
only methods of science he had been able to support a rational
religious faith.
J.H.Stirling retained a certain amount of confidence in
the traditional proofs, and John Laird after re-examining the
proofs claimed to have made a "plausible" case for theism.
Sorley, T~lor and De Burgh were convincing exponents of the
argument from moral experience. More recently C.A.Campbell
asserted at the end of his series of lectures,
270
" Objective philosophical thinking, in which straight
metaphysical argument is supplemented by reflection upon
the implications of man's moral consciousness, leads
independently to belief in an infinite and eternal being
who is the sole ultimate reality, the creator of the
finite temporal world, and the source of the moral law
which has absolute authority over man's conduct in that
world.,,76
But even this is only a claim that reflection leads to belief.
The Gifford discussion, especially where scientists have
been involved, has led to a clarification of the two questions,
How? and Why? Gilson recognised that we must ask both questions
and that the scientist is peculiarly suited to answer the
question, How?
" But if anyone looks only for the how, can he be
surprised if he fails to find the why?,,77
The metaphysician and the man of faith go·beyond the "How?" to
the "Why'?". The distinction was made by Charles Kingsley in the
generation after Darwin in a book dedicated to his son and his
schoolfellows, Madam ~ and Lady Why. He complains about
philosophers who make mistakes about how and why and criticises
books which do not really tell us about U\'lby and Because" but
only "How and So". He tells us that Madam How is the servant
of Lady \t,Tby,"though she has a Master over her again - whose
name I leave you to guess.,,78
Apologists have not always distinguished between the two
questions. The answer to the question how the watch works is
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in one sphere. When we ask why someone took the trouble to make
a watch we are in the realm £! ~, and in his book entitled,
The Realm ~ Ends, James Ward wrote,
H Faith contradicts nothing that science is in a position
to affirm, and asserts nothing that science is in a position
to deny. Science cannot disclaim it as error, nor can it
appeal to science as truth. But what science can neither
positively affirm nor positively deny may still count for
something as being more or less probable; and 'probabilities
are the guide of life'.H79
Once we believe in God for some other cause science can tell us
much of the way God works, but the scientist as scientist cannot
go beyond the question of how the world works. At least this
seems to be the general conclusion of the Gifford scientists,
some of whom. like Heisenberg, claimed nothing more for science
than that it led to a reverent agnosticism.
If Kant is right about the arguments for the existence of
God then natural theology cannot produce a completely convincing
apologetic. If St. Augustine's experience is to be taken as
typical then natural theology not only cannot but need not go all
the way. Apologists sometimes argue that the existence of God
is at least a probability and that faith is in the nature of a
wager. But, as James Ward declared, "the prudence thus advocated
is not faith; and assuredly is not religiontl•80 St. Augustine's
religion was not based upon probabilities even though he weighed
the arguments intellectually before he took the final step. A
modern journalist, writing of his own spiritual Odyssey, described
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the point to which he had been led by natural theology in this way:
" St. Thomas Aquinas's five proofs of God seemed to me
unanswerable, but ••• I was obliged to admit that whilst
they carried with them intellectual conviction they had not
made God come alive for me.tlB1
Later he describes how he and his wife were still searching,
" We had come to accept the intellectual case for God,
to see that without it not only Catholicism but the universe
itself made nonsense. We had discovered with some surprise
that the great thinkers and philosophers of the Church had
made out a better case for God's existence than Marx and
82Engels had done for his non-existence."
It was not until he came to the point of commitment that he found
what could be described as a satisfying faith.
More than one Gifford lecturer has pointed out that the
arguments for the existence of God are unable to convince the
unbeliever and are no longer needed by the believer. Yet the
believer may still wish to defend his faith and apologetic may
serve the defence of faith as well as its propagation, and it may
well bring an enquirer or an opponent to a point where he can see
for himself. Perhaps Lord Gifford hoped for more than this from
natural theology. He wanted the knowledge imparted by the lect-
urers to be "true and felt". ~ational examination can test
the truth of the knowledge. Rational argument can lead to the
assertion of probabilities, but if a rational argument appears
to lead to a "felt" knowledge it is because some other element
than reason has entered the situation. Commenting on Paley's
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apologetic, Newman wrote,
" If I am asked to use Faley's argument for my own
conversion, I say plainly I do not want to be converted
by a smart syllogism; if I am asked to convert others by
it, I say plainly I do not care to overcome their reason
without touching their hearts. I wish to deal not with
controversialists, but with inquirers.n83
This underlines the limitation of natural theology as apologetic,
but natural theology may allay doubts of the mind, enabling the
heart to be touched by faith.
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1. Metaphysics
As we turn from our examination of natural theology as
apologetic to its relationship to metaphysics we may remind
ourselves that the two aspects can be confused. John Stuart
Mill:';(':,writing in the latter part of the nineteenth century,
said,
" The whole of prevalent metaphysics of the present
century is one tissue of suborned evidence in favour
of religion.,,1
Similar accusations have been made against Gifford lecturers,
but as we have seen, Lord Gifford himself distinguished the
two t.ske. He asked first that lecturers should consider the
truth of religion with the precision of scientific method.
Secondly, he wished this knowledge, if real, to be propagated.
. --
He sought a religion based on metaphysical speculation rather
than on supposed special revelation. His address to the
Edinburgh Young Men's Christian Association, delivered in
November, 1878, just ten years before the first Gifford lectures,
reveals his attitude of mind and gives an indication of the
intellectual atmosphere of the period. The High Court Judge
gave this advice to young men :
" Now I take the opportunity of saying tolOu, - y-oung men,
keenly desirous of mental amd moral elevation, - Don't
neglect Metaphysicsl The Sciences of the Mind, and the
doctrine of the Unseen and the Universall What are
proudly- though not quite justly- called the Physical
Sciences are perhaps now in the ascendant, (and very self-
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asserting some of them are); and there are not wanting among
their votaries and champions those who arrogantly claim for
them alone the name of "Sciences", as if the polar colloc-
ations and whirling vortices of enchanted atoms were all
that ultimately man could really know • •• I make no
apology for asking you to think. Your presence here
declares your readiness and your anxiety to do so. No
truth of the smallest value can be attained without thought,
2without thought often painfully earnest and protracted."
Very much influenced by Spinoza, he believed that without a true
doctrine of substance and cause, philosophy would be a delusion
and religion a dream.3 He declared to the young men of Edinburgh,
.. God is the substance of your soul and mine, aye, the
very substance, its very self, in strictest truth. And
4your soul and mine are but "forms" of God."
In his peroration Judge Gifford summed up the evidence and
demanded a verdict.
" I have not gone a single step out of my way as a student
of metaphysic and mental science, and if I have had to
speak to you of God, frankly and freely, that is only
because God is necessarily found by all who fairly follow
up the scientific idea of substance to its deepest roots
and to its highest sources. The highest science always
becomes religious, nay, religion itself."'
But Lord Gifford's knowledge of the weakness of human nature and
human argument led him to conclude with the reminder that hurnanum
est errare •.........
It is clear from this address that Lord Gifford himself
believed that a study of metaphysics would inevitably lead to a
theistic conclusion. He was talking to young men who already
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belonged to a Christian association so that his purpose was not
simply apologetic. He seems to have been anxious to demonstrate
to his hearers that however they had arrived at belief in God
such a belief could be supported by reasoned argument. Should
their trust in the authority of the organised church waver, as
undoubtedly his own had done, they could still rely on
metaphysical support for their faith.
It has been said that as soon as a man use. the word "God"
he is doing metaphysics. In his elementary religious assertions
man was trying to make sense of his limited universe. His
primitive scientific knowledge led him to discover a unity of
cause and effect. In his myths he intuitively sought such a
unity and his broadening vision led him to seek a unity within
which his scientific knowledge and his religious insights could
be comprehended. From this humble beginning arose that study so
highly commended by Lord Gifford in the eighteen=seventies and
so highly suspect in our own times.
It needed an Aristotle to specify the function of this study
and to give it a name.
6Its subject matter is Being qua Being.
It is man's attempt, using ordinary methods of reasoning, to
reach conclusions concerning the ultimate reality of the Universe.
Leibniz described the function of metaphysics in a letter quoted
by John Laird.
" Since what perfects our mina (if we leave on one side
the illumination of grace) is the demonstrative knowledge
of the greatest truths by their causes or reasons, it must
be admitted that metaphysics or natural theology, which
treats of immaterial substances, and particularly of God
and the soul, is the most important of all.,,7
Thus he identified natural theology with metaphysics, and, as we
have seen, a number of Gifford lecturers made the assumption that
the subject prescribed by Lord Gifford was indeed metaphysics.
Whitehead, for instance, set himself the task of producing "a
system of general ideas in terms of which every element in our
experience can be interpreted".
2. Early Greek Speculation
James Adam claimed that natural theology in its main
principles is a development from Greek metaphysics.8 Christopher
Dawson described pre-Socratic philosophy as essentially a natural
theology, in the sense of a doctrine of the divine order of nature,
" a via media between the irrational mythology of the traditional
religion and the irreligious rationalism which was already
beginning to attract the western mind".9 We saw in an earlier
chapter how the Greek thinkers criticised the concepts af
popular religion. Now we turn our attention to the constructive
thought through which they tried to explain the universe.
the early thinkers attempted to find this explanation in a single
When
cosmological principle they became metaphysicians; when they
called this principle or principles divine they became natural
theologians.
Thalee floated his earth on water and saw water as the
source of all things; Anaximander posited the 'boundless' or
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'infinite'; Anaximenes saw air as the primal substance. It is
difficult to know what Thales meant when he talked of 'gods', but
with Anaximander we are clearly in the realm of natural theology.
" With this philosopher," writes Jaeger, " we are for the
first time in a position to see clearly how that which we
may call hie theology ie a direct outgrowth from the germ
of hie new intuition of fJ~,S .•• Anaximander' s cosmos
marke the triumph of the intellect over a whole world of
rough and unformed powers. • •• Even the old gods are
denied admission to the new world-system, though their names
and their cults persist. Their passing leaves a gap which
the philosopher now must fill.,,10
Anaximander saw that the beginning of things must go back not to
one element like water but to something from which all the other
diverse elements draw their being, something which is itself
boundless, hence apeiron. 11From the evidence of the fragments
Anaximander appears to have been the first to identify the apeiron
with the arch~ or first principle. We learn from the same
fragments that it is 'immortal and imperishable', 'eternal and
ageless', 'encompassing and governing all things' and 'encompassing
all worlds'. and, according to Aristotle, was to be identified with
l
Jh
_
'the divine' ("TO V(10". It may be that modern man can more
readily think of Zeus as a god than the abstract apeiron just as
he clings to the concept of 'Father' and finds it difficult to
pray to the 'Depth of Being', but Jaeger silences this complaint.
" We have no right ••• to complain that Anaximander's
god is not a god one can pray to, or that physical
speculation is not true religion. ourely no one will deny
that we simply cannot conceive of any advanced form of
religion as lacking the idea of endlessness and eternity
which Anaximander links with his new concept of the Divine1~
In identifying the apeiron with air, Anaximenes "spiritua1isedll
the scientific concept of Anaximander and made the world into a
breathing soul for as the human sou1.is identified with air so
14breath and air compass the/whole universe. But neither in
~imander or Anaximenes do we find the unifying concept of one
God.
Xenophanes, as we have seen, was a dispassionate critic of
religion, but he also went beyond negative criticism to the
conception of one God, who is uncrea~ed, who neither in body or
mind resembles man, yet is all eye, all thought and all hearing.
What precisely he meant by this is much disputed.15 It may be
that the one God of Xenophanes is no more than the One Being of
Parmenides in theological attire. Farmenides does not identify
Being with God and, 16as Jaeger remarks, it is more in line with
the character of his thought to speak of the Myster, of Being
rather than of God. Jaeger writes.
It The religious element lies more in the way the man has
been affected by his discovery, and in the firm and
decided handling of the alternatives of truth and appearance,
than in any classification of the object of his research
as divine.,,17
Even if the name of God is not used we have natural theology in
embryo and the distinction made by Parmenides Between Being and
non-being was to influence natural theologians down the centuries.
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In our own times we find echoes of Parmenides in the theology of
Paul Tillich, who made the leap that Farmenides failed to make,
asserting in his Gifford lectures,
" In the moment in which one says that God is or that
he has being, the question arises as to how his relation
to being is to be understood. The only possible answer
seems to be that God is being-itself, in the sense of
18the power of being or the power to conquer non-being."
When we read19 that Being is un-become, imperishable, whole,
single, unmoved, limitless and complete, we are not far from the
mediaeval conception of God.
Heraclitus takes us into the realm of intuition and it will
be more appropriate to consider his work in a later chapter. The
word used by Farmenides to designate the activity of the
philosophical mind is~o~~~ , where Heraclitus favours the word
~~o~ii~- the traditional Greek term for 'right thinking' or
'right intuition' with more particular reference to practical
conduct.20 There is a distinction between metaphysical speculation
and mystical insight even though it is difficult to draw it
clearly particularly when mystics speculate on the basis of their
ineights.
With Empedocles we return to the emphasis on physics. He
discarded the Parmenidean concept of the One and posited four
primary elements, fire, water, earth and air. There are two
further powers, Love and Strife, which cause the mixing and
unmixing of the basic elements. The four elements are personified
as Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis; Fhilia and Neikos (i.e.
~ove and Strife) are said to be gods of equal rank with the
other four. Thus Empedocles mingles metaphysics and mythology
and gives us a clue to the relationship between metaphysics
and natural theology. Scientific and philosophical man seeks
an explanation of the universe and produces some kind of
metaphysical construction. Religious man has already worshipped
divinity in some form and has discovered what Otto has termed
the Numinous. When religious man becomes philosophical he
identifies the Numinous of his worship with the Essential Being
01' his metaphysics and his metaphysics then becomes natnral
theology. It is such knowledge 01' God that he can arrive at
by reasoning about the facts of the universe. So Empedocles
identified the physical elements of his universe with the gods
of the old time religion. Later Aquinas would make the same
transition from metaphysics to natural theology by the simple
link, "And this (the First Cause, Prime Mover, etc.) we call
God". Developing scientific knowledge and speculative thought
may change the image of God but the non-rational element persists
if only in the names of the gods or God.
Anaxagoras,a contemporary of Empedocles, was one of the
first teleological thinkers and his concept of Nous became
formative of later metaphysical thought. Within the physical
world everything is a mixture with the exception of Nous or
21Mind. In the fragments quoted by James Adam we find, among
other things, that Nous 'owns no master but itself' and is
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'alone, itself to itself'. Nous is further the 'subtlest and
purest of all things, and moreover has all knowledge about
everything and the greatest strength'. Nous has power over the
movement that generated the world and set in order the things
that did not exist but now do. Our minds are reflections of
the divine Nous, which enables us to have some understanding
of the divine purpose. Here ia the fragments of the work of
Anaxagoras we have the beginnings of the teleological argument
which was to be developed by so many later thinkers. Yet even
here we have the implicit premiss that Nous is the Divine.
This was to prove a fruitful line of thought and Aristotle had
no doubts about the contribution to thought made by Anaxagoras
\
when he declared that among the earlier thinkers Anaxagoras
22seemed like a sober man among the drunk.
Diogenes failed to see the distinction between mind and
matter that had been so clear to AnaxagoraSt for him mind and
matter were one. He believed that through his study of nature
and in particular the positioning of the heavenly bodies he had
Been a plan which offered a clue to the existence and nature of
the Divine. So far the existence of the Divine had been taken
for granted. Up to this time the problem had been the nature
of the gods or God rather than their existence. With Diogenes
the problem Bwitches to the existence of God and this was the
question posed for Rlato, Aristotle and their successors.
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3. Plato and Aristotle
Socrates was interested in man rather than the universe,23
and it is not surprising that his disciple, Plato, should begin
hie philosophising by considering the nature of man. It is true
that he saw man within the context of the universe but the clue
to the meaning of the universe was to be found in the mind of
man rather than in the external universe. According to the
allegory of the cave the 'things' of the universe are no more
than shadows. The visible world is the image of the invisible;
the highest faculty of the soul is reason, and the lowest what
24we call scientific knowledge - knowledge of the shadows.
Metaphysica, for Plato, is indeed 'beyond' the physical, for
the physical gives only a distorted reflection of the real.
Man's pilgrimage is upward from the things seen to the things
unseen.25 Man must set his mind on thinga immortal and divine.26
It is notoriously difficult to summarise Plato's ideas of
religion for the simple reason that there are clear contradictions
exemplified in the vacillation between singular and plural in
his references to deity. In a recent study of the influence of
th i fl f Pl t li· 27 J Kreligion on Plato and e n uence 0 a 0 on re g10n , ••
Feibleman writes of Plato's ~ religions, which correspond to
his two moods in philosophy. The one is a kind of supernatural
mysticism, the heritage of Orphicism and consistent with his
idealist philosophy. The other is a naturalistic religion,
consistent with popular Greek religion and related to his realist
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philosophy. The former approach was adopted by the neoplatonists
and probably represents Plato's personal religion. Aristotle's
religious metaphysic follows the naturalistic realist approach.
Plato did not claim that he could demonstrate the existence
of God. He took a humbly agnostic attitude. "This or something
like it is true," he wrote in the Phaedo concerning his views of
28the after-life. "God knows whether it is true," he said in
the Republic of his allegory of the Cave.29 It was in this
spirit that he speculated in the Timaeus concerning the creation
of the world. He did not claim to give exact notions but only
probabilities "as like as any others".30 Because Plato's natural
theology is the product of insight and intuition rather than
metaphysical argument, it will find a place 1n a later chapter.
Aristotle's natural theology 1s more clearly based on metaphysical
speculation.
Aristotle, like Plato, criticised the early mythological
conceptions of deity.31 Like Plato, he saw the clue to the
meaning of the universe in the activity of the human mind. The
highest form of human activity is contemplation, but because
of bis limitations man cannot attain perfect self-realisation.
In God there must be identity of thought with its objects and
therefore in God there must be perfect contemplation. Being qua
being is the subject matter of metaphysicS32, and God is
essential being. Aristotle offered proof of the existence of
God, which was to be the basis of all future attempts at
demonstration, a task that Plato never essayed in quite the same
way.
Movement gives the key to Aristotle's metaphysical system.
In theprdinary experiences of life nothing moves spontaneously,
but this rule cannot apply throughout the universe or there would
be no movement and therefore no change. Since we do in fact
experience movement and change there must be some kind of
movement which is not caused by other movement. Aristotle thought
that he had discovered such movement in the circular movement of
what he describes as the 'first heaven', i.e., the planets, the
sun and the moon. This movement must then be explained.
Aristotle either thought or talked anthropomorphically for he
described the first heaven as being moved by its soul, and the
further fifty five spheres about which he speculates are also
moved by their souls. We then have'to ask how soula are moved.
The movement of bodies is described as motion but the movement of
soule is described as ~motion. and so the souls or intelligences
are moved by love or desire directed towards the prime mover.
The prime mover does not reciprocate the love. Further he is
not the creator of the universe, for matter and subordinated
forms are eternal. He is not the providential ruler since his
thought is of himself alone. Although he is loved he is not a
god of love since emotion of any sort would mar his contemplation.
He is purely transcendent. He is thus the god of pure thought
but not the God of religious experience. As Gilson remarks,
II The God of St. Thomas and Dante is a God who loves,
the god of Aristotle is a god who does not refuse to be
loved; the love that moves the heavens and the stars in
Aristotle is the love of the heavens and the stars for god,
but the love that moves them in St. Thomas and Dante is the
love of God for the world."33
It may be that we are aEking too much of natural theology if we
expect it to provide a ready made religion. Metaphysics tackles
problems of causes and ends and motion, but if it leads to
worship it is because something has been added to the metaphysical
speculation. Aristotle attempted pure metaphysics.
It may be true that St. Thomas's re-interpretation adds
certain elements missing from Aristotle but it would be wrong to
dismiss Aristotle's metaphysic of God on that ground. J.H.
Stirling claims that Aristotle's Prime Mover is as near to the
Christian God as a Greek could get.34 He describes the well
known passage in the seventh chapter of the twelfth book of the
Metaphysics as the f! Profundis of Aristotle and renders it in
this way
" As there comes not possibly anything" or all, out of
night and nothingness, there must be the unmoved mover,
who in his eternity, is actual, and substantial, one.
Unmoved himself, and without a strain, he is the end-aim
of the universe towards which all strain. Even beauty is
not moved but moves; and we move to beauty because it is
beauty, not that it 1s beauty only because we move to it.
And the goal, the a1m, the end, moves even as beauty
moves, or as something that 1s loved moves. It is thought
that has made the beginning. As mere actuality, actuality
pure and simple, as that which could not not-be, God knows
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not possibility, he is before and above and without
potentiality, the beginning, the middle, and the end,
the first and last, the principle and goal, without peers
as without parts, immaterial, imperishable, personal,
single, one, eternal and immortal. On him hang the
heavens and the earth. And his joy of life is always,
as is for brief moments, when at its best, ours. In him
indeed is that enduringly so. But it is impossible for
us. For joy in him is his actuality, - even as to us the
greatest joy is to be awake, to see and feel, to think,
and 50 to revive to ourselves memories and hopes. Thought,
intellection is his; and his intellection is the sub-
stantial intellection of that which is substantial, the
perfect intellection of that which is perfeet • • • What,
then, there is of divine in intellection, that is diviner
still in its actuality in God; and speculation is what is
the highest joy and the best. And if, as with us inter-
ruptedly, it is always in felivity so with God, then there
is cause for wonder; and for much more wonder if the
felicity with God is of a higher order than ever it is with
us. But that is so. In him is life; for the actuality
of intellection is life, and that actuality is his.
Actuality that is absolute -~, as life of him, is
life best and eternal. So it is we say that God is a living
being, perfect and eternal. Life eternal and enduring
being belong to God. And God is that.,,35
This is the high watermark of Greek metaphysical theology. It is
true that we cannot read Aristotle or Plato without reading into
their words and phrases meanings that come from Christian thought.
Further we are eclectic in that we select passages that can be
fitted into the framework of Christian theology. Nevertheless
Aristotle taught Christian thinkers how to go about the business
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of natural theology. Without him the Christian philosophy of
the middle ages would have been very different.
4. St. Thomas Aquinas
We turn now to the middle ages, not because there is no
metaphysical speculation between Aristotle and Aquinas, but
because pre-Christian philosophers did little more than follow
up trains of thought started by Plato and Aristotle and the
earlier Christian were more concerned with apologetic and the
creation of a dogmatic theology. In the thought of St.Augustine
and St. Anselm philosophy was subordinate to faith and had no
rights of its own. In the hands of Aquinas metaphysical argument
was a new tool which would complement revealed theology.
St. Thomas believed that it is possible, by metaphysical
argument, to reach the conclusion that God exists. With Aristotle,
he conceived the subject matter of metaphysics to be being ~
being, and, since God is pure being, this must mean that
metaphysics yields some knowledge of God. A prior knowledge of
the world is, of course, necessary.
" In order to know the things that the reason can
investigate concerning God, a knowledge of many things
must already be possessed. For almost all philosophy is
directed towards the knowledge of God, and that is why
metaphysics, which deals with divine things, is the last
- 36part of philosophy to be learned."
On the other hand there is a knowledge of God which surpasses
reason and we only know God truly "when we believe him to be
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above everything that it is possible for a man to think about
him" .37 We may remind ourselves of threefold classification
of man's knowledge of God, which he describes thus:
" There is • • in man a threefold knowledge of things
divine. Of these, the first is that in which man, by
the natural light of reason, ascends to a knowledge of
God through creatures. The second is that by which the
divine truth - exceeding the human intellect - descends
on us in the manner of revelation, not, however, as
something made clear to be seen, but as something spoken
in words to be believed. The third is that by which the
human mind will be elevated to gaze perfectly on the
things revealed_,,38
Aquinas thus offers a clear line of demarcation between the
findings of reason and the gift of faith. The knowledge afforded
by reason is produced by the evidence whereas the knowledge of
faith comes by an act of will. Neither rational knowledge nor
faith knowledge can give to man the vision of God which is the
ultimate source of true felicity.
St. Thomas set out his demonstration of the existence of
God in the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Summa Theologica.
As given in the Summa Theologica the first of the five ways,
described as "the more manifest way", is a reproduction of
Aristotle's argument from motion. The proof in the Summa Contra
Gentiles is elaborated for the benefit of the unbelievers.
Something moves, and it is our experience that a moving object
has always been moved by something else. We cannot trace
movement to infinity_ Each of these propositions is confirmed
by three proofs from Aristotle, and Aquinas concludes that an
unmoved mover necessarily exists. Then he makes the leap from
metaphysics to natural theology by adding, "This we call God.,,39
The other four ways have a similar conclusion. Thus
" Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient
cause, to which everyone gives the name of God."ltO
" Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some
being having of itself its own necessity ••• This all
men speak of as God.,,41
" Therefore there must be also something which is to allbeings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other
lt2perfection; and this we call God."
" Therefor some intelligent being exists by whom allnatural things are directed to their end; and this being
we call God.,,43
Now it is one thing to argue for the existence of an unmoved
mover, a first cause, a necessary existent, a cause of being
and goodness and a designer of the universe. It is another matter
to identify these as one being and that one being as God.
When we speak about an unmoved mover or a first cause we
are using the language of metaphysics; when we speak of God we
are using the language of religion. Edward Sillem brings out
the distinction.
" Sacred teaching is a supernatural theology totally
different from the natural theology of the philosophers • •
•• it (natural theology) cannot meet the concrete needs
of all men, nor indeed bring the good news of God's might
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and loving salus to any.,,44
This brings before us once again the relationship between
metaphysics and natural theology. As a result of metaphysical
argument Aquinas could conclude that the unmoved mover exists.
By faith he accepted the God known by revelation and through
religious experience. Then he identifies the two. His
metaphysics can then be rightly termed natural theology since
it consists in that knowledge of God accessible to natural
reason. But however we set out the arguments of Aquinas we can
never reach the God of religion. There must always come some
point where we assert the identity of the unmoved mover of our
metaphysics and the God of our worship.
45
In his book, ~ ~ ~, E.L.Mascall raised the problem
of this identification. Indeed he raised the prior question of
the identification of the First Mover, the First Efficient Cause,
the F~rst Necessary Being, the First and Supreme Perfection and
the Ultimate Final Cause. He asked, "Night not the universe be
governed by a Supreme 60uncil of Five7,,46 This unity, Mascall
showed, is arguable on the basis of necessity, but St. Thomas
was content to demonstrate the unity by identifying each with
God. The five ways are not to be regarded as arguments
strengthening each other, but as demonstrating five different
truths concerning the nature of God. Mascall made the distinction
between the intellectual and the intuitional acceptance of the
existence of God, using the analogy of the stUdent of mathematics
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who sees the chain of reasoning but needs to "get hold" of the
solution. Something must 'click'. What the Thomist proofs
afford is the apprehension of the existence of God rather than
an experience of his reality. The latter belongs to religion;
the former to natural theology.
Unlike some later philosophers, Aquinas never pretended
that a man could find a satisfying religious faith through
natural theology. He was concerned to show that the fundamental
truth of religion, namely the existence of God, could be reached
by reasoned argument. He was concerned to demonstrate by
metaphysical argument that there is no contradiction between the
truths of revelation and the findings of reason. The philosophy
of Thomas, as Clement Webb declared, "is concerned not merely
to defend a heterogeneous assemblage of dogmas but to penetrate
to principles which may exhibit these dogmas as forming an
organic unity.,,47
5. A New Beginning
Descartes' methodological doubt is not an entirely new
approach in philosophy, and those who assume that little or
nothing happened between the time of Plotinus and Descartes
ignore the fact that the so-called modern philosophers inherited
not only the problems but some of the methods of Augustine and
the mediaevals. For Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas any
philosophising on the basis of pure reason is carried out with
the assumption that there are truths of faith. Descartes made
much of his claim for the independence of philosophy but he
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dimiriShed the effectiveness of the claim when he declared that
for practical purposes he intended to adhere firmly to the faith
in which he had been educated from childhood48• Nevertheless
from the time of Descartes the primacy of faith can no longer
be assumed. Descartes claimed that as a philosopher h. would
only accept as true those things which were presented so clearly
and distinctly that all doubt was removed. He resolved to seek
no other knowledge than that which he could find within himself
or within the great book of the world. He tells us that he was
particularly delighted with mathematics because of the certainty
of the demonstrations but he was also careful to mention his
reverence for theology. The conclusions which Descartes reached
through his process of methodological doubt were happily in line
with the traditional thinking of the church, and for this reason
he was able to combine the task of metaphysician and apologist
more easily than some of his successors. He believed that through
his metaphysical reasoning he was reaching knowledge of God
without recourse to revelation. Close analysis, however, would
show that there is a point where he introduces a clear and
distinct idea of God and it is not therefore surprising that
this should appear in his conclusion.
Spinoza not only sought a system of philesophy that would
yield mathematical certainty but openly attacked those who looked
to the authority of scripture rather than reason. liMen who
contemn reason and reject I.wderstanding," he declared, " are
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strangely believed to be possessed of heavenly light.,,49 His
views of the scriptures were very much in advance of his time
and he criticised those" who mostly assume as the basis of all
enquiry into the true meaning of the Bible, that it is
everywhere inspired and literally true •.,50 One obstacle in the
way of grasping the truth is "the idea that Reason should be
subordinate to Theology".51 Spinoza admitted that the prophets
grasped truths beyond the reach of lesser men, but this was
because of their vivid imaginative insight and their certainty
was moral rather than mathematical. Beginning with his
definitions and axioms Spinoza moved relentlessly on his
mathematical way. But God was his beginning rather than his
conclusion. Indeed it was his boast that
" Popular philosophy starts from creatures: Descartes
starts from mind: I start from God.,,52
The attraction of Spinoza's work, at least for some of his
admirers, lies in the fact that it is a religion seeking a
metaphysic rather than a metaphysical scheme concluding in a
religious outlook.
Descartes had separated mind and matter, God and the world.
Spinoza brought the divided universe together. More dependent
upon the mystics than upon the mediaeval theologian-philosophers,
Spinoza brought together Greek substance and modern scientific
knowledge in what appears at times to be mysticism as much 85
metaphysics. For Spinoza there are three kinds of knowledge;
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(1) The first kind arises from perception, from vague or casual
experience, from what Spinoza calls 'signs' - what we have heard
or remember. This he calls cognitio, opinio, or imaginatio.
(2) The second is ratio, which arises from the fact that we have
common notions and adequate ideas of the proportion of things.
(3) The third kind is scientia intuitiva, which arises from an
adequate idea of the essence of God.53
It is this third type of knowledge that leads eventually to the
intellectual love of God. This intellectual love of God is the
love wherewith God loves himself. Here we see the shadow of the
mediaeval mystics and the foreshadowing of Hegelian metaphysics.
Hegelian philosophy was still influential in Britain in the late
nineteenth century and it is (l).6Y to Bee why Spinoza made such an ~'P
appeal to a man like Adam Gifford. Calvinism had lost its hold
on theology in Scotland and Hegelianism had enthralled her
philosophy. It is not surprising that truth should be sought
in an all-embracing Spinozistic philosophy to the exclusion of
anything smacking of the miraculous or the irrational.
Spinoza saw the world as a unity but modern science did not
need the mystic's intuition to discover this truth. It was part
of the scientific data. Law and design were evident everywhere
and the universe was expressive of a single mind if not the
creation of such a mind. Like Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz
saw in mathematics the deepest kind of truth. Mathematics and
~ priori reasoning in general produce truths of reasoning as
opposed to truths of fact. Because of the law of necessary reason-
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God is the Necessary Being behind contingent facts. God is the
answer to the question why things in the universe are as they
are and not otherwise. Material being is important for Leibniz
as providing a mirro. which reflects the necessary being of God.
Berkeley was to take the argument further, denying the reality
of material in order to underline the spiritual nature of the
universe. But, ss we have seen already, metaphysical speculation
cannot reach the God of religion. If it appears to do so it i6
because the metaphysic has become a religion. Man does not
worship Necessary Being or All-embracing Mind, but once he has
worshipped God he may describe him in these terms.. Locke, in
spite of his empirical approach, was driven to appeal to the
miraculous to find evidence for the truths beyond reason. The
weakness of the new metaphysical approach lay in its divorce
from faith. It remained for Hume and Kant to demonstrate
unequivocally that unassisted reason cannot reach God.
6. The LimitBtions of Metaphysical Speculation
We have already written of Hume as a critic of religion
and in this lay his strength. That he recognised this himself
is borne out by the words of Cleanthes to Philo, who 60 often
represents Hume:
" I must confess, Philo, that of all men living, the task
you have undertaken of raising doubts and objections suits
you best."54
Hume demonstrated negatively as clearly as Luther and Calvin
asserted positively, that religion is a matter of faith rather
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than reason. He believed he could frame a complete system of
the sciences based on the study of human nature, or so he
claimed in the introduction to the Treatise~5 However at the
end of the first volume he reached an impasse and it seemed that
reason was undermined in all its activities. There can be no
certainty for the true sceptic, who "will be diffident of his
philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical
. 56certainties." In his attempt at metaphysical construction
Hume could find no more than probability and therefore asserted
that any religion seeking a solif foundation must l~ok to faith
rather than metaphysical speculation. So Hume who had proposed
to escape from the temples of religion into the calm waters of
philosophy, found that philosophy could offer no certainty.
Hume was a man as well as a philosopher and he found that a few
hours of dining, backgammon and friendly conversation served to
dispel his philosophical doubts for all practical purposes.
Kant's refutation of the theistic arguments is too well
known to need repetition. For Kant, Metaphysics is ! priori
reasoning about God, Freedom and Immortality. Hume was prepared
to contemplate the works of nature in his search for truth and
Kant included the starry heavens above as part of the evidenae.
But in Kant the evidence of nature is subordinated to the moral
experience of the individual. After he Had shown,eto his own
satisfaction, conclusivelyO, that it is impossible for reason
either to prove or disprove the existence of GOd58, he turned
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his attention to devising a demonstration based on practical
reason. which has become known as the moral argument. He wrote:
II Now I maintain that all attempts of reason to establish
a theology by the aid of speculation alone are fruitless,
that the principles of reason as applied to nature do not
conduct us to any theological truths. and. consequently,
that a rational theology can have no existence. unless it
is founded upon the laws of morality."59
It is not to be thought of as a proof of the existence of God
for Kant's strictures apply to this argument as to the others.
\
God. Freedom and Immortality are postulates of pure practical
reason. In other words. belief in God ••Freedom and Immortality
makes sense of the individual's moral experience. This would
apply within limits to the teleological argument. Given a belief
in God from another source then the teleological argument makes
sense. By themselves neither the teleological nor the moral
arguments are able to convince the unbeliever. The physico-
theological proof (as Kant describes the teleological argument)
may prepare the mind for theological cognition and gives the
60right direction but does not offer a firm foundation for theology.
The evidence from moral experience involves the concept of
freedom and demands more explanation than nature can afford.
So we are led to postulate the existence of God. but ot a God
who is to be reverenced as the Universal Legislator. One wonders
if Kant's religious experience had been as vivid as his sense of
duty was strong whether we should have had a proof of the
existence of God as a postulate of pure practical religion:
All that Kant does in the end is to demonstrate that it is
not unreasonable to believe in God. Natural theology for Kant
consists, as we saw in a previous ch~er, in the careful
criticism of religion, and, as we now see, in the construct-
ion of a rational scheme within which it is possible to hold
a religious faith.
There were, in the main, three reactions to the Kantian
criticism of metaphysics. Kant had claimed that he was
abolishing knowledge to make way for faith and oneaaderstandable
reaction was to leave speculation to the philosophers and to
return to the external authority of the church or scriptures.
Kant opened the way for both Catholics and Protestants to
continue their theologising according to their particular
understanding of faith.
The second reaction was to turn to science for the only
reliable knowledge available. This logically would lead to
positivism but apologists are not always logical and we soon
find renewed attempts to prove the existence of God by inference
from the wonders of nature. As we saw in the previous charter
these argUments were put forward as if Hume and Kant had never
written.
The third reaction was a turning to experiential
religion. Before Kant's time scriptural and ecclesiastical
authority had been questioned and now that rational support of
religious truth was undermined the time was ripe for a return to
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a religion in which the affective element provided its own
authority_ In the England of the eighteenth century the
Methodist Revival was in part a reaction to the philosophical
theologies of the day. In spite of Wesley's claim that "to
renounce reason is to renounce religion, that reason and
religion go hand in hand, and that all~rational religion is
61false religion," the strength of his movement lay in the
rediscovery of experiential religion_ In the realm of philosophy
and theology the thought offchleiermacher in the nineteenth
century and Otto in the twentieth is symptomatic of this
continued reaction. Religion is more than metaphysics and in the
final chapter of this section we shall follow this development
more closely.
It remains now to trace the continued development of
metaphysical speculation with its culmination in the all-embracing
philosophy of Hegel.
7. The Hegelian World View
Hegelian metaphysics assumes the existence of God rather
than attempting to prove it. Where Descartes and others were
concerned to establish the ontological argument, Hegel made what
62has been described as the great Ontological Assertion. He writes:
" We shall, to begin with, accept as a simple statement
of fact the assertion that the result of philosophy is that
God is the absolutely True, the Universal in nnd for itself,
the All-comprehending, All-containing, that from which
everything derives its sUbstance_,,63
This assertion is, as John Laird remarks, "the Acropolis ot
64certain philosophies and the rock ot ottence to others".
God is neither the Substance of Spinoza nor the Monad ot Leibniz.
God is Spirit - the all-knowing Idea, and the Universe as we
experience it is a retlection ot that Being. Hegel does not use
the term "natural theology". He distinguishes between "Theology
ot Reason" (Vernunft Theologie) and Philosophy of Religion.
The theology of reason is concerned with the exegesis of the
scripture. aAd the exposition of Christian symbol.; philosophy
is concerned with pure reason. Truth or reason i8 a unity and so
philosophy is not in opposition to positive religion. Thus,
" The expression that God as reason rules the world, would
be irrational if we did not assume that it ha. reference
al.o to religion, and that the Divine Spirit work. in the
special character and form assumed by religion.,,65
Religion differs from metaphysical speculation in that it.
attitude is expressed in symbolic rather than conceptual form.
Begel claims that religion itself is knowledge of GOd66, but
this does not constitute a proof of the existence of God.
Religion essentially involves feeling and while feeling may give
subjective certainty it does not confer intellectual certainty.
Neverthelss such religious knowledge is a reflection of the
Absolute and therefore offers truth. In their own way the
proots of the existence of God also offer truth but this i8
philosophical truth. John Baillie, who in his Gifford lectures
examined the authority of religious experience, well expressed
Hegel's distinction between religion and philosophy.
" He (Hegel) believes that the religious mind operates, not
by means of Begriffe, exact concepts or notions, but by
means of imaginative representations or Vorstellungen.
Religion is picture-thinking, which means that it is
thinking of super-sensible reality in terms of sensible
things, and of the invisible in terms of the visible.
Philosophy, on the other hand, can offer us adequate knowl~
of the super-sensible realm, which to him is the realm of
reality as distinct from appearance, because Begriffe are
its natural currency.,,6?
We might say then that in the Hegelian scheme metaphysical
speculation does yield a natural theology which offers truth about
God whereas religion yields partial and symbolic truth.
In this way Begel did much to re-instate the arguments for
the existence of God. As we have seen, the early Gifford
lecturers were for the most part Begelian in their outlook and
this is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in the following
passage from Stirling :
It There is a triplet of perpetual appearance and
reappearance in the ancient Fathers of the Church. It i.
!!!!, vivere, intelllgere; and these are but three
successive stages of the world itself. '1'0 live is to b.
. --
above ~ £!, and ~ think is to be above ~!!!!. All
three are at once in the world; and though they offer
hands, as it were, each to the other, each is for itself.
So it is that the Three Proofs are but the single wave in
the rise of the soul, through the Trinity of the Universe,
up to the unity of God. And, with such thoughts before
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us, it will be found that the ontological proof will
assume something of r~ality, and will cease to be a mere
matter of words. The very thought of Gof is of that which
68 ---!!" ~ cannot not-be."
Neyertheless even Stirling recogni.ed that the ontological
argument is not logically verifiable but is rather a "mood of
the mind, a veritable process of the soul, a movement of spirit
to:spirit, and a revelation of God to man.,,69
Philosophy, for Hegel. is indeed religion as he himself
acknowledged.?O Christianity, as the Absolute Religion, states
the same truth. aa Hegelian philosophy, or 60 Hegel believed.
Thus it does not much matter whether we say that Christianity is
the religious manifestation of Hegelian philosophy or that
Hegelian philosophy is Chri.tianity in conceptual form. But
what we have when Hegel ha. finished i. not the traditional
Christian faith, but the Christian faith adapted to Hegelian
thought forms. Philosophy 'and Christianity may be partners once
more in Hegelian thought but there is little doubt as to which
partner i. the senior. In hi. History ~ Philosophy Copleston
comments:
" Hegel make. speculative philosophy the final arbiter
of the inner meaning of Christian revelation. Absolute
idealism i. presented as esoteric Christianity and
Christianity as esoteric Segelianism; and the mystery
insisted on by theology i. subordinated to a ~hilosophical
clarification which amounts in fact to a transformation.,,?1
Some of the early Gifford lecturers attempted to show that
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Hegelian philosophy provided ,a metaphysical system within which
Christianity could be understood. There are dangers in too
close an identification for while a man may think about an
Absolute Synthesis, to use S.S.Laurie's phrase, he worships a
living God. Natural theology as metaphysical speculation may
help our understanding of religion but it must not become a
substitute religion. That is not the intention of either
metaphysics or natural theology.
8. Metaphysics in the Twentieth Century
The story of metaphysics in the twentieth century can be
told, to a considerable extent, in terms of Gifford lecturers.
Edward Caird, Henry Jones, Royce, Pringle-Pattison, Bosanquet
and others offered their idealist metaphysics to a world
impatient for a scientific realism. Sorlwy, Taylor and De Burgh
followed Kant in seeking to establish a metaphysic of morals.
Others, like Lloyd Morgan, Alexander and Whitehead made meta-
physical ventures on the basis of realism. The outstanding
,attempt at a Christian metaphysic was, of course, William Temple's
Nature, ~ ~ God. Gilson represents contemporary Roman Catholic
thought. A full account of twentieth century religious metaphysics
is to be found in John Macquarrie's Twentieth Century Religious
Thought (1963), which, of course, goes beyond the Gifford
boundaries. It is interesting and impressive to note how
frequently the names of Gifford lecturers appear in Macquarrie's
account, and very often the Gifford appointment hasvprovided i!
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the incentive for the production of a magnum opus.
The twentieth century will be remembered for its opposition
to metaphysics, not that such opposition is anything new. Hume
and Kant in the eighteenth century and Mill and Comte in the
nineteenth raised questions which are fundamentally the same as
those raised by the anti-metaphysicians of the present century.
The difference lies in the fact that religious thinkers of the
present century have taken the questions much more seriously than
did their predecessors. At the beginning of the century G.E.
Moore and Bertrand Russell were already challenging the validity
of metaphysics. In his account of Hegel Russell castigates him
for introducing metaphysical muddles into mathematics.72 or the
philosophers who have attempted to prove the existence of God,
he says
" In order to make their proofs seem valid, they have
had to falsify logie, to make mathematics mystical, and
to pretend that deep-seated prejudices were heaven-sent
intuitions.,,?3
Philosophy had traditionally included metaphysics, psychology and
logic. Psychology was rightly transferred to the realm of
science; metaphysics was relegated to the sphere of poetry;
logic was left in sole possession of the philosophical field.
A.J.Ayer's Language, Truth ~ Logic (1936) provided the clearest
expression of the new positivism in Britain and in that work
Ayer denied the very possibility of metaphysics.
" We may ••• define a metaphysical sentence as a sentence
which purports to express a genuine proposition, but does,
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in fact, express neither a tautology nor an empirical
hypothesis. And as tautologies and empirical hypothese.
form the entire class of significant propositions, we are
justified in concluding that all metaphysical assertions
are nonsensical.u?6
And further,
tf We shall maintain that no statement which refers to a
'reality' transcending the limits of all possible sense-
experience can possibly have any literal significance;
from which it must follow that the labours of those who
haTe striTen to describe such a reality have all been
deToted to the production of nonsense."??
•
For Ayer the whole class of true propositions i8 composed of
scientific and philosophical propositions. These cannot contra-
diet each other for science is reporting on empirical facts and
philosophy merely proTides the rules for such reporting; indeed
philosophy i. little more than the logic of science. If the
scientist goes beyond his science into the realm 01 metaphysics,
as some Gifford lecturers have done, then Ayer would say that the
scientist is talking nonsense the moment he crosses the border.
Moral philosophy and theology come under the same condemnation
as metaphysics. Natural theology, our 'sick man of Europe' is
Dot eTen mentioned by name in Ayer's criticism, perhaps on the
grounds that one doesn't speak ill of the dead and only of the
dying in whispers1
Metaphysics and natural theology are strangely resilient.
The argument of Language, Truth ~ Logic has been answered in
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Tarious ways by Gifford lecturers. John Laird was one of the
earliest Gifford protagonists in the defence of metaphysics
against the new pesitivism. He declared his readiness to be
~ccused of rashness, vacuity. obstinacy and other forms of
wrongheadednessn?8 in his defence of metaphysics. In speaking
of his conclusions Laird confessed that there was even more in
metaphysics than he had thought.
n I may say that I did not appreciate the force of theism
when I began this enquiry. I was comforted by the
recollection that Lord Gifford expressly permitted a
lecturer on this foundation to be a sceptic and freethinker.
I hoped to be able to avoid pulpit theism and soap-box
atheism. (I may add the irrelevance that I dislike both.)
I may even have thought that theism was a decrepit
metaphysical vehicle harnessed to poetry. I do not think
so now.,,?9
Laird does not claim that metaphysical speculation yields
verifiable truth but suggests that there are indeed degrees of
plausibility between 'nonsense' and verifiable propositions.
H.J.P.ton dealt at some length with the linguistic veto and,
while he recognised that the challenge of logical positivism and
linguistic analysis had been salutary for religious thought, he
described the positivist ban on metaphysics as a road sign marked
80 81'slow' rather than 'halt'. More recently C.A.Campbell ,
quoting a atudent who had declared in an examination paper that
'metaphysical had become a swear word, makes no apology if his
lectures are bristling with bad language! Campbell believes that
there is a sense in which religious statements can be described
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as true and sets out to demonstrate the relevance of such
statements.
If the statement 'God exists' is nonsense then the statement
'God does not exist' is equally nonsense. Intuitions and insights
may not yield verifiable propositions. but it is an empirical
fact that men and women have had intuitions and insi~ts and it
is not unreasonable to suppose that they will go On having them.
It is all to the good that there should be warning notices raised
here and there by the logicians so that we can distinguish between
faith and knowledge, intuition and scientific statement. We need
a word to describe man'a thoughts about the ultimate nature of the
universe, based on his scientific knowledge and any tru~h
afforded by insight or intuition, and metaphysics is as good a
word as any. If such speculation involves discussion of the
existence and natura of God tha natural theology is a legitimate
term.
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1. ~ilosophy and Faith
St. Paul was not only an apologist who was prepared to use
philosophical argument to persuade unbelievers; he presented the
gospel aa a philosophy - a new kind of wisdom. Philosophy is more
than an aid to the unbeliever in his ••arch for faith; it is an
aid to the believer in understanding his own faith. The faith
preached by Paul was something for which Greek philsophy might
serve as introduction but never a substitute. First and foremost
St. Paul was an expositor of this new kind of wisdom. The
relationship between faith and philosophy was succinctly described
by Gilson when he wrote of the apostle :
" He knows nothing, he preaches nothing, save Jesus
Christ crucified and the redemption of .innere by Hi. grace.
It would b. altogether absurd therefore to speak of a
philosophy of St. Paul, and if we find certain fragments
of Greek philosophy embedded in his writings these are
either wholly adventitious, or, more often, integrated
with a religious synthesis which transforms their meaning
altogether. The Christianity of St. Paul is not a
philosophy added to other philosophies, it ia a religion
which supersedes all that is ordinarily called philosophy
and absolves us from the trouble of seeking one. For
Christianity is a way of salvation, and therefore something
1other than, and more than a scheme of knowledge."
The gospel was neither an appeal for moral rectitude nor the
provision of a philosophy. Hence it was a stumbling block to
the law-respecting Jew and the truth-seeking Greek. Salvation by
grace through faith was offered to both alike. The wi.dom of the
wise and the cleverness of the clever were cancelled out by the
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2gospel. Yet although St. Paul described the gospel as
foolishness, within a sentence or two, he described it as a new
kind of wisdom, -
" a secret and hidden wisdom of God, which God decreed
before the ages for our glorification.,,3
It looks, at first sight, as if St. Paul was content to
dispense with Greek philosophy, offering a short cut to wisdom,
which could be obtained by faith in Jesus Christ rather than by
the laborious toils of philosophy. Yet the man who is by nature
a philosopher will not be satisfied with such a ready made faith,
unless it can give satisfactory answers to the questions he has
been asking. In other words, he has sought the meaning of life
through philosophy and has not found it, but once he has acceptea
the wisdom of God by faith, the meaning of life becomes plain.
In believing he understands. So, as we have seen, Justin
described his new found faith as a philosophy and thereafter
described himself as a philosopher. So too with st. Paul; once
he had made the initial act of surrender on the Damascus road,
the answer to other problems became clear. The letter to the
Romana, for instance, provides an interpretation of history and
answers to the problems of suffering and providence, answers
which would not make sense apart from the initial act of faith.
At this point it will be well to distinguish between two
radically different conceptions of faith. What has been called
the "propositional" view, a view that dominated the mediaeval
period, 1s that by revelation a body of truth has been made
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known and faith consists in the acceptance of this truth. Faith,
according to the Vatican Council of 1870, i. "a supernatural
virtue, whereby, inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we
believe that the things which he has revealed are true". Faith
is thus intellectual assent. Nor is this view confined to Roman
Catholicism. For certain protestants faith has implied an
intellectual assent to the scriptures as revealed truth. Yet
when taith is described in the scriptures it is always more than
intellectual assent to revealed truth. When Abraham lett his
kindred he was doing more than assenting to a monotheistic
conception of God. When Moses heard the voice of God by the
burning bush he was not merely giving assent to the proposition
that the nature of God is pure Being. Similarly taith for St.
Paul was more than an acceptance ot the theology expressed in
his letter to the Romans. Faith, in these instances, is the
outcome of an I-Thou controntation with God.
We have then two interpretation& ot faith
(1) Faith as the acceptance of a direct revelation from God,
'Dften'!recorded in the form of a vision, and
(2) Faith as acceptance, on the authority ot church or scripture,
ot truth. revealed to individual. or councils. Thi& second kind
of faith is our main concern in this chapter. Faith, involving
direct intuition of God, will concern us in the chapter
immediately following.
The man of faith, in the second sense, is still an
intelligent creature, called to love God with all his mind. So
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the believer ~ ~ ~ satisfaction seeks a rational
exposition of the faith he holds, but it is still a faith.
There is no salvation by correct deduction and if a man argues
from faith he cannot reach any more than faith; he can only
make his faith more explicit. Faith may thus be strengthened
by the examination of reason, but it is not the product of
reason. Funthermore faith, strengthened by reason, provides
a standard by which a man lives. Gilson, in commenting on
Lactantius, contrasts the philosopher, who depends on nothing
but his own reason, and the Christian philosopher whose faith
provides him with "a criterion, a norm of judgment, a principle
of discernment and selection".4 The peculiar contribution of
Lactantius lay in his bringing together wisdom and faith; he
chose the certitude of reason directed by revelation in
preference to unguided reason. Indeed early Christian thinkers
argued against Greek thought on the ground of the "contradictions"
of the philosophers. The Greeks had discovered snippets of
truth but their truth could only be recognised in the light
of revelation.5
2. Nisi Credideritis ~on Intelligetis
The Latin translation from the Septuagint of the line from
6Isaiah may not reflect the true meaning of the Hebrew, but it
became a guiding principle for St. Augustine in his consideration
of the relationship between faith and reason. The Manichean
teaching appealed to the unconverted Augustine simply because
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it offered him a way to truth by reason without any appeal to
faith. Later, what has been described as "the amiable scepticism"
of Cicero, made a similar appeal and then the teaching of
Plotinus. Finally he discovered that all that was worth while
in neoplatonism was already contained in Christian teaching in
the Gospel of John and the Book of Wisdom.
" Thus," says Gilson, " the philosophy he vainly sought
by reaaon was offered him by faith. Those all too
uncertain truths which Greek speculation reserved for an
intellectual 'lite, had already been brought together,
purified, justified, completed by a revelation which put
them within reach of all the world."?
Faith now became the yardstick by which St. Augustine measured
the findings of the philosophers. St. Thoma. tells usB that
whenever Augustine found anything consistent with faith in the
teaching of the Platonists he adopted it, but he amended their
teaching when it was not in accordance with faith. So for
Augustine, who owed so much to non-Christian philosophy, faith
was primary. His reason was not nullified by his faith, but
rendered his faith comprehensible. While reason could not
establish faith it might show faith to be not unreasonable.
Johannes Scotus Erigena, who accepted the same Latin
mistranslation of Isaiah and likewise insisted on the primacy
of faith, used the story of the approach of Peter and John
to the empty tomb as symbol of the approaeh through faith and
reason respectively. Both the disciples ran to the tomb but
Peter, representing faith, entered first and John, representing
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reason, followed.9 We accept the truths of God by faith and
then bring Our powers of reason to bear upon them. This
exercise leads us to two kinds of theology. If we accept the
truths given by revelation and then draw inferences from them
we are led into the realm of dogmatic theology or theology
proper. If we accept the truths given through faith and then
reason about them as far as we can without reliance upon
revelation then we arrive at the kind of natural theology
pursued by St. Anselm. It is to St. Anselm that we owe the
most fully elaborated formulation of the principle of the
primacy of faith. For the Christian, faith is the given point
of departure. If he does not put faith first, then, according
to Anselm, he is presumptuous. On the other hand if he does
not bring reason to bear on his faith he is negligent.
" While the right order requires that we should believe
the deep things of the Christian faith before we undertake
to discuss them by reason, it seems careless for us, once
we are established in the faith, not to aim at
understanding what we believe.,,10
Even though St. Anselm described his ontological argument as a
short way with unbelievers it was produced first at the request
of some of the monks at Bee who asked for a model of meditation
11on the existence and essence of God based on reason. As the
monks themselves were believers it was indeed fides quaerens
intel1ectum, i.e., the faithful bringing reason to bear on the
object of their faith. The possibility of demonstrating the
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existence of God apart from faith does not seem to have entered
the mind of St. Anselm, who lived before the rediscovery of
Aristotle and for whom the later distinction between natural
and revealed theology did not exist.
In the Mono10gium St. An~selm had presented three
traditional proofs of God's existence based on empirical
experience. First of all what is experienced as good is more or
less good, which ia another_y of saying that it participates
in absolute goodness, which ia God. Secondly, Anselm presented
the argument concluding in a first cause. Thirdly, he argued
that relative degrees of perfection pOint to a being more perfect
than the rest, namely God. It is clear that these are not
really proofs of the existence of God and it is doubtful whether
Anselm thought they were. But it isV~l~ar that once the being
of God is accepted by faith such rational argument supports faith.
In the Pros10gion St. Anselm described how he began to
question with himself whether there might not be found a single
argument which would be self-sufficient and all-sufficient. He
tells us that the ontological argument came to him quite
suddenly. It has the advantage that it does not depend in the
least upon empirical experience but solely upon the idea of God,
whom he addresses in the second person. The argument can only
be understood in the context of this I-Thou relationship. The
argument runs as follows :
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" And so, 0 Lord, since thou givest understanding to
faith, give me to understand - as far as thou knowest it
to be good for me - that thou dost exist, as we believe,
and that thou art what we believe thee to be. Now we
believe that thou art a being than which none greater can
be thought. Or can it be that there is no such being,
since -the fool hath said in his heart,'There is no God'''?
But when this same fool hears what I am saying - "A being
than which none greater can be thought" - he understands
what he hears, and what he understands is in his
understanding, even if he does not understand that it
exists ••• Even the fool, then, must be convinced that a
being than which none greater can be thought exists at
least in his understanding. But clearly that than which
a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the understand-
ing alone. For if it is actually in the understanding
alone, it can be thought of as existing also in reality,
and this is greater. Therefore, if that than which a
greater cannot be thought is in the understanding alone,
this same thing than which a greater cannot be thought is
that than which a greater can be thought. But obviously
this is impossible. Without dO~, therefore, there exists
both in the understanding and in reality, something than
12which a greater cannot be thought."
Kant's criticism is well known and need not be repeated.
According to Karl Barth the argument is nothing more than a
statement of faith and Anselm is essentially a theologian. The
Proslogion is described by Barth as a study of the implications
13of the divine Name rather than a proof of God's existence.
Barth's judgment is summed up in the following comment :
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n The aim of theology cannot be to lead men to faith,
nor to confirm them in the faith, nor even to deliver.
their faith !rom doubt. Neither does the man who asks
theological questions ask them for the sake of the
existence of his faith; his theological answers, however
complete they may be, can have no bearing on the existence
o! his faith.n14
If Barth's interpretation is correct it is difficult to see how
Anselm could have thought that his argument would be a short way
with unbelievers. Barth may be right as far as unqualified
theology is concerned, But Anselm seems to have thought that
he was indeed stretching out beyond faith to rational argument,
to what would later be described as natural theology. Others
have described Anselm's work as mystical theology15, but St.
Anselm's quest was essentially rational rather than mystical.
His argument is the explication of a concept of God rather than
an experience of God.
Perhaps the best way of expressing Anselm's position is
to eay that he accepted God's existence by faith and then
proceeded to show that it would in fact be illogical to believe
anything else. Later Aquinas would assert explicitly that there
can be no contradiction between the data of faith and the
findings of reason. Anselm assumed, without saying so
explicitly, that what he accepted by faith must be amenable to
logical demonstration. It could be, however, that the onto-
logical argument is just another way of saying that the person
who believes in God cannot possibly think of God as not existing.
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If the unbeliever attempts to reach Anselm's conclusion on the
b~s of an experimental hypothesis the only proposition he
reaches is, "If God!! that than which no greater can be
conceived then God exists." It is faith that gives certainty to
the argument. Its weakness is seen when it is judged purely as
a dialectical exercise. Aquinas, Locke and Kant saw this
weakness, yet Descartes, Leibniz and Hegel saw tuuth in it.
Gilson comments :
" What all those who accepted it have in common is the
identification of real existence with intelligible being
conceived by thought; what all those who condemn its
principle have in common is the refusal to consider any
problem of existence aside from an empirically given
16existent."
The abiding strength of Anselm's position is that he saw faith
as something that could be madeexp1icit by reason and never is
this more clearly demonstrated than in the ontological argument.
If God is believed in and conceived as Being then he necessarily
exists. As the first Gifford lecturer at Edinburgh put it,
for Anselm "the thought of God means the being of GOd".17 So
Anselm cries out :
" Thanks be to the., good Lord, thanks be to the., because
I now understand by thy light what I formerly believed by
thy gift, so that even if I were to refuse to believe in
18thy existence, I could not fail to understand its truth."
And later
" Thou alone, therefore, 0 Lord, art what thou art and
thou art he who i8.,,19
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An examination of ~ ~ Homo? confirms the judgment
we have made of Anselm's view of the faith-reason relationship.
The first book, he tells us,
" contains the objections of unbelievers who reject the
Christian faith because they regard it as contrary to
reason, along with the answers of believers. It ends by
proving by necessary reasons (Christ being put out of
sight, as if nothing had ever been known of him) that it
is impossible for a man to be saved without him.,,20
In commenting on the enquiries he receives Anselm writes of the
enquirers
" They do not expect to come to faith through reason,
but they hope to be gladdened by the contemplation and
21the understanding of the things they believe."
In obedience to the scriptural command the Christian is to be
ready to give an answer tor the hope that is in him. Yet the
answer turns out to be no more than a demonstration of the
reasonableness of the Christian taith. "Everything you say,"
confesses Boso, the questioner in the dialogue, "seems reasonable
to me, and I cannot gainsay it.,,23 And Anselm's final word
confirms the primacy of faith :
" If we have said anything that should be corrected,
I do not retuse correction, if it is done with good
reason. But if what we think we have discovered by
feason is confirmed by the testimony of the truth, we
should ascribe this not to ourselves, but to God who is
24blessed for ever. Amen."
It is clear from this comment that the revealed truth of God is
the final standard and if anything is at fault it must be the
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reasoning of Anselm rather than the record of the revelation.
This testifies to the humility of Anselm, but it is not
favourable to the establishment of an independent natural
theology. Anselm saw that faith was integral to religion and
that it is impossible to speculate about truths of religion
in vacuo. The "natural" theology of St. Anselm consists in the
attempt to demonstrate the reasonableness of faith as far as
possible without resort to revelation but the final authority
is revelation rather than reason.
3. The Changing Relationship of Faith and Reason
In religious thought after the time of St. Augustine there is
discernible a gradual transition from the idea of faith as
immediate personal experience, to faith as the acceptance of
revelation and finally to faith as the acceptance of the external
authority of the church expressed in scripture or credal
statements. With the rediscovery of Ari5totle in the thirteenth
century a further development took place. Augustine had derived
consciousness of God from self-consciousness. Anselm had
argued from his personal apprehension of God. Now attention was
diverted to the external world and Aquinas made a completely
new approach to natural theology. There was a knowledge of
God to be gained independently of faith. However I, the
Augustinian approach still had its champions and St.Bonaventure
claimed thatbthere could be no such thing as autonomous knowledge
of the created world.
" The human reason cannot reach a full and final
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explanation of created things unless it is aided by an
understanding of the most pure, actual, complete and
absolute Being, in other words, unless it reaches out
to the utterly simple and eternal Being of God in whose
mind are to be found the ultimate ground and reason of
all things.,,25
For Bonaventure as for Augustine and Anselm before him all
reasoning about religion begins with faith. Theology is the
believable translated into the intelligible by the process of
26reasoning. Similarly Duns Scotus, in spite of the synthesis
offered by Aquinas, did all his philosophising on the basis of
faith, and at the outset offered this truly Augustinian prayer:
" o Lord, our God, when Moses asked of Thee as a most
true Doctor, by what name he should name Thee to the
people of Israel; knowing well what mortal understanding
conceive of Thee and unveiling to him Thy ever blessed
name, Thou didst reply : Ego sum qui sum; wherefore
art Thou true Being, total Being. This I believe, but
if it be in any wise possible this I would also know.
Help me, 0 Lord, to seek out such knowledge of the true
being that Thou art as may lie within the power of my
natural reason, starting from that being which Thou
Thyself hast attributed to Thyself.,,27
Where Aquinas set out to prove that the being of God was a
necessary truth Duns Scotus accepted the truth as a gift of
'aith. Aquinas too accepted the revelation vouchsafed to Moses
as yielding truth but he also claimed that his proof of the
necessary being of God yielded valid knowledge of God.
The Thomist distinction between theology and philosophy
ls succinctly stated by Gilson in his opening Gifford lecture:
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" In Thomism ••• Theology remains in its proper place,
that is to say at the head of the hierarchy of the
sciences; based on divine revelation, from which it
receives its principles, it constitutes a distinct
science starting from faith and turning to reason only to
draw out the content of faith or to protect it from error.
Philosophy, doubtless, is subordinate to theology, but,
as philosophy, it depends on nothing but its own proper
method; based on human reason, owing all its truth to the
selt-evidence of its principles and the accuracy of its
deduction., it reaches an accord with faith spontaneously
and without having to deviate in any way from its own
28proper path."
The true Thomist would not fall into what Gilson describes as
the unpardonable error of a St. Augustine or a St. Anselm and
ask us to believe in God as a prerequisite of providing us with
a proof. But Augustine and Anselm lived in times when the
existence of God was tor the most part unchallenged and the
believer was trying to understand his own faith. Aquinas lived
at a time when Christians and non-Christians were making new
ventures of thought and the Christian thinker was on the
defensive in a way in which he had not been since the earliest
days of the faith. As we have seen the need for apologetic
forced St. Thomas to invent reasoned arguments for the faith,
but he also saw the possibility of metaphysical speculation
independent ot faith, a metaphysic very much after the pattern
of Aristotle's.
According to Aquinas, then, natural theology can give us
a knowledge ot the existence of God and some knowledge, largely
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negative, of the nature of God. It is sufficient to confute
unbelievers, but not adequate to lead them to the fullness of
the Christian faith.
" The sole way to overcome an adversary of divine truth
is from the authority of scripture - an authority divinely
confirmed by mirac1es.,,29
As far as this kind of truth is concerned Aquinas is at one with
Anselm for he tells us that faith propounds and reason
investigates.30 Similarly in the Summa Theo1ogica we are told:
" Sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not,
indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith
would come to an end), but to make clear other things that
are put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace
does not destroy nature, but perfects it, natural reason
should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will
ministers to charity.,,31
There is, of course, the third kind of knowledge, described by
Aquinas as the thunder of God's greatness in contrast to the
knowledge of"faith - 'a little drop of His word,.32 This third
kind of knowledge is not to be accepted without the confirmation
of scripture and is in any case the experience of the privileged
few. One cannot but admire the neatness of the Thomist scheme,
which allows for scriptural authority, mystical insight and
rational argument together with an over-all faith that there can
be no contradiction. Furthermore in any case of doubtful
argument, dubious interpretation of scripture or questionable
'revelation' the Church is the final arbiter. Since few people
have mystical experiences and comparatively rew have the
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intellectual ability to follow the dialectics of natural theology
and the correct interpretation of scripture is notoriously
difficult for the unlearned the vast majority will depend on
the authority of the Church. For most people. according to the
Thomist scheme. faith is an act of will. an act of obedience to
an external authority. Where for St. Augustine faith was a
commitment of the total person as a result of the inner
experience of conversion. for Aquinas it became obedience to
an external authority with the possibility that a select few
might reason their way through towards faith or find the
confirmation offered by religious insight.
It is significant tha~whether we describe natural theology
as apologetic. as metaphysics or as ally of faith, St. Thomas
claims a prominent place in the account. As John watson remarks,
,
Aquinas combines in his total thought "reason and faith,
philosophy and religion. rationalism and a mystical intuition".33
Where Thomas synthesised the approaches through faith and reason,
later thinkers separated them. The rationalist philosophers
dispensed with faith; the positivist theologians saw the
danger of giving any place to reason in man's reaching for God.
4. The Uneasy Partnership of Faith and Reason
The partnership of faith and reason established by Aquinas
proved to be an uneasy one. It is true that faith was the
senior partner and had the casting vote in any matter of
controversy. The problems of such a partnership had already
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been seen by Tertullian when he asked rhetorically what Jerusalem
and Athens could ever have in common. It is the way of reason
to go on asking questions; it is the way of faith to assert
rather than argue. So the very neat deeds of partnership devised
by St. Thomas proved unworkable. The junior partner, in the
form of modern philosophy. attempted to establish his own
business. This led to a natural theology completely divorced
from faith and to the attempt to establish a religion within
the bounds of mere reason. The underetandab1e reaction of the
senior partner was that he should run the business on his own;
If the junior partner was to be offered re-employment it would
be in the capacity of junior clerk with some little responsibility
inside the firm but with no executive authority.
Some thinkers considered that Aquinas had gone too far in
allowing so much independence to reason, and we have noted how
Bonaventure and Duns Scotus attempted to restore the balance.
William of Ockham marks the end of the golden age of scholastic-
ism. He declared that only by faith is it possible to know the
existence of God. It is possible by reasoned argument to reach
probabilities, but probabilities are not the same as faith,
and no'strength of probability can lead to faith. Probability
is the concern of rational argument; faith is something very
different. Ockham believed that it was possible to prove the
existence of a first cause, but this is not God in the religious
sense. He thus undermined all the natural theology of his
predecessors. He believed moreover that theology cannot be
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described as a science, for it depends on faith and a science
must depend on empirical facts. As Gilson put it,
" Faith was intact, but to follow Ockham was to give up
any hope of achieving, in this life, a positive philosoph-
ical understanding of its intelligible meaning.,,34
Ockham is thus the fore-runner of the Reformation thinkers.
5. Faith and Reason in Reformation Thought
In his emphasis on the primacy of faith Ockham was returning
to Augustine, who had first posed the problem for mediaeval
thought. Luther and Calvin were also returning to Augustine.
As Gwatkin comments of Augustine,
" One part of his capacious mind fixed the ruling ideas
of the Middle Ages, while another set the problems of
the Reformation.,,35
Luther belieTed that some knowledge of God is possible apart
from faith, and, as we n~ve seen36, accepted the scholastic
distinction that we can know quod !!!~ but not quid !!!~.
Any attempt to discover the nature of God through natural
theology i8 fraught with the danger of idolatry. A man is saved
by grace through faith. Further, this faith is not to be
interpreted in any propositional sense; it is faith in God
mediated through Christ. Where St. Thomas had attempted to
bring together nature and grace, reason and revelation and
the world and God, Luther stressed theirseparation. In his
concluding lecture Otto Pfleiderer wrote
" To Luther • • • faith is • • • the religious possession
of salvation. It connects man with God, frees him from
human mediators and means, and makes him immediately
certain within of his salvation ••• Luther saw the divine
grace, not as conjoined with the Church and its means of
salvation, but only with Christ and His Gospel.,,37
Luther himself described faith as tladivine work in us which
transforms us and bears us anew out of God", and as "a living
trust in God's gracell•38 In so far as this faith is mediated
it is mediated through Holy Scripture, but the faith is in God
through Christ, not in Holy Scripture. Nor can Luther be
accused of accepting the scriptures uncritically, for his
careful comments on the epistles of St. Paul testify to an
assiduity equal to that of any of the Scholastics in their
comments on the Fathers. He was ready to distinguish: between
the Epistle to the Romans, the bulwark of his gospel, and the
Epistle of St. James, that "epistle of straw". According to
Aquinas the truth of the scriptures was confirmed by miracles.
While Luther does not deny the miracles he declares that,
" External miracles are the apples and nuts which God
gave to the childish world as playthings; we no longer
have any need of them. ,,39
Scripture shines as truth in its own light. Luther:was
prepared to use reason within the realm of scriptural
interpretation but it was a redeemed reason. For man to
presume to discover the truths of God by the exerci6e of reason
alone was anathema. When reason protests against the rigidity
of the new faith it is ascribed to the agency of the devil.
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The Scholastics were roundly condemned for their emphasis
on reason and their exaltation of Aristotle. In the Disputation
against Scholastic Theology, Luther declared
" It is a wrong thing to say that a man cannot become
a theologian without Aristotle. The truth is that a man
cannot becoma a theologian unless he becomes one without
Aristotle.,,40
This is one of the milder comments on Aristotle. B.A.Gerrish,
41in Grace ~ Reason, has gathered together a few of the
epithets applied by Luther to Aristotle, who is variously,
"the stinking philosppher", "the Clown of the High Schools",
"trickster", "rascal", "liar and knave", "the pagan beast",
"blind pagan", "lazy ass" and "Billy-goat". Luther, we gather,
was not over fond of Aristotle, whom he saw as the personification
of man's attempt to reach God by the works of re~son. It would
be untrue to say that Luther had no place for reason and Gerrish
points out42 three different ways in which Luther speaks of
reason
(1) There is natural re~on which has its own proper domain.
We can use such reasoning in science and mathematics.
(2) There is arrogant reason, trespassing on the domain of
faith. It is for this type of reason that Luther reserves his
most bitter attacks. This arrogant reason is "the Devil's
whore" and the enemy of God.
(3) There is a regenerate reason serving humbly in the
household of faith. This kind of reasoning is useful in the
exegesis of scripture.
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This threefold distinction helps us to understand not. .
only Luther and Calvin but also th\~mOdern counterpart, Karl
Barth. There is no out and out denial of reason, but only the
denial of any possibility of reaching knowledge of God by human
reason. Philosophy, for Luther, is the heathen theology of
reason.43 There is no way to God through such natural theology.
Calvin made a similar distinction between the types of
reasoning open to man. Like Luther, he believed that reason is
a gift of God to be used in the conduct of the ordinary affairs
of life. It is efficient for the pursuit of mechanical arts
44and liberal studies. It can even recognise the existence of
God, and this, so that man should have no excuse, but it cannot
go beyond quod ill ~ to quid ill ~.
" To the great truths, What God is in himself, and
what he is in relation to us, human reason makes not
the least approach.,,45
While not so virulent as Luther in his attacks on the phi10sopher~
Calvin criticised them for their assumption that reason can
anewer all questions. In the search for God reason is impotent.
" Ae the human mind is unable, from dulness, to pursue
the right path of investigation, and after various
wanderings, stumbles every now and then 11ke one groping
in darkness, at length gets completely bewildered, so
ite whole procedure proves how unfit it is to search the
46truth and find it."
Indeed, the wisdom of the world, far from helping in the
eearch, is a kind of veil which prevents the mind beholding
All true wisdom and revelation is the gift of God,
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according to Calvin. Once the gift has been received the
understanding is enlightened with a new knowledge. This
knowledge of God which brings salvation is entirely different in
quality from that which takes away excuse.48 Reason was deemed
a queen by the heathen but she had been effectively dethroned
by St. Faul. The mind is corrupt and must be renewed as well
as the heart.49 Once the mind is renewed then it is enabled
to grasp the truths offered by scripture, which is its own
evidence.
Barth, as we have seen, denied all possibility of natural
theology. The Confessio Scotiea, on which he based his Gifford
lectures, begins with the words,
" We confesse and acknawledge ane onelie God."
Barth points out that the Confession does not conceive its
object at all but it acknawledges one only God.50 The revelation
is made by God and man can only acknowledge the one and only God;
it is not something a man learns by his own efforts. St. Faul
said that there are gods many and lords many51 but he was using
the term figuratively. Men make gods of human ideologies,
mythologies and philosophies, but these are false religions.
Barth is at one with Luther and Calvin when he declares, albeit
in a parenthesis:
52" Universities are the temples of these religions."
Faith knowledge, in that it comes from revelation, is different
from the knowledge derived from books or universities. Even the
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question, "Who is God?" is not one that man thought of for
himself.
" On the contrary, on every occasion that he raises it
in earnest, he is compelled to raise it, because without
his ever coming to think of it of his own accord, . this
question !! put to him in such a way that it must be
faced and cannot be evaded.,,53
But of course the question had been asked many times before,
particularly by the Greeks, and the Greek philosophers devised
the very terms used in the Confessio Scotic., namely, "eternal,
infinite, unmeasurable, incomprehensible, omnipotent, invisible".
Barth answers this objection by explaining that we draw the
meaning of these terms from our knowledge of God, not our
knowledge of God from the words. The revelation is the
revelation of a hidden God. The fitting humility of the
believer before revealed mystery is set against scepticism,
which, in contrast, is the human answer to the human question.
Similarly the Majesty of God is not to be measured by the
human idea of the Absolute, which is nothing more than
"the reflection of the world, and in the end the disastrous
reflection of human personality".5'+ In the same way if we
follow the traditional paths of the ~ negativa, the!!!
eminentiae or the via causalitatis we may well conclude,
"God is nothing", "God is everything", or "God is the One
in everything". "And with it all," adds Bartp, "what we have
defined would not be God.,,55
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Aquinas, as we have seen, found no difficulty in
identifying the conclusion of his various arguments with the
God of religious experience, but Barth denies that there can
be any relationship at all between man's concept of the First
Cause or Prime Mover and the Majestic God of the Conieseio
Scotica. Finally God ie not the God of human conception in
any sense, yet even Barth must use the language of human
personality to describe him.
" A.sa Person, in distinction from those images of our
imagination, He is One Who knows and wills, who acts and
speaks, Who as an "litcalls me tlThou"and Whom I can
call "Thou" in return. This is the true name of God
declared by Him Himself, and in which we must seek also
the whole mystery of His majesty. Apart from this name. 6it would have to remain completely hidden from us. ,,5
In this passage we see how close Barth is to existentialist
thought. He repeatedly asserts that man can never find God
as object. God as subject encounters man; he approaches as
the "I am". Barth finds even in Luther and Calvin traces of
a natural theology, "that is of a general view of the freedom
of God based on one philosophical system or another,,,57 and
he will have none of it. He declares :
" The true mystery of Predestination is neither the
secular mystery of determinism nor the equally secular
mystery of indeterminism, but the holy and real mystery
of Jesus Christ.,,58
Mystery is the operative word, a word of faith, a word the
philosopher does not understand. Indeed the sentence just
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quoted illustrates the difficulty of any possible dialogue
between Barth and the natural theologian. Barth denies the
right of the 'natural theologian to question his faith knowledge;
there is thus no place for the natural theologian as critic.
Even it natural theology could furnish apologetic it would
not lead to true knowledge of God. As metaphysic natural
theology is powerless to reach the God of mystery. In Barth
we have the clearest expression of theological positivism,
the logical conclusion of one strand of Augustinian thought.
6. Natural Theology and the Existentialists
In so far as any philosophical influence is discernible
in the,theology of Karl Barth it is ~rkegaardian existentialism.
But for Barth it is not human despair that prepares the way
for the acceptance of salvation. Everything in the drama of
salvation is the work of the Sovereign God. However, for
Kierkegaard, it was despair of human argument that led to the
leap of faith. In Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard
expresses this despair :
" I will surely not attempt to prove God's existence:
and even if I began I would never finish, and would have
to live constantly in suspense, lest something so
terrible should suddenly happen that my bit of proof
would be demolished.,,59
Faith depends on something other than correct argument and
Kierkegaard found that it was only when he let the prDof go
that he could know the existence of God.
tt As long as I keep my hold on the proof, i.e.
continue to demonstrate, the existence does not come out,
if for no o~ner r~ason than that I am engaged in proving
it; but when I let the proof go, the existence is there.
But this act of letting go is surely also something; it
is indeed a contribution of mine. Must not this also be
taken into account, this little moment, brief as it may
be - it need not be long, for it is a leap?"60
Kierkegaard's teaching is formative for much twentieth
century philosophy and theology. His influence is discernible
in the work of Kroner, Marcel, Niebuhr, Bultmann and Tillich
among our Gifford lecturers. The question we must now ask is,
How far can natural theology persist side by side with
existentialism? The answer given Kroner,. Niebuhr and Bultmann
is fundamentally that of Barth. Natural theology has no part
to play in bringing us to a knowledge of God. In one way or
another we make a leap of faith, humbly recognising our inability
to think straight about God. Tillich finds a place for natural
theology even though he denies its ability to answer questions
about God. Where Barth declares that man cannot even ask the
question, ~ho is God?' in his own strength, Tillich allows that
natural theology can frame the existential questions. The
answers are given by revelatory events. This is the most that
existentialism allows; natural theology can investigate the
problem but can do no more. Faith is reached by a leap rather
than a ladder.
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7. Poet-Liberal Theology
In spite of the onslaught of Luther and Calvin, natural
theology survived both in the Roman Catholic Church and in
Protestantism. It continued as the main instrument of apologetic
and we have seen already how it led on the one hand to Deism and
on the other to a somewhat formal Christianity strengthened by
reasoned argument. Within Protestantism scientific method,
applied to the study of religions and to the scriptures, led to
liberalism, and eome of the early Gifford lectures demonstrate
the lengths to which liberalism led Christian philosophers.
The immediate result:, of Barthian theology was a new
emphasis on the Bible and the authority of the Word. Natural
theology was in danger of total eclipse. Among recent Gifford
lecturers H.R.Farmer, John Baillie and Leonard Hodgson may be
named as post-liberal theologians. They have seen the weaknesses
of the older liberalism as well as the extravagances of the newer
Biblical theology and find a place for natural theology which does
not usurp the rightful place of revelation and yet contributes to
the understanding of faith. In the early days of Barthian
influence William Temple had protested that a revelation, however
divine, must still satisfy conscience and reason. Even if there
is a redemptive act man must be able to understand its purport
if he is to distinguish between true religion and superstition.
" Whether in fact there is such a redemptive act, or
what its mode, may be declared by positive religion;
it is no question for the Natural Theologian. But Nat,ural
Theology may very well enquire what its conditions must
be if it is to satisfy the requirements of the problem
as it has defined itself.,,61
This is not unlike Tilli~ch's view, but for Temple natural
theology not only poses the problem but reserves the right to
criticise the revelatory answers.
John Baillie, while appreciating Barth's emphasis on
the transcendence of God, believed that man possesses in
himself something of worth that enables him to recognise the
revelation of God. Man has, for Baillie, that knowledge of
God which Calvin allowed and almost immediately disallowed and
which Barth does not recognise at all. Yet even this natural
theology depends ultimately on God himself, and all the proofs
of the existemce of God are merely arguments to support what
man believes already.
" It is doubtful," says Baillie, "whether any race of
men has ever believed that man could discover anything
about God if God were not at the same time actively. 62seeking to make himself known."
This means that natural theology is only natural as opposed to
theology based on the special revelation of God in Christ.
H.H.Farmer saw Christianity as unique and formative for other
religions by reason of the Incarnation, but, like Baillie, he
finds room for a natural theology, which, while it may not
prove the truths of religion, can nevertheless show them to be
not unreasonable. Farmer does not quite say that natural
theology only demonstrates what a man believes already, but
he recognises that the arguments only make their appeal because
he ie ready to be convinced. Farmer writes :
" If the reasonings of natural theology convince a man
at all, they always draw some of their power to do so
from the fact that something of natural religion or
natural religio-theism is concommitantly active in hie
mind.,,63
Similarly Leonard Hodgson claims that revelation and reason
are complementary, being the divine and human sides in the
64dialogue between God and man. This is a typically British
response to Barthianism, a via media, which recognises the
truth of the transcendence of God but also sees that there must
be some human means, not totally inadequate or corrupt,
whereby this transcendent God can be known.
8. Natural Theology in Modern Catholic Thought
It ie usual to date the revival of interest in Thomism
(and thereby in natural theology) from the Papal Encyclical of
1879 but it should be remembered that this only set the seal
on a growing interest. The possibility of natural theology
was always recognised by the Roman Catholic Church and in
England of the nineteenth century Cardinal Newman clarified
many of the issues involved. He enjoyed the advantage of St.
Augustine in being a convert, not, of course, from paganism,
but from what he came to regard as incomplete truth even as
Augustine regarded neo-platonism as incomplete truth. Newman's
analysie of belief ie most relevant to our understanding of
the function of natural theology. Newman realised some of the
limitations of natural theology, recognising that there was no
easy way to the conversion of the unbeliever. He had little
patience with the prevalent view that more widespread instruction
in the arts and sciences would lead to more widespread religious
conviction. In February, 1841, Newman wrote to The Times
protesting against "a dangerous doctrine" maintained by Lord
Brougham and Sir Robert Peel :
II That doctrine was to the effect that the claims of
religion could be secured and sustained in the mass of
men, and in particular in the lower classes of society,
by acquaintance with literature and physical science, and
that, through the instrumentality of Mechanics'
Institutes and Reading Rooms, to the serious
disparagement ••• of direct Christian instruction.,,65
Later in the century Lord Gifford would attempt to reach the
whole population of Scotland by means of the Gifford lectures,
for which, if possible, there should be no admission charge,
and which should be published in cheap form if the trustees
so desired. Newman could have readily pointed out that the
widespread diffusion of natural theology would not necessarily
lead to a spread of religion.
Newman recognised that knowledge may be followed by
reasoning, but the heart. which 1s involved in belief, is
reached through the imagination rather than the reason.
Religion is concerend with what he calls !!!! assent. Notional
assent is the acceptance of a theological proposition. It is
possible to assert something without apprehension, but when
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we assert with apprehension then we can be said to have given
real assent. This assent is belief, which is described as the
unconditional acceptance of a truth. We find in Newman
something of later existentialism, when he declares
" Life is for action. If we insist on proof for
everything, we shall never come to action: to act you
must assume, and that assumption is faith.,,66
Nevertheless there is a place for natural theology and Newman
argues from the experience of conscience, the desire in man
for reconciliation with tiod, and the response awakened even in
the mind of a child to the teaching of religion. A child has
.. that within him which'actually vibrates, responds and
gives a deep meaning to the lessons of his first teachers
about the will and the providence of God.,,67
This is more than a notion of God; something clicks; God
becomes real. Proofs of the existence of God may produce
notional assent without real assent, but we never give real
assent without notional assent. Religion cannot maintain its
ground without theology. So natural theology can lead us
towards notional assent, but real assent demands response of
the whole person not to a neat syllogism but to the living God.
Natural theology can lead to notional assent - to the factual
existence of God; it cannot lead to a living faith. This is
not neo-Thomism but it restates the distinctions made by Thomas.
It is unfortunate that Jacques Maritain was unable to lecture
at Aberdeen in 1940 or to accept the renewed inviation after
the war, for we might have had within the Gifford series an
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exposition of the neo-Thomist positi~n by one of the foremost
of neo-Thomist philosophers. Eti'enne Gilson, another neo-
Thomist, did much to revive the spirit of mediaeval philosophy
in his historical review. Maritain's little book, Approaches
~~, provides an outline, that might well have been
developed into Gifford lectures. In it he gives clearly and
concisely the neo-Thomist approach to the traditional Thomist
arguments.
Maritain introduces his discussion of the Five Ways with
an exposition of what he describes as "the Primordial Way of
Approach". This is the way to God through the pre-philosophical
knowledge described by St. Paul.68 It is aatural knowledge, says
Maritain, but virtually metaphysical. One is reminded that
Maritain was formerly a follower of Bergson, when he says :
" It involves a reasoning, but a reasoning after the
fashion of an intuitive grasp, bathed in the primordial
intuition of existence.,,69
The Five Ways of St. Thomas are shown to be a developing and
unfolding of this natural knowledge. We cannot speak about a
'proof' of the existence of God, for a proof renders evident
what is not evident. Indeed, we do not need a proof; we only
need to demonstrate the existence of God. Maritain goes on
to develop ..8. -Sixth Way" based on the consciousne ss of human
existence, expressed briefly in a paragraph :
n I, who am thinking, have always existed, but not in
myself or within the limits of my own personality - and
not by an impersonal existence or life either (for
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without personality there is no thought, and there must
have been thought there, since it is now in me);
therefore I have always existed by a suprapersona1
existence or life. Where then? It must have been in
a Being of transcendent personality, in whom all that
there is of perfection in my thought and in all thought
existed in a supereminent manner, and who was, in His
own infinite Self, before I was, and is, now while I am.
more I than I myself, who is eternal, and from whom I,
the self which is thinking now, proceeded one day into
temporal existence.,,70
Here we are in the realm of intuition, mysticism and faith.
Neo-Thomist philosophers, like Maritain and Masca11, 1ead.us
beyond philosophy to the hope of a direct vision of God.
Masea11 likens the approach of philosophy to theology to the
coming of the Queen of Sheba to Solomon. She came bringing all
her own treasures but was awed into silence by the glory she
saw.71 Maritain writes ..
" Through the night of faith it is given us to attain
in His inner life - on the testimony of His Word - the
very God who will be intuitively grasped when faith gives
way to vision. And in the intellect elevated to the life
of faith, the natural desire to see God supernaturally
becomee a desire which knows what it asks for - a knowledge
of God through Hie essence, ~!! li! gives Himself in
~ ~ uncreated light - and which from now on has ~ germ
the wherewithal to attain what it asks for.,,72
One can understand that this is a "Sixth Way" for Maritain, but
it is a way of mysticism, based on an intuition of Being. The
precise relationship between natural theology and mystical
insight will be discussed in the next chapter.
Gabriel Marcel, another of the few Roman Catholic thinkers,
in the Gifford lists, began his enquiry with the mystery of
Being, the starting point for Aristotle and for so many
Catholic thinkers. As we have seen, faith for Marcel is never
the culmination of an argument; it is a matter of seeing through
to the meaning of reality rather than logical inference. It
remains for us to enquire whether this insight or intuition
can be the basis of a natural theology or whether such insight
is an elementary faith, which may provide a groundwork for
Christian Philosophy rather than what has been traditionally
known as natural theology.
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1. The Nature of Religious Insight
In tracing the development of natural theology the
separation of natural theology from religion has been forced
on our attention. It is clear that if natural theology
consists in a critique or religious concepts then the two must
be separate. In our discussion of natural theology as
apologetic we found that at the end of the argument there was
something missing. Natural theology does not make contact
with religion and the seeker after faith must make a leap of
faith at the end of the argument. Similarly metaphysical
argument does not lead to religion unless something of a
religious faith is introduced at some pOint in the process
as with Hegelianism. In our discussion of natural theology as
allied to faith we again saw that natural theology must begin
with faith as in Anselm's thought or must at some point be
supplemented by faith as in Thomist though~. In this final
discussion we come upon a concept of natural theology which
identifies it with religious insight. Christopher Dawson
remarked
" Religion does not arise from the experience of men
like Archdeacon Paley, but from that of men like
Ruysbroeck, and the thought of Ruysbroeck is more
genuinely natural theology than thethought of Paley,
even though it may be less communicable and less
adapted to logical discussion.,,1
And further :
" Natural Theology says not only look up and look out-
it also says look down and look in, and you will find
proofs of the reality of God in the depths of your own
nature • • • The men of religious experience - the saints
and the sages - have always taught that the further man
penetrates into the depth of his consciousness and ot
what lies below his consciousness, the nearer he
2approaches to spiritual reality."
In coming to this concept of natural theology we have made full
circle and are back with St. Faul on Mars Hill. If God is the
one in whom we live and move and have our being, where else can
we expect to find proof of God than in the depth of our own
experience? Throughout the ages men of varied cultural and
religious backgrounds have experienced what they took to be the
reality of the divine so that it is possible to speak with some
meaning ot a "perennial philosophy", a kind of consensus
gentium based on religious experience.
Christopher Dawson made the contrast between Paley and
Ruysbroeck; he might just as well have contrasted Aristotle
and Plato. The knowledge ot God achieved by Aristotle is in
the main the result of discursive reasoning while Plato's
knowedge of God is the product of insight and reason. Bergson
distinguished between knowledge ot understanding and knowledge
of intuition. The God of Aristotle is the conclusion of an
argument, and, according to Bergson3, has nothing in common
with the gods worshipped by the Greeks and little more in
common with the God of the Bible. Real religion is dynamic
and its source is mysticism. Bergson declared that mysticism
3.5.5
and religion are mutually cause and effect.4 T.H.Hughes, in
a careful study of mysticism.5, distinguished between the
knowledge gained by reasoning and the knowledge gained by the
mystic. They differ in three respects :
(1) The knowledge we attain by reasoning, e.g. mathematical
truths, conforms to the laws of logic. There is something more
than inference in the mystic's knowledge, though he may use
logical reasoning to test it. Rational knowledge is
inferential; intuitive knowedge is an immediate experience.
This is something like Newman's distinction between notional
and real assent.
(2) In the rational quest we are reaching out to achieve
knowledge. The mystic has the experience of something being
forced upon him from without, as when a picture presented
from outside awakens an aesthetic response. This is why the
Christian (and others use similar language) speaks of faith
itself as a gift of God.
(3) In reasoning we attempt to rule out feeling and consider
that we are better scientists if we eliminate feeling. In the
grasping of intuitive knowledge there is a strong affective
element.
Summing up, Hughes writes of intuitive knowledge :
" This is not reached by a process of reasoning. It
seems to come to us in a flash, or better, we live
through it. It i8 akin to the consciousness of life
itself, closely related to the primal instincts of
human nature; an experience rather than a bare
perception, and linked intimately to the feeling or
affective aspect of consciousness.,,6
Many of the problems raised in Gifford lectures and in
natural theology generally would be resolved if we could keep
clearly before us the fact that in attempting to investigate
truths of religion by means of logic and science we are using
instruments only partially appropriate, even if they are the
best instruments available. The expert who investigates the
quality of the paint and the canvas may tell us important facts
about an old Master but it will only be a partial account.
A literary critic may miss the real meaning of a poem. Pascal
was right in distinguishing between the God of Abraham, Isaac
and Jacob and the God of the philosophers. The God of
Aristotle we think about; the God of Abraham we worship. We
could not pretend to be natural theologians in any sense if
there were no such thing as religion. As Clement We_b put it
tt To try to prove the existence of God apart from
religious experience is as great a mistake as it would
be to hope to demonstrate the existence of Beauty
apart from an aesthetic experience."?
2. Mysticism and Revelation
At the time of the writing of the early Gifford lectures
the distinction between natural and revealed relgion was
patently clear. Christianity, Judaism and, to some extent,
Mohammedanism were revealed religions. All the rest were the
results of man's groping after God. If then it could be shown
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that concepts of God acceptable to Christianity were to be
found in other religions and no "borrowing" was evident, then
the case for natural theology was made out. Natural theolo gy
would then consist of those propositions about God and reality
discoverable by man's unaided reason or intuition. Christian
...~~...
theology would subsume these truths but would enjoy the fuller
truth vouchsafed by revelation. Natural theology would be
able to argue ~ consensu gentium while Christianity argued
from revelation. This was the position adopted by lecturer.
like Max Muller and A.H.Sayce who traced back the roots of
Christianity and Judaism to earlier religions.
If indeed God is a God who reveals himself rather than
a passive Deity waiting to be discovered then the knowledge of
God gained by others than Christians and Jews must also have
something of the nature of revelation. This consideration led
8some Gifford lecturers to query the hard and fast distinction
implied in Lord Gifford's will. We can say either, that all
religion is revealed and allow for degrees of general and
special revelation, or conversely, all religious knowledge is
"natural" and allow for varying depths of insight. Clement
Webb reminds us9 of Gibbon's famous gibe concerning the
doctrine of the Logos :
B.C.200 Taught in the School of Alexandria
A.D. 97 Revealed by the Apostle John.
There is no reason why revelation should necessarily be
discontinuous with what has been discovered "naturally" before,
yet it it is to be called "special" revelation one would expect
some "jump" unaccounted for by the ideas that have gone
immediately before. So the answer to Gibbon is that between
the year 200 B.C. and 97 A.D. something had happened. St.John's
teaching about the Logos sprang in one sense "naturally" from
the teaching of the Alexandrian schools, but the content of
John's teaching depended upon the life and death of Jesus of
Nazareth. We have the further proble~ that even this "special"
revelation was only understood by comparatively few, who saw
beyond the historical events. The recognition of the "special"
revelation, like the discovery of the "general" revelation,
is dependent upon religious insight or faith. This insight,
10it has been suggested ,is not dissimilar to the insight or
flair of the mathematician or the musician.
What comes to one man as an insight is passed on as a
belief. What was revealed to Peter at Caesarea Philippi became
a dogma of the Church. Sometimes experiences of mystical
insight are formative for those who are incapable of mystical
experience themselves. So visions and insights recorded in
the scriptures take on an authority for Christians, who may be
misled into thinking that all living experience of God was in
the past. Archbishop Soderblom pointed out this problem in
one of his lectures :
" Does God continue to reveal himself to mankind '1
A little bOy is reading his lesson in Bible history:
'And God said unto Moses.' His critical younger
brother who has not yet begun to go to school: 'What a
stupid you are! God can't speak in that way to a man!'
'Shut up, he could in those daysl,,,11
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The Archbishop added, "Does not theology reason much in the
same way?" The Bible contains a record of a series of I-Thou
experiences. These experiences may now be regarded as valid
because they are recorded in scripture, but they were first
recorded in scripture because they were regarded as valid in
themselves. Thus even what we have called "propositional"
faith is grounded in religious experience. "That Jesus Christ
1s the Son of God," is a statement in propositional form
arising out of the experience of some who lived with Jesus of
Nazareth or who experienced the transcendent Christ.
Unless we assume that the Church was guided to include
within the Canon all authoritative visions of God there must
remain the possibility that others, outside the record of
Scripture, made discoveries or received revelations which
represent truth about God. The Church has always recognised,
even if guarde!ly, that men and women may have direct visions
or intuitions of God, and if within the context of the
Christian faith, why not outside it? Karl Rahner asks
" who is to say that the voice heard in earthly
philosophy, is the voive of nature alone (and perhaps
of nature's guilt) and not also the groaning of the
creature, who is already moved in secret by the Holy
Spirit of grace, and longs without realising it for
the glory of the children of God 1,,12
Lord Gifford did not prohibit the discussion of revelation,
but only disallowed "reference to or reliance upon any supposed
special exceptional or so-called miraculous revelation". So
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the findings of mysticism or religious insight may provide
subject matter for the Gifford lecturer. Lord Gifford desired
that natural theology should be discussed just as Chemistry or
Astronomy. The fact that knowledge of chemistry and astronomy
is limited to a relatively small circle of students does not
prevent the production of knowledge within that circle, which
will be available to all. So the mystics, possessed of
religious insight, may be the experts upon whom the rest must
depend for knowledge of God.
The history of mysticis~as been well recorded13 and
anthologies of mysticism tell their own tale. Max Muller in
his fourth series of Gifford lectures gave a brief historical
account of mysticism and used the title Theosophy or
Psychological Religion to describe this direct approach, thus
suggesting that religious man is in search of a sophia of God
rather than a theology. In studying representative contribut-
ions to mystical philosophy we shall consider in what sense we
can reach knowledge of God through mysticism, - a natural
theology based on a consensus mysticorum.
3. Religious Insight in Platonic Thought
14In his lecture on Heraclitus Werner Jaeger spoke of
Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Farmenides as well as Heraclitus
not only as religious thinkers but as men with a prophetic
fervour. Because of the depth of their own religion and their
scientific spirit the Greek thinkers were ready to bring reason
to bear on religious beliefs, at times criticising the
generally accepted ideas and at times creating new speculative
systems. Heraclitus marked a new departure. He spoke of
"the word" which the philosopher proclaims. This word, which
is eternal, can only be understood by those who are "awake".
This "logos" is not the will of'God but "a principle according
to which eyerything occurs".15 Men gain knowledge of this
"logos" through insight which is common to all.16 Yet
Heraclitus also said, "Great learning does not teach insight.
Otherwise it would have taught Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes
and Hecataeus.,,17 The Wise, "which is apart from all things",
is the divine principle behind the universe and in some sense
18can b. identified with Zeus. Because of the fragmentary
nature of the evidence it is not clear what Heraclitus meant
by all this but Anaxagoras has a not dissimilar view of Mind
as the source of all things. This Mind is "itself bY'itself"
but man has access to the Divine Mind by means of his own
mind. In thinkers like Heraclitus and Anaxagoras we have the
precursors of those who see man's way to God as a religious
insight which is not identifiable with intellectual perception
but not whmlly divorced from it.
Plato was a poet and prophet, mystic and philosopher.
In describing mysticism J.B.Pratt19 suggested that most people
whotry to understand it are like blind psychologists learnedly
explaining sight. This is reminiscent of Plato's cave dwellers.
The mystic, like Plato's philosopher, is the one who has caught
a glimpse of reality. Plato wrote :
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" Whether I am right or not God only knows; but,
whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of
knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is
seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also
inferred to be the universal author of all things
beautiful and right, parent of light and lord of light
in this world, and the source of truth and reason in
the other; this is the first great cause which he who
would act rationally either in public or private life
must behold." 20
ror Plato Mind rules the uniTerse21 and the man who chooses
the life of thought and wisdom leads the most divine of all
22lives. There is in man a genius, a divine principle within
him,23 through which a man comes to know the good and through
goounes6 ":;od. Plato tells us that the way to God, the Father
and Maker of the universe, is difficult to find, and if one does
24find him there is little one can say. We are given a
description of the spiritual adventure of Socrates in The
Symposium, where we are told that love, described as a spirit
(~cU t'-"''') , is the intermediary between the gods and man.
Through this power the prayers and sacrifices of men are
conveyed to the gods and the commands and rewards of the gods
are given to men. Then quite suddenly we move from the
plurality of deities to the singular.
" For God mingles not with man; and through this power
all the intercourse and speech of God with man, whether
awake or asleep, is carried on.,,25
We may assume that the words of Diotima to Socrates represent
Plato's interpretation of the spiritual quest
" For he who has been instructed thus far in the things
of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due
order and succession, when he comes towards the end will
suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty - and this
••• is that final cause of all our former tOils, which
in the first place is everlasting, not growing and
decaying, or ~axing and waning ••• but beauty only,
absolute, separate, simple and everlasting, which
without diminution and without increase, or any change,
is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties
of all other things.,,26
It thus appears that philosophy finds its climax in an
experience which can only be described as a mystic vision.
The mystic vision does not arise simply from thought but
from a whole way of life. The pure in heart are those who see
God. As a preparation for this moment of insight the seeker
after God must become as like him as possible, and there is no
unrighteousness in God. Evil has no place in heaven •
., Wherefore, also, we ought to flyaway thither, and
to fly thither is to become like God, as far as this is
possible, and to become like him is to become holy and
just and wise •.,27
In the Seventh Epistle Plato gives a further description of
the difficulties of grasping the Heal. In understanding
anything we may learn a little from the name, a description,
the bodily form or a concept, but the moment of awareness
is something beyond all these.
" At last in a flash understanding of each blazes up,
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and the mind, as it exerts all its powers to the limit
of human capacity, is flooded with light.,,28
This sort of insight is not verifiable in the scientific sense
but Plato claims that it is knowledge, the only real knowledge,
and the end of philosophy. James Adam sums up Plato's
position in this way:
" The t,).o~~+~t or love of knowledge, on which Plato
so constantly insists, is of necessity and from the first
a religious aspiration, because of the way in which he
regards not only the organ, but also the object of
knowledge. The real of sensibles - the twilight land
which lies between the darkness of Not-Being and the light
of Being - can never be known; of the seen and temporal
there is no knowledge, but only, at best "opinion"; that
which alone we can know, is the unseen, the eternal, the
divine.,,29
So Plato .et the pattern for western mysticism. He is the guide
of those who are aware of their own being but who seek to
understand the nature of Being itself. "The true Platonist,"
said Dean Inge, "is he who sees the invisible and who knows
that the visible is its true shado•• ,,30
There is so much in Plato's thought that echoes Hebraic
conceptions of God and it is understandable that the Timaeus
should b. compared with the book of Genesis and that Plato
should be thought to have copied from Moses. Indeed he has
been described as "Moses thinking in Attic Greek".31 This
argument enabled the opponents of natural theology to dismiss
Platonic thought as evidence for the existence of knowledge of
God independent of revelation. Philo thought that Plato and
the Greek philosophers had borrowed all their good ideas from
Moses. As this is pure conjecture it can only mean, as Edward
Caird pointed out32, that Fhilo was unable to read ~10ses except
in the light of Plato. At all events he may well have learned
the art of "demythologising" from Greek thinkers, for he was
always ready to dismiss the anthropomorphism of the Old Testament
and to interpret difficult passages symbolically.33 Supremely
the Logos teaching of the Greek thinkers enabled Philo to
re-interpret the expression ''Wordof God", which, in the Old
Testament had not carried with it the idea of mediation. In the
following brief quotation it is difficult to tell whether we are
reading Philo or Plato :
" It is the property of those who serve the living God. • •
to mount up with their reason to the height of heaven. They
desire to see God, but failing that to see his image, the
most sacred word, and next that the most perfect work,
the world. For to philosophise is nothing else but a
desire to 8ee things accurately.,,34
In similar vein Philo speaks of the invisible divine reason
perceptible only by the intellect35 and of the eyes of the soul
by which we see God36• Philo's thoughts of God are summed up .
by Pfleiderer :
" According to Philo, God is not only not to be thought
of in an anthropomorphic way as like man, but He is as
such without attributes; He is exalted above all
conception, and He is not properly to be designated by
any name. One eannot know of Him what He is, but only
that He is and what He is not. He is not in space, not in
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time, not changeable, not in need of anything; He is
Iabsolutelysimple, purer than the one, better than the
I
good, more~eautiful than the beautiful, more blessed
than the blest. He is who He is; only being can
absolutely belong to Him as a predicate.,,"7
Thus Philo brought together the wisdom of Athens and the
wisdom of Jerusalem, the philosophy of man and the word of God.
It is natural to turn from Philo to Plotinus, who was
to sum up the Platonic speculations of eeven hundred years.
In the thought of Plotinus we see the fruition of the natural
theology of Platonism before it was merged with its rival
Christianity. Dean Inge, who devoted his Gifford lectures
to the work ot Plotinu8, while not describing the philosophy
of Plotinus as natural theology, claimed that he was fulfilling
the conditions of Lord Gifford that the lecturers should
"study the nature of the Supreme Reality" and that they
should be concerned with "knowledge of our own" independent
of any external authority. The thought of Plotinus certainly
fulfils these two requirements. In so far as there is a
philosophy in the mysticism of Plotinus it begins with the
soul and the soul's consciousness of itself"as part of the
One Reality. The foundation of neoplatonic thought is a
t'rinity constituted by the perceiving spirit, the spiritual
world and the spiritual perception which unites subject and
object in one.,,8 This knowledge of the Real that the mystic
enjoys is different in kind from the knowledge of objects in
the sensible world. Plotinus,distinguishes it thuB :
" Our apprehension of the One does not partake of the
nature of either understanding or abstract thought as
does our knowledge of other intelligible objects, but
has the character of presentation higher than
understanding. For understanding proceeds by concepts,
and the concept is a multiple affair, and the soul
misses the One when she falls into number and plurality.
She must then pass beyond understanding and nowhere
emerge from her unity.,,39
Whatever critics may say of mysticism Plotinus himself was
quite certain that the experience yielded knowledge of God.
It was more than knowledge; it was a union with God, expressed
40in the classic phrase, "a flight of the alone to the alone".
Plotinus, like his master Plato, regarded this mystical
experience as the supreme attainment of the philosopher. He
recognised that it was impossible to argue anyone into the
experience, and, like Philo, acknowledged that there are
ineffable mysteries.
" Remember there are parts that it most concerns you
to know which I cannot describe to you; you must come
with me and see for yourselves. The vision is for him
41who will see it."
Thus the final argument of Plotinus is what Christopher
Dawson described as the traditional argument of natural
theology, "Look up and libokout, and look down and look in."
In his concluding reflections on Plotinu8 Dean Inge pointed
out the strength of neoplatonism, which in the eyes of
Christians revealed its weakness :
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" Neoplatonism differs from popular Christianity in
that it offers us a religion the truth of which is not
contingent on any particular events, whether past or
future. It floats free of nearly all the 'religious
difficulties' which have troubled the minds of
believers since the age of science began. It is
dependent on no miracles, on no unique revelation
through any historical person, on no narratives about
the beginning of the world, on no prophecies of its
end. No scientific or historical discovery can refute
it, and it requires no apologetic except the testimony
42of spiritual experience."
It was the task of Plotinus to consolidate the Greek contrib-
ution to Christianity. St. Augustine declared that if Plotinus
had lived a little later he might well have changed a few words
and phrases and become a Christian. As it was he reached
through speculation and mystical insight truths which are
precious to Christians. From the time of Augustine Platonic
and Chriatian thought were inextricably woven.
4. Christian Mysticism
In the fourth gospel to know Jesus Christ is not simply
to know facts about him or to accept theological propositions
about his person. To know him is Life Eternal. Jesus Christ
i. the Word of God made flesh and through the Word men may
come to know the only true God. The words in which St. Paul
describes how he "was caught up to the third heaven ••• into
Paradise • • • and he heard things that cannot be told, which
man may not utter," 43 are the language of mysticism. His
account of his present partial knowledge of God is Platonic
" For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to
face. Now I know in part; then I shall understand
fully, even as I have been fully understood.,,44
For St. Paul God is the depth of Being, for in him we live and
move and have our being. Muller comments that if anyone else
had uttered these words, they would at once have been condemned
as pantheism45, but they serve to illustrate the close
connection between the mystical thought of Greece and
Christianity from the very beginning.
Among the Christian Platonists of Alexandria and in
particular in the writings of Clement and Origen we find
further evidence of Platonic philoaphy leading, if not to
mysticism, to the expression of the gospel in language readily
understood by mystics. Christianity was a faith seeking a
philosophy. The facts of the life, death and resurrection
of Jesus Christ had to be placed in a cosmic context and
Platonic philosophy was the best instrument to hand. It is
sometimes said that the Christian faith could not have spread
so rapidly but for the Roman roads and sea routes. It certa1nly
would not have spread so rapidly had it not been able to offer
a religion which matched Greek philosophy, and an experience
which fulfilled the yearnings of the natural theology of
Greek thought.
St. Augustine brought to Christianity a mind steeped in
neoplatonic thought. Like Philo he speaks of the inner eye of
the soul which is above intelligence. Like Philo and Plotinus
he had first hand experience of mystical insight. He tells us
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of the ecstasy he experienced before his conversion46 and of
his experience after his conversion just before his mother's
death47• There does not appear to be any difference in the
content. In the former account we are told :
" The mind somehow knew the unchangeable. And thus
with a flash of a trembling glance, it arrived at ~
which is. And I saw thy invisibility understood by means
of the things that are made.,,48
In the second :
" We came at last to our own minds and went beyond
them, that we might climb ••• where life is that
Wisdom by whom all things are made, both which have
been and are to be. Wisdom is not made, but is as
she has been and forever shall be; for "to have been"
and "to be hereafter" do not apply to her but only
"to be", because she is eternal and "to have been" and
"to be hereafter" are not eternal.,,49
In both cases we have the intuition ot Being, and Augustine
seems to consider both equally to be revelations of God. The
experience itself is ineffable but in recollection it is
translated into intelligible language. Augustine described
the process in the First Catechetical Instruction
" Intuition floods the mind, as it were, with a sudden
flash of light, while the expression of it in speech is
a slow, drawn-out, and
speech is being formed,
already hidden itself in
far different process, and while
intellectual apprehension has
its secret recesses; never the-
less because it has stamped in a wonderful way certain
imprints upon the memory, these endure for the length
of time it takes to pronounce the words; and from these
imprints we construct those audible symbols which we
call language.,,50
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One would be more suspicious of the experience if revelation
of some particular piece of information were claimed. The
mystic experience is the more impressive because it simply
reiterates in many different ways the belief that we live and
move and have our being in God, who is himself pure Being.
It would be tedious to go through the whole roll of
Christian mystics, for one can only repeat similar experiences
described in much the same language in the works of Bernard
ot C1airvaux, Bonaventure, Hugo of St. Victor and others.
It would be wrong to pass over Pseudo-Dionysius, whose work
influenced all the later mystics and many theologians. In his
work, ~ Divine Names, he discussed the titles and names
given to God in the scriptures. He knew that it was wrong to
think of God anthropomorphically or to think of him as Sun,
Star, Fire, Rock or indeed as all creation, for God is himself
not created, and the scriptures declare that he is nameless
except in terms of Being as revealed to Moses. Dionysius says:
" Thus, then, the Universal and Transcendent Cause must
both be nameless and also possess the names of all things
in order that it may be truly an Universal Dominion, the
Centre of creation on which all things depend, as on
their aause and Origin and Goal; and that, according to
the ~criptures, It may be all in all, and may be truly
called the Creator of the world, originating and
perfecting and maintaining all things; their Defence
and Dwelling, and the Attractive Force that draws them:
and all this in one single, ceaseless and transcendent
act.,,51
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As far as the intellect is able to reach out to God it can
only arrive at his existence. Gilson comments i
" Dionysius had good reason • • • to say that the God
whom our reason reaches remains, so to speak an unknown
God: Deo quasi ignoto conjugimur; for we know indeed
that he i8, and we know what he is not, but what he
is remains wholly unknown to us. ,,52
This might prove to be the end of the quest except that the
mystic believes that he can reach through insight a knowledge
beyond the grasp of intellect, even though this knowledge is
incommunicable in the sense that it cannot be expressed in
verifiable propositions. The God of Dionysius is not
completely unknown for h. is Love. Sometimes he is thought
of as the object of love and sometimes as subject. Dionysius
tells us that God leads and moves onward "Himself unto Himself."
It has been said that St. Thomas drew almost all of his
theology from Dionysius53 and while this is an exaggeration
one can frequently discern his influence. The distinction made
by Aquinas between natural theology, revealed truth and direct
vision is ~learly a development from the thought of Dionysius.
Following Dionysius, as Muller points out54, there were two
streams of thought, the Scholastic concerned with the definition
of Christian doctrines and the Mystic "concerned with the Divine
element in man or the birth of Christ within the soul". These
two streams ran side by side through the middle ages, occasionly
converging. "A little mysticism," wrote Gwatkin, " was a
useful outlet for unquiet spirits, and did little harm so long
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as it was safely caged up in a cloister.,,55 Similarly a little
rationalism confined to the cloister would do little harm. But
in the public controversy between St. Bernard and Abelard we
see two fundamentally different approaches to knowledge of God.
St. Bernard, the mystic, who was yet able to accept the
dogmatic teaching of the Church~ was confronted by Abelard who
must submit everything to the criticism of reason. Both
approaches are necessary. John Watson wrote :
" These two men, like the systems they represent, are
really complementary of each other; for, if it is true
that the highest reach of the mind must consist in the
contemplation of the Absolute, it is not less true that
this contemplation must contain within it the specific. 56distinctions of reason."
So the history of mediaeval thought might be written in terms
of the three elements in the controversy. An undue emphasis
on the purely intellectual approach.may l.eadto arid
theologising; an emphasis on mystical insight may lead to all
kinds of extravagance; both speculative thought and religious
contemplation may be stifled by excessive emphasis on
eccl.esiastical authority in matters of belief. On the other
hand reason can play the part of critic to the mystic and the
dogmatic theologian; mysticism is a healthy reaction to the
prosaic search for God through discursive thought or accepted
creed; the authoritative church, conserving earlier insights
intellectual and religious, acts as a safeguard against
excesses.
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5. The Later Influence of Mysticism
Meister Eckhart was described by one Gifford lecturer57
as the greatest of all speculative mystics; he is seen by some
scholars as a precursor of the Reformation. While not openly
opposed to scholastic thought men like Eckhart fell back upon
the authority of personal religion. Again we find an emphasis
on direct knowledge of God. Eckhart claimed to know that God
is but not what he is. Eckhart declared that God is "the God
who understands and who is grasped by the intellect alone, who
is all intellect."58
" It is perfectly clear • • • that God alone!! in the
true sense of the word, that He is intellect or under-
standing, and that He is understanding alone, purely
and simply, apart from any other being.,,59
As God is identified with Being, so for Eckhart evil is
non-being. In much the same sense the distinction between
Being and non-being has been made byc.thinkers from Farmenides
to Tillich. Eckhart speaks variously of a power within man,
an uncreated light or a divine spark, by means of which he may
60penetrate to the very ground of his being. One can under-
stand how a man who sought God in this personal and intimate
way, almost independently of church and Scriptures should come
under suspicion of heresy.
The cons.pt of God as the ground of being and man as in
some sense a reflection of that being is to be found in the
thought of Tauler, Boehme and other German mystics and their
influence was to be felt by later theologians. Just as Aquinas
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and the mediaevals were influenced by the earlier mystics so
Luther and Calvin were influenced by their later counterparts.
Boehme's influence'extended to a later period and, through
the English mystics, helped to counteract the deism-of the
eighteenth century. His natural theology was based on feeling
and imagination rather than on reasoning and demonstration.
61With Christopher Dawson we may describe Boehme as a natural
theologian "of a sort" but his teaching was very different
trom the natural theology ot the Enlightenment.
6. Mysticism and Philosophy
Mysticism, as we have seen, is a compound of thought and
feeling, speculation and intuition. It offers a way of escape
trom the dryness ot a purely intellectual search for God and
from the coldness of a formal creed. The influence of mysticism
can be seen in philosophy and in particular in the thought of
Spinoza and Hegel. Writing of Spinoza, A.E.Taylor said
" If we could look anywhere for religion wholly
independent'ot history, revelation, authority,
institutions, it is hard to see where we might look with
62better prospect ot success than in Spinoza'~ Ethics."
Part One of the Ethics with its definitions, axioms arid
propoeitions and its terse title, "Concerning God", promises
well. We are led to expect a clear mathematical.demonstration,
but we learn later that we come to know God through an
intellectual love, which, we are told, is the love with which
God loves himself. We realise then that we are out of the
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realm of mathematics and once more in the domain of mysticism,
and we recall Eckhart's statement that "the eye with which I
see God is the same as that with which God sees me.,,63
A.E.Taylor commented :
" The God who thus loves Himself is not really the
'substance' of the First!!!! of the Ethics: He is the
'Blessed One' of the devout Jewish home in which the
64philosopher had been brought up."
If we take the trouble to 'translate' Spinoza's Substance we
find that God is that which 'stands under' the world we know,
which is another way of saying that God is the ground of being.
We find at the end of ~ ~ that all we can know of God is that
he necessarily exists, that he is one alone and the free cause
of all things. It is the living religion at the heart of
Spinoza's philosophy that saves him from complete pantheism.
It is the emotional element in his thought that led to the
description of Spinoza as God-intoxicated. His philosophy at
first sight may appear to be a c~llY calculated mathematical
demonstration of the existence of God, but it is a philosophy
supporting a faith rather than a metaphysic generating a
religion. The speculative mystic would defend the position on
the ground that it is a mistake to separate the intellectual
and emotional elements in thought. "Mysticism," wrote Dean
lnge, "is a spiritual philosophy which demands the concurrent
activity of thought, will and feeling.,,65 He added that
"there is no special organ for the reception of Divine or
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spiritual truth, which is simply the knowledge of the world
66as it really is.1I Thus when Spinoza viewed the world
mathematically he was seeing it partially; when he looked
at it through the amor intellectualis Dei he was seeing it as
it really is.
A similar distinction was made by Hegel between under-
standing and reason. Understanding deals with each predicate
as a separate and independent unit. Reason, which is
described by Hegel as immediate knowledge, treats reality as a
whole. "Reason is the region in which alone religion can be
at home.,,67 Understanding results in the scientific analysis
.f the universe; reason leads to a religious and mystical
attitude. Writing of this immediate knowledge, Hegel said;
" Inasmuch as this knowledge exists immediately in
myself, all external authority, all foreign attestation
is cast aside; what is to be of value to me must have
its verification in my own spirit, and in order that I
may believe I must have the witness of my spirit. It
may indeed come to me from without, but any such external
origin is a matter of indifference; if it is to be valid,
this validity can only build itself up upon the found-. 68ation ot all truth, in the witness of lli Spirit."
The authoritative nature of the mystical experience could not
be expressed more clearly. This is not to say that Hegel was
a mystic in the traditional sense, but in his emphasis on
immediate knowledge of God and his stress on the unity of man
with the Absolute he provided a philosophy within which
mysticism is at home. It was this mystico-religious element
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in Hegelianism which proved a stumbling block at a time when
the scientific spirit of the nineteenth century was changing to
.the neo-positivist attitude of the twentieth.
7. The New Stress on Feeling
In the Methodist revival of the,eighteenth century
Wesley, influenced by the Moravians and indirectly by Boehme
and the mystics through William Law, offered a way of escape from
the arid deism which had infected so much of the religious life
of England. Wesley always insisted on a reasonable approach
in matters of religion, but he would scarcely have been open
to the charge of 'enthusiasm' had not the emotional element
in his preaching been strong. The believer must 'feel' and
'know' the saving grace of God. Wesley had in his own way
attempted to reconcile reason and religion but he was an
evangelist rather than a theologian. It was to be left to a
greater theologian than Wesley to attempt a reconciliation
which would profoundly influence modern theology.
Schleiermacher, like Wesley, was greatly influenced by
the Moravians, among whom he was brought up. Later he came
under the influence of the philosophy and theology of the
Enlightenment and finally under the guidance of Spinoza and
the Romantics reached the position expressed in the Reden.
Like the mystics Schle1ermaeher cr1ticieed any attempt to
separate thought, feeling and activity. Man's life is a unity.
To the cultured despisers of religion he said :
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" Because you do not deal with life in a living way,
your conception bears the stamp of perishableness, and
is altogether meagre. True science is complete vision;
true practice is culture and art self-produced; true
religion is sense and taste for the Infinite.,,69
Religion offers a full comprehension of the meaning of the
universe in a way that science cannot.
" The sum total of religion is to feel that, in its
highest unity, all that moves us in feeling is one;
to feel that aught single and particular is only possible
by means of this unity; to feel, that is to say, that
our being and living is a being and living in and through
God.,,70
Finally
" True religion is • • • immediate consciousness of the
Deity as He is found in ourselves and in the world.,,71
Thus a man finds meaning in the depths of his own being and
Schleiermacher speaks with reverence of a great and powerful
mysticism, through which "some secret power ever drives the
man back upon himself, and he finds himself to be the plan and
, 72key of the Whole." Religion is ultimately a feeling of
dependence. Kant's Religion within ~ Limits ~ Reason Alone
had appeared six years before the Reden. Schleiermacher was
protesting against the state of affairs in which religion had
become a metaphysic or a system of morality. Schleiermacher
rediscovered the sensus Numinis, that which differentiates
religion from metaphysics and morality.
Rudolf Otto expressed profound admiration for Schleier-
macher but criticised him on the ground that he makes the fact
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of God an inference from the feeling 01 dependence. Otto
believe~ that the experience of the numinous has immediate
reference to an object outside the self - 8,numen praesens.73
Otto's analysis of the experience of the numinous is brilliant,
but the question remains whether or not this experience does
indeed furnish what we may call knowledge of God. He describes
the "Holy" as an !. priori category, by which he means that
it is something we recognise as soon as it is pointed out to
us. In support of this contantion he quotes Luther, who says:
" For all men, !!~ !§. they ~ II treated 2.!,
find this belief written in their hearts, and
acknowledge it as proved, even unwillingly: first,
that God is omnipotent ••• ,,74
The affective experience is thus accompanied simultaneously by
a judgment of fact. The thought that God is and the feeling
that God is are inseparable. These are the two elements in
the complex category of the "Holy" - the rational and the
non-rational, both of which are !. priori. The non-rational
preserves the mystical element in religion and prevents it
from becoming mere rationalism, and the rational element
prevents it from sinking into fanaticism or mere "mysticality".
The process of recognising the "Holy" or the numinous Otto
describes as "divination". He acknowledges that it is
impossible to prove that this experience is an objective
experience of God, but he is content to leave the experience
as self-authenticating. Thus
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" Here, if anywhere, coercion by proof and demonstration
and the mistaken application of logical and juridical
processes should be excluded; here, if anywhere, should
be liberty, the unconstrained recognition and inward
acknowledgment that comes from deep within the soul, 75
stirred spontaneously, apart from all conceptual theory."
Otto's description of the experience of the numinous is very
much like Buber's description of the I-Thou relationship.
The experience of the numinous is an I-Thou encounter and, in
spite of the careful analysis, finally ineffable. As soon as
we seek to describe it it becomes an I-It relationship and
ceases to be a religious experience. Yet if this direct
experience does give some knowledge of God it is arguable
that - in some sense - this is natural theology. It is also
arguable that such knowledge co.es through revelation and
cannot strictly be called natural theology. We return to
this issue later.
8. Mystical Experience as discussed in Gifford Lectures
Of all Gifford lecturers William James made the most
thorough study of mysticism and religious experience. He
himself knew nothing at first hand of such experience. He
found in his analysis of mystical experience two main
characteristics, its ineffability and its noetic quality.
The experients are quite sure that they -know" something of
God but find great difficulty in expressing the truth they
have grasped. James quoted case after case to illustrate
the nature of religious experience but concluded that while
the experiences were undoubtedly authoritative for the
experients they have no authority for those outside the
experience. He admitted the impressiveness of the evidence
but "the utmost they (the mystics) can ever ask of us in this
life is to admit that they establish a presumption.,,76
He also concluded that "the existence of mystical states
absolutely overthrows the pretension of non-mystical states
to be the sole and ultimate dictators of what we may believe."??
William James established that in any discussion of the
existence of God religious experience is part of the data
that must be taken into account.
Gilson, who is not unsympathetic towards the mystics,
writes :
" After reading W.James, I still want to know if my
religious experience is an experience of God, or an
experience ofmyself.,,?8
This is a proper question and one that must be answered.
It is clear that religious experience tells us something about
.,
ourselves. The one who has had the experience claims that it
tells him something about God, unless on reflection he has
judged that the experience was a subjectively induced illusion.
Even if he claims that he has learnt something about God he
will claim no more than faith-knowledge. IA.J.Ayerflatly
I
denies the possibility of reaching any kind of knowledge by
means of mystical insight. He declares :
" Those philosophers who fill their books with
assertions·that they intuitively 'know' this or that
moral or religious 'truth' are merely providing material
for~e psychoanalyst. For no act of intuition can be
said to reveal a truth about any matter of fact unless
it issues in verifiable propositions. And all such
propositions are to be incorporated in the system of
empirical propositions which constitute science.,,79
Now no mystic would dispute the fact that the knowledge he gains
is different in kind from the knowledge categorised as science.
He would wish to assert, however, that the scientist's
"knowledge" of the world is incomplete and that the insights
gained through mystical experience do tell us something about
the world and to that extent may be described as knowledge.
If we accept Ayer's definition of knowledge then the argument
is over before we begin. No Gifford lecturer, nor anyone else,
would claim that religious "truths" are scientifically verifiable.
Of the Gifford lecturers who have approached religious
truths from a scientific viewpoint four in particular have
et,ressed the fact that science only gives a partial account
of the universe. "Science," wrote Emile Boutroux, " is the
selection and classification of all that which, at any time
and for any mind, can be the object of clear and distinct
80knowledge." With this Professor Ayer would agree and would
stop there. This is the only kind of knowledge he is interested
in. But Emile Boutroux went further :
" Religion is the fullest possible realisation of the
human self • • • Religion takes as her starting point a
a concrete bit of experience, a full fact, comprising-thought, feeling, and, perhaps, the faint sense of
participation in the life of the universe. The starting-
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point of science is an abstraction, i.e. an element
extracted from the given fact and considered separately.,,81
The scientist abstracts from experience and not surprisingly
finishes up with abstractions - extremely useful abstractions.
The religious man - and we take the mystic to be the religious
expert - sees life in its wholeness and grasps a meaning that
evades the scientist. Boutroux sums up the distinction in
82the aphorism, "Man uses science, but he lives religion."
Eddington made the same point, quoting an elaborate
formula showing that wind of less than half a mile per hour will
leave the surface of water unruffled while at a mile an hour
there will be minute corrugations. Over against the formula
he set some lines of Rupert Brooke
" There are waters blown by changing winds to laughter
And lit by the rich skies, all day. And after,
Frost with a gesture, stays the waves that dance
And wandering loveliness. He leaves a white
Unbroken glory, a gathered radiance,
A width, a shining peace, under the night.,,83
We may say, and rightly, that only a Rupert Brooke sees the
waves like this, but no-one sees the wind playing on the
water in the shape of a formula. And while only a poet can
express his "visiontt in poetical language there are others who,
although not able to write poetry, immediately appreciate the
poet's vision at second hand. Similarly no-one experiences a
rainbow as "a band of aetherial vibrations arranged in systematic
order of wavelength from about .000040 cm. to .000072 cm.,,84
Indeed we would not be giving a correct scientific account of
the world did we not recognise that people do see rainbows and
not wavelengths. A full account of the situation must include
the fact that there are such things as aesthetic and religious
experiences. There are other than religious experiences that
are ineffable. When a joke is explaiped the whole experience
of humour may be lost. If any experience is closely analysed
the very essence of the experience may be destroyed. Eddington
offered a defence for a mystic haleQ before a tribunal of
scientists :
" The familiar material world of everyday conceptions,
though lacking somewhat in scientific truth, is good
enough to live in; in fact the scientific world of
pointer readings would be.an impossible sort of place to
inhabit. It is a symbolic world and the only thing that
could live comfortably in it would be a symbol. But I am
not a symbol; I am compounded of that mental activity
whic~from your point of view a nest of illusion, so that
to accord with my own nature I have to transform even
the world explored by my senses. But I am not merely
made up of senses; the rest of my nature has to live and
grow. I have to render account of that environment into
which it has an outlet. My conception of my spiritual
environment is not to be compared with :rourseieiltificr~0
world of pOinter readings; 1t 1s an everyday world to be
compared with the material world of familiar experience.
I claim it as no more real and no less real than that.
Primarily it is not a world to be analysed, but a world
to be lived in.,,85
In the process 0·1 living in this world we depend on the sense
organs we possess. Our view of the world depends upon our
consciousness of it and our consciousness is part of the data.
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Eddington speaks of the "pointer readings" of the scientiet but
also of the "background of pOinter readings" which is life
itself. We cannot live as if this background did not exist.
We cannot live as if we had no consciousness of other than
scientific facts. Eddington hazarded the guess that in some
way by the operation of natural selection the human mind has
accepted values given to it by the external wQrld-stuff and
that "the world-stuff behind the pointer readings is of a nature
continuous with mind." This is not an argument for the
existence of God, let alone a proof - "that idol before whom
the pure mathematician tortures himself." It is to say that
if we take into account the data which is passed over by science
then the religious account of the universe is at least plausible.
Bishop Barnes, a scholar trained in the disciplines of
science and theology, thought it relevant to set down in his
Gifford lectures some of his own experiences as part of the
evidence to be considered :
" On the last occasion, which still remains vivid, I sat
down in the early afternoon on a piece of bare turf in a
fern-covered moor near the sea. I remember that I was
going to bathe from a stretch of shingle to which the few
people who stayed in the village seldom went. Suddenly
the noise of insects was hushed. Time seemed to stop.
A sense of infinite power and peace came upon me. I can
best liken the combination of timelessness with amazing
fullness of existence to the feeling one gets in watching
the rim of a great silent fly-wheel or the unmoving surface
of a deep, strongly flowing river. ~othing happened : yet
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existence was completely full. All was clear. I was in
a world where the confusion and waste and loss inseparable
from time had vanished. At the heart of the world there
was power and peace and eternal life.tt86
Bishop Barnes does not claim that his faith is grounded in such
experience; nevertheless such experience confirms a faith held
on other grounds. It does not yield any ve~ifiable knowledge
of God but it is at least part of the evidence.
More recently Michael Polanyi has reminded us of the partial
nature of the scientist's account of the.universe. He describes
the mystic experience as a deliberate attempt to relax
intellectual control and to cOn£~rate on the universe as a
whole rather than on particulars. In his Gifford lectures he
shows how religion has affinities with intellectual experiences
and he claims that "the relation of Christianity to natural
experience • • • is but one thread in this network of mutual
penetrationse"8? At the same time religious and natural
findings by-pass each other so that it is pointless to try to
prove an article of faith such as the virgin Birth biologically,
and in the end the religious account of reality may be more
complete than the scientific. Says Polanyi :.
. It The book of Genesis and its great pictorial
illustrations like the frescoes of Michelangelo, remain a
far more intelligent account of the nature and origin of
the universe than the representation of the world as a
chance collocation of atoms. For the biblical cosmology
continues to express - however inadequately - the
significance of the fact that the world exists and that
man has emerged from it, while the scientific picture
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denies any meaning to the world, and indeed ignores all
our most vital experiences of this world.1I88
Polanyi again reminds us that the human mind is part of the
world it reflects. The fact of consciousness provides a clue
as well as the facts of which we are conscious. In his
concluding paragraph Polanyi writes :
" So far as we know, the tiny frag-ments of the universe
embodied in man are the only centres of. thought and
responsibility in the visible world. If that be so, the
appearance of the human mind has been so far the ultimate
stage in the awakening of the world; and all that has gone
before, the strivings of a myriad centres that have taken
the risks of living and believing, seem to have all been
pursuing, along rival lines, the aim now achieved by us
up to this point. They are all akin to us • • • We may
envisage then a cosmic field which called-forth all these
centres by offering them a short-lived, limited, hazardous
opportunity for making some progress of their own towards
an unthinkable consummation. And that is also, I believe,
how a Christian is placed when worshipping GOd.,,89
~his is not something that the intellect alone can grasp, nor
is it something that can be grasped without the intellect. Dean
Inge, we recall, described the religious insight which is gained
through mysticism as "a spiritual philosophy which demands the
concurrent activity of thought, will, and feeling.,,90
9. The Validity of Religious Insight
The Gifford lecturers, discussed in the preceding section,
while not mystics themselves, recognised that many people enjoy
milder forms of mystic:-4.lexperience - intuitions of the wholeness
of life. Some mystics speak of "the logic of the whole
personality.,,91 The mind must operate as a "well-knit whole."
T.H.Hughes, to whose study of mysticism we have already referred,
described the mystic's insight in this way:
" The mystic vision breaks, truth is seen with open face,
not by an organ different from reason, nor yet by a special
gift which only few possess. It is seen by the highest
and fullest operation of reason itself, at that point
where the fusion of the different elements is most complete
under the dominance ot love.,,92
If the "knowledge" achieved by this "fullest operation of reason"
is to be accepted it must stand up to some of the tests applied
to what we ordinarily call knowledge achieved by what we
ordinarily call reason.
At a minimum such knowledge must be non-contradictory. For
instance, the insight vouchsafed to the mystics that God is one
and the "revelation" granted to the prophetess of the Lumpur
church that there are two gods, one black and one white, cannot
both be true. Reason or common sense tells us that the two
claims cannot both be correct. We then have to ask by what
standard we judge between two contradictory insights. There
are at least three answers :
(1) We would naturally look for some general agreement between
those who have religious insight. Nevertheless the odd man out
may be the one who has seen a new truth.
(2) If we have accepted some set formulation of religious belief
by faith, then we would expect any religious "vision" to confirm
our belief, or at least not to contradict it.
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(3) Because of the self-consistency we find in our experience
of the universe, we would expect to find a self-consistency in
the spiritual realm. We expect knowledge of any kind to be
reaeonable.
This means that any religious insight must be subjected to
examination by reason for purposes of comparing it with other
illginsights or for discower/ its own self-consistency.
William James spoke of the "eternal unanimity" of the
mystics, quoting from the literature of Hinduism, Sufism and
the Christian Mystics to show agreement on the two central
affirmations of the unity of God and the possibility of man's
finding salvation through union with God.93 One of the reasons
given by C.E.M.Joad for his conversion to Christian belief was
the unity of the evidence of the mystics, whom he saw as the
religious experts.94 Soderblom in his Gifford lectures brought
out the unity of the central affirmations of various living
religions. Inge claimed that we can only explain this close
agreement if we regard the mystical experience as a genuine part
of human nature.95 It would be foolish, however, to deny the
diversity and the contradictions in the evidence. As William
James reminds us, once we go beyond the central agreement we
find the widest diversity. The evidence is not clear enough
to establish proof but it is nevertheless impressive. An account
such as that given in Aldous Huxley's ~erennial rhilosophy is
sufficient to establish the point of general agreement. When
we have seen beyond the ext.avagances and idiosyncrasies of
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individual mystics there remains what is claimed to be a basic
experience of reality.
In The World and the Individual----- --- --- ------~-- Josiah Royce discussed the
nature of mysticism at some length. "Mysticism," he declared,
"consists in asserting that to be means, simply and wholly, to
be immediate.,,96 The mystic believes profoundly that he is in
touch with reality.
" He gets his reality not by thinking, but by consulting
the data of experience. He is not stupid. And he is
trying, very skilfully, to be a pure empiricist. Indeed,
I should maintain that the mystics are the only thorough-
going empiricists in the history of Phi10sophy.,,97
The mystic differs from the realist thinker in that he is not
satisfied with the partial fleeting and at times contradictory
appearance of things. He is dissatisfied with the so called
realist view of the world because he has caught a glimpse of the
"more Real". He has discovered internal meanings while the
realist is only concerned with external meaning.
It The essence of this view of the mystic is that to be
real means to be felt as the absolute goal and consequent
quietus of all thinking, and so of all striving. Or in
other words, Reality is that which you immediately feel
when, thought satisfied, you cease to think.,,98
Royce traced the development of philosophical mysticism in the
Upanishads and drew parallels from western mysticism. He does
not find in mysticism a satisfactory philosophy, but in his
own particular form of Absolute Idealism he offered a philosophy
which attemp~B to do justice to the experience of the mystic and
the realist.
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C.A.Campbell, after a careful examination of Otto's
analysis of religious experience, concluded that the experience
of the numinous cannot be shown to be a direct awareness of God
eyen if in fact it is. We cannot by rational argument prove
that what we have is real knowledge of God, but at the same time
we can use reason to examine those experiences that purport to
yield such knowledge. God would not be the mysterium tremendum
if indeed he were accessible to reason. Yet we may know something
analogically about God. Otto's solution, which is accepted by
Campbell, is to say that there is a felt analogy between
emotions we have when we experience ordinary events and the
emotions we have when we experience the numinous. II~is, therefore,
not unreasonable to suggest that there must be some similar
analogy between the object which .vokes the emotion and the
numinous. Campbell is thus led to a supra-rational theism :
" i.e. a Theism which proclaims that the Nature of God is
in principle incapable of being conceived in terms of
rational concepts in their literal significance, but that
certaih of these concepts are validly applicable to God
when understood not as literal portrayals, but as
appropriate symbols, of the Divine Nature.,,99
Campbell goes on to claim "symbolic validity" for the concepts
which express our knowledge of God. Those qualities we ascribe
to God are only symbols or ideograms of the Divine. The
analogies are sound, it is argued, not because there ie a
conceived identity between the symbol and the symbolizandum,
100but a !!!! identity. For Campbell, then, religious experience
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may produce a supra-rational theology which may be examined and
tested by reason, but he remains unconvinced by Otto's assertion
that the experience of the numinous is evidence of the objective
existence of uod. H.J.Paton, in his aiscussion of Otto, arrived
at a similar conclusioU. ''What Otto has done," said Paton,
"is .... to supply material for philosophical reflection.,,101
Such unanimity as can be found among the Gifford lecturers is
best expressed by saying that any discussion of the truth of
religion must take into account the experiences which we call
religious but that these experiences of themselves do not furnish
proof of the existence ot. God convinving to others than the
experients.
10 Religious Insight and Natural Theology
We may now ask if there is any sense in which we can describe
religious insight as natural theology or as yielding natural
theology. Otto reminds us that there is in any religious
experience a combination of the rational and the non-rational.
There is such a combination in the mystic's experience and if
Baillie's understanding of faith is correct there is a cognitive
element in faith. There are then two possible ways in which we
can think of natural theology in relation to religious insight,
which may be gained through mystical experiences, milder forms
of mysticism or through faith.
(1) We can identify natural theology with the rational element
in such experience. We could thus conclude that God exists, that
he is one, and that he reveals himself to man. Natural theology
would then be the summation of those truths about God which can
be known apart from the Judaeo-Christian revelation. But the
mystics would claim that their experience of God comes not
simply through the~seeking but through the revelation of God.
St. Paul recognised that the gentiles could only know of God
because God had revealed himself to them.102 We are thus led
to the strange conclusion that natural theology is revealed
truth. It would be impossible to discover a reluctant God and
it is clear that if God is a God who reveals himself it is
impossible to know him apart from his revelation. This kind
of natural theology is utterly impossible for Barth and is
nothing more than idolatry. On the other hand it would be
readily accepted by those who assert that anyone who looks at
the world in the right way will know of God's existence.
(2) Alternatively, recognising that all knowledge of God
depends ultimately on revelation, and recognising the strong
subjective element in any religious experience, we can give to
natural theology the task of criticising and assessing the
insights that arise from religious experience. In this case
the natural theologian would be the man who thinks about God
rather than the one who knows about God. The man who knows
about God is the man of faith or the man of religious insight.
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1 Was Lord Gifford asking the impossible?
We are now in a position to assess how far Lord Gifford's
intentions have been f*lfilled and to ask, in view of the
changing fortunes of natural theology, how far it is possible
today to fulfil the conditions laid down in 1885. Lord Gifford
wished the lecturers to formulate what he ca.lled "true knowledge
of God." Later it is described as "the ~ and ~ knowledge
(not merely nominal knowledge)." Lord Gifforddefined this
subject matter as natural theology, declaring that it was to be
understood in the widest sense of the term and describing it
under four heads :
(1) The Knowledge of God, the Infinite, the All, the First and
Only Cause, the One and the Sole Substance, the Sole Being,
the Sole Reality, and the Sole Existence.
(2) The Knowledge of His Nature and Attributes.
(3) The Knowledge of the Relations which men and the whole
universe bear to Him.
(4) The Knowledge of the Nature and Foundation of Ethics or
Morals, and of all Obligations and Duties thence arising.
The subject matter permitted under the first two heads is
later amplified :
" For example, they may freely discuss ••• all questions
about man's conceptions of God or the Infinite, their
origin, nature and truth, whether he can have any such
conceptions, whether God is under any or what limitations,
and so on."
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Finally this knowledge was to be expounded "without reference to
or reliance upon any supposed special exceptional or so-called
miraculous revelation."
The latter condition cannot be interpreted literally. It
would seriously curtail enquiry if no reference were permitted
to any supposed miraculous revelation. Reference to the Oracle
at Delphi would be as inadmissible as reference to the Incarnation.
The phrase "without reference to" must be understood in the
light of the supporting phrase "without ••• reliance upon".
No appeal is to be made to miraculous revelation as unquestioned
authority. But since "all questions about man's conceptions of
God" are to be discussed it i$ermiseib1e to discuss the
conception of a God who reveals himself. It is clear that the
Gifford lecturer may discuss the origin and nature of such
conceptions of God. The difficulty arises when he wishes to
discuss the truth of such conceptions; he must make no direct a~r
appeal to the supposed special revelation.
If our conclusions are right then it seems that natural
theology is impotent to produce any knowledge of God, ~ or
!!!!. All knowledge of God is in some sense revealed, and the
-.
task of natural theology is to judge and assess. Lord Gifford
was assuming that philosophical speculation would confirm his
own Spinozistic religion. In his description of God he laid
down the conclusion of what was to be an impartial enquiry!
Natural theology, as we have seen it, cannot construct a
religion, and yet this seems to have been Lord Gifford'. aim.
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Fortunatel~ the wording of his will allows great breadth of
interpretation. The lectureships have provided ample scope
for the discussion of religion in the past even if the term
natural theology cannot be universally applied. Even if we
limit the function of natural theology in the ways we have
suggested, it will always be possible to fulfil one of Lord
Gifford's wishes - that "able reverent,men, true thinkers,
sincere lovers of and earnest inquirers after truth" should
be able to discuss the meaning of life.
2. Man's Conceptions of God
Any study of comparative religion fulfils the letter of
the law. If a particular conception of God has been held at
any time then its origin, nature and truth can be discussed.
It is permissible to discuss the origin and nature of belief.,
as Sir James Frazer and others have done, without re'ference to
their truth. Similarly it is allowable to give an objective
account, as Pfleiderer did, of the conceptions of God actually
held. in the course of the development of Christian theology.
It is arguable that Barth's interpretation of the Scottish
Confession of 1560 is an account of the origin and nature of
a conception of God actually held. The real problem emerges
when a Gifford lecturer begins to discuss the truth of any
particular conception of God. By what standard is he to make
his judgment? He may judge some primitive.conception of God
to be self-contradictory or nonsensical and therefore untrue.
But if he himself is a Christian ( or a Mohammedan or a Jew
401
for that matter,) he will find it difficult to avoid judging
other concepts of God by reference to his own which depends
on "special revelation". Because of the problems involved in
Lord Gifford's prohibition, some Gifford lecturers, as we have
seen, produced purely objective studies of religion. Studies
such as those of Frazer, Sayce and MacBeath fulfil the conditions
laid down by Lord Gifford but they are studies of religion
rather than natural theology.
3. The Foundation of Ethics
Other scholars have seized upon the clause which allows
studies concerning" the Knowledge of the Nature and Foundation
of Ethics or Morals, and of all Obligations and Duties thence
arising." Again, purely ethical studies fall within the
permitted scope, but unless the lecturer concerned goes on to
consider the bearing of moral experience upon the problem of the
existence and nature of God then the study, though permissible
under the Gifford deeds, is not natural theology. The lectures
of RW~D.Ross, Brand Blanshard and von Wright fall within the
scope allowed by the will, but the scholars concerned would make
no claim to be doing natural theology. On the other hand the
studies of Sorley, A.E.Taylor and De Burgh are clearly within
the realm of natural theology.
4. The Truth of Man's Conceptions of God
If it is ever conclusively demonstrated that there is no
such study as natural theology appointments to Gifford chairs
will be confined to students of comparative religion and ethics.
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In that case only one part of Lord Gifford's intention would be
fulfilled. He clearly intended that his lecturers should go
beyond the study of religion and ethics to reach a "knowledge
of God", which should be taken in this context to include
"the Infinite, the All, the First and Only Cause, etc." as set
out in the will. The word "knowledge" is repeated again and
again and more than on reference is made to the "truth" of man's
conceptions of God, so that it is clear that he was not
concerned merely to find out what people actually believed in
ancient Egypt or sixteenth century Scotland. His use of the
word "theology" carries the implication that he was concerned
with truth about God rather than facts caocerning religion.
This makes it exceedingly difficult for the natural theologian
who concludes that while his studies may investigate what are
claimed to be truths about God he is in fact unable to establish
their truth without appeal to special revelation. If indeed it
is true, as Temple concluded, that "Natural Theology ends in a
hunger for that Divine Revelation which it began by excluding
1from its purview," then the Gifford lecturer must be content
with a partial or limited knowledge of God, as must the natural
theologian qua natural theologian.
5 Diecovery and Revelation
Lord Gifford's qualification of theology by the term
"natural" must be understood in the light of his veto on
"reference to or reliance upon any supposed special exceptional
or so-called miraculous revelation." The veto does not apply
to revelation as such but only to "special" revelation. John
Baillie remarked that it is doubtful whether anybody has ever
really thought that God could be discovered if ke were not
willing to reveal himself; and, as we have seen, Lord Gifford
himself accepted "general" reve1ation.3 If there is such
"general" revelation then there will be a very important
difference betwwen natural theology and any other science.
The two sciences instanced by Lord Gifford, Chemistry and
Astronomy, deal with truths about the world or the heavens that
have been awaiting discovery. We only speak figuratively of
Nature revealing her hidden secrets. If God does reveal himself
even if only in a "general" way, then natural theology can never
be a scientific investigation "wust as astronomy or chemistry".
Th. truths of astronomy or chemistry become clear to anyone who
has the necessary background of knowledge and sufficient
intelligence to understand. But when the truth of the existence
ot God is explained to intelligent people who may have a background
of general knowledge of religion, it does not necessarily become
clear. The listener may understand the argument by unaided
reason but the element of faith ie missing. It appears that
faith is necessary for the apprehension of any kind of revelation
"general" or "special". But faith and reason need not be
mutually exclusive. If it is true that faith is involved in the
acceptance of any re1i~ious truth, it is also true that reason
is involved in the apprehension of any such truth. Bishop Butler
declared :
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" Reason is indeed the only faculty wherewith to judge
concerning anything, even revelation itse1f.,,4
Leonard Hodgson pointed out5 that neither the sUbstitution of
faith for reason nor the supersession of reason by faith is
necessary. Reason and faith are both means whereby we
apprehend spiritual truths, reason representing the critical
faculties of man's mind which need to be active if faith is to
be distinguished from credulity.
This means that if natural theology is to be the work of
unaided reason it must limit itself to the critical assessment
of revealed truth or;gpeculative construction against which
revealed truth may be tested. There would be an angry "NoJ"
from Karl Barth even to such a limited natural theology.
Knowledge of God comes entirely from God and man is helpless
and sinful in groping for this knowledge by human reason.
If Barth is right then of all men the natural theologian is
most wretched. The sick man of Europe is ready for burial -
in unconsecrated groundl If there i8 to be any future for
natural theology Barth must be answered.
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1. The Avowed Opponent of Natural Theology
Barth is the self-declared opponent of all natural theology
and propoaed to serve natural theology by presenting to it "ita
indispensable opponent". He wrote :
" It can only be to the good of "Natural Theology" to be
able once again to measure itself as the truth - if it is
the truthS - by that which from its point of view is the
grea;est of erro~s.,,1
But who or what is this indispensable opponent? What is the
greatest of errors from the viewpoint of natural theology?
Natural theology does not need to deny the possibility of
revelation though, as natural theology, it will make no appeal
to revelation. There is no antithesis between Roman Catholic
theology and natural theology. Both Calvin and Luther allowed
a carefully circumscribed place to natural theology. What Barth
describes as Protestant Modernism or Neo-protestantism gives
natural theology a place. Contemporary theologians like Brunner
and Ti1lich recognise that there are limited functions performed
by natural theology. Only Barth and his disciples deny the
very possibility of natural theology. He recognises that there
is such a study as natural theology but does not see how there
can be any fruitful conclusions from such a study. The history
of natural theology, Barth would claim, consists of the adventures
of man in search of God while Christian'truth tells of the advent
of God in search of man. The adventures of man in search of God,
like Alice's adventures in Wonderland, finish exactly where they
began. So Barth 1s the real opponent of natural theology, and
Barthian theology, in spite of the truth it embodies, ie from
the viewpoint of natural theology the greatest of errore.
If Barth is right then every approach we have so far made
ie a cul-de-sac. Reason has no right to criticise the truths
of religion for reason is corrupt. Natural theology is worse
than useless as apologetic for con~ersion comes only by the
proclamation of the Word of God. Metaphysics is no more than
the raising of false images. Mysticism looks for God in the
wrong direction; indeed, looking for God in any direction is
presumptuous. Least of all can natural theology find employment
as an ally of faith. Salvation is sola fide and unredeemed
reason is a helpless intruder.
Barth tells us that he learnt his fundamental attitude to
the problem of the knowledge of God at the feet of st. Anselm.2
Reason can neither lead us to faith nor confirm our faith.
" The aim of theology cannot be to lead men to faith,
nor to confirm them in the faith, nor to deliver them
from doubt. Neither does the man who asks theological
questions ask them for the sake of the existence of his
faith; his theological answers, however complete they
may be, can have no bearing on the existence of his
faith.,,3
The possibility that rational argument can lead a man to a
position from which he can make either a confident or
despairing leap of faith is discounted. In his Church Dogmatics
Barth writes
" If it is an experiment - even the last and greatest -
in a series of other experiments; if we think that after
408
trying this or that we will or can in the last resort try
also a religious philosophy of authority, and then in this
framework give Jesus, the Bible or Church dogma a trial
too, we simply cannot expect to think and speak with the
certainty of the true knowledge of God. The sacrificium
intellectus as the last despairing, audacious act of self-
confidence, in which a man thinks he can decide upon his
very knowledge of God, has always turned out to be a bit
of conjuring, about which no one can be happy in the long
run. Even interpreted as a leap into faith, it does not
create a position which cannot be attacked and is not
attacked. For why should not a religious philosophy of
authority be just as open to attack, and just as freely
attacked, as any other philosophy1 The doubter cannot
free himself from doubt, even by persuading himself to
will to doubt no more, even by performing this sacrificium.
And the doubter cannot free other doubters from their doubt
by exacting this sacrificium from them - perhaps by making
it convin~ing, perhaps by inducing them to perform it for
themselves. He must not be a doubter at all if help is to
4come to him and through him to others."
This passage is quoted at length for it strikes at the very
possibility of any natural theology. A discussion such as that
initiated by the publication of Honest 12 ~, where a believer
airs his doubts, achieves precisely nothing. according to Barth.
Barth puts himself in an almost impregnable position even if it
renders him incommunicado at the same time. He cannot be called
upon to defend himself by reason nor will he recognise the validiw
of any attacks based on reason. We can only attempt to show the
reasonableness of recognising some function, however limited,
fulfilled by natural theology and where Barth's position is
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based on Holy Scripture to show that there are other permissible
interpretations.
2. Barth and St. Paul
The key New Testament passage for the natural theologian
is Romans 1. 18-21. In his commentary on ~ Epistle ~ ~
Romans (1921) Barth allowed that this passage is evidence of
natural theology but of a natural theology that is only
theoretically possible. The crucial verses read as follows
II For what can be known about God is plain to them,
because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation
of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal
power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things
that have been made. So they are without excuse; for
although they knew God they did not honour him as God or
give thanks to him, but they became futile in their
thinking and their senseless minds were darkened.
Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the
glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man
or birds or animals or reptiles.1I5
It must be admitted that these verses will bear Barth's
interpretation of them. Knowledge of God is theoretically
possible according to this passage, but elsewhere, as we shall
se., St. Paul approaches the Gentiles as if such knowledge were
a !!!! possibility. It is difficult to see how man can be
IIwithout excusett unless there has been a real possibility of
knowing God. The fa~that some Gentiles, for ex~pl., Plato..
and Aristotle, had seen something of the truth of God suggests
that the attainment of such knowledge is a real possibility.
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Barth himself admitted in his commentary that
the
the
Plato "in his wisdom recognized long ago that behind
visible there lies the invisible universe which is
Origin of all concrete thinge.n6
Yet in Barth's judgement when a man outside the sphere of the
Word attempts to create a speculative theology he is wanting to
be as God. The wrath of God is God's "No" to any effort on
the part of man to save himself. Men hold the truth "imprisoned
in the chains of their unrighteousness". Man exalts himself and
obscures the distance between himself and God. All we know,
according to Barth, is that "God is He whom we do not know".7
He further suggests that while man has known God in some sense,
through sin he has forgotten what he was able to know. This
limited knowledge of God, St. Faul tells us, comes through
"the things that have been made" Barth however speaks of a
knowleage of God "attainable through the simple observation of
the incomprehensibility, the imperfection, the triviality of
. 8human life." This can scarcely be what st. Faul meant.
Yet Barth repeats that man's unrighteousness is inexcusable
" for the clearly ~ facts bear witness to the everlasting
divinity of God.,,9 The knowledge of God that Barth admits
seems to amount to no more than the fact that God is unknowable.
It is difficult to conceive that this was what St. Faul meant
when he declared that God's invisible nature, his eternal power
and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have
been made. At Lystra Paul and Barabas declared to the
inhabitants
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" In past generations he allowed all the nations to walk
in their own ways; yet he did not leave himself without
witness, for he did good and gave you from heaven rains
and fruitful seasons, satisfying your hearts with food and
gladness.,,10
The "witness" or the "clue", as the New English Bible renders it,
would be of little value if man were utterly unable to make
anything of it.
Reference has already been made to the preaching of St. Paul.
at Athens. It is difficult to know how we are to interpret the
reference to the Unknown God. If the Athenians had simply arrived
at the conclusion that God is unknowable then Barth's point would
be made. In speaking of the "ane onelie God" Barth declares that
the principles and objects of other than Christian systems are in
reality "no gods or at best gods so-called".11 Yet st. Paul
seems to have thought that the Athenians had a dim apprehension of
the true God rather than a completely false image. At least his
words, '~at therefore you worship as unknown, this I proclaim
to you,,,12 bears this interpretation. One might almost say that
they were worshipping the true God in spite of their ignorance.
One Gifford lecturer, Sir William Ramsay, gave considerable
attention to the later verses :
" ••• that they shoulf seek God, in the hope that they
might feel after him and find him. Y~t he is not far from
each one of us, for
, In him we live and move and are;'
as even some of your poets have said,
, For we are indeed his offspring. ,,,13
It is generally recognised that the quotation, "For we are indeed
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his offspring,tI comes from the poet Aratas. The passage suggests
more than one poet and Ramsay followed Rendel Harris in his
suggestion that, tlInhimwe live and move and are," is a quotation
from Epimenides but tithemetrical character is disguised by
transformation from the Ionic dialect to the Attic and from the
second person to the third.,,14 If this is so then this much quoted
word of St. Paul is originally a Greek thought about Zeus as was
the second quotation from Aratas. Barth quotes the line, "In him
we live and move and are," in his Romans as evidence that man has
had a real opportunity of knowledge of God, but in his Dogmatics
. 16in Outline he applies the same verse to the truth of Jesus Christ:
"In this light we live and move and have our being(Acts 17.28)."
Now this is permissible theological exegesis, but when St. Paul
originally used the words he was evidently quoting from two Greek
poets to illustrate his point that the Greeks had some knowledge
of God, which was to be corrected and completed by the message of
the gospel. Now according to the Confessio Scotica "the Image
of God (is) utterly defaced in man," and according to Barth,
" Man has now become a tarnished mirror in which the
glory of God can Ho longer be reflected."17
If this is so these two thoughts about God from Greek sources
cannot reflect the truth of God. How inadvisable of the apostle
to quo~them if indeed his viewpoint coincided with that of Barthl
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,. The Ima~o Dei
According to the book ot Genesis man was made in the image
and likeness of God. Thus knowledge of God would be feasible by
analogy from man's knowledge of himself. According to Barth the
image of God is utterly defaced in man and the traditional analogia
entis is the invention of Antichrist.18 It is pointless to ask
in what respects man is like God or was like God in the beginning.
Rather man is appointed to be the image of God and to reflect his
glory but this can only come about through Christ.19 We can know
nothing of God except through Christ. We cannot start from man
in our search for God.
" To '.tart from man' can only mean to start with man of
the lost status integretatis, that is, of the presently
20existing status corruptionis."
Brunner in his essay, Nature ~ Grace21, criticised
Barth's dismissal of the imago ~ and the analogia entis. He
agrees with much of Barth's theology but claims that there must
be some "point of contact" between man and God if reconciliation
is to be achieved. Further the Christian preacher must be able
to find som. e1milar "point of contact" if the gospel is to be
communicated. The gist of Barth's angry "NoJ" to Brunner is
that no such point of contact is necessary.
" The Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the Father and the
Son and 1s therefore revealed and believed to be God,
do•• not stand in need of any point of contact but that
which h. himself creates. Only retrospectively is it
possible to refl.ect on the way in which he "makes contact"
with man, and this retrospect will ever be a retrospect
upon a mirac1e.,,22
Barth has no time for apologetics nor for what Brunner calls
eristics23• Yet at a minimum sinful man must be able to under-
stand the message spoken to him. Man's sinfulness has not
prevented him discovering truths of mathematics and science and
the same basic vocabulary is used in the poetical expression of
24truth. We may agree with St. Anselm and Barth when they
speak of the inadequacy of language to express truth about God,
but if man can be given saving knowledge by means of the fool.ish-
ness of preaching, then the preacher must use words or analogies
to express the truth of God. If the fourth gospel is to convey
such truth then the word "Logos" on the author's lips must bear
some resemblance in meaning to the word "Logos" as it is
understood by the Alexandrian Jew or the Greek gentile. Even
the word "Father", so precious to Barth, can only be understood
by analogy. Tillich comments :
" The famous "No" of Karl Barth against any kind of
natural theology, even of man's ability to ask the question
of God, in the last anal,~~s is a self~deceptiont as the26use of human language in speaking of revelation shows."
As Brunner remarks27, any kind of Christian education demands
a theo1ogia naturaliSe Neither Brunner nor Tillich would say
that natural theology can take a man all the way to God; indeed.
they would say it can't take him very far on the road at all.
Nevertheless the possibility of natural theology allows for the
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possibility of a saving knowledge of God. But the Confessio
Scotica declares :
" Of ourselves we are not sufficient to think one gude thoct,"
and Barth comments :
" With faith itself comes the conclusive insight, that
no one has the capacity for faith by his own effort, that
is either the capacity to prepare for faith or to start it,
or to persevere in it, or to p~rfect it.,,28
This is qualified in his corr.ment,on Anselm, where he speaks of
" the encounter with him which can never be brought about
by all our searching for Godhowe~er thorough it may be,
although it is only to the man who seeks God with a pure
heart that this encounter comes.,,29
Barth would say that the pure heart is not a condition wrought
by man's effort but is itself the point of contact made by the
Holy Spirit. Yet there are those whose experience suggests that
by their own adventures of thought they have arrived at a point
where they have recognised that the only way forward was by a
leap of faith. It may help us if we examine in some detail the
experience of one such man who has furnished autobiographical
material.
e.S.Lewis described his experience in Surprised ~ Joy.
After losing, during his adolescence, what f~ith he had he
concluded that the universe was "a rather regrettable institution"
and his experiences 'in the first world war confirmed his atheism.
After the war he read Philosophy and English literature. He
.discovered that the people he admired in literature seemed to
",
be on the theistic side - Plato, Aeschylus, Virgil, Spenser,
Milton, George MacDonald and Chesterton. Chesterton's Everlasting
~ particularly impressed him and a re-reading of the Hippolytus
of Euripides marked a crucial stage in his pilgrimage. One of
our Gifford lecturers played his part in this development.
Alexander's Space Time ~ Deity gave Lewis the distinction
between "enjoying" and "contemplation". Briefly, contemplation
means for Alexander the observation of an object. When you turn
your mind from the object to the act of observing the object, you
are enjoying it. You contemplate the beautiful picture, but you
enjoy the contemplation. e.S.Lewis came to feel that he had been
searching for the experience of joy rather than the object of joy.
So the philosophers helped him in his search as he himself
confe.ses
" What I learned from the Idealists ( and still most
strongly hold ) is this maxim: it is more important that
Heaven should exist than that any of us should reach it.
And so the great Angler played His fish and I never
dreamed that the hook was in my tongue. But two great
advances had been made. Bergson had showed me necessary
existence; and from Idealism I had come one step nearer
to understanding the words, 'We give thanks to thee for
Thy great glory.' The Norse gods had given me the first
hints of it; but then I didn't believe in them, and I
did believe ••• in the Absolute.,,30
It seems that he was OU.mbing William James's Faith-Ladder step
by step. In retrospect it was more like Jacob's ladder; the
Lord stood above it; the Lord was in this place and he knew it
not. Lewis did not dismiss his partial knowledge of God, but
declared
" I am one of many who have bowed in the house of the
real God when I believed Him to be no more than lammon.,,31
If he is right in this judgement then Plato, Aeschylus, Euripides,
Spinoza and Alexander had all played their part along with the
Christian thinkers.
It would be foolish to assume that a man only needs to
read the philosophers, decide which is the most reasonable
hypothesis, and then declare his faith. This is not borne out
by experience. On the other hand a man does not increase his
faith by believing six incredible things every morning before
breakfast like the Duchess in Alioe. Faith is more than
commitment to a likely hypothesis. C.S.Lewis found it so.
" Doubtless, by definition, God was Reason itself.
But would He also be 'reasonable' in that other, more
comfortable, sense? Not the slightest assurance on
that score was offered me. Total surrender, the
absolute leap in the dark, were demanded • • • In the
Trinity Term of 1929 I gave in, admitted that God was
God, and knelt and prayed.,,32
We must now ask if C.S.Lewis would have been in a position to
make this leap of faith if he had not been prepared by his
previous exp,rience to take such a leap. While he had found
no "proof" of the existence of God it can be said that he had
arrived at a point where it seemed ~ unreasonable to admit
that God was God. C.S.Lewis believed that his experiences were
signposts. At the conclusion of the book he remarks that
signposts lose their importance once we have arrived at our
destination, but when we are lost the sight of any signpost is
a great matter. ~ut Barth insists that we cannot prepare for
faith in the slightest degree. The believer who tries to paint
some signposts for the unbeliever is wasting his timel
If e.S.Lewis is at all typical of twentieth-century
western man then his experience may suggest a way of approach to
the unbeliever. Kant bars the way to any attempt to "prove"
the existence of God and Barth is right in declaring that faith
is not the conclusion of an argument, but Brunner, among others,
be1ievee that there is a place for apologetic based on reason.
In the eesay which incurred the wrath of Barth he says
" There is such a thing as an intellectual and conceptual
work of preparation, which clears obstacles out of the way
of proclamation. Everyone who carries on pastoral work
among intellectuals or has the task of instructing modern
louth, knows the significance of this. But the centre on
which everything turns is the centre of the ~heologia
natura1is: the doctrine of the imago ~ and especially
of responsibility. •• In the long run the Church can bear
the rejection of theologia natura1is as little as its
misu... It is the task of our theological generation to
find its way back to a true theologia natura1is.,,3}
If Brunner is right the imago B!! is overshadowed by sin but not
completely destroyed. Man's ability to see the evidence of God
in nature and his capacity for revelation are not completely
invalidated. When we consider the experience of a man like e.s.
Lewis this seems to be a far more likely account of the situation
than Barth's.
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4. Barth and St. Anselm
St. Anselm began and ended his argument for the existence
of God with prayer. The whole discourse is carried on in the
context of faith. Barth is right when he says that we can only
understand Anselm when we see that "the object of the inquiry
stands over against him who inquires not as 'it' not even as
'he', but as 'thou', as the unmediated 'thou' of the Lord.,,34
Anselm was already a believer and all he needed was the grace to
think correctly about God. Barth understan&Anselm's use of the
; "'" ~ <word iiHelligere as intus legere :
It The fundamental meaning of intelligere in Anselm is
legere: to reflect upon what has already been said in the
Credo. In recognising and assenting to truth intelligere
and credere come together and the intelligere is itself
and remains a credere while the credere in and by itself,
as we have seen, is also an embryonic intelligere_,,35
For Barth the argument is a contemplation of what is believed
rather than an attempt to confirm the assertions of faith. God
can only be known by revelation and the fact that Anselm addresses
God as "Thou" is an indication that he has already received this
revelation. Being in this position and the.nthinking of "that
than which a greater cannot be conceived" be must think of God
and it is utterly impossible for bim to conceive of the
non-existence of God. It is possible for Anselm to conceive
of the non-existence of anything else but not of God.36
It is true that Anselm's position can only rightly be
understood in the light of Fides Quaerens Intellectum and his
use of the ontological argument, Barth warns us, must not be
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confused with the use of a deceptively similar argument by
Descartes and Leibniz. The argumentsof Kant, Barth declares,
have no bearing on the theology of Anselm.37 Anselm's argument
may well be in a different category from that of Descartes and
Leibniz. He was following up his own principle that a Christian
should believe the deep things of faith before undertaking to
to discuss them by reason, but that once he is established in
the faith he should aim at understanding it. But if Anselm was
indeed only attempting intus legere, it is difficult to see why
in the Monologium
he should have presente~three other proofs which do not grow out
of faith or why he should have described his "ontological"
argument as "a short way with unbelievers". This suggests an
apologetic aim and it is difficult not to conclude that he was
arguing from within faith to demonstrate the reasonableness of
faith. This is a kind of apologetic, but apologetic for which
Barth has no place.
5. Barth and Reformed Theology
Both Luther and Calvin, a8 we have seen, allowed that there
i8 a knowledge of God apart from faith-knowledge. Barth critic-
ises the reformers on this ground and regards the appeal of
Calvin and Luther to a natural theology as a lapse from their
general desire to see human salvation founded on the Word of
God a10ne.38 A reformed confession, he tells us, differs from
all confessions based on natural theology because it recognises
that God reveals Himself to Man in Jesus Christ.39 But no
confession unless it be eighteenth-century Deism is based on
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natural theology. It cannot be said too often that natural
theology is not opposed to revelation in the way in which Barth
suggests it is. The pre-reformation theologians found~ place
for natural theology alongside revelation. Luther and Calvin,
while aware of the presumptuous nature of reasoning man, allowed
a carefully circumscribed place for possible knowledge of God
apart from faith. It is true that there have been times - and
perhaps the late nineteenth century which saw the beginning of
the Gifford lectures was such a time - when natural theology made
higher claims for itself. But today, perhaps due to Barthian
influence, there must be few if any who regard natural theology
by itself as a satisfactory foundation for religion. Barth will
not allow the possibility of any reconciliation between the claims
of natural theology and revelation.
" Knowledge of God according to the teaching of the
Reformation does not therefore permit the man who knows
to withdraw himself from God, so to speak, and to maintain
an independent and secure position over against God so that
from this he may form thoughts about God, which are in
varying degrees true, beautiful and good. The latter
procedure is that of all natural theology. One can only
choose between this and the procedure of Reformed theology,
40one cannot reconcile them."
Barth is here pushing natural theology into an opposition it
does not seek. Natural theology does not seek to maintain an
independent and secure position over against God. Gifford
lecturer after Gifford lecturer has declared that the believer
cannot and does not need to prove the existence of God for
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himself. Nevertheless he may examine in the light of reason
what he accepts by faith and if he wishes to share his faith
with others he may well attempt to demonstrate its reasonableness.
Before Hume and Kant the natural theologian might ..-L have
attempted to prove the existence of God but now h. is more likely
to limit himself to showing that his belief is not unreasonable.
Or again, the natural theologian may wrestle with the problem of
evil simply to show that it is possible to hold the belief that
God is good in the context of a world that seems to contain
elements of evil. Natural theology attempts to be the ally of
this other theology of which Barth writes. It is simply not true
that
" 'Natural Theology' has to make itself known, demonstrate
itself and maintain itself over against this other theology
by distinguishing itself from it and protesting against ii~tI
At the conclusion of his Gifford lectures Barth speaks again of
the teaching of the Reformation as the exact opposite of Natural
Theology42. They are only exact opposites if we set the extreme
view of natural theology held by the Deists and the extreme
interpretation of Reformation teaching expressed by Barth.
Barth dismisses the limited admissions of Luther and Calvin as
ata.isms. He admits that in his own earlier days he may have
had lapses; some passages in iis Epistle 12 ~ Romans may be
interpreted as recognising a limited scope for natural theology.
Barth thus attempts to set up his own Church Dogmatics as the
repository of pure Reformation theology, and to purge the
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founders of Reformation theology of their ill-advised admissions.
In his reply to Brunner, for instance, Barth spends some time
in correcting Brunner's account of Calvin and points out43 that
Calvin never follows up the "Platonic and Ciceronian phi1osoph-
oumena" in the introduction to the Institutes. But he cannot
deny that it is there. If Calvin was indeed of Barth's mind
then it was as inadvisable for him to admit a limited theologia
naturalis at the outset of his Institutes as it was for St. Paul
to quote the Greek poets.
6. Knowledge of God
When Barth declares that :
"God is one and only One and proves Himself to be such by
His being both the Author of His own Being and the source
of all knowledge of Himself.,,44
he is saying something with which many advocates of natural
theology would agree. Of course God must be known through
himself, and likewise he would not be God unless he were, in
some sense. the author of his own being. We learn later that
God "does not content Himself with Himself • • • On the
rc~ntr""J:·'y.His glory overflows in His creating. sustaining.~
and governing and in the world man, and in His giving to
this His creation the glory of being the reflection(imago)
of His own glory.,,45
God is thus not only the author of his own being but author of
creation. The world of nature and the world of s;eirit are
created by God.46 Man is created to be the image and likeness
of God.47 Thus it should follow. or sO St. Paul thought. that
something of God can be known through nature. But, for Barth,
man is b1in«ed by sin and so he cannot see the truth except by
the grace of God.
" Everything depends not only on the fact that God grants
him grace to think correctly about him, but also on the fact
that God himself comes within his system as the object of
48his thinking."
Thus God enables man to think correctly about him through
revelation vouchsafed by the Holy Spirit. It is wrong to seek
illumination through mystical vision or any other way. St.
Augustine fell into this error in the garden at Ostia; it
involves abandoning "the place where God encounters man in His
revelation and where He gives Himself to be heard and seen by
man.,,49 It is equally wrong for man to seek God within himself
or in creation. Knowledge of God comes only by the Word of God.
" We know nothing of our created state from our created
state. but only through the word of God, from which we
we can derive no independent, generally true items of
knowledge, different from the Word of God and therefore
leading up to it."'O
Thus the heavens may declare the glory of God and the firmament
may show his handiwork but apart from the Word of God man cannot
know this truth. It is true, as Saul Kane found, that after the
encounter with the Word the world of nature speaks with a new
voice. but is nature necessarily dumb before the encounter?
Barth asserts that nature cannot speak of God in any voice
comprehensible to man until he has encountered the Word.
Barth does not identify the Word of God and Holy Scripture,
which is at the same time a work of human frailty and the work
of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless the Bible is the Word of God,
a miracle of God, but it is not to become a "paper Pope".
We have the strange assertion that the authors
" have still spoken the Word of God in their fallible and
erring human word. It is the fact that in the Bible we
can take part in this real miracle, the miracle of the
grace of God to sinners, and not the idle miracle of
human words which were not really human words at all,
which is the foundation of the dignity and authority of
the Bible.,,51
It is reasonable to ask on what grounds we are to differentiate
between the human element and the work of the Holy Spirit. It
seems that unregenerate man is in the same predicament when he
attempts to read the Bible as when he tries to read the book of
nature. He can read the words but he cannot grasp the meaning.
There are, however, some questions he wants to ask before he
commits himself to faith. An unbeliever looking at the world
of nature might say, "I would like to believe and I could if
only someone would show me how I can think about the problem
of evil in the world and reconcile it with the idea of a good
God." Similarly an unbeliever reading the Bible might puzzle
over problems involving the historicity of the accounts. Barth
tells us that the scientific study of the Bible can yield some
results
" One is entitled to expect from it that it will
clarify the whole hmman form of the witness to Christ
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in the Old and New Testaments, throwing light on its
linguistic, literary, historical and religious-historical
aspects.,,52
But we must not be too optimistic for we learn before the
paragraph ends that scientific study practised by unbelief will
make a very poor job of it. Only in the Church can Holy
Scripture be rightly interpreted. Barth asks the question and
answers it :
" How could revelation ever be recognised as the divine
content of that testimony except through revelation~
But so to recognise revelatio~ through revelation means
to recognise it by revelation awakening one's faith.,,53
This answer is irrefragable, but if analysed it is simply
saying that we recognise revelation in Holy Scripture because
the Holy Spirit has enabled us to recognise revelation in Holy
Scripture. In any other sphere of knowledge we reserve the
right of reason to criticise. Even in the sphere of art where
reason makes no claim to be able to produce a work of art there
is a place for the literary, dramatic or art critic. We enjoy
the play or the poem aesthetically on the one hand and on the
other we assess it critically. No doubt the author would not
use the vehicle of poetry or drama if he could say the same
thing in prose, but it is reasonable to ask, "What 1s the
author trying to say·,,,and to expect an answer in prose. This
prose answer may be the means whereby a man is led to a real
appreciation of the poem or the play. The natural theologian
might claim such a critical and explanatory function 1n respect
to revelation. But Barth will not allow even such a limited
function.
" One may obe7 or not obey, believe or not believe what
is called revelation in the Bible - either ia open - but
one cannot from another standpoint perceive, or from
another standpoint take one's bearings, as to whether 54
it has really taken place and whether its oontent is true."
Barth's position might be acceptable if everyone who
read the Bible through the eyes of faith were able to come to
the same conclusion as to what precisely is revealed. The
Jehovah's Witness tells us to have faith and read the Bible and
we shall know the truth. Likewise the Latter Day Saint bids us
believe and read the Word. These interpretations are much more
naive than that of Barth, but they all make the basic error
of not allowing reason any critical function. Now if a
theological position is based on a mistranslation of the original
text this can be corrected by any pagan scholar who has studied
the languages involved. True, he may not be able to show
positively what the Bible is revealing, but by pointing out
mistranslations he can correct linguistic misinterpretations.
Further,. the impartial investigator can point out inconsist-
encies. If reason is not allowed any function as judge or
arbiter there is no means of judging whether Barth or the
Jehovah's Witness is the correct interpreter of scripture. It
can be admitted that reason does not make the revelation
. .possible but it offers a means of assessing "true" and "false"
428
revelations. To a limited extent reason can do just what
Barth declares is impossible; it can provide another standpoint
from which to take one's bearings. Reason is of course as
fallible as any other human faculty, but it is the best
instrument to hand, and we may re-affirm our earlier conclusion
that reason and revelation are not necessarily opposed.
The advocate ot this limited natural theology would agree
with Barth when he says that we cannot know God except through
God, but he would claim that God reveals himself in a general
way through nature. Such a natural theologian, looking at
nature, tries to discover meaning and purpose in the universe
and attempts to tind evidence for the existence of God. He is
not likely in these days to claim that he has tound conclusive
evidence, but circumstantial evidence is still evidence.
There is in Scots law a verdict ot t~ot proven", one with which
Lord Gifford would be Tery familiar. It was this verdict that
John Laird gave at the end of his lectures. It was this verdict
that Kant and Hume gave in declaring that it is equally
impossible to prove or disprove the existence of God. But a
verdict of "Not proven" might also be correct in a situation
where there is some evidence in tavou~ of the existence of God
but where it is not strong enough to command a positive verdict
to that effect. Barth is right in saying that we cannot reach
knowledge of God in this way, but for Borne people this kind of
argument may be necessary as a preparation tor faith. Such
dialogue will not create a living faith, but it may offer a
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live option. If this is so Barth is wrong in declaring that
natural theology cannot prepare the way for faith. Before
C.S.Lewis could make his final act of commitment belief had to
become a live option.
7. The Philosopher's God
" God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob," wrote
Pascal in the testimony stitched up in his doublet, " Not of
philosophers and savants." Barth draws the same distinction
as any man of religion would. Barth goes further and denies
the identity of the God of Abraham and the God of the natural
theologian. The god of the philosophers is an idol. ~~en St.
Thomas attempted to prove the existence of the First Cause, the
Prime Mover or Necessary Being he was able to make the straight-
forward equation at the end of each of his five ways because he
was not only a philosopher but a man of religion. It was as if
he said, "Reason leads us to the concept of First Cause, Prime
Mover or Necessary Being; faith leads us to belief in the One
and Only God; therefore this One and Only God must be First
Cause, Prime Mover and Necessary Being." Natural theology had
thus posed the problems involved in cause and effect, motion
and being, and had within its limits produced an understandable
answer. But one does not worship the Prime Mover, First Cause
or Necessary Being; one worships God. So the natural
theologian thinks about God while the man of religion worships
God. In Buber's language, the man of religion is involved in
an I-Thou relationship; the theologian is limited to speaking
in terms of an I-It relationship. There seems to be no reason
why the same man should not be able at times to think about God
in terms of natural theology and at other times to worship God
and experience the encounter of which Barth speaks. Barth,
however, interprets every human effort to understand God as a
projection of man himself. If we accept the findings of
natural theology then God, says Barth, "would have betrayed
himself to be one of those principles underlying human systems
and finally identical with man.,,55 This is not necessarily so.
All that need be admitted is that God reveals himself as creator
in the natural world and that man as part of that creation shares
the imago E!!, even if it is darkened by sin. Man, looking at
nature through the eyes of reason, forms the concept of a First
Cause or a Designer. He identifies this concept with the
non-rational concept of God and worships. He is not projecting
his own image so much as seeing through a glass darkly.
The image of God seen by man has often appeared to be a
sadly distorted image. St. Paul saw how far short man had
fallen in his attempt to picture God without the aid of
revelation.
" Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged
the glory of the immortal God for images resembling
mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles." 56
Barth 1a1s the blame for all this error upon sin, but there are
two possible sources of such error. We may admit that one
source of error is sin, but the second source of error lies
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in man's inability to find language adequate for the discussion.
Man has to talk in a language he understands and so is driven
to use analogies, which may well lead him to anthropomorphism
or theriomorphism, both of which were condemned by st. Paul.
Even St. Paul was driven to describe God as "immortal" which
can only have meaning in the light of the mortality known to man.
St. Paul criticised the gentiles because they exchanged the
glory of the immortal God for images resembling men and beasts,
but some centuries before, Xenophanes had criticised and
dismissed such anthropomorphism and theriomorphism. Indeed the
criticisms of Xenophanes are strangely akin to the judgements
of ]sUah on the gods of the nations. ~ah of course was
passing his judgement in the light of his knowledge of the
living God while Xenophanes was pitting his poor human reason
against contemporary superstitions. If Isaiah was right so was
Xenophanes. Even though he might not create a religion he was
able to criticise the religion presented to him.
In his Dogmatics Earth raises the question of those
outside the covenant who appear to have a real knowledge of God.
He gives the examples of Ealaam, Rahab, Ruth and Naaman and
takes Mechizedek as their symbolic ,representative. Two of his
comments deserve note. He writes of them
" They are strangers, and yet as such adherents;
strangers who as such have some very important and
incisive things to say to the children of the household;
strangers who from the most unexpected distances come
right into the apparently closed circle of divine election
and calling and carry out a kind of commission, fulfil an
office for which there is no~' name, but the content of
which is quite obviously a service which they have to
render.,,57
This is exactly what the natural theologian would wish to say of
the Greeks; the office and function is not nameless as far as
the Greeks are concerned but is quite conveniently described as
natural theology. Barth is quick to close the gap in case we
8hou1d surmise that those non-Israelites had a natural knowledge
of God, and he adds
" It is not on the basis of natural knowledge of God
and a relationship with God that all these strangers play
their striking role. What happens is rather that in
them Jesus Christ claims Himself to be the great Samaritan:
as it were, in a second and outer circle of His revelation,
which by its very nature can only be hinted at. ,,58
If the priest of Salem can be included in such a second and
outer circle of revelation, might we not make a similar plea
for Xenophanee, Plato and Aristotle? Have they - and many others -
not had important and incisive things to say to the children of
the household?
Barth, however. insists that any deity worshipped by man
apart from the God revealed in Jesus Christ is an idol. The
philosopher, positing an Absolute, is erecting an idol. The
Greek thinker, dismissing polytheism, is under the influence
of "the charm of the idea of mathematical unity.,,59 If one
accepts the truth that the living God reveals himself, it is
understandable that he should make his one-ness known to a
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bedouin sheikh in the middle east. It is more difficult to see
why the same .God should not be thought of as revealing himself
to earnest thinkers of another nation who are seeking to under-
stand the meaning of the world through reason. Yet any attempt
to find God through reason is condemned by Barth as presumptuous.
In his reply to Brunner Barth used the analogy of a man being
rescued from the sea by a competent swimmer. To suggest that
the man might ~ave helped himself by swimming a few strokes is
heresy. In the absence of any knowledge of God given through
revelation what was the Greek to do? Was he presumptuous to
try to swim for himself a little? The earnest thinker is not
necessarily erecting a tower of Babel or storming the gates of
heaven. He may be a humble seeker after truth who believes that
his reason has been given to him as a faculty to be used. He
may indeed become presumptuous but so may the other kind of
theologian who declares that he alone has the true revelation
and the correct interpretation of the true revelation. The
natural theologian has no monopoly of presumption. And it may
well be that the other kind of theologian has no monopoly of
the knowledge of God. The ancient philosophers did not make
any distinction between the God of philosophy and the God of
worship. The advocate of natural theology today would make
that distinction but he claims that in talking about the God
of philosophy he is saying something meaningful about the God
of religion. Otherwise Harth is right in saying that natural
theology is not about anythingl
8. A Possible Natural Theology
Barth resolutely avoids defining the natural theology to
which he is opposed. This constitutes a considerable problem
for the defender of natural theology. Brunner attempted to set
out Barth's position in respect to natural theology in six
60theses , but Barth refused to acknowledge them as an expression
61of his views • He holds that natural theology does not exist
"as an entity capable of becoming a separate subject within
what I consider to be real theology - not even for the sake of
62being rejected." It is an abyss to be avoided rather than
explored. So he stedfastly refuses to identify his foe or to
refute natural theology except by the positive assertion of his
other theology. At the outset of his Gifford lectures he
promised to speak positively without losing sight of the
problemsof natural theology63, and at the end he claimed that
there is "no important statement in the lectures which the
representative of Natural Theology can avoid considering as the
64direct opposite of his own tenets." But as we have insisted
there is no reason why natural theology should be relentlessly
opposed to this other theology. Natural theology does not deny
the possibility of this other theology in the way in which this
other theology of Barth's denies the possibilit1~~of natural
theology. St. Thomas was able to reconcile a theology of
revelation and a theology based on human reasoning. To a limited
degree Luther and Calvin made the same acknowledgment. The
advocate of natural theology, if he is a Christian, will wish
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to acknowledge the truth of so much that Barth has to say, but
he will be as resolute in the defence of natural theology as
Barth is in its denial. We will now specify the kind of
natural theology we are prepared to defend.
(1) Natural theoloq, ~ ~ ~ in which!!! !!!. prepared
~ defend it, ~!!2.! claim ~ ~ ~ !2. establish ~ religion
within the limits of mere reason. It is not therefore an
alternative to a religion grounded on revelation. Natural
theology might have made such a claim in earlier centuries but
no modern advocate of natural theology would press the claim.
If we can judge from our knowledge of Lord Gifford's personal
faith, what he had in mind was not that the existence of God
should be proved as a rational inference from the data of the
universe but that all the problems involved in any possible
knowledge of God should be investigated by reason unhampered
by the vetoes of authoritarian religion. Almost certainly h.
privately hoped that the kind of faith he himself held would
be shown to be reasonable. He was anxious to lead others to
a "true and felt" knowledge of God and deemed natural theology
to be a fit instrument. Raymond of Sebonde made extravagant
claims for his theologia naturalis but no modern advocate of
natural theology would claim to be able to lead a man to God by
natural theology "in less than a month and without trouble".
In this sense natural theology has never been the same sine.
the days of Hume. Contemporary natural theology has learned
humility and the natural theologian carefully circumscribes
his task.
(2) Natural theology ~ ~ deny "special" revelation 1it
depends ~ its existence ~ the possibility of revelation.
Lord Gifford never denied the possibility of general or special
revelation, nor does the natural theologian. In an effort to
make the proposed investigation impartial appeal to supposed
exceptional or so-called miraculous revelation was forbidden.
The distinction between special and general revelation has
never been satisfactory and as early as 1890 John Caird
pronounced the distinction to be "arbitrary amd misleac!ing".65
It is tempting to take one of the extreme positions, either
holding that all revelation is general or declaring with Barth
that all revelation is special. There can be no nard and fast
distinction. We may devise a rough and ready distinction if
we speak of natural theology when we focus attention upon God's
approach to man through nature and man's quest for God through
human reason and we speak of theology (unqualified) when we
focus attention upon God's approach to man through grace and
man's acceptance of that grace through faith. The story of
natural theology might then well be the adventures of man in
search of God while the other theology tells of the advent of
God in search of man. Yet there is grace in nature and nature
in grace; there is faith in reason and reason in faith.
(3) Natural theology ~ ~ deny revelation ~ Scripture
and indeed claims scriptural support. The natural theologian
may well allow that there are truths of God not accessible to
reason which are made known to men of faith through scripture.
He also asserts that such truths must stand up to the criticisms
of reason. The Eible, recognised by Barth as a human document,
must be judged as a human document; it cannot claim immunity
from criticism. Both the advocate and the opponent of natural
theology may be guilty of what Leonard Rddgson called "eclectic
66quotation" , but the presence of natural theology is easier
to prove than its absence. We have already examined the
Pauline evidence. We can find further evidence in the Psalms,67
and if we turn to the teaching of Jesus we find frequent appeal
to the analogies provided by nature. Canon Raven wrote
" If anyone denies that there is evidence of the Spirit's
presence in nature he will find it difficult to explain
how it is that Jesus, in bringing to life His disciples,
uses not the Law and the Prophets but flowers and birds
and little children, the sowing of a field, the growth of
a tree, the leavening of bread and the daily work of men
and women. If nature is, as Dr. Barth insists, corrupt
and meaningless, if natural theology is non-existent,
68it is strange that Jesus spent so much time on it."
It should be added that natural theology only appeals to the
authority of scripture because it is on this authority that it
is opposed.
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(4) Natural theology reserves ~ right to stand outside ~
realm of revelation ~ criticise ~ ~ standpoint 2! reason.
We saw in our brief discussion of Barth's Anselm : Fides
Quaerens Intellectum that St. Anselm was arguing in the
context of faith but it also appeared that he was making the
attempt, theoretically at least, to stand outside his faith
to examine its implications in the light of reason. He regarded
this examination of faith by reason as an obligation. William
Temple, in many ways an admirer of Barth's contribution to
modern theology, was constrained to write :
" To deny that revelation can, and in the long run
must, on pain of becoming manifest as superstition,
vindicate its claim by satisfying reason and conscience,
is fanatical."69
Any individual is capable of believing and reasoning. When a
statement is presented to him he cannot separate these two
faculties. If the statement is arrant nonsense belief is an
impossibility. Even if for a time his critical faculties are
silenced by an emotional experience he will ultimately either
reject his faith or come to believe that it is reasonable, all
things considered. If we dare to ask what lies behind the
publication ot volume after volume of Barth's DOgmatics must
not the answer be that it is a sustained attempt to show that
the position adopted by Barth is, all things considered,
reAsonable ?
(5) Natural theology ~ ~ pre-requisite £! any apologetic.
This was the point made most strongly by Brunner in his attack
on Barth. As we have seen, the natural theologian can stand
outside the realm of revelation as critic; he may also stand
outside as advocate. Even if it is admitted that the gospel
is ultimately a proclamation rather than an argument, the
advocate must still meet people where they are and address them
in a language they' can understand. Brunner pleaded for a
natural theology which would pOint to such evidence of the
existence of God as we have and which would prepare the way
intellectually and conceptually for the proclamation of the
gospel. It would be a mistake to conclude that it was Lord
Gifford's intention that his lecturers should provide such
preparatory apologetic. He hoped for more. He expressed the
wish that such knowledge of God as might be provided by natural
theology should be diffused among the whole population of
Scotland, but he was only cherishing a lingering nineteenth-
century hope that reason might be able to provide the answer
to every question asked by man. He was undoubtedly out of
patience with the dogmatic utterances of the churches, and
wanted religious assertions brought out into the fresh air and
subjected to the searching light of reason. Even if natural
theology cannot produce the kind of apologetic Lord Gifford
hoped for, it remains tru~ that there are many problems of
theology that can be discussed without resort to special
revelation and in some generations problems that must be
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discussed before any proclamation is comprehensible. Natural
theology will not inevitably lead to faith but it may prepare
the way for faith.
(6) Natural theology ~ ~ necessarily ~ purely human effort.
Barth's final attack on natural theology70 is directed against
it on the grounds that it is a purely human effort. The
Confessio Scotica, like st. Anselm's Proslogion, begins and
ends in prayer. In contrast Barth thinks of natural theology
as a purely human effort. Now if the chemist or the astronomer
is a religious man he will believe that it is God's universe
he is investigating even while he brings to it all the
impartiality of scientific method. He too may pray at the
beginning and end of his work; his personal religious faith
may be deepened by reason of his scientific knowledge of the
universe. Similarly the natural theologian may be a man of
faith; for the reasons we have noted he may wish to stand
outside his faith and examine it in the light of reason.
He too can pray at the beginning and ending of his work. His
faith may be deepened by such an examination and he may be
enabled to share his faith with others.
This carefully circumscribed natural theology we are
prepared to defend against the onslaught of Barth.
Part 3.
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1. The Phenomenon of Religion
In calling theological formulae secondary products William
James recognised that without religious feelings and mystical
experiences man would not have needed to frame a philosophical
theology or assert a faith.
"Men would have begun with animistic explanations of
natural fact, and criticised these away into scientific
ones, as they actually have done.,,1
The fact that people have experiences that they describe as
religious is part of the data which any investigator must take
into account. William James was the first of the Gifford
lecturers to recognise the need for an impartial psychological
examination of what is described as religious experience. As
he discovered for himself, there are many varieties of such
experience. Such experiences sometimes occur spontaneously,
sometimes as the outcome of ascetic discipline, and sometimes
as the result of the administration of nitrous oxide. Such
experiences vary also in "depth". Most people have experienced
at some time or another a vague sense of the "numinous", which
mayor may not be given a religious interpretation. Some people
find relief from a deep sense of guilt in an experience of
forgiveness. To some there comes at times a joy or ecstasy,
which again mayor may not be given a religious interpretation.
MYstics, as we have seen, have an overwhelming sense of having
caught a glimpse of the meaning of life yet find the greatest
difficulty in sharing the secret. William James's study left
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him in no doubt that for the mystic himself the experience is
authoritative. Whatever conclusion others come to, the mystic
believes that he has received a revelation of a new depth of
truth.
James, however, was too much of a realist to be misled by
the psychological data. In discussing saintliness, he declared:
II The fruits of religion ••• are, like all human
products, liable to corruption by excess.
2muet judge them."
Common sense
Common sense is implicit in natural theology. The natural
theologian initially brings common sense to bear on what are
claimed as "revelations". This does not mean that we dismiss
everything that does not tally with common sense, but at least
common sense makes us look twice (or more) at the unusual.
It is clear that one of the functions of natural theology is
the impartial assessment of religious experience.
The natural theologian has usually been expected to make
a more positive contribution. In his closing lectures William
James turned to the consideration of the vital question
" Can philosophy stamp a·warrant of veracity upon the
religious man's sense of the divine? ,,3
In his assessment of what philosophy can't do, William James is
the complete pre-Barthi~n Barthian. His negative answer to
the question is worthy of full quotation
" What religion reports ••• always purports to be a
fact of experience: the divine is actually present,
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religion says, and between it and ourselves relations of
give and take are actual. If definite perceptions of
fact like this cannot stand upon their own feet, surely
abstract reasoning cannot give them the support they are
in need of. Conceptual processes can class facts,
define them, interpret them; but they do not produce
them, nor can they reFoduce their individuality. There
is always a plus, a ~ness, which feeling alone can
answer for. Philosophy in this sphere is thus a
secondary function, unable to warrant faith's veracity.
In all sad sincerity I think we must conclude that
the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual
processes the truth of the deliverances of direct
religious experience is absolutely hopeless.,,4
. .
He goes on to say, and here he parts company with the Barthian,
that there is a service philosophy can perform "if she will
abandon metaphysics and deduction for criticism and induction.,,5
By probing and questioning philosophy can eliminate the local
and the accidental from religious formulations. By setting the
findings of natural science over against religious affirmations,
philosophy can purify the latter of the scientifically absurd.
By use of the method of hypothesis philosophy may test some of
the assertions of religious faith. William James does not use
the term natural theology, but William Temple was quite
prepared to describe this exercise as natural theology. Thus
" Natural ~heology should be the criticism of actual
religion and of actual religious beliefs, irrespective
of their supposed origin and therefore independently of
any supposed act or word of Divine Revelation, conducted
with full understanding of what is criticised, yet with
447
the complete relentlessness of scientific enQuiry.,,6
At a minimum then the task of natural theology is one of
clarification as John Laird suggested? or a matter of construing
rather than constructing religion as William Wallace put it.8
Richard Kroner described it as the science of the problematic
idea of God.9
In the course of the years the natural theologian has
learned from Hume, even if the lesson-had to be repeated by
his successors, that he can nejtherprove"nor'~demonstrat. truths
of religion. Because he wants to talk sense about religion
he will be willing to listen to the scientist or the logical
positivist or indeed anyone who is concerned with reaching
truth. Lord Gifford revealed what he considered to be the
true spirit of natural theology when he declared that the
lecturers "may be of any religion or way of thinking, or, as it
is sometimes said, they may be of no religion, or they may be
so-called sceptics or agnostics or freethinkers, provided
only that ••• they be able, reverent men, true thinkers,
sincere lovers of and earnest inquirers after truth." Lord
Gifford was right in thinking that the cause of natural theology
would be served by such widespread and impartial enquiry. The
natural theologian is one who thinks about God rather than one
who claims to know about God. In his thinking about God he
will welcome the contribution of the psychologist, the student
of comparative religion, the sociologist, the historian and the
philosopher, for if he talks about God and religion he desires
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above all to talk meaningfully. He wants to talk sense even if
he does not define sense in terms of verifiability. The natural
theologia~ defines sense in terms of coherence and claims that
there is nothing inherently contradictory in the idea of God's
existence. So in claiming the right to discuss problems of
God's nature and existence he pleads not guilty to the positivist
charge that he is talking nonsense, though it must be admitted
that, as an individual, he is as liable to talk nonsense as any
philosopher. The natural theologian cannot provide proof of
religious propositions but he can subject them to assiduous
analysis and careful acrutiny, using all the means at his disposaL
2. Faith and Knowledge
We have said that the natural theologian is the man who
thinks about God, while the religious man claims to have knowledge
ot God. The use of the word "knowledge" to categorise religious
certainty has been the cause of much ambiguity. The use of the
word "know" in the statement, "I know that William the Conqueror
came to England in 1066," is very different from the usage in
the religious affirmation, "I know that my Redeemer lives."
Historical evidence can be produced for ~e former; the latter
is ultimately an assertion of faith. Lord Gifford himself
contributed to the ambiguity when he asked for true and !!!!
knowledge (not merely nominal knowledge) of God. He was
assuming that true and felt knowledge could be reached as a
result of a series of lectures. If the natural theologians of
an earlier generation had been successful in what they essayed,
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then they would have produced - what some of them thought they
had produced - verified knowledge of God's existence. Such
knowledge, if it were at all possible, would only be factual
knowledge of God's existence - what Lord Gifford called nominal
knowledge. But the religious man claims that his "knowledge"
is more than this. Knowing about William the Conqueror is know-
ledge of a matter of fact; knowing about God is a matter of faith.
Many of the Gifford lecturers have seen the importance of
this distinction, but the distinction has not always been as
clear as it might have been, since the one word "knowledge"
has been used to describe fact-certainty and faith-certainty.
John Baillie followed Tillich's distinction between knowledge of
truth and knowledge of reality. Knowledge of truth is in
principle verifiable. Knowledge of reality is only verifiable
in the sense that one person can con~end his faith to another.
We can argue about knowledge of truth; the best we can hope to
do about our knowledge of reality is to put the other person in
a position where he can see the truth as we do.
" Knowledge of reality," says Tillich, "has never the
certitude of complete evidence. • • Every knowledge of
reality by the human mind has the character of higher or
10lower probability."
John Macmurray distinguished between scientific knowledge of
things and personal knowledge of other human beings. Our
knowledge of God is in the realm of the personal.
4;0
It might be well to reserve the term~nowledge' for our
knowledge of verifiable truths and to use the term faith for
the knowledge of reality apprehended by the believer. This may
prove a useful distinction so.long as it does not give the impress-
ion that faith is utterly opposed to knowledge and that the
believer can believe what he likes. Faith does not conflict with
knowledge b~transcends it. R.B.Perry expressed the relationahip
in this way :
" Faith is an extension beyond knowledge. From knowledge
faith learns where and how to look, the unknown - the not
impossible - takes its cue from the actually known.
Faith, therefore, is not blind. It does not ignore
theoretical evidence; it does not fly in the face of facts
or turn its back on them. There can be no justification
for a belief which is contrary to the evidence. Faith is
a belief which agrees with the evidence as far as it goes,
but goes further. It lacks proof, but it may nevertheless
be true and certain; for ••• neither truth nor certainty
11depend on proof."
Some~imes faith has been described as the acceptance of a likely
hypothesis, but if this were all it would be no more than a
judgment of prmbability. It is more than a resolution to act
"as if" the belief were true. It is the basing of the whole of
12life upon what Brunner calls the "faith-truth". It involves a
belief that there is a reality corresponding to the "faith-truth".
"I cannot have faith in God," wrote John Watson13, "without having
the conviction that he is not a mere figment of my imagination."
Faith thus appears to combine elements of belief and knowledge.
A man believes with his heart and his head. His heart gives him
451
a certainty of its own even though his head tells him there is
no certainty. "The concept of faith," says John Bai11ie14 ,
"always contains both the idea of knowing and the idea of not
knowing fully." He further describes faith as f1amode of
primary apprehension.,,15 It is not an inference from religious
experience but is rather the pognitive element in that experience~6
Other Gifford lecturers have expressed the distinction
between faith and knowledge by asserting that faith yields a
more complete picture of reality than can be given by scientific
analysis. Richard Kroner, as we have seen, linked faith with
imagination. Imagination, for Kroner, is the instrument of
religious insight. The sober intellect analyses and sees the
world in part. The poet's description, he claims, comes nearer
to reality than the scientist's.
" Imagination binds together ~ ~ thinking ~
separates: or more precisely: it maintains the
original unity of the elements separated by abstract
thought.,,17
Because this is so faith rather than abstract thought is
authoritative in the sphere of religion. Kroner claims that
no abstract proof of God's existence is possible or even
necessary.
" Imagination furnishes the means through which faith
solves the problems that reason alone is unable to solve.
God is a God of faitn, not of thought. He appears in the
kingdom of the imagination, not in the system of
categories; He appears on Mount Sinai; in the burning
bus~, in the still small voice, not in the absolute idea.
The knowledge of God is a knowledge immanent in faith; it
cannot be made logical and conceptual.1I18
This view confirms the conclusions reached in our discussion of
mystical insight. The mystic claims that he is seeing the
wholeness of reality while the scientist's picture is partial.
It is precisely because faith has a cognitive element or,
in Kroner's phrase, there is a knowledge immanent in faith, that
natural theology has any point of contact with faith. If no
interpretation were given to the religious ecstasy and no meaning
to the moment of vision and no claim made that faith reflects
reality then there would be no work for the natural theologian.
But while it is claimed that there is meaning in religious
propositions and while faith claims to be relevant to reality
the natural theologian claims the right to investigate and
analyse even if he be impotent himself to construct a religion
or to prove the existence of any deity.
3. Can a man of faith be a natural theologian?
We have spoken so far as if the natural theologian were an
independent assessor of religious truth, who could examine the
evidence impartially. The accusation brought so often against
Gifford lecturers is that they are misusing philosophy to justify
a faith that they hold for quite other reasons, and it must be
admitted that the vast majority of Gifford lecturers have been
believers, who have accepted the Christian faith in one form
or another. This need not necessarily be a bar to the natural
theologian. The believer at least has some understanding of
the language of faith and can offer that sympathetic criticism
that William Temple thought was necessary. If he is an honest
man he will do his utmost to think clearly and impartially. He
will be as anxious as any impartial observer to distinguish
between faith and credulity. It will be no part of his desire
to shelter his "faith" from therigours of criticism. He will be
mindful of Whitehead's dictum that reason is the safeguard of
the objectivity of religion. There is no reason why the man
of faith should not also be a natural theologian. Just as the
scientist subjects his "hunches" to the test of reason, so the
believer can exercise this faculty of self-criticism.
4. Can an unbeliever be a natural theologian?
The unbeliever, whether he be atheist or agnostic, can
also discuss what to him will be the problematic idea of God.
He may even discuss it sympathetically as an anthropologist can
discuss the habits and customs of simple folk without sharing
their assumptions. If the natural theologian is one who thinks
about God rather than one who claims to know about God, then
there is no reason why the unbeliever should not be described
as a natural theologian, though he himself might prefer another
title. Th. study he is engaged in is certainly natural theology
in the sense we have described it.
The unbeliever, however, cannot do natural theology in
a vacuum. Without living religion there might be a study called
metaphysics but not natural theology in the sense of thinking
about God. Metaphysics may produce the concept of a Prime
Mover or a First Cause but the concept of God arises from
religion. If it is said that Aristotle's assertions concerning
the Prime Mover have a religious ring about them, it can only be
that his intellectual efforts to understand the nature of reality
were accompanied by a religious awareness of God. When the
unbeliever investigates the problematic idea of God he may well
be performing a service of criticism and clarification for the
believer. He may .... shake the faith of the believer, but this
in its way may also be a servic~ for the honest believer, capable
of some depth of thought, has no wish to hold on to a faith that
is not intellectually respectable. The criticisms of unbelief
can benefit religion as Lord Gifford asserted when he expressly
allowed that agnostics and freethinkers might be appointed as
lecturers. Yet for believer or unbeliever natural theology has
no meaning unless it is set over against the assertions of faith.
5. The Impotence of Natural Theology
It may seem then that natural theology is like a rocking
chair; it gives you something to do but it doesn't get you
anywhere. By itself it is impotent to produce knowledge of
God, there is no Gospel of Natural Theology. Set over against
faith ..... its raison d'@tre.becomes apparent. Tillich reminds
us that in a world whose foundations are shaking believer and
unbeliever alike ask the existential questions. Natural theology
frames the questions but cannot find the answers. The natural
theologian may offer metaphysical constructions or reasonable
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postulates but unless they are touched with the fire of religion
they have no power to satisfy. Tillich saw no possibility of
an answer arising from the question itself, at least, no final
and satisfying answer. The believer is the one who, having asked
the question, accepts the answer given in revelation.
Now, while no-one in these days believes that unaided
reason can scale the heights of heaven, Tillich's analysis is
too simple. Natural theology asks the questions and revelatory
answers are offered. But then natural theology asks further
questions and further answers are offered, and so on ad infinitum.
Faith flourishes or fades by reason of the persistent questioning,
criticising and clarifying that natural theology affords.
Natural theology provides the meeting point for faith and
reason,and offers an apportunity for a continuing dialogue
between belief and unbelief.
The natural theologian who is a believer desires to probe
and clarify hie faith. For this purpose he may well stand
outside his own faith. If as a man of faith he wishes to commend
his faith to the unbeliever then natural theology will provide
the point of contact. If he has learned the lesson of Hume he
will not expect more of natural theology than it is able to
offer. But it can offer more than sophistry and illusion. It
is the determined effort of the believer to talk sense about his
faith. For the unbeliever it ie the determined effort to find
out anything that can be found out concerning the problematic
idea of God through the examination of religious phenomena and
the persistent questioning of faith. It will not lead the
unbeliever to a position of faith, but it may lead him to the
point where he sees that the only hope of finding a satisfying
answer to his questions lies in faith acceptance. As William
Temple concluded :
" Natural Theology ends in a hunger for the Divine
Revelation which it began by excluding from its purview.
Rightly sifting with relentless criticism every argument,
it knows what manner of Voice that must be which shall
promise relief to mankind; but that Voice is not its own.,,19
It should be added that natural theology may also lead to a
judgment that the revelatory answers offered by faith are simply
inadequate. Unless the natural theologian is prepared to take
this risk he is only pretending to examine religion impartially.
6. Christian Philosophy
We have spoken so far of the man of faith. In the western
world and in the Christian era the man of faith interested in
natural theology has been the Christian. It is not surprising
that the attempt to reconcile the insights of faith and
philosophy should be described as Christian Philosophy. St. Paul
described the Christian faith as a new kind of wisdom and Justin
Martyr chose the term "philosophy" to describe the new way of
life he adopted on his conversion. Is Christian Philosophy a
possible description for a study that can include and transcend
the bounds of the old natural theology?
In his Gifford lectures Etienne Gilson concluded that there
might well be something called Christian Philosophy, based on
the dual findings of philosophy and faith. He says :
" In so far as the believer bases his affirmations on
the intimate conviction gained from faith he remains
purely and simply a believer, he has not yet entered the
gates of philosophy; but when among his beliefs he finds
some that are capable of becoming objects of science th~n
he becomes a philosopher, and if it is to the Christian
faith that he owes this new philosophical insight, he
becomes a Christian phi10sopher.n20
In such Christian Philosophy the attempt is made to keep the
elements of faith and reason distinct. Gilson adds
" I call Christian, every philosophy which, although
keeping ~ ~ orders formally distinct, nevertheless
considers the Christian revelation as an indispensable
- 21 - - -auxiliary to reason."
In certain spheres the so-called Christian Philosopher will not
be discernibly different from any other philosopher. The problems
he discusses will be such as face any philosopher. In problems
concerning God and immortality he will turn to the insights
offered by faith.
22In a recent work, ~ Essay in Christian Philosophy ,
Dom Illtyd Trethowan applied the title Christian Philosophy to
what seems, at first sight, to be very much the kind of
discipline we have called natural theology. The Christian
philosopher, we are told, "uses the philosopher's tools and no
others.,,23 He meets the non-Christian philosopher on common
ground. He nevertheless recognises the limitations of unaided
reason and acknowledges that some philosophical questions can
only be answered by an appeal to faith. Christian philosophy
then appears to be the honest attempt to philosophise about God
and the world as far as this can be done independently of faith
with the recognition that there are limits beyond which a resort
to faith is necessary. If it is true that the distinctive aim
24of the philosopher is to give a coherent account of the
universe as a whole, taking adequate account of all the funda-
mental aspects of the whole, then the Christian philosopher
cannot, even for the purposes of philosophy, pretend that the
revelation he believes in does not exist. Christian philosophy
would then be the attempt to create a metaphysical system which
makes sense of all the data of the universe including the
Christian revelation. There seems to be no objection to
describing such a study as Christian Philosophy.
In spite of similarities this is not quite the same as
natural theology. Natural theology maintains a greater
independence. It recognises and depends for its existence upon
the fact that there is such a thing as faith, but it sets itself
over against faith to question, to criticise and to clarify.
If natural theology makes metaphysical ventures they are in
the nature of experimentations based on a feasible hypothesis.
The natural theologian attempts to discover whether the findings
of faith will indeed fit in with knowledge gained from other
spheres of inve~tigation. He is thus able to test, and at times
to demonstrate, the reasonableness of faith. Natural theology has
obviously much in common with Christian Philosophy but they are
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by no means identical.
7. Other Possible Names
The natural theology we are defending is a much less
ambitious study than the natural theology of earlier days and it
has been suggested that we should dispense with the name.
Philosophy of Raligion is an obvious alternative. This has
become a familiar and honoured name. but there is much to be
said for retaining the title "theology" for a discipline whose
chief purpose is the discussion of the being and nature of God.
Philosophical Theology is gaining in favour and there is much
to be said for linking the two disciplines in the title of a
study that involves the philosophical examination of theological
insights. History apart. this might well be the most satisfactory
title. It will certainly be used increasingly.
Yet, thanks to Lord Gifford, while the Gifford bequest
remains. we shall continue to discuss what natural theology means
and in what the study really consists. It has been given a
variety of interpretations since Varro first coined the phrase.
There can be little objection to the term "theology" for we are
talking about God. The means we are using to understand what we
can of the mystery are "natural" - as opposed to the supernatural
aids vouchsafed to faith. Natural Theology is still an adequate
description of the discipline.
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1. The Two Ways to Knowledge of God
We began our study with the assumption that there were two
clear ways to a knowledge of God, the one offered through
revelation for acceptance by faith, the other open to all men
and available to unaided reason. The possibility of this second
kind of knowledge of God was based on the fact that there were
those, or so it seemed, who had reached a knowledge of God
independently of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Some of the
pagan thinkers, foremost among them Aristotle, had appeared to
reach theistic conclusions by argument, and so it was readily
assumed that partial knowledge of God could be reached by reason
but full knowledge of God, as far as it is available to man in
the present situation, can only come by revelation to faith.
This was the position crystallised by Aquinas. But it never
seemed right to think of God as one who could be discovered by
reason as if he were an undiscovered continent or a mathematical
law. Barth has enunciated clearly what others have felt
intuitively when he says that God is the subject and never the
object. This was the thought that led some of the early Fathers
to speak of God's revelation to the Greeks. If the Greeks knew
something of God it was not because they were clever but simply
that they were able to see what God had revealed to them. st.
Paul recognised that any truth about God that the gentiles had
grasped was not the result of unaided reason but the consequence
of God's revelation.
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As we have examined the religious utterances of some of
the Greek thinkers it has seemed that we were reading testimonies
of faith rather than conclusions of arguments. Our survey of
mystical thinkers in an earlier chapter led us to the conclusion
that their knowledge of God is based on intuitions and insights
rather than on unaided reason. The unsatisfactoriness of the
distinction between varying kinds of revelation has emerged again
and again in Gifford lectures. All knowledge of God must come
by revelation to faith. We have been reminded by several Gifford
lecturers that revelation is "personaP'. Knowledge of God is a
matter of God's gracious self-revelation rather than man's eager
questing, yet because revelation is personal there will always
be the elements of revelation and discovery.
It would be feasible to give the name of natural theology
to that knowledge of God that comes from general revelation as
opposed to the dogmatic theology that belongs to the Judaeo-
Christian tradition, but we would be in danger of falling into
the familiar confusion of natural theology with natural religion.
This distinction, as we have seen, is too facile.
It has usually been assumed that natural theology is the
work of unaided reason. All the evidence has gone to show that
unaided reason cannot reach knowledge of God. We now have to
ask precisely what unaided reason can achieve.
2. What can unaided reason achieve?
First it must be admitted that if God is the Creator and
it man possesses the imago Dei then to talk of unaided reason
464
poses problems. If, however, we con~ede that man has been given
freedom by God then there will still be meaning in the word
"unaided". At best unaided reason will be able to reach
"theoretical" knowledge of God as opposed to the personal
knowledge of God which comes by revelation to faith. Natural
theology can only talk about religion; in Buber's language, its
concerns are always "I-It" and never "I-Thou" relationships.
Natural theology, then, is the attempt to find out all that
can be found out about God on the basis of unaided reason. This
is what Raymond de Sebonde essayed and this has been the
traditional task of natural theology. The natural theologian has
attempted to prove the existence of a Prime Mover, a First Cause
or the Ens Entium, sometimes from a priori principles, sometimes
from empirical data. Even if he had been successful he would not
have proved the existence of the God of religion but an abstract
principle, for God is ,,-alwa,,smore than can be denoted by the
conclusion of an argument. If Hume is right the task of
producing such proof is utterly beyond man's ability. Kant,
however, allowed that if a man's belief is derived from another
source then natural theology can offer support and clarification.
None of the Gifford lecturers claim to have proved the existence
of God and to this extent they support Hume. Most have supported
Kant in one way or another. If it were possible to take a popular
vote among the Gifford lecturer~the proposition,that natural
theology, using the limited means at its disposal, does indeed
give some support to theism, would be carried. There would, of
course, be some abstentions and at least one angry "No!"
The task of natural theology must be carefully circum-
The attempt to prove the existence of God will no
longer be made, but the natural theologian may set out to
scribed.
demonstrate that a theistic faith is reasonable. If we ask
the believer why7§esires such demonstration, his answer will be
that he wishes for his own satisfaction to examine the faith by
which he lives; he may also wish to commend his faith to others
by urging its reasonableness.
3. Unprejudiced Investigation
The natural theologian stands outside faith to ask how
far it is possible to demonstrate its reasonableness, which is
another way of saying that he examines his faith in the light of
reason. The natural theologian is a critic of religion even if
a sympathetic critic. Our examination of St. Anselm led to the
conclusion that although faith is primary it is still permissible
to examine faith in the light of reason; indeed the believer is
negligent if he fails to do so. Aquinas' in describing his own
method spoke of the truth which faith professes and reason
1investigates.
Among the occupants of Gifford chairs, lecturer after
lecturer has borne witness to this task. C.P.Tiele said that
the purpose of natural theology was "to subject religion to
2unprejudiced investigation." G.G.Stokes wrote:
" Progress may be made in natural theology in either of
two ways: by deducing consequences from what we know or
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observe, or by assuming ~ trial the truth of a statement
made on whatever authority it may be, and then examining
whether the supposition of its truth so falls in with such
knowledge as we possess. • • as to lead us to the conviction
that the statement does indeed express the truth.,,3
This latter method implies the possibility of examining revealed
truths by the method of hypothesis. In similar vein, A.M.
Fairbairn wrote :
" The only condition on which reason could have nothing
to do with religion, is that religion should have nothing
4to do with truth."
If revelation is a valid way of knowing truth nothing need be
feared from reason which represents the only way open to us of
testing truth. So Edward Caird could say :
tI It seems as if religious faith must seek reason, as
a condition of its own life; and yet that, in seeking
reason, it seeks its own destruction. It must seek
reason: for it is impossible that any real faith can live
without attempting to understand itself or to develop its
own intell.ectual content ••• If it appeals to reason,
to reason it must go.,,5
We recall the title given by Henry Jones to his essay in natural
theology, The Faith ~ Enquires. Natural theology is honest
enquiry into faith.
More recently John Laird concluded that while natural
thanlogy might not prove much it could clarify much in theology.
We recall Leonard Hodgson's conclusion that it is not inconsistent
to hold that the findings of revealed religion should be submitted
to the judgement of human reason.6 Writing of natural theology,
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C.A.Campbell said :
"Its main business, as I understand it, is to consider how
much of certain or probable knowledge is obtainable, on
grounds which approve themselves to reason, concerning the
existence of God; and, in the event of an affirmative
answer to the question of God's existence, concerning His
nature, and His relationship to the human soul.
Formulated in more rough and ready, but not, I think,
fundamentally misleading fashion, Natural Theology seeks
a rational answer to the question 'Is religion true?'
And if so, in what precise sense?,,7
Here again we notice that religion provides the data which is
to be tested and sifted by natural theology. Natural theology
is the unprejudiced examination of what claims to be religious
truth; it is at the same time critic and ally of faith; it is
the believer's self-criticism.
We have noted that the unbelievers also may criticise.
From Xenophanes to Hume and to our own day there have been
critics outside the realm of faith who have made their own
particular contribution to natural theology.
4. Apologetic
The second driving force for natural theology is the need
to provide apologetic. We have seen that there is no swift way
with unbelievers. As William Temple said, the number of people
converted by the arguments of natural theology must be extremely
small. Raymond de Sebonde's claim to give people the answers
in less than a month smacks of slick modern salesmanship. Yet
there is need for a modern theologia naturalis as Emil Brunner
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pointed out :
" Though proof is excluded, this does not exclude the
possibility of a discussion pointing towards such evidence
of the ~xistence of God as we have. The decisive factor
will always be the simple proclamation of the Christian
message. But there is such a thing as theological work
done upon the message, i.e. intellectual work in the
realm of concepts, which can and is intended to serve the
proclamation of the message. Similarly there is such a
thing as an intellectual and conceptual work of preparation,
8which clears obstacles out of the way of proclamation.11
We saw in e.S.Lewis's account of his own spiritual pilgrimage how
the poets and philosophers prepared the way for his acceptance of
faith. There is need for such preparatory apologetic. This
kind of apologetic has been provided again and again by Gifford
lecturers. Indeed lecturers have sometimes been criticised
because this apologetic element has appeared to loom large.
Lord Gifford undoubtedlylhoped that the apologetic element would
appear in the lectures. His will makes it quite clear
II My desire and hope is that these lectureships and
lectures may promote and advance among all classes of the
community the true knowledge of Him ~~o is, and there is
none and nothing beside Him, in Whom we live and move and
have our being, and in Whom all things consist, and of
man's real relationship to Him Whom truly to know is life
everlasting."
We could hardly wish for clearer support for the view we have
already expressed. Lord Gifford himself had a deep personal
faith in God. He desired that this faith should be investigated
impartially. He deliberately allowed for the possibility of
freethinkers and unbelievers sharing in the investigation.
Nevertheless he trusted that in general the lectures would serve
an apologetic end.
There is no defence for the apologist who deliberately
distorts the evidence in order to convince the unbeliever. There
will always remain, however, the possibility that a philosopher's
conclusions will be unconsciously motivated by wishful thinking.
A High Court Judge, even without the benefit of Freud's
findings, must have recognised this possibility and in asking
that natural theology should be treated like chemistry or
astronomy Lord Gifford was trying to secure such impartiality as
is possible. -He was wrong if he thought that the evidence
produced would be irrefragably convincing. He would be more in
line with the view expressed by Brunner if he had seen the task
of the natural theologian as that- of cross-examining the witnesses
and presenting the evidence as lucidly as possible. In a court
of law the evidence is often inconclusive but some kind of verdict
must be given. Faith however-is not a purely human judgement on
evidence presented, but the presentation of the evidence, as
~runner suggests, may clear obstacles out of the way of faith-
acceptance. Lord uiffora does not quite express it in this way
but in the light of changing convictions concerning possibilities
of proof and demonstration it is a legitimate interpretation of
his intention.
Natural theology pre·vides a common meeting ground for
belief and unbelief. This has been recognised more readily by
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the Roman Catholic Church than by protestantism. Neither catholic
nor protestant would be prepared to claim that natural theology
can take a man all the way to faith. At the end a leap of
faith-collimitment is necessary. We recall Douglas Hyde's
description of one stage of his pilgrimage :
II St. Thomas Aquinas's five proofs of God seemed to me
unanswerable, but ••• I was obliged to admit that
whilst they carried with them intellectual conviction
they had not made God come alive for me • • • I could
accept his existence intellectually but that was all.,,9
All that the five ways could do for him was to show him the
necessity of a Prime Mover, a First Cause or Necessary Being,
they could not give him religion. NeverthelesB Buch arguments
put him in a position where he could accept faith with
intellectual integrity.
Natural theology was described by H.R.Farmer as
" the attempt to present theism as a reasonable and
satisfying (indeed, the most reasonable and satisfying),
though not logically demonstrable, world-view.,,10
Even when this "reasonable world-view" has been expounded the
leap of faith is still necessary. The natural theologian of
today recognises his limitations, but such recognition is not
new. The first of the now despised Bridgewater Treatises ended
on this note :
" Natural theology ••• however little to be trusted as
an informer, yet as an enquirer, or rather as a prompter
to enquiry, is of inestimable service. It is a high
function that she discharges, for though not able to
satisfy the search, she impels to the search.,,11
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Thomas Chalmers thus recognised the limited apologetic service
rendered by natural theology. This tallies with the conclusion
reached by so many of the Gifford lecturers, but there has been
decreasing confidence in the power of natural theology as
apologetic. One could almost plot a graph showing the decline
of the fortunes of natural theology in this respect, beginning
with the high hopes of the Hegelians and descending to the point
where natural theology is limited to providing a neutral ground
for discussion between the believer and unbeliever. Nevertheless
if a leap of faith is necessary natural theology can ensure that
the leap is not made entirely in the dark. Apologetic is not
the primary function of natural theology, and there will always
be the inherent danger that the impartiality of enquiry will be
sacrificed to the attempt to persuade. Yet for the rational man
natural theology may be a prolegomenon to faith, for faith
appeals to reason in a way that credulity does not.
5. Natural Theology and Metaphysics
It has become clear that there can be no simple identific-
ation of natural theology and metaphysics. Metaphysical
speculation such as that of Whitehead, Alexander or Bergson is
best described as metaphysics. It is only natural theology in
the broadest sense. Metaphysical constructions based on
Christian insights, as we have suggested, may fittingly be
described as Christian Philosophy. A metaphysical scheme, into
which revealed truth can be integrated, might conceivably be
described as natural theology on the grounds that is serves
to demonstrate the reasonableness of faith. There will always
be an area of overlap between metaphysics, Christian Philosophy
and natural theology. Lord Gifford was wise in being so
meticulously comprehensive in his interpretation of natural
theology for the purpose of the lectureships. Our study of
metaphysics led us to the conclusion that we don't go far in any
kind of metaphysics before we enter the realm of faith or we make
faith statements under the guise of metaphysics. We shall be
wise not to make too close an identification between natural
theology and metaphysics.
6. Prognosis
In spite of any difficulties created by the actual wording
of Lord Gifford's will there has been an extremely wide survey
. .
of the problems involved in natural theology. Religion has been
discussed by the anthropologist, the psychologist, the sociolist
and the historian. The scientists have examined the world order
to find what evidence there is of deity. The moral philosophers
have investigated man's moral experience with a view to finding
whether God is indeed a necessary postulate. Philosophers have
examined metaphysical systems and constructed more in the attempt
to solve the problems of theism. Other philosophers have
examined and re-examined the traditional arguments for the
existence of God, while the theologians, with notable exceptions,
have been prepared to put faith to the test of rational enquiry.
With the exception of a few who have carefully avoided the
ultimate issue the lecturers have attempted, in one way or
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another, to answer the fundamental questions:
~ !!!can unaided reason verify ~ assertions of faith?
and,
~ ~ ~ knowledge £! ~ ~ unaided reason reach?
The answers have been varied, Barth disallowing any possibility
of help from reason, others like Brunner and Tillich allowing
a minimal contribution, others again assigning a greater
importance to the impartial investigation made by reason. There
is sufficient unanimity for us to assert that there is such a
study as natural theology, perhaps only a shadow of that study
envisaged by Raymond de Sebonde and less influential than Lord
Gifford desired, but yet an indispensable discipline. Because
of the wording of the will appointments to the Gifford lecture-
ships need not be limited to those who will undertake the study
of natural theology in the limited form that we have outlined.
Natural theology, in order to do its own work, needs to examine
the findings of the scientist, the psychologist, the sociologist
and the historian. He must listen to the theologian and the
philesopher. Even listening to natural theology's avowed
opponent has clarified certain issues for the natural theologian.
The Gifford endowment makes it possible to continue calling in
such specialists as these who, while they mayor may not call
themselves natural theologians, serve the cause of natural
theology by bringing the light of reason to bear upon the issues
of religion.
We may surr~arise the reports of the specialists called in
to attend this sick man of Europe by saying that there is still
a reasonable expectation of life. The patient must not attempt
as much as he did in his younger days. Indeed, if he contents
himself with the less ambitious but nevertheless arduous task
we have outlined, he can look forward to an interminable old
age. The changing climate of the theological world is also
auspicious for him. There is today a readiness to re-examine
long established theological positions. Church leaders them-
selves have given publicity to the doubts and difficulties of
the ordinary man. In a theological setting where it is almost
a virtue to doubt natural theology can only flourish. While
there are those who want to think about their religion and not
just to accept it blindly there will be a place for the
natural theologian, the man who is prepared to examine by the
impartial light of unaided reason the claims of religion whether
they be based on so-called miraculous revelation or the light
that enlightens every man.
Part 3
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Chapter 4 Reference Notes
Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles,
3 G.91,
4 G.32,
5 ~,
6 Supra
7 G.23,
Book 1, Ch.9
Vol. 1, p.8
Vol. 1, p.3
p.18
Vol.1, p.14
p.230 G.49,
p. 5
Vol. 1, p.22
8 Brunner and Barth, Natural Theolbgy, 1946, p. 58
9 Douglas Hyde, I believed, 1950, p.220
10 G.33, p. 8
11 Thomas Chalmers, ~ ~ Power, Wisdom and Goodness of ~,~
1832, Vol.2. p. 289.
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APPENDIX ONE
The Text of Lord Gifford's Will
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•DEEDS OF NEW FOUNDATION, ETC.
GIFFORD LECTURESHIP ON NATURAL THEOLOGY
EXTRACTS from the Trust-Disposition and Settlement of the late
ADAM GIFFORD, sometime one of the Senators of the College of
Justice, Scotland, dated 21st August 1885.
It ADAM GIFFORD, sometime one of the Senators of the College of
Justice, Scotland, now residing at Granton House, near Edinburgh,
being desirous to revise, consolidate, alter and amend my trust-
settlements and testamentary writings, and having fully and
maturely considered my means and estate, and the circumstances
in which I am placed, and the just claims and expectations of my
son and relatives, and the modes in which my surplus funds may
be most usefully and beneficially expended, and considering
myself bound to apply part of my means in advancing the public
welfare and the cause of truth, do hereby make my Trust-deed
and latter Will and Testament - that is to say, I give my body
to the earth as it was before, in order that the enduring blocks
and materials thereof may be employed in new combinations; and
I give my soul to God, in Whom~and with Whom it always~s, to be
in Rim and with Him for ever in closer and more conscious union;
and with regard to my earthly means and estate, I do hereby give,
grant, dispone, convey, and make over and leave and bequeath All
and Whole my whole means and estate, heritable and moveable,
real and personal, of every description, now belonging to, or
that shall belong to me at the time of my death, with all writs
and vouchers thereof, to and in favour of Herbert James Gifford,
my son; John Gifford, Esquire, my brother; Walter Alexander
Raleigh, my nephew, presently residing in London; Adam West
Gifford, W.S., my nephew; Andrew Scott, C.A., in Edinburgh,
husband of my niece; and Thomas Raleigh, Esquire, barrister-at-
law, London, and the survivors and survivor of them accepting,
and the heirs of the last survivor, and to such other person
• as printed in the Edinburgh University Calendar, 1888-89
or persons as I may name, or as may be assumed or appointed by
competent authority, a majority being always a quorum, as trustees
for the ends, uses and purposes after-mentioned, but in trust only
for the purposes following: (Here follow the first ten purposes.)
And I declare the preceding ten purposes of this trust to be
preferable, and I direct that these ten purposes be fulfilled in
the first place before any others, and before any residue of my
estate, or any part thereof, is disposed of, and before any
residue is ascertained or struck, declaring that it is only what
may remain of my means and estate after the said ten purposes are
fulfilled that I call herein the "residue" of my estate" and out
of which I direct the lectureships aftermentioned to be founded
and endowed. And in regard that, in so far as I can at present
see or anticipate, there will be a large Itresidue" of my means
and estate in the sense in which I have above explained the word,
being that which remains after fulfilling the above ten purposes,
and being of opinion that I am bound if there is a "residue" as
so explained, to employ it, or part of it, for the good of my
fellow-men, and having considered how I may best do so, I direct
the "residue" to be disposed of as follows : - I having been for
many years deeply and firmly convinced that the true knowledge of
God, that is, of the Being, Nature, and Attributes of the Infinite,
of the All, of the First and the Only Cause, that iSt the One and
Only Substance and Being, and the true and felt knowledge ( not
mere nominal knowledge ) of the relations of man and of the
universe to Him, and of the true foundations of all ethics and
morals, being, I say, convinced that this knowledge, when really
felt and acted on, is the means of man's highest well-being, and
the security of ijisupward progress, I have resolved from the
"residue" of my estate as af.resaid, to institute and found, in
connection, if possible, with the Scottish Universities, lecture-
ships or classes for the promotion of the study of the said
subjects, and for the teaching anddlffusion of sound views
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regarding them, among the whole population of Scotland, Therefore,
I direct and appoint my said trustees from the "residue" of my
said estate, after fulfilling the said ten preferable purposes,
to pay the following sums, or to assign and make over property
of that value to the following bodies in trust: - First, To the
Senatus Academicus of the University of Edinburgh, and failing
them, by declinature or otherwise, to the Dean and Faculty of
Advocates of the College of Justice of Scotland, the sum of
£25,000. Second, To the Senatus Academicus of the University of
Glasgow, and failing them, by declinature or otherwise, to the
Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow, the sum of
£20,000. Third, To the Senatus Academicus of the University
of Aberdeen, whom failing, by declinature or otherwise, to the
Faculty of Advocates of Aberdeen, the sum of £20,000. And
Fourth, To the ~enatus Academicus of the University of St Andrews,
whom failing, by declinature or otherwise, to the Physicians and
Surgeons of St Andrews, and of the district twelve miles round
it, the sum of £15,000 sterling, amounting the said four sums in
all to the sum of £80,000 sterling; but said bequests are made,
and said sums are to be paid in trust only for the following
purpos.~ that is to say, for the purpose of establishing in each
of the four cities of Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen, and St
Andrews, a Lectureship or Regular Chair for "Promoting, Advancing,
Teaching, and Diffusing the Study of Natural Theo10gy,n in the
widest sense of that term, in other words, "The Knowledge of
God, the Infinite, the All, the First and Only Cause, the One and
the Sole Substance, the Sole Being, the Sole Reality, and the
Sole Exiatence, the Knowledge of His Nature and Attributes, the
Knowledge of the Relations which men and the whole universe bear
to Him, the Knowledge of the Nature and Foundation of Ethics or
Morals, and of all Obligations and Duties thence arising." The
Senatus Academicus in each of the four Universities, or the
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bodies substituted to them respectively, shall be the patrons
of the several lectureships, and the administrators of the said
respective endowments, and of the affairs of each lectureship
in each city. I call them for shortness simply the "patrons".
Now I leave all the details and arrangements of each lectureship
1n the'J.hamd"and in the discretion of the "patrons" respectively,
who shall have full power from time to time to adjust and
regulate the same in conformity as closely as possible to the
following brief principles and directions which shall be binding
on each and all of the "patrons" as far as practicable and
possible. I only indicate leading principles. First, The
endowment or capital fund of each lectureship shall be preserved
entire, and be invested securely upon or in the purchase of
lands or heritages which are likely to continue of the same value,
or increase in value, or in such other way as Statute may permit;
merely the annual proceeds or interest shall be expended in
maintaining the respective lectureships. Second, The "patrons"
may delay the institution of the lectureships, and may from time
to time intermit the appointment of lecturers and the delivery
of lectures for one or more years for the purpose of accumulating
the income or enlarging the capital. Third, The lecturers shall
be appointed from time to time, each for a period of only two
years and no longer, but the same lecturer may be re-appointed
for other two periods of two years each, provided that no one
person shall hold the office of lecturer in the same city for
more than six years in all, it being desirable that the subject
be promoted and illustrated by different minds. Fourth, The
lecturers appointed shall be subjected to no test of any kind,
and shall not be required to take an oath, or to emit or subscribe
any declaration of belief, or to make any promise of any kind;
they may be of any denomination whatever, or of no denomination
at all (and many earnest and high-minded men prefer to belong to
no ecclesiastical denomination); they may be of any religion or
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way of thinking, or, as is sometimes said, they may be of no
religion, or they may be so-called sceptics or agnostics or
freethinkers, provided only that the "patrons" will use
diligence to secure that they be able reverent men, true
thinkers, sincere lovers of and earnest inquirers after truth.
Fifth, I wish the lecturers to treat their subject as a strictly
natural science, the greatest of all possible sciences, indeed,
in one sense, the only science, that of Infinite Being, without
reference to or reliance upon any supposed special exceptional
or so-called miraculous revelation. I wish it considered just
as astronomy or chemistry is. I have intentionally indicated,
in describing the subject of the lectures, the general aspect
which personally I would expect the lectures to bear, but the
lecturers shall be under no restraint whatever in their treatment
of their theme; for example, they may freely discuss (and it
may be well to do so) all questions about man's conceptions of
God or the Infinite, their origin, nature, and truth, whether
he can have any such conceptions, whether God is under any or
what limitations, and so on, as I am persuaded that nothing
but good can result from free discussion. Sixth, The lectures
shall be public and popular, that is, open not only to students
of the Universities, but to the whole community without matric-
ulation, as I think that the subject should be studied and known
by all, whether receiving University instruction or not. I
think such knowledge, if real, lies at the root of all well
being. I suggest that the fee should be as small as is consistent
with the due management of the lectureships, and the due
appreciation of the lectures. Besides a general and popular
audience, I advise that the lecturers also have a special class
of students conducted in the usual way, and instructed by
examination and thesis, written and oral. Seventh, As to the
number of the lectures, much must be left to the discretion'of
the lecturer, I should think the subject cannot be treated even
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in abstract in less than twenty lectures, and they may be many
times that number. Eight9, The "patrons" if and when they see
fit may make grants from the free income of the endowments for
or towards the publication in a cheap form of any of the lectures,
or any part thereof, or abstracts thereof, which they may think
likely to be useful. Ninth, The "patrons" respectively shall
all annually submit their accounts to some one chartered
accountant in Edinburgh, to be named from time to time by the
Lord Ordinary on the Bills, whom failing, to the Accountant of the
Court of Session, who shall prepare and certify a short abstract
of the accounts and investments, to be recorded in the Books of
Council and Session, or elsewhere, for preservation. And my
desire and hope is that these lectureships and lectures may
promote and advance among all classes of the community the true
knowledge of Him v/ho is, and there is none and nothing beside
Him, in Whom we live and move and have our being, and in Whom
all things consist, and of man's'real relationship to Him V/hom
truly to know is life everlasting. If the residue of my estate,
in the sense before defined, should turn out insufficient to
pay the whole sums above provided for the four lectureships
( of which shortcoming, however, I trust there is no danger),
then each lectureship shall suffer a proportional diminution;
and if, on the other hand, there is any surplus over and above
the said sum of £80,000 sterling, it shall belong one-half to
my son, the said Herbert James Gifford, in life-rent, and to
his issue other than the heirs of entail in fee, whom failing,
to my unmarried nieces equally in fee; and the other half shall
belong equally among my unmarried nieces. And I revoke all
settlements and codicils previous to the date hereof if this
receives effect, providing that any payments made to legatees
during my life shall be accounted as part payment of their
provisions. And I consent to registration hereof for preservation,
and I dispense with delivery hereof. - In witness whereof, &c.
APPENDIX TWO
Lists of Gifford Lecturers
at the four Universities
The dates are those given in the respective
University Calendars. In numerous cases
the lectures were not given in the year of
appointment.
Gifford Lecturers at Glasgow 484
1888
1892
1893
1895
1896
1900
1903
1906
1910
1913
1916
1921
1923
1926
1928
1930
1934
1937
1939
1947
1949
1952
1956
1959
1961 .
1965
Friedrich Max Muller
John Caird
William Wallace
John Caird •
Alexander Balmain Bruce
Edward Caird
Emile Boutroux
Andrew Cecil Bradley
John Watson
Arthur James Balfour
Samuel Alexander
Henry Jones
William Paterson Paterson
John Scott Haldane
John Alexander Smith
William Temple
William l-lacNeileDixon
William Ernest Hocking
John Laird
Ralph Barton Perry
Herbert Henry Farmer
John Macmurray
Leonard Hodgson
Carl Frii'drich von Weizsacker
Charles William Hendel
Herbert Butterfield
• John Caird's second series was delayed due to his
illness.
48,5Gifford Lecturers at Edinburgh
1888 James Hutchison Stirling
1890 George Gabriel Stokes
1892
1894-
1896
1899
1903
1905
1907
1909
1911
1913
191.5
1918
1921
1924-
1926
1927
1928
1930
1932
1934-
193.5
1937
1940
1945
1949
1950
1952
1954
1956
Otto Pfleiderer
Alexander Campbell Fraser
Cornelia Petrus Tiele
William James
Henry Melvill Gwatkin
Simon Somerville laurie
Robert Flint •
William Warde Fowler
Bernard Bosanquet
Henri Bergson
l'lilliamMitchell Ramsay
George Frederick stout
Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison
James George Frazer
Arthur Stanley Eddington
Alfred North Whitehead
John Dewey
Nathan Soderblom
Edwyn Robert Bevan
Albert Schweitzer
Charles Sherrington
Reinhold Niebuhr
Oscar Kraus
Christmpher Dawson
Niels Bohr
Charles Earle Raven
Arnold Joseph Toynbee
Rudolf Karl Bultmann
Austin Y~rsden Farrer
• Robert Flint did not lecture owing to illness
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Gifford Lecturers !i Edinburgh (continued)
1957-58 Wolfgang Kohler
1959-60 Roderick Diarmid hclennan
1961-62 John Baillie •
1962-63 David Daube
1964-65 Donald MacKenzie MacKinnon
• .John Baillie died in 1960 but the written lectures
were accorded the status of Gifford lectures.
Note: Friedrich von Hugel accepted an invitation
to occupy the Gifford Chair for sessions 1924-5
and 1925-6, but was compelled to withdraw on the
grounds of ill-health.
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Gi!ford Lecturers at Aberdeen
1889-91 Edward Burnett Tylor
1891-93 Andrew }~rtin Fairbairn
1896-98 James Ward
1899-00 Josiah Royce
1900-02 Archibald Henry Sayce
1904-06 James Adam
1907-08 Hans Driesch
1909-11 William Ridgeway
1912-13 Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison
1914-15 William Ritchie Sorley
1918-19 Clement Charles Julian Webb
1921-22 Ernest William Hobson
1924-26 William Mitchell
1927-29 Ernest William Barnes .
1931-32 Etienne Gilson
1935-36 William David Ross
1937-38 Karl Barth
1938-40 Arthur Darby Nock
1940-42
1949-50
•Jacques Maritain
Gabriel Marcel
1948-50 John Wisdom
1951-52 Michael Polanyi
1953-54 Paul Tillich
1956-57 Herbert Arthur Hodges
1959-61 Henry Habberley Price
1963-65
1964-66
1966-68
Alister Hardy
~Raymond Aron
+Malcolm Knox
•
+
Jacques Maritain did not lecture owing to war conditions•
Lectures not yet delivered
Gifford Lecturers !!~ Andrews 488
1888-90
1890-92
1894-96
1899-01
1902-04
1907-10
1911-13
1915-16
1917-18
1919-20
1922-24
1924-25
1926-28
1929-30
1931-32
1935-36
1936-37
1937-38
1938-39
1939-40
1947-48
1948-49
1949-50
1951-53
1953-55
1955-56
1956-58
1958-60
1960-62
1962-64
1964-66
Andrew Lang
Edward Caird
Lewis Campbell
Rodolfo Lanciani
Richard Burdon Haldane
James Ward
James George Frazer
John Arthur Thomson
William Ralph Inge
Lewis Richard Farnell
Conwy Lloyd Morgan
Lewis Richard Farnell
Alfred Edward Taylor
Charles Gore
Robert Ranulph Marett
Herbert Hensley Henson
Werner Jaeger
William George De Burgh
Joseph Bidez
Richard Kroner
Emil Brunner
Alexander ~~cbeath
Herbert James Paton
Brand Blanshard
Charles Arthur Campbell
Werner Heisenberg
Vigo Auguste Demant
Georg Henrik von Wright
Steven Runciman
Henry Chadwick
John Niemeyer Findlay
APPENDIX THREE
An alphabetica1 list of Gifford lecturers,
an annotated bibliography of published lectures
and subjects of unpublished lectures
ADAM, James (1860-19°7>
Aberdeen, 1904-06
~ Religious Teachers 2! Greece,Edinburgh, 1908
James Adam traces two streams of religious though t ,
the poetic beginning with Homer and culminating in
Sophocles and the philosophical culminating in Anaxagoras.
There is a confluence in Euripides, 'the philosopher upon
Ithe stage; the closing lectures are devoted to Platonic
philosophy. The volume was published posthumously and
contains a memoir.
ALEXANDER, Samuel (1859-1938)
Glasgow, 1916-18
Space ~ ~ Deity, 1920, two volumes
A metaphysical essay based on the view that Space-Time
is the stuff of which matter and all things are
specifications. The world does not exist in Space and
Time, but in Space-Time. God is the universe in so far
as it is striving towards deity.
ARONt Raymond See page 527
BAILLIE, John (1886-1960)
Edinburgh, 1961-62
The Sense of the Presence of God, 1962- -- --
These lectures which were never delivered were prepared
by John Baillie before his death and were accorded the
status of Gifford lectures by the trustees. The years
recorded above indicate when the lectures were due to be
delivered.
John Baillie discusses the validity of religious
knowledge in the light of contemporary movements in
philosophy and theology. Faith for Baillie is the
cognitive element in religious experience and is a mode
of primary apprehension. The sense of the presence of God
involves this perceptual element and is to a degree
verifiable.
BALFOUR, Arthur James (1848-1930)
Glasgow, 1914 and 1922-23
Theism and Humanism, 1915
Theism and Thought, 1923
Lord Balfour sets out to give a "plain man's"
philosophy, taking into account the data presented to the
ordinary man. Naturalism cannot give a satisfactory
explanation of beauty, goodness and truth as values in
the universe. The answer lies in theism - a belief in
the God of religion rather than the God of metaphysics.
In the second series of lectures, separated from the first
by the world war, Balfour applies methodological doubt
to theistic concepts and concludes again that theism is
necessary if the values of life are to be meaningful.
BARNES, Ernest William (1874-1953)
Aberdeen, 1927-29
Scientific Theory ~ Religion, Cambridge, 1933
Bishop Barnes's lectures contain detailed discussion
of space-time, relativity, theories of matter and the
origin of life, the evolution of plant and animal life
and the place of our world within the universe. None of
this scientific data contradicts the Christian concept of
God. Science may indeed provide supporting evidence for
faith, but the religious man's final authority lies in
spiritual insight.
BARTH, Karl (1886- )
Aberdeen, 1937-38
~ Knowled~e of God and the Service of God, 1938
Barth describes himself as "an avowed opponent of all
natural theology", and in expounding the Confessio
Scotica of 1560 proposes to serve natural theology by
demonstrating the strength of the antagonist. There is
no place for a human approach to God. The whole attempt
to form a natural theology is a sign of man's over-weening
pride. YJt3.nmust accept God's approach through the VIord.
Any other approach is idolatry.
BERGSON, Henri (1859-1941)
Edinburgh, 1913-14
Bergson le~tured on ~ Problem of Personality. The
outbreak of war prevented the delivery of the second
series and no lectures have been published.
BEVAN, Edwyn Robert (1870-1943)
Edinburgh, 1933-34
Symbolism ~ Belief, 1938
Holy Images, 1940
Holy Im~ges contains the first four lectures of the
series, which take the form of an inquiry into idolatry
and image-worship in ancient paganism and Christianity.
Symbolism ~ Belief raises the question of the value of
symbols as an aid to conceptual thought. Symbolism is
compared and contrasted with the principle of analogy.
All ideas of God are finally symbolical and reason's
function is to criticise and correct the symbolism.
BIDEZ, Joseph (1867-1945)
St. Andrews, 1938-39
Eos ou Platon !! l'Orient, Bruxelles, 1945
Professor Bidez of l'Academie Royale de Belgique
traced the influence of middle-eastern concepts and myths
upon Platonic thought as evidenced in the Dialogues and
the Republic. This work has not been translated into
English.
BLANSHARD, Brand (1892- )
St. Andrews, 1951-53
Reason ~ Goodness, 1961
The tension between reason and feeling in moral
philosophy is the main theme of the earlier lectures,
the Stoics and St. Francis being taken as exemplars. The
views of recent moral philosophers (Moore, Ross, Ewing,
Dewey and Perry) are discussed. A final appeal is made
for the rational temper in ethical thought. Reason and
Belief, containing the second series of lectures is not
yet published.
BOHR, Niels Henrik David (1885-1962)
Edinburgh, 1949
Niels Bohr, the distinguished nuclear scientist,
lectured on Causality ~ Complementarity : Epi6temolo~ical
Lessons of Studies in Atomic Physics. The lectures have
not been published.
BOSAN~UET, Bernard (1848-1923)
Edinburgh, 1911-12
The Principle of Individuality and Value, 1912
~ Value ~ Destiny £! ~ Individual, 1913
Bosanquet's thought is greatly influenced by Hegel
and Bradley. Individuality or self-completeness gives
the clue to re~lity. Individuality finds itself and
loses itself in the Absolute. This world is "a vale of
soul-making" and in the second series Bosanquet traces
the adventures of the self as it faces the hazards and
hardships of the finite world in its quest for
stability and security, which is finally discovered
through the religious consciousness.
BOUTROUX, Emile (1845-1921)
Glasgow, 1903-05
Science ~ Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, 1909
translated by J. Nield
M. ),outroux lectured in French on La Nature et
l'Esprit, and though the above volume is not
acknowledged as being based on the Gifford Lectures
it seems that much of the material is embodied in it.
In Part I the author deals with the naturalistic
approach of Comte, Spencer and others; part II is
concerned with the thought of Ritschl, the limitations
of science, and the authority of religious experience.
BRADLEY, Andrew Cecil (1851-1935)
Glasgow, 1907-08
Ideals 2! Religion, 1940
A.C.Bradley occupied the Chair of Poetry at Oxford
and the Chair of English Literature at Glasgow. He
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brought the insights gained from his own field to his
thinking about religion. A man can study poetry
without feeling it and a man can study religion in the
same way, but he must feel it to be able to assess its
truth. Man is described by Bradley as "finite infinite";
as he loses himself in God he finds his real being.
Bradley's thought reflects the idealism of his brother,
F.R.Bradley, and is very much in line with Bosanquet's
thought. The volume was published posthumously over
thirty years after the lectures were delivered.
BRUCE, Alexander Balmain (1851-1899)
Glasgow, 1897-98
The Providential Order of lli \Vorld, 1897
The Moral Order £! lli World, 1899
A.~.Bruce, essentially a Biblical scholar rather than
a philosopher, accepted evolutionary theories as
explaining man's development, but nevertheless found
evidence for the existence of God in man's spiritual
and moral progress. In the second series of lectures
Bruce dealt with the idea of providence in ~uddhism
and Zoroastrianism, in Greek, Hebrew and Christian
tnought and in some contemporary writings.
BRUNNER, Emil (1889- )
St. Andrews, 1947
Christianity ~ Civilisation,1948 and 1949,two volumes
In these lectures we have an avowedly Christian
answer to certain questions facing western civilisation.
The problems of being, truth, time, justice, freedom
and creativity are discussed. In the second series
specific problems of technics, science, art, wealth and
education are approached from the viewpoint of Brunner's
Biblical theology.
BULT~~NN, Rudolf Karl (1884- )
Edinburgh, 1954-55
History ~ Eschatology, Edinburgh, 1958
Bultmann offers iU. these lectures a clear statement
of his attitude to history. The Christian believer is
taken out of the world of time and is confronted by the
ever present Lord who transcends history. Bultmann has
been influenced in his thinking about the meaning of
history by R.G.Collingwood in whose thought he finds
considerable affinity. This is particularly evident
in this volume.
BUTTERFIELD, Herbert See page 527
CAIRD, Edward (1835-1908)
(1) St. Andrews, 1890-92
The Evolution £! Religion, Glasgow, 1894, two volumes
In the first course (volume 1) Caird investigates
the possibility of a science of religion with special
reference to }lax r.1ullerand Herbert Spencer. and traces
the evolution of religion in Greek and Jewish history
in the pre-Christian era. The second course is
concerned with the evolution of Christianity in the
early centuries with two concluding lectures on the
pre-Reformation and post-Reformation periods.
(2) Glasgow, 1900-02
The Evolution of Theology ~ the Greek Philosophers,
Glasgow, 1904, two volumes.
The first volume is concerned mainly with Platonic
and Aristotelian "theology" with introductory lectures
on the nature of theology and its relationship to
religion. Caird concludes his treatment of Aristotle
in the second volume and traces the contribution to
theological discussion of the Stoics, Philo and
Plotinus, summing up the influence of Greek thought
upon Christian theology in a final lecture.
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CAIRD, John
Glasgow, 1892-93 and 1895-96
~ Fundamental Ideas £! Christianity, Glasgow,1899,
two volumes.
The lectures were published posthumously with a memoir
on John Caird written by his brother Edward. Lectures on
the relationship of faith and reason and natural and
revealed religion are followed by discussion of the
Christian concept of God (compared with pantheism and
deism), the origin and nature of evil, the Incarnation,
Atonement and the Future Life. The truths of Christianity
are seen as the fulfilment of the truths of natural
theology.
CAMPBELL, Charles Arthur (1897- )
St. Andrews, 1953-55
On Selfhood ~ Godhood, 1957
The first course was devoted to eelfhood, freedom and
moral experience with preliminary lectures on the function
of reason in relation to religion. Professor Campbell
argues that it is still reasonable to talk about the
human "soul". The second course dealt with problems
involved in theism - sin and suffering, religious
experience and the objective validity of religion.
Religious experience which can only be interpreted
symbolically provides prima facie evidence to be tested
by reason. Philosophy may support theistic beliefs
but cannot take us beyond the bounds of probability.
CAMPBELL, Lewis (1830-1908)
St. Andrews, 1894-96
Religion in Greek Literature, 1898
This volume provides a straightforward account by a
classical scholar of the development of religion in
Greek culture, beginning with the religion of the Iliad
and the Odyssey. The changing pattern of Greek religion
is traced through the hero cults and mystery religions
to the times of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.
CHADVJICK, Henry (1920- )
St. Andrews, 1962-64
Henry Chadwick lectured on Authority ~ ~ Early Church
with particular reference to the authority of scripture,
tradition and reason in the writings of some of the early
fathers. The lectures are not yet published.
DAUBE, David (1909- )
Edinburgh, 1962-63
David Daube took as the subject of his first course
The Deed and the Doer in the Bible. The lectures are not--------
yet published.
DAWSON, Christopher (1889- )
Edinburgh, 1947-49
ReIip;ion ~ Culture, 1948
ReIie'ion ~ lli ~ .2!. Western Culture t 1950
Christopher Dawson describes religion as the dynamic
element in culture. He traces the impact of religion
upon world cultures, narrowing the field in the second
volume to the western world, showing the influence of
Christianity upon the barbarian world of the early centuries
and its tontributl~ft to the pattern of mediaeval society
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ODE BURGI, William Geor«e (1866-1943)
St. Andrews, 1937-38
~ Morality !2Religion, 1,,8
De Burgh shows how moral experience presents a problem
which philosophl is unable to sol.e but to which religion
offers a solution. The mutual. relationships of religion
and morality are fulll discussed and the moral argument
for theism treated at length.
DEMANT, Vigo Auguste (1893- )
St. Andrews, 1956-58
Canon Demant lectured on ~ Penumbra ~ Ethics, the
title of the first series being The Religious Climate
and the second ~ Moral Career of Christendom. The
lectures are not let published.
DEWEY, John (1859-1952)
Edinburgh, 1928-29
~ Quest ~ Certainty, 1930
This is an essay in pragmatic philosophy. The world
needs not so much more scientific knowledge as greater
ability to discern .alues. The task of philosophy is
to interpret the conclusions of science with reference
to beliefs about purpose and values. Tbe quest for
certaintl finds its fulfilment not in speculative
knowledge but action.
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DIXON, William MacNeile (1866-1946)
Glasgow, 1935-37
The Human Situation, 1937
This is confessedll an attempt to meet the condition
that the lectures should be popular in the sense that
thel should be intelligible to the average man. The
problems of science, religion and moralitl, and most
of the usual subjects in tAe Gifford curriculum are
dealt with and the argument is frequently illustrated
by apt quotation from the world of literature. w.M.
Dixon, formerly Professor of English Literature at
~
Glasgow was invited to take the place of Emile Melerson
who had died before he could fulfil his duties as
Gifford lecturer.
VRIESCK, Hans (1867-1941)
Aberdeen, 1907-08
Science ~ Philosophy ~ Organism, 1908 two volumes
The first volume is a biological study, surveying
eome ot the nineteenth century theories of evolution.
This eurvey is concluded in the eecond volume, in
which Bans Dri.sch also propounds his own particular
philosophy ot organism - vitalism. This philosophical
view may be held alongside a religious faith but the
work is one ot speculative philosophy rather than
natural theology.
EDDINGTON, Arthur Stanley (1882-1944)
Edinburgh, 1927
!!! ~ature ~ ~ Physical World, Cambridge, 1928
Eddington, the first representative of Astronomy
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among the Gifford lecturers, examines the concepts of
Time, Relativity and Gravitation, and expounds the
Quantum Theory. ~cientific analysis of the universe
is necessary but it deals in pointer readings rather
than ultimate truth. The man who uses the scientist's
picture for purposes outside science does so at his
own risk. The scientist makes an inventory while the
mystic seeks for meaning only part of which he finds
in the inventory.
FAIRBAIRN, Andrew Martin (1838-1912)
Aberdeen, 1891-93
~ Philosophy ~ ~ Christian Religion, 1902
It is thought that much of the material used in the
lectures is embodied in this work, but it is not
acknowledged in any way. Fairbairn makes a comprehensive
survey of the philosophical problems involved in
Christian theology.
FARMER, Herbert Henry (1892- )
Glasgow, 1949-50
Revelation ~ Religion, 1954
Farmer interprets natural theology as "the attempt
to present theism as a reasonable and satisfying,
though not logically demonstrative, world view", and
proceeds to make out a case for theism based on
Christian insight. The Christian revelation is not
just another illustration of the general class of
religions but provides the normative concept of
religion itself.
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FARNELL, Lewis Richard (1856-1934)
St. Andrews, 1919-20 and 1924-25
Greek ~ Cults, 1921
The Attributes of God, 1,25- --Th. first series of lectures was concerned with the
relationship between early hero cults and the religious
practices of ancient Greece. ~ Attributes £!~
is a comparatiTe study of ideas of deity current in
pre-Christian religions. After introductory lectures
on anthropomorphism, polytheism and monotheism, the
tribal, national, political and moral attributes of God
as revealed in early religions are discussed. Metaphysical
aspects of the problem are treated in a closing lecture.
FARRER, Austin Marsden (1904- )
Edinburgh, 1956-57
The Freedom of the Will, 1958- ---
Dr. Farrer describes this work as a "hand to hand fight
with deterministic misconception". He discusses the
problema of determinism and free will in the light of
contemporary philosophy, and shows the necessity of
freedom if ethics and theology are to be meaningful.
FINDLAY, John Niemayer See page 527'
FLINT, Robert (1838-1907)
Edinburgh, 1907
The name of Robert Flint appears in the official list
of Gifford lecturers; the lectures were not given owing
to hi. illness, nor has any work been published.
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FOWLER, William Warde (1847-1921)
Edinburgh, 1909-10
~ Religious Experience ~ !h! Roman People, 1911
Warde Fowler's lectures provide an historical surve~
of Roman religion down to the time of Augustus. Natural
theology plays little part in its development until the
time of the Stoics, but Roman religion had its own
particular contribution to make to western thought,
described in the closing chapter.
FRASER, Alexander Campbell (1819-1914)
Edinburgh, 1894-96
~ Philosophy ~ Theism, 1894, two volumes
Campbell Fraser's data for philosoph~ is provided b~
the .elf, the natural world and the concept of God.
uod is revealed in man and nature but only to faith.
Fraser, the editor of Berkeley's works. was greatly
influenced by his philosoph~. Materialism finds its
fulfilment in scepticism; idealism in theism. The
problem. of evil, miracle and human progress are
discussed in the final section. A one-volume amended
edition of the lectures was published in 1899.
FRAZER, James George (1854-1941)
(1) St. Andrews, 1911-13
~ Belie! ~ Immortality. 1913
This volume is an anthropological study of belief in
immortality and the worship of the dead among primitive
peoples, particularly among the Australian aborigines,
the Torres ~trait Islanders and the natives of New
~uinea and Melanesia.
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(2) Edinburgh, 1924-25
!!! Worship £! Nature, 1926
A turther anthropological study - of the worship of the
Sky, the Earth and the Sun among ancient Aryan and non-Aryan
peoples and in modern China, Japan, Africa and Indonesia
and among the Indian tribes of north and south~~'rica.
Frazer understands natural theology to be "the conception
which man, without the aid ot reTelation, has formed to
himself of the existence and nature of a God or gods",
which explains his particular approach.
"
GILSON ,/ Etienne (1884- )
Aberdeen, 1931-32
Ltesprit !!~ philosophie medieTale, 1932,
The Spirit £! M.diaeval Philosophy, tr. A.H.C.Downes, 1936
Gilson tinds in mediaeTal thought "Christian Philosophy
par excellen.c.". Christian philosophy, like Christian
art and literature, acc~ts the heritage of the past from
all sources and makes its own synthesis. The thought ot
Augustine and Aquinas, BonaTenture and Duns Scotus i.
caretully explored as well as the work of lesser scholars.
GORE, Charle. (1853-1932)
St. Andrews, 1929-30
Th. Philosophy ot the Good Life, 1930
Bishop Gore gives an account ot the idea of the good
life as it ie found in the thought of Zarathustra, Buddha
and other Asiatic teachers, with chapters on Israel,
Platonism and Jesus Christ. The later chapters interpret
moral ideals as in in the various religious contexts.
Gore expounds a rational faith based on the eTidence ot
the moral coneciousness of man.
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GWATKIN, Henry Melvill
Edinburgh, 1903-05
!h!Knowledge ~~, Edinburgh, 1906 two volumes
The major part of this work, the contribution of a
(1844-1916)
Church historian to the Gifford discussion, is an account
of the developing ideas of God from primitive times,
through Greek and Biblical thought, to the Christian era.
The earlier lectures are concerned with possible ways
of knowing God and the nature of revelation. Gwatkin
traces the development of Christian thought from the time
of the early church to his own day, giving particular
attention to the influence of the Reformation.
HALDANE, John Scott
Glasgow, 1927-28
The Sciences ~ Philosophy, 1929
J.S.Haldane criticises both mechanistic and vitalistic
(1860-1936)
interpretations of the data provided by biology and
psychology. Science only giTes a partial account of our
actual experience and brings us to the point where we
require more than science. Philosophy criticises and
clarifies the findings of science, and with science may
perform the same service for theology. Haldane accepts
a spiritual interpretation of the universe but~ puts a
question matk against the "supernatural"elements in
Christianit,..
HALDANE, Richard Burdon (1856-1928)
St. Andrews, 1902-04
!h!Pathway 12 Reality, 1903 1nd 1904, two volumes
A metaphysical essay in Hegelian idealism. God is to
be defined as Ultimate Reality and Ultimate Re.lity i. Mind.
In God's nature there is no distinction between Thought and
Thinker. Man is separated from God by his finiteness, and
it is his duty to OTercome this separation. Religion conei.t.
in the consciousness of the potential unity of the finite selt
and the absolute self. Lo.e achieyes this unity. Haldan. w••
greatly influenced by the thought of Goethe and Hegel.
HARDY, Alister See page 527
HEISENBERG, Werner (1901- )
St Andrews, 1955-56
Physics ~ Philosophy, 1959
The book ia sub-titled ~ ReTolution in Modern Seiene.
and deals in the main with RelatiYity and the Copenhagen
interpretation of the Quantum Theory. Heisenberg and Niel.
Bohr, another Gifford lecturer with whom he worked. b.long
to the 'Copenhagent school. A closing ch~,ter deals with
the role of modern'physics in the present deyelopment of
human thinking. Physics haa giYen society nuclear weapons
but it also has a more positiye contribution to make to the
unification of the world.
HENDEL, Charles William (1890- )
aasgow, 1962-63
Dr. Charl.s Hendel, formerly Professor of Philosophy at
Yale. lectured in 1962 on Politics : ~ Trial ~ ~ Pelagian
Faith. The lectures haTe not yet been published.
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HENSON, Herbert Hensley (1863-1947)
St. Andrews, 1935-36
Christian Morality, Natural,- Developing, Final, Oxford, 1936
Bishop Hensley Henson claims that Christianity is the
most highly developed of 'natural' religions, and that
Christian morality is the climax or perfected version of
natural morality. In the earl!er lectures he traces the
development of Christianity from Judaism, its attitude to
the non-Christian world and its subsequent development in
the history of the west. The later lectures are concerned
with sexual morality, racial attitudes, the state,
industrialism and current secular philosophies.
HOBSON, Ernest William (1850-1933)
Aberdeen, 1921-22
The Domain of Natural Science, Cambridge, 1923
Professor Hobson, a Pure r-iathematician, discusses
scientific law as manifested in mathematics, dynamics,
thermodynamics and biology and in a concluding lecture
examines the relevance of scientific findings to the
cosmological and teleological arguments. Natural science
cannot establish the complete rationality of the universe.
HOCKING, William Ernest (1873- )
Glasgow, 1937
W.E.Hocking lectured on Fact ~ Destiny; the lectures
have not been published.
HODGES, Herbert Arthur (1905- )
Aberdeen, 1956-57
Professor Hodges lectured on ~ Logic ~ Religious
Thinking, the first series entitled ~ Customary }i'ormsand
Presuppositions, the second, Its Intellectual Status. The
work is not yet published.
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HODGSON, Leonard (1889- )
Glasgow, 1955-57
For Faith ~ Freedom (two volumes), Oxford, 1956 and 1957
In the first volume Dr. Hodgson discusses faith in the
light of recent theological and philosophical discussion
and surveys the contribution of ~atural Theology to the
problems of Creation, Freedom and Evil. The second volume
is an outline of Christian Theology, justified by the
conviction that as man has looked out on the world trying
to make sense of it, the Christian faith has made the best
sense.
INGE, William Ralph (1860-1954)
St. Andrews, 1917-18
The Philosophy ~ Plotinus, (two volumes), 1918
While the main theme of Dean Inge's lectures is the life
and thought of the great philosopher of mysticism, Neoplat-
onism in general is discussed and its contribution to Christ-
ian thought assessed. Plotinus is of special interest to
the natural theologian for he appears to have found, through
what many would call 'natural religion', truths which the
Christian recognises as a fundamental part of his faith.
JAEGER, Werner (1889-1961)
St. Andrews, 1936
!h! Theology £! ~ Early Greek Philosophers, Oxford, 1947
Natural theology is fundamentally a Greek invention and
Werner Jaeger traces the contribution of the pre-Socratic
thinkers to its growth. The thesis of the book is that
Greek cosmological thought is more than an outgrowth of
mysticism and Orphism and is to be seen as part of the
rational approach to understanding the nature of reality.
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JAMES, William (1842-1910)
Edinburgh, 1901-02
The Varieties of Reli~ious Experience, 1902
This is probably the most widely known series of Gifford
lectures. Psychology as applied to religious behaviour was
in its infancy and this volume prepared the wgy for many
other attempts to understand the nature of religion through
psychology. The validity of religious experience is still
a live issue and William James's insights remain relevant.
His conclusions are given in a final chapter which emphasises
the subjective value of religion without committing the
author to statements concerning the objective nature of deity.
JONES, Henry (1852-1922)
Glasgow, 1920-21
! Faith ~ Enquires, 1922
Henry Jones regarded his book as a challenge to the
dogmatism of the church. He appeals for "unsparing
intellectual enquiry" in religious matters. He discusses
the problems involved in applying scientific method to
religious enquiry and considers the a~thority of moral
consciousness and the relationship of the God of faith to
the Absolute. The whole is a testimony to and an exposition
of a personal faith which the author believes can stand the
test of enquiring intelligence.
KNOX, }1alcolm See page 527
KOHLER, Wolfgang (1887- )
Edinburgh, 1957-58
Dr. Kohler lectured on The Psychology ~ Values and
Psychology ~ PhYRics; the lectures have not been published.
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KRAUS, Oscar (1872-1942)
Edinburgh, 1940
Oscar Kraus, formerly Profesor of Philosophy in the
University of Prague, lectured on New l-1editations.£!!. ~,
~ ~ lii! Creation; the lectures have not been published.
KRONER, Richard (1884- )
St. Andrews, 1939-40
The Primacy 2! Faith, New York, 1943
The relationship of knowledge and faith is discussed
against the background of biblical and natural theology;
Kant's doctrine of rational faith is fully explored. Neither
science nor metaphysics can provide what faith gives. "God
alone can assist man to attain pure being, but not by means
of man's understanding or will." Richard Kroner was Professor
of Philosophy at Kiel in the thirties but left Germany in 1938.
LAIRD, John (1887-1946)
Glasgow, 1939-40
Theism ~ Cosmology, 1940
~ ~ Deity, 1941
The first volume is a careful study of the cosmological
and teleological arguments and their implications. Laird is
prepared to "examine the deistic part of theism" more closely
on "a provisionally realistic basis". The second volume deals
similarly with the ontological and moral arguments, neither of
which Laird regards as finally satisfactory. But the
indemonstravl~eed not be incredible and Laird finds theism
more plausible than other conclusions.
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LANCIANI, Rodolfo Amedeo (1846-1929)
St. Andrews, 1899-1901
~ Tales of Q!£~, 1901
This is an archaeologist's account of then recent
discoveries in and around Rome and the evidence they afford
of religious rites and superstitions. Three concluding
chapters deal respectively with Jewish, English and Scottish
memorials to be found in Rome. Profusely illustrated, it
was no doubt - and possibly still is - a useful guide to
Roman antiquities.
LANG, Andrew (1844-1912)
St. Andrews, 1888-90
~ Making ~ Religion, 1898
IAn anthropological study critical of the beliefs of
Tylor and Spencer and supporting the view that primitive man
originally believed in "high gods" and that animism replaced
theism in the course of time.
LAURIE, Simon Somerville (1829-1909)
Edinburgh, 1905-06
Synthetica (Volume 2), 1906
Volume two of Synthetica takes the form of a series of
meditations on God and man. God is immanent as feeling and
as the Beautiful. He is also Reason, a God of the head as
well as the heart. God is revealed to man as the Absolute
synthesis. Man finds ethical fulfilment in God and society.
Through suffering man shares the pain of God Himself. Death
is the gateway to Immortality for the human Ego.
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mCBEATH, Alexander (1888- )
St. Andrews, 1948-49
Experiments ~ Living, 1952
An essay in comparative ethics, concerned particularly
with the moral and social life of the Trobriand Islanders,
Crow Indians, Australian aborigines and a Bantu tribe.
MACKINNON, Donald MacKenzie See page 527
McLENNAN, Roderick Diarmid (1898- )
Edinburgh, 1959-60
Professor McLennan lectured on The Unity .2! Horal
Experience; the lectures have not been published.
MACMURRAY, John (1891- )
Glasgow, 1953-54
~ ~ ~ Agent, 1957
Persons 1£ Relation, 1961
Professor MacHurray's thesis is that a purely mechanical
or organic interpretation of life is not fully adequate.
Man is a person actively conscious of himself and other
persons. "I do" is to replace "I think" and "It happens".
Action is seen as the integration of knowledge and movement.
In the second volume the structure of social relationships
and the place of religion in human life are explored in the
light of person to person relationships.
MARCEL, Gabriel (1889- )
Aberdeen, 1949-50
~ Mystery ~ Being (two volumes), 1950 and 1951
Mystery for Marcel is not a problem to be solved but an
experience to be explored. It is not to be understood
through man's attitude to objects but through his response
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to presence. The metaphysic of Being is to be understood
through the experience of "we are" rather than "I think".
Marcel is frequently described as a Christian existentialist
but his thought is difficult to categorise. The Gifford
lectures come nearest to a systematic exposition of his
philosophy but even here he quotes freely from his plays
and journals.
MARETT, Robert Ranulph (1866-1943)
St. Andrews, 1931-32
Faith, Hope ~ Charity in Primitive Religion, Oxford, 1932
Sacraments of Simple~, Oxford, 1933
Marett discusses the varying phases of fear and hope,
lust and cruelty, curiosity and admiration, and shows how
faith and charity have their early beginnings in primitive
society. Religious activity among primitive folk is
primarily emotional and the rational content small or non-
existent. In the second series Marett describes the
sacramental function of the common acts associated with life
and death among primitive peoples.
MARITAIN, Jacques (1882- )
Aberdeen, 1940-42
Jacques Maritain did not lecture owing to war conditions-
His appointment as French Ambassador to the Holy See prevented
his ~cceptance of a further invitation after the war.
MITCHELL, William (1861-1962)
The Place of Minds in the World, 1933- - --
This volume, representing the first series of lectures,
is concerned with the functions of mind. Knowing is living
as well as a means of living; it is the function of mind to
be subject. The methods and categories of science and the
development of modern physics are discussed. There is no
application of the argument to theism, which application might
h.ve been made had the second volume on Powers 2! ~ a~red_
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MORGAN, Conwy Lloyd (1852-1936)
St. Andrews, 1922-23
Emergent Evolution, 1923
Life, Mind ~ Spirit, 1926
Psychologist, biologist, disciple of Huxley (but
differing from him on many issues) t Lloyd ~torgan used his
Gifford lectures to propound his theory of Emergent
Evolution, according to which deity is also emergent as in
Alexander's system. Life, Mind and Spirit are emergent
values and may be interpreted as spiritual progressions but
not in terms of "supernatural" intervention, which would
deny the naturalistic monistic interpretation on which Lloyd
Morgan insists.
MULLER, Friedrich Max (1823-1900)
Glasgow, 1888-92
Natural Religion, 1889
Physical Religion, 1891
Anthropological Religion, 1892
Theosophy or Psychological Heligion, 1893
Natural Religion is a general survey of the subject which
~uller had expounded in Introduction !£ ~ Science £!
Religion (1873). Physical Heligion is concerned in the
main with the Rig ~ and Indian religions. In Anthropolog-
~ Helieion Muller discusses religions in \,Thichancestor
worship and the survival of the human soul play a prominent
part and in Theosophy he shows that as man progresses he
reaches a religion in which the intellectual element plays
a greater part. Muller uses the term "theosophy" to describe
certain types of mysticism, in which divine wisdom and
personal knowledge of God are stressed. In all he is
concerned to show that man, through natural religion without
the aid of miraculous revelation, can arrive at some of the
fundamental doctrines of Christianity.
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NIEBUHR, Reinhold (1892- )
Edinburgh, 1939
The Nature and Destiny ~ ~ (two volumes), 1941 and 1943
The thesis of the first volume, Human Nature,is that
the nature of man cannot properly be understood on the
basis of either naturalistic or idealistic presuppositions.
Only the Christian doctrine of Man and Sin gives an adequate
account of the human d1~emma. Other views of man's nature
are examined and found wanting; the greater part of the
book is devoted to Niebuhr's theology of human nature.
The second volume, Human Destiny, offers Niebuhr's
interpretation of history. For the Christian, he claims,
the meaning of history can only be found beyond history.
NOCK, Arthur Darby (1902- )
Aberdeen, 1938-40
A.D.Nock lectured on Greek philosophy and religion
under the general title, Hellenistic Religion ~ ~ ~
Phases; the lectures have not been published.
PATERSON, William Paterson (1860-1939)
Glasgow, 1924-2.5
~ Nature £! Religion, 1925·
In th~ight of the results of scientific studies of
religion and the insights of psychology, Faterson
examines varying concepts of the nature of religion and
differing views as to what religion has to offer to man.
The very existence of religion is educed as evidence for
the existence of God.
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PATON, Herbert James (1887- )
St. Andrews, 1949-50
The Modern Predicament, 1955
In the last decades natural theology has been beset
behind and before by positivist philosophers and biblical
theologians, and the way of irrationalism in the form of
mysticism or existentialism offers a ready escape. In the
face of this "modern predicament" Paton reasserts the right
and duty of the natural theologian to think dispassionately
about religious questions, for religion must satisfy the
mind as well as the heart.
PERRY, Ralph Barton (1876-1957)
Glasgow, 1947-48
Realms ~ Value, Cambridge,Mass., 1954
Anything has value, according to Perry, when it is the
object of an interest, but it can only be such when its
being expected leads to·'''actionslooking to its realization
or non-realization". Any field of personal and social
events is a realm of value. The realms of culture, morals,
politics, jurisprudence, economics and education are
explored in these Gifford lectures. Perry accepts William
James's Meliorism and declares that the office of religion
is to proclaim the "proud purpose" of replacing evil with
good and the good with the better.
PFLEIDERER, Otto (1839-1908)
Edinburgh, 1892-94
Philosophl and Development of Religion(two volumes), 1894
Volume One deals with the revelation of God through ~he
natural order, the moral order and religious experience.
Varying religious views of man and his world are discussed.
The second volume provides an historical survey of Christian
thought from its earliest beginnings to the Reformation.
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POLANYI, Michael (1891- )
Aberdeen, 1951-52
Personal Knowledge, 1958
The first part of Michael Polanyi's book is concerned
with the art of knowing. Knowledge is never merely impersonal
or passive; knowing that bears on reality is active, personal
and objective. The second and third parts adumbrate this
thesis, and in the concluding section the relationship between
knowing and being is discussed. The appearance of the human
mind is seen as the ultimate stage in the awakening of the
world. Polanyi successively occupied the chairs of Physical
Chemistry and Social Studies in the University of Manchester.
PRICE, Henry Habberley (1899- )
Aberdeen, 1959-61
Professor Price lectured on ~ Nature of Belief; the
lectures have not been published.
PRINGLE~PATTISON, Andrew Seth (1856-1931)
(1) Aberdeen, 1912-13
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Light ~ Recent Philosophy,Oxford,1920
The first series, after two introductory lectures on Hume
and Kant, is concerned with typical nineteenth-century
philosophical approaches - Idealism, Naturalism and Positivism.
Early twentieth-century philosophy, exemplified by Bradley,
Bosanquet, Bergson and McTaggart, is discussed in the second
series.
(2) Edinburgh, 1922-23
The Idea of Immortality, Oxford, 1922
Studies ~ ~ Philosophy ~ Religion, Oxford, 1930
The first volume is concerned with the developing concept
of immortality in primitive thought, among the Hebrews and the
Greeks, in eastern religions and Christian belief, with a
brief excursion into the realm of Body-Mind relationship and
concluding reflections. The second volume, only six chapters
of which were given as Gifford lectures, is a comparative
and historical survey of early religious thought.
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RAMSAY, William Mitchell (1851-1939)
Edinburgh, 1915-16
Asiani~ Elements in Greek Civilisation, 1927
Ramsay investigated textual and archaeological evidence
in the attempt to find the antecedents of Hellenism. Social
and religious customs and ideas are traced to Crete and Asia
Minor. Philosophical problems are not raised in this purely
historical survey.
RAVEN, Charles Earle (1885-1964)
Edinburgh, 1950-52
Natural Religion ~ Christian Theology(two volumes),
Cambridge, 1953
Volume One, Science and Religion, follows the attempts of
the scientist and the theologian to build a world picture from
the Biblical period to the age of Darwin. Volume Two,
Experience and Interpretation, is concerned with religiou5
experience and its Christian interpretation.
RIDGENAY, William (1853-1926)
Aberdeen, 1909-11
William Ridgeway's subject was !h!Evolution £!~
Religions ~ Ancient Greek ~~; the lectures were not
published.
ROSS, William David (1877- )
Aberdeen, 1935-36
Foundations £! Ethics, Oxford, 1939
This is a restatement of a modern intuitionist theory of
ethics first expounded by Sir David Ross in ~ Right ~
ih! ~ (1930). The two concepts are carefully analysed,
and in the course of the argument the views of a number of
recent moral philosophers are discussed. The science of
ethics is treated as self-authenticating without reference
to theism.
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ROYCE, Josiah (1855-1916)
Aberdeen, 1899-1900
~ World ~ ~ Individual (two volumes),New York,1900-01
Josiah Royce was in his time the best known representative
of Idealism in America. These two volumes give a comprehens-
ive statement of his particular version of Idealism. Man,
a product of nature, is a finite being when viewed in the
context of the physical world, but is nevertheless linked to
the very life of God, who himself constitutes the unity of
the universe. Religion gives a clue to the meaning of the
universe and Idealism is the only satisfactory philosophy.
RUNCIMAN, Steven (1903- )
St. Andrews, 1960-62
Sir Steven Runciman lectured in the first session on the
Orthodox Greek Church before the fall of Constantinople and
in the second session dealt with the later history of the
Greek Church under the Ottoman Turks. The lectures have not
been published.
SAYCE, Archibald Henry (1845-1933)
Aberdeen, 1900-02
!!!! Religions 2.! Ancient Egypt !.!!.2. Babylonia,_!:dinbnrgh, 1902
A straightforward account by a distinguished Assyriologist
of conceptions of deity held in ancient ~gyptian and
Babylonian religions, with some indications of the influence
of Egyptian thought upon Christianity and of Babylonian
thought upon Judaism.
SC~NEITZER. Albert (187?-1965)
Edinburgh, 1934
Albert Schweitzen lectured in French on The Prohlem £!
Natural Theolo$Y and Natural Ethics, posing the question,
" To what ethical and religious knowledge can man'a unaided
reason attain?" The lectures have not been publi~hed.
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SHERRINGTON, Charles Scott (1857-1952)
Edinburgh, 1937-38
~ ~ his Nature, Cambridge, 1940
Beginning with the speculations of the sixteenth-century
Philosopher-physician, Jean Fernal, Sir Charles Sherrington
examines the nature of man in the light of developments in
scientific knowledge. No proof of God's existence is possible,
but a study of nature can lead to the discovery of design and
to a purely natural religion. Man's glory is to have discovenrl
perhaps only for a moment "a harmony wherein he is a note".
SMITH, John Alexander (1863-1939)
Glasgow, 1928
J.A.Smith lectured on ~ Heritage of Idealism; the
lectures have not been published.
SODERBLOM, Nathan (1866-1931)
Edinburgh, 1930-31
~ Living~, 1933
Archbishop Soderblom of Upsala lectured on Indian and
Iranian religions, the religion of Socrates and the
incarnational religion of Christianity. The living God
reveals himself in all religions and continues to reveal
himself in history. The second series of lectures was not
delivered. The volume contains a biographical introduction
byDr. Yngve Brilioth.
SORLEY, William Ritchie (1855-1935)
Aberdeen, 1914-15
Moral Values ~ ~ Idea of ~, Cambridge, 1917
An exposition of theism from an idealist standpoint based
on moral values. This imperfect world is necessary for man's
moral development and moral values giye meaning to an other-
wise mechanical existence. Man's end however is not absorptXm
into the Absolute; there must be further enterprise to
satisfy his moral nature and this demands individual survival.
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STIRLING, James Hutchison (1820-1909)
Edinburgh, 1888-90
Philosophy and Theology, Edinburgh, 1890
J.H.Stirline, the first Edinburgh lecturer, gave an
historical survey of the theistic proofs in his first series
of lectures. In the second series he showed how the proofs
fared as·a result of the thought of Hume, Kant and Darwin.
The eleventh lecture, the first in the second series, is a
fairly full account of a little book of lectures by Lord
Gifford himself, which had been published posthumously.
STOKES, George Gabriel (1819-1903)
Edinburgh, 1891-93
Natural Theology (two volumes), 1891 and 1893
Sir George Stokes, physicist and mathematician, was the
first scientist among the Gifford lecturers. He claimed the
right to apply the scientific method of "hypothesis" to the
truths of Christianity and presented evidence from evolution
and from other fields of science to support his own Christian
convictions. The Christian faith extends beyond natural
theology and involves the admission of the supernatural; it
does not contradict natural theology but fulfils it.
STOUT, George Frederick (1860-1944)
Edinburgh, 1919-21
Mind ~ Matter, Cambridge, 1931
God and Nature, Cambridge, 1952--
Stout's first volume is concerned with the body-mind
relationship. Having considered common sense views in an open-
r .,Iing section, Stout goes on to find purely materialistic
Tiews unacceptable. After a discussion of Kantian philosophy
he argues that Mind is fundamental in the Universe of Being
and is not derivative from anything not mind. The second
volume published posthumously some thirty years after the
lectures further explores the concept of Universal Mind, which
is finally to be described as God - the God of theism, not of
pantheism.
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TAYLOR, Alfred Edward (1869-1945)
St. Andrews, 1926-28
The Faith £!~ Moralist (two volumes), 1930
The subject matter of the first volume is sufficiently
described in it sub-title, The Theological Implications £!
Morality. In the second volume, Natural Theology and ~
Positive Religions, Taylor deala with the historical, super-
natural and miraculous elements in religion, the question of
authority, problems arising from institutionalism and finally
the relationship between faith and knowledge.
TEMPLE, William (1881-1944)
Glasgow, 1932-34
Nature, ~ ~~, 1934
Archbishop Temple suggested as a possible sub-title, !
Study ~ Dialectical Realism. Starting from a realist view
of the physical universe he found the existence of minds an
inescapable conclusion. The reality behind the universe is
Transcendent Mind which becomes immanent in man and natu~and
makes itself known to finite minds. There is however a hunger
for Divine Revelation which natural theology cannot satisfy;
it can discuss God but it cannot find him.
THOMSON, John Arthur (1861-1933)
St. Andrews, 1915-16
~ System ~ Animate Nature (two volumes), 1920
The Realm of Organisms !! it is is the sub-title of the
first volume, in which Thomson traces the adaptiveness and
purposiveness to be found in human and animal behaviour. The
second volume, ~ Evolution ~ ~ Realm of Organisms,
traces the progress of man, who is seen as the crown of
nature. Disharmony is evident in the universe, but finally
the scientific description of animate nature is not
inconsistent with a religious interpretation.
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TIELE, Cornelis Petrus (1830-1902)
Edinburgh, 1896-98
Elements of ~ Science of Religion (two volumes),1897 & 1899
In his first series of lectures C.P.Tiele, Professor of
the History and Philosophy of Religion in the University of
Leyden, traced the development of religion from its earliest
stages. The second series traced institutional developments
and discussed the fundamental nature of religion. Science
of Religion, for Tiele, is not simply an objective study of
religion but a discipline which may lead man to a fuller
grasp of the spirit - to real religion beyond the outward
forms.
TILLICH, Paul (1886-1965)
Aberdeen, 1953-54
SystemRtjc Theology (Volumes 2 and 3), 1957 and 1964
Tillich's two series of lectures Existence and the Christ
and ~ ~ !h! Spirit are embodied respectively in the
second and third volumes of his Systematic Theology. The
lectures do not appear in the form in which they were
originally given but the substance is in the published work.
TOYNBEE, Arnold Joseph (1889- )
Edinburgh, 1952-53
An Historian's Approach !£ Religion, Oxford, 1956
Toynbee's work provides a fascinating commentary on the
interplay of the religious and the secular in the history of
the west. In part one, ~ ~ ~ Higher Religions, man-
worship is traced in the idolisation of the parochial
community, which is superceded by the idolisation of the
ecumenical community, which in turn gives place to the
idolisation of religious institutions. Part two, Religion
~ ~ Westernizing World,traces the fortunes of religion in
the west from the seventeenth century to the present, which
is seen as a ~esting time for world religions.
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TYLOR, Edw~rd Burnett (1832-1917)
Aberdeen, 1889-91
Tylor, the author of Primitive Culture (1871), lectured
on the beliefs and customs of savage peoples; the lectures
were not published.
WALLACE, William (1844-97)
Glasgow, 1893-94
uctures ~ Essays ~ Natural Theology and Ethics, 1898
William Wallace died as a result of a cycle accident
before the lectures were revised for publication and they were
edited (with a memoir) by Edward Caird. Wallace dealt with
the rise of natural theology from Greek thought and in the
later lectures with the inter-relationships of religion and
morality. Other essays in moral philosophy are included.
WARD, James (1843-1925)
(1) Aberdeen, 1896-98
Naturalism ~ Agnosticism (two volumes), 1899
James Ward surveyed the mechanical theory of nature
suggested by science, the implications of evolutionary
theories and various types of psycho-physical parallelism.
In a later section he refutes dualism and finally~xpounds
his own particular form of spiritualistic monism. True reality
is shown to be not mechanistic but a Realm of Ends.
(2) St. Andrews, 1907-10
!!!.! Realm .2!. Ends, or Pluralism and Theism, Cambridge', 1911
James Ward followed up the theme of his Aberdeen lectures.
In the first section Pluralism receives detailed attention
and Hegel provides subject matter for two lectures. In the
second part under the general heading of Theism, the idea of
Creation, Freedom, the problem of evil, the future life and
the relationship between faith and knowledge are discussed.
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WATSON, John (1847-1939)
Glasgow, 1910-12
The Interpretation ~ Religious Experience (two volumes),
Glasgow, 1912
In his first volume Watson offers an historical survey
of philosophical thought concerning religion from the earliest
Greek ventures to those of Hegel. He gives special attention
to Dante, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant.
The second volume provides a constructive statement of
Watson's own philosophy - a Spiritual Monism, and includes
a critical assessment of opposing views.
WEBB, Clement Charles Julian (1865-1954)
Aberdeen, 1918-19
~ ~ Personality, 1919
Divine Personality ~ Human Life, 1920
In his first series of lectures Clement Webb affirmed
Personality in God, thus distinguishing God from the Absolute
and Religion from Philosophy. The presence of personal
relationships between man and God is the essence of religion.
The second series was concerned with an examination of this
relationship between God and man and the destin1 of the
individual. Eternal life is personal intercourse between
man and God expressed in the relationship of love.
WEIZSACKER, Carl Friedrich von (1912- )
Glasgow, 1959-61
~ Relevance ~ Science,1964
Weizsacker traces the interaction of myth and science
from earliest times to the present day and discusses the
problems involved in regarding science as a pseudo-religion.
Science has an important part to play but not as a religion.
The second series of lectures were given under the title
The Philosophy ~ Modern Physics; these lectures are not yet
published.
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WHITEHEAD, Alfred North (1861-1947)
Edinburgh, 1927-28
Process and Reality, Cambridge, 1929
Whitehead's lectures are described as an essay in
speculative philosophy, which in~turn is defined as "the
endeavour to frame a co~erent, logical, necessary system of
general ideas in terms of which every element of our
experience can be interpreted." This work provides an
outline of Whitehead's philosophy of Organism. God's
primordial nature is completed by the derivation of his
consequent nature from the temporal world. Individual
creatures find their immortality in the everlasting being of
God. The meaning of the world is to be found in God's
adventure of Creation, whereby the many are finally
understood as One.
WISDOM, John (1904- )
Aberdeen, 1948-50
John Wisdom lectured on ~ Mystery £!~ Transcendental
and ~ Discovery £!~ Transcendental; the lectures have
not been published.
WRIGHT, Georg Henrik von (1916- )
St. Andrews, 1958-60
The Varieties of Goodness, 1963- -----
Von Wright tentatively describes his work as an "Inquiry
into the Conceptual Foundations of Morals and Legislationtl•
The published volume represents the second series of lectures,
in which he discusses the various uses of the word tlgoodtl,
its moral sense, and the relationship of goodness to virtue
and justice. The first series, originally entitled Norms,
is to be published later.
~ ~ Action w~s in fact published later in 1963.
It has little or no bearing upon the problems of
naturgl theology.
Recent Additions 12 !h! foregoing alphabetical List
ARON, Raymond ( )
Aberdeen, 1964-66
Professor Aron of the University of Paris is lecturing
on "Historical Consciousness in Thought and Action." The
first series on "Understanding the Past" was given in 196.5.
The second series has not yet been given.
BUTTERFIELD, Herbert (1900- )
Glasgow, 196.5-66
Professor Butterfield lectured on "Human Beliefs and
the Development of Historical Writing." The second series
will be delivered in 1966.
FINDLAY, John Niemayer (1903- )
St. Andrews, 1964-66
~ Discipline 2! ~~, 1966
Professor Findlay uses Plato's analogy of the Cave to
suggest that the phenomena of this life cannot be properly
understood without reference to something beyond the Cave.
The influence of Hegel and Husserl is evident in the
lectures, in which Professor Findlay expounds what he calls
a teleological idealism. The second series of lectures is
to be published under the title, The Transcendence £! ~
Cave.
HARDY, Alister (1896- )
Aberdeen, 1963-65
Sir Alister Hardy's general subject was "Science,
Natural History and Religion", the titles of the two series
being: "The Living Stream: Natural Theology and Evolution,"
and "The Divine Flame: Towards a Natural History of
Religion." The lectures are not yet published.
KNOX, Malcolm (
Aberdeen, 1966-68
The lectures have not yet been delivered and no
prospectus has appeared.
)
MACKINNON, Donald MacKenzie (1913- )
Edinburgh, 1964-66
Professor HcKinnon lectured in 1965 on tiThe Problem of
Metaphysics." The second series is due in 1966.
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APPENDIX FOUR
A Supplementary Bibliography
(a) Lord Gifford
Gifford, Adam
Gifford, John
Lectures Delivered ~ Various Occasions,
Frankfort, 1889
Recollections 2!~ Brother, ~ Gifford, one
~ ~ Senators 2! the College 2! Justice in
Scotland under the title ~ Gifford,
Printed for the family, 1891
Cb) Concerning the Gifford Lectures
Cc) The History of Natural Theology
Caldecott, A. and Mackintosh, H.R. (Editors and Translators),
Selections ~ ~ Literature of 'l'heism,
Edinburgh, 3rd edition, 1931
! History 2! Philosophy, (7v) 1951-62
Genesis ~ Geology, New York, 1959
~ ~ Philosophy, 1941
History of Christian Philosophy !!!. .!!:!:.! Middle
Davidson, W.L.
Jessop, T.E.
Copleston, F.
Gillispie, C.G.
Gilson, E.
, t
Recent Theistic Discussion, Edinburgh, 1921
(A discussion of the lectures given up to 1921.)
!Bibliography 2! David ~ ~ £! Scottish
Philosophy ~ Hutcheson !£ Balfour, 1938
(Contains a Gifford bibliography up to 1938.)
Ages, 1955
Langmead Casserley, J.V. The Christian in Philosophy, 1949
l1acquarrie, J.
Metz, R.
Rogers, A.K.
Smart, N.
Webb, C.C.J.
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Twentieth Century Religious Thought, 1963
! Hundred Years ~ British Philosophy, 1950
! Student's History ~ Philosophy, New York, 1901
Historical Selections ~ ~ Philosophy of
Religion, 1962
Studies in the History of Natural Theology,
Oxford, 1915
(d) Recent Discussions of Natural Theology
Baillie,John, Barth, Karl and Brunner, Emil, Natural Theology,
comprising "Nature and Grace," by Professor Dr.
Emil Brunner and the reply "No:" by Dr. Karl
Barth, with an introduction by John Baillie,
EngliBh Translation, 1946.
Braithwaite, R.B. An Empiricist's ~ ~ ~ Nature of Religious
Belief, Cambridge, 1955
De Lubac, H. ~ Discovery ~~, E.T., 1960
Edwards, D.L.(Editor) The Honest ~ God Debate, 1963
Ferre, F. Language, Logic ~~, 1962
Flew, A. and MacIntyre, A. (Editors) ~ Essays in Philosophical
Theology, 1955
Langmead Casserley,J.V. Apologetics ~ Evangelism, 1962
Gornall, T. ! Philosophy ~~, 1962
Lewis, H.D.
,,
MacIntyre, A.
MacKinnon,D.M.
McPherson, T.
Naritain, J.
Mascall, E.L.
~ Experience of ~, 1959
Philosophy of Religion, 1965
(Editor) Metaphysical Beliefs, 1957
Borderlands of Theology, 1961
!h! Philosophy ~ Religion, 1965
Approaches ~ God, 1955
Words ~ Images, 1957
Meynell, H. Sense, Nonsense and Christianity, 1964
Mitchell, B. (Editor) Faith ~ Logic, 1957
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Ramsey, I.T. Religious Language, 1957
,, (Editor) Prospect ~ MetaEh;lsics, .1961
Robinson, J. Honest .!£ God, 1963
Sillem, E. Ways ~ Thinking about Q2i, 1961
Smart, N. Reasons and Faiths, 1958
,,
Trethowan, I.
Vidler, A.R.
Woods, G.F.
Philosophers ~ Religious Truth,
An Essay ~ Christian Philosophy,
(Editor) Soundings, 1962
Theological EXElanation, 1958
1964
1954
